Fort Bend County v. Davis

541

Syllabus

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fth circuit No. 18–525. Argued April 22, 2019—Decided June 3, 2019

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in em- ployment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42

U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). The Act instructs a complainant, before com-

mencing a Title VII action in court, to fle a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission). § 2000e–5(e)(1), (f)(1). On receipt of a charge, the EEOC is to notify the employer and investigate the allegations. § 2000e–5(b). The Com- mission may “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of . . . conciliation.” Ibid. The EEOC also has frst option to “bring a civil action” against the employer in court. § 2000e–5(f)(1). But the Commission has no authority itself to adjudicate discrimination complaints. If the EEOC chooses not to sue, and whether or not the EEOC otherwise acts on the charge, a complain- ant is entitled to a “right-to-sue” notice 180 days after the charge is fled. Ibid.; 29 CFR § 1601.28. On receipt of the right-to-sue notice, the complainant may commence a civil action against her employer. § 2000e–5(f)(1).

Respondent Lois M. Davis fled a charge against her employer, peti- tioner Fort Bend County. Davis alleged sexual harassment and retalia- tion for reporting the harassment. While her EEOC charge was pend- ing, Fort Bend fred Davis because she failed to show up for work on a Sunday and went to a church event instead. Davis attempted to sup- plement her EEOC charge by handwriting “religion” on a form called an “intake questionnaire,” but she did not amend the formal charge document. Upon receiving a right-to-sue letter, Davis commenced suit in Federal District Court, alleging discrimination on account of religion and retaliation for reporting sexual harassment.

After years of litigation, only the religion-based discrimination claim remained in the case. Fort Bend then asserted for the frst time that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Davis' case because her EEOC charge did not state a religion-based discrimination claim.

The District Court agreed and granted Fort Bend's motion to dismiss Davis' suit. On appeal from the dismissal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Title VII's charge-fling requirement, the Court

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Syllabus

of Appeals held, is not jurisdictional; instead, the requirement is a pru- dential prerequisite to suit, forfeited in Davis' case because Fort Bend had waited too long to raise the objection.

Held: Title VII's charge-filing requirement is not jurisdictional.

Pp. 547–553.

(a) The word “jurisdictional” is generally reserved for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases a court may entertain (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons over whom the court may exercise adjudi- catory authority (personal jurisdiction). Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S.

443, 455. A claim-processing rule requiring parties to take certain pro- cedural steps in, or prior to, litigation, may be mandatory in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if timely raised. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S. 12, 19. But a mandatory rule of that sort, unlike a prescription limiting the kinds of cases a court may adjudicate, is ordi- narily forfeited if not timely asserted. Id., at 15. Pp. 547–550.

(b) Title VII's charge-fling requirement is a nonjurisdictional claim- processing rule. The requirement is stated in provisions of Title VII discrete from the statutory provisions empowering federal courts to ex- ercise jurisdiction over Title VII actions. The charge-fling instruction is kin to prescriptions the Court has ranked as nonjurisdictional—for example, directions to raise objections in an agency rulemaking before asserting them in court, EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L. P., 572 U. S. 489, 511–512, or to follow procedures governing copyright reg- istration before suing for infringement, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 157. Pp. 550–553.

893 F. 3d 300, affrmed.

Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak argued the cause for petitioner.

With her on the briefs were Neal Kumar Katyal, Mitchell

P. Reich, and Randall W. Morse.

Raff Melkonian argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Thomas C. Wright, R. Russell Hollen- beck, Brian H. Fletcher, and Pamela S. Karlan.

Jonathan C. Bond argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affrmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Francisco, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Dreiband, Deputy Solicitor General Wall, Bonnie I.

Cite as: 587 U. S. 541 (2019)

543

Opinion of the Court

Robin-Vergeer, James L. Lee, Jennifer S. Goldstein, Eliza- beth E. Theran, and Gail S. Coleman.*

Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes dis- crimination in employment on the basis of race, color, reli- gion, sex, or national origin. 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). The Act also prohibits retaliation against persons who assert rights under the statute. § 2000e–3(a).

As a precondition to the commencement of a Title VII action in court, a complainant must frst fle a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commis- sion). § 2000e–5(e)(1), (f)(1). The question this case pre- sents: Is Title VII's charge-fling precondition to suit a “ju- risdictional” requirement that can be raised at any stage of a proceeding; or is it a procedural prescription mandatory if timely raised, but subject to forfeiture if tardily asserted?

We hold that Title VII's charge-fling instruction is not juris- dictional, a term generally reserved to describe the classes of cases a court may entertain (subject-matter jurisdiction) or the persons over whom a court may exercise adjudicatory authority (personal jurisdiction). Kontrick v. Ryan, 540

U. S. 443, 455 (2004). Prerequisites to suit like Title VII's

charge-fling instruction are not of that character; they are

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Center for Workplace Compliance et al. by Rae T. Vann, Karen R. Harned, Elizabeth Milito, and Daryl Joseffer; and for the National Conference of State Leg- islatures et al. by Collin O'Connor Udell and Lisa Soronen.

Briefs of amicus curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Constitu- tional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and Ashwin P. Phatak; for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., by Sherrilyn A. Ifll, Janai S. Nelson, and Samuel Spital; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by Michael

Scott Dodson fled a brief of amicus curiae, pro se.

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properly ranked among the array of claim-processing rules that must be timely raised to come into play.

Title VII directs that a “charge . . . shall be fled” with the EEOC “by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved” within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occur[s].” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(b), (e)(1). For com- plaints concerning a practice occurring in a State or political subdivision that has a fair employment agency of its own empowered “to grant or seek relief,” Title VII instructs the complainant to fle her charge frst with the state or local agency. § 2000e–5(c). The complainant then has 300 days following the challenged practice, or 30 days after receiving notice that state or local proceedings have ended, “whichever is earlier,” to fle a charge with the EEOC. § 2000e–5(e)(1).

If the state or local agency has a “worksharing” agreement with the EEOC, a complainant ordinarily need not fle sepa- rately with federal and state agencies. She may fle her charge with one agency, and that agency will then relay the charge to the other. See 29 CFR § 1601.13 (2018); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 3.

When the EEOC receives a charge, in contrast to agencies like the National Labor Relations Board, 29 U. S. C. § 160, and the Merit Systems Protection Board, 5 U. S. C. § 1204, it does not “adjudicate [the] clai[m],” Alexander v. Gardner- Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974). Instead, Title VII calls for the following course. Upon receiving a charge, the EEOC notifes the employer and investigates the allegations.

42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(b). If the Commission fnds “reason- able cause” to believe the charge is true, the Act instructs the Commission to “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged un- lawful employment practice by informal methods of confer- ence, conciliation, and persuasion.” Ibid. When informal methods do not resolve the charge, the EEOC has frst op- tion to “bring a civil action” against the employer in court.

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§ 2000e–5(f)(1). Where the discrimination charge is lodged against state or local government employers, the Attorney General is the federal authority empowered to commence suit. Ibid.1

In the event that the EEOC determines there is “n[o] rea- sonable cause to believe that the charge is true,” the Com- mission is to dismiss the charge and notify the complainant of his or her right to sue in court. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(b), (f)(1); 29 CFR § 1601.28. Whether or not the EEOC acts on the charge, a complainant is entitled to a “right-to-sue” no- tice 180 days after the charge is fled. § 2000e–5(f)(1); 29 CFR § 1601.28. And within 90 days following such notice, the complainant may commence a civil action against the al- legedly offending employer. § 2000e–5(f)(1).

Respondent Lois M. Davis worked in information technol- ogy for petitioner Fort Bend County. In 2010, she informed Fort Bend's human resources department that the director of information technology, Charles Cook, was sexually har- assing her. Following an investigation by Fort Bend, Cook resigned. Davis' supervisor at Fort Bend, Kenneth Ford, was well acquainted with Cook. After Cook resigned, Davis alleges, Ford began retaliating against her for reporting Cook's sexual harassment. Ford did so, according to Davis, by, inter alia, curtailing her work responsibilities.

Seeking redress for the asserted harassment and retalia- tion, Davis submitted an “intake questionnaire” in February 2011, followed by a charge in March 2011.2 While her

1 A different provision of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–16, prohibits em- ployment discrimination by the Federal Government and sets out proce- dures applicable to claims by federal employees.

2 Davis submitted these documents to the Texas Workforce Commission.

Complaints lodged with that commission are relayed to the EEOC, under a “worksharing” agreement between the two agencies. See How To Submit an Employment Discrimination Complaint, Texas Workforce Commission,

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Opinion of the Court

EEOC charge was pending, Davis was told to report to work on an upcoming Sunday. Davis informed her supervisor Ford that she had a commitment at church that Sunday, and she offered to arrange for another employee to replace her at work. Ford responded that if Davis did not show up for the Sunday work, she would be subject to termination.

Davis went to church, not work, that Sunday. Fort Bend thereupon fred her.

Attempting to supplement the allegations in her charge, Davis handwrote “religion” on the “Employment Harms or Actions” part of her intake questionnaire, and she checked boxes for “discharge” and “reasonable accommodation” on that form. She made no change, however, in the formal charge document. A few months later, the Department of Justice notifed Davis of her right to sue.

In January 2012, Davis commenced a civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging discrimination on account of religion and re- taliation for reporting sexual harassment.3 The District Court granted Fort Bend's motion for summary judgment.

Davis v. Fort Bend County, 2013 WL 5157191 (SD Tex., Sept.

11, 2013). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affrmed as to Davis' retaliation claim, but reversed as to her religion-based discrimination claim. Davis v. Fort Bend County, 765 F. 3d 480 (2014). Fort Bend fled a peti- tion for certiorari, which this Court denied. 576 U. S. 1004 (2015).

When the case returned to the District Court on Davis' claim of discrimination on account of religion, Fort Bend moved to dismiss the complaint. Years into the litigation, Fort Bend asserted for the frst time that the District Court

https:// twc.texas.gov/jobseekers/how-submit-employment-discrimination- complaint (as last visited May 30, 2019).

3 Davis also alleged intentional infiction of emotional distress, but she did not appeal the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Fort Bend on that claim.

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Opinion of the Court

lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Davis' religion-based dis- crimination claim because she had not stated such a claim in her EEOC charge. Granting the motion, the District Court held that Davis had not satisfed the charge-fling require- ment with respect to her claim of religion-based discrimina- tion, and that the requirement qualifed as “jurisdictional,” which made it nonforfeitable. 2016 WL 4479527 (SD Tex., Aug. 24, 2016).

The Fifth Circuit reversed. 893 F. 3d 300 (2018). Title VII's charge-fling requirement, the Court of Appeals held, is not jurisdictional; instead, the requirement is a prudential prerequisite to suit, forfeited in Davis' case because Fort Bend did not raise it until after “an entire round of appeals all the way to the Supreme Court.” Id., at 307–308.

We granted Fort Bend's petition for certiorari, 586 U. S.

1113 (2019), to resolve a confict among the Courts of Appeals over whether Title VII's charge-fling requirement is jurisdictional. Compare, e. g., 893 F. 3d, at 306 (case below) (charge-fling requirement is nonjurisdictional), with,

e. g., Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F. 3d 297, 300 (CA4

2009) (federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction when the charge-fling requirement is not satisfed).

“Jurisdiction,” the Court has observed, “is a word of many, too many, meanings.” Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 454 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 90 (1998)).4 In recent years, the Court has undertaken “[t]o

4 “Courts, including this Court, . . . have more than occasionally [mis]- used the term `jurisdictional' ” to refer to nonjurisdictional prescriptions.

Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 413 (2004) (quoting Kontrick v.

Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454 (2004) (alterations in original)). Passing refer- ences to Title VII's charge-fling requirement as “jurisdictional” in prior Court opinions, see, e. g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 798 (1973), display the terminology employed when the Court's use of “jurisdictional” was “less than meticulous,” Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 454.

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Opinion of the Court

ward off profigate use of the term.” Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 153 (2013). As ear- lier noted, see supra, at 1, the word “jurisdictional” is gener- ally reserved for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases a court may entertain (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons over whom the court may exercise adjudicatory authority (personal jurisdiction). Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 455.

Congress may make other prescriptions jurisdictional by incorporating them into a jurisdictional provision, as Con- gress has done with the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal-court diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between (1) citizens of different States . . . .”). In addition, the Court has stated it would treat a requirement as “jurisdictional” when “a long line of [Supreme] Cour[t] decisions left undisturbed by Con- gress” attached a jurisdictional label to the prescription.

Union Pacifc R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 558 U. S. 67, 82 (2009) (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 209–211 (2007)). See also John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 132 (2008).

Characterizing a rule as a limit on subject-matter jurisdic- tion “renders it unique in our adversarial system.” Au- burn, 568 U. S., at 153. Unlike most arguments, challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by the defend- ant “at any point in the litigation,” and courts must consider them sua sponte. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S. 134, 141 (2012). “[H]arsh consequences” attend the jurisdictional brand. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 409 (2015). “Tardy jurisdictional objections” occasion wasted court resources and “disturbingly disarm litigants.” Au- burn, 568 U. S., at 153.

The Court has therefore stressed the distinction between jurisdictional prescriptions and nonjurisdictional claim- processing rules, which “seek to promote the orderly prog-

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ress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specifed times.” Henderson v.

Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (2011). A claim-processing rule may be “mandatory” in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if a party “properly raise[s]” it. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S. 12, 19 (2005) (per curiam). But an objec- tion based on a mandatory claim-processing rule may be for- feited “if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point.” Id., at 15 (quoting Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 456).5 The Court has characterized as nonjurisdictional an array of mandatory claim-processing rules and other preconditions to relief. These include: the Copyright Act's requirement that parties register their copyrights (or receive a denial of registration from the Copyright Register) before commenc- ing an infringement action, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 157, 163–164 (2010); the Railway Labor Act's direction that, before arbitrating, parties to certain railroad labor disputes “attempt settlement `in conference,' ” Union Pacifc, 558 U. S., at 82 (quoting 45 U. S. C. § 152); the Clean Air Act's instruction that, to maintain an objection in court on certain issues, one must frst raise the objection “with reasonable specifcity” during agency rulemaking, EPA v.

EME Homer City Generation, L. P., 572 U. S. 489, 511–512 (2014) (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 7607(d)(7)(B)); the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's requirement that a cer- tifcate of appealability “indicate [the] specifc issue” war- ranting issuance of the certifcate, Gonzalez, 565 U. S., at 137 (quoting 28 U. S. C. § 2253(c)(3)); Title VII's limitation of cov- ered “employer[s]” to those with 15 or more employees, Ar- baugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 503–504 (2006) (quoting

42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b)); Title VII's time limit for fling a

charge with the EEOC, Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 393 (1982); and several other time prescriptions

5 The Court has “reserved whether mandatory claim-processing rules

may [ever] be subject to equitable exceptions.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 583 U. S. 17, 20, n. 3 (2017).

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for procedural steps in judicial or agency forums. See, e. g., Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 583 U. S. 17, 27 (2017); Musacchio v. Uni ted States, 577 U. S. 237, 246 (2016); Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 412; Auburn, 568 U. S., at 149; Henderson, 562 U. S., at 431; Eberhart, 546

U. S., at 13; Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 414

(2004); Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 447.6

While not demanding that Congress “incant magic words” to render a prescription jurisdictional, Auburn, 568 U. S., at 153, the Court has clarifed that it would “leave the ball in Congress' court”: “If the Legislature clearly states that a [prescription] count[s] as jurisdictional, then courts and liti- gants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue[;] [b]ut when Congress does not rank a [pre- scription] as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 515–516 (footnote and citation omitted).

Title VII's charge-fling requirement is not of jurisdic- tional cast. Federal courts exercise jurisdiction over Title VII actions pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1331's grant of general federal-question jurisdiction, and Title VII's own jurisdic- tional provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(f)(3) (giving federal courts “jurisdiction [over] actions brought under this sub- chapter”).7 Separate provisions of Title VII, § 2000e–5(e)(1)

6 “If a time prescription governing the transfer of adjudicatory authority from one Article III court to another appears in a statute, the limitation [will rank as] jurisdictional; otherwise, the time specifcation fts within the claim-processing category.” Hamer, 583 U. S., at 25 (citation omitted).

7 When Title VII was passed in 1964, 28 U. S. C. § 1331's grant of general

federal-question jurisdiction included an amount-in-controversy require- ment. See § 1331(a) (1964 ed.). To ensure that this “limitation would not impede an employment-discrimination complainant's access to a federal forum,” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 505 (2006), Congress enacted Title VII's jurisdiction-conferring provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–

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Opinion of the Court and (f )(1), contain the Act's charge-filing requirement.

Those provisions “d[o] not speak to a court's authority,” EME Homer, 572 U. S., at 512, or “refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts,” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 515 (quoting Zipes, 455 U. S., at 394).

Instead, Title VII's charge-fling provisions “speak to . . . a party's procedural obligations.” EME Homer, 572 U. S., at 512. They require complainants to submit information to the EEOC and to wait a specifed period before commencing a civil action. Like kindred provisions directing parties to raise objections in agency rulemaking, id., at 511–512; follow procedures governing copyright registration, Reed Elsevier, 559 U. S., at 157; or attempt settlement, Union Pacifc, 558

U. S., at 82, Title VII's charge-fling requirement is a process-

ing rule, albeit a mandatory one, not a jurisdictional pre- scription delineating the adjudicatory authority of courts.8

5(f)(3). See Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 505–506. In 1980, Congress elimi- nated § 1331's amount-in-controversy requirement. See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369. Since then, “Title VII's own jurisdictional provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(f)(3), has served simply to underscore Congress' intention to provide a federal forum for the adjudication of Title VII claims.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 506. Title VII also contains a separate jurisdictional provision, § 2000e–6(b), giving federal courts jurisdiction over actions by the Federal Government to enjoin “pattern or practice” discrimination.

8 Fort Bend argues that Title VII's charge-fling requirement is jurisdic-

tional because it is “textually linked” to Title VII's jurisdictional provision.

Brief for Petitioner 50. Title VII states in 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) that “a civil action may be brought” after the charge-fling procedures are fol- lowed. Section 2000e–5(f)(3) gives federal courts jurisdiction over “ac- tions brought under this subchapter,” a subchapter that includes § 2000e– 5(f)(1). Therefore, Fort Bend insists, federal jurisdiction lies under § 2000e–5(f)(3) only when a proper EEOC charge is fled. But as just observed, see supra, at 9, the charge-fling requirement is stated in provi- sions discrete from Title VII's conferral of jurisdiction on federal courts.

See Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 155 (2013) (a requirement “does not become jurisdictional simply because it is placed in a section of a statute that also contains jurisdictional provisions”); Gon-

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Resisting this conclusion, Fort Bend points to statutory schemes that channel certain claims to administrative agency adjudication frst, followed by judicial review in a federal court. In Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U. S. 1 (2012), for example, the Court held that claims earmarked for initial adjudication by the Merit Systems Protection Board, then review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, may not proceed instead in federal district court.

Id., at 5–6, 8. See also Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U. S. 200, 202–204 (1994) (no district court jurisdiction over claims assigned in the frst instance to a mine safety commission, whose decisions are reviewable in a court of ap- peals). Nowhere do these cases, or others cited by Fort Bend, address the issue here presented: whether a precondi- tion to suit is a mandatory claim-processing rule subject to forfeiture, or a jurisdictional prescription.

Fort Bend further maintains that “[t]he congressional pur- poses embodied in the Title VII scheme,” notably, encourag- ing conciliation and affording the EEOC frst option to bring suit, support jurisdictional characterization of the charge- fling requirement. Brief for Petitioner 27. But a prescrip- tion does not become jurisdictional whenever it “promotes important congressional objectives.” Reed Elsevier, 559

U. S., at 169, n. 9. And recognizing that the charge-fling

requirement is nonjurisdictional gives plaintiffs scant incen- tive to skirt the instruction. Defendants, after all, have good reason promptly to raise an objection that may rid them of the lawsuit fled against them. A Title VII complainant would be foolhardy consciously to take the risk that the em- ployer would forgo a potentially dispositive defense.

In sum, a rule may be mandatory without being jurisdic- tional, and Title VII's charge-fling requirement fts that bill.

zalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S. 134, 145 (2012) (a nonjurisdictional provision does not metamorphose into a jurisdictional limitation by cross-referencing a jurisdictional provision).

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Opinion of the Court * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap-

peals for the Fifth Circuit is Affrmed.