United States v. Grinnell Corp.

563

*Syllabus.

No. 73. Argued March 28-29, 1966.W-Decided June 13, 1966.*

The Government brought a civil action against Grinnell Corporation and three affiliated companies, which it controlled through pre- ponderant stock ownership, alleging violations of §§ 1 and 2 of' the Sherman Act. Grinnell manufactures plumbing supplies and fire sprinkler systems and its affiliates supply subscribers with fire and burglar alarm services from central stations through auto- matic alarm systems installed on subscribers' premises. The affil- iates, which had participated in market allocation agreements, discriminatory price manipulation to forestall competition, and the acquisition of competitors, had acquired 87% of the country's insurance-company-accredited central station protective service market. One affiliated company, American District Telegraph Co.

(ADT), itself controls 73% of the national rharket. The District Court treated -the accredited central station service business as a single "market" and held that the geographic market is national.

It found that the four companies had violated §J 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and entered a decree enjoining them from restrain- ing trade or monopolizing the market, ordering the. filing of price information, enjoining them from acquiring any other enterprise in that market, requiring divestiture by Grinnell of its affiliates, and enjoining them from employing the president of Grinnell. All

1. The existence of monopoly power may be inferred from the

predominant share of the market., and where Grinnell and its affiliates have 87% of the accredited central station service busi, ness there is no doubt they have monopoly power, which they achieved in part by unlawful and exclusionary practices. Pp.

570-571, 576.

*Together with. No. 74, Grinnell Corp. v. United States, No. 75, American District Telegraph Co. v. United States, No. 76, Holmes Electric Protective Co. v. United States and No. 77, Automatic Fire Alarm Co. of Delaware v. United States, also on appeal from the same court.'

564

Syllabus.

2. The District Court was justified in treating the accredited

central station service business as a single markQt. Pp. 571-575. (a) There is no barrier to combining in a single market a number of different products or services where the combination reflects commercial realities. Here there is a single basic service, the protection of property through use of a central station, that tinst be compared with all other forms of property protection.

(b) Just as under § 7 of the Clayton Act's "line of com- merce," a "cluster of services" marks the appropriate market for "part" of commerce within the meaning of § 2 of the Sherman Act.

Pp. 572-573.

(c) Accredited, as distinguished from nonaccredited central station service, is a relevant part of commerce, with specific re- quirements, recognition and approval by insurance companies, and distinct customer needs and demands. P. 575.

3. The geographic market for the accredited central station

service, as the District Court found, is a national one. While the main activities of an individual central station may be local, the business of provfding such service is operated on a national level, with national planning and agreements covering activities in many States. Pp. 575-576.

4. Adequate relief in a monopolization case should terminate the

combination and eliminate the illegal conduct, and render impotent the monopoly power found to be in violation of the Act. Schine Theatres v. United States, 334 U. S. 110, 128-129. Pp. 577-580.

(a) The mere dissolution of the combination by Grinnell's divestiture of its affiliates will not reach the root of the evil; there must be some divestiture on the part of ADT, with 73% of the market, to be determined by the District Court. Pp. 577-578.

• (b) On the record it appears that ADT's requirements of five-year contracts and retention of title to equipment installed on subscribers' premises constitute substantial barriers to competi- tion and relief against.them by the District Court is appropriate.

(c) A provision that the companies be required to sell devices manufactured by them for use in furnishing central station service is inadequate unless purchasers are assured of replacement parts to maintain those systems. P. 579.

UNITED STATES v. GRINNELL CORP. 565 563

Syllabus.

(d) The District Court should reconsider its denial of the Government's request for "visitation rights," that is, requiring reports, examining documents .and interviewing company personnel, relief commonly granted to determine compliance with an antitrust decree. P. 579.

(e) While the barring of Grinnell's president from employ- in a case where predator. is not the situation here. P.

ment might have been appropriate conduct was conspicuous, such 579.

(f) On remand the general terms of the restraining order should be recast, so that the precise practices in violation of the Act are specifically enjoined. Pp. 579-580.

(g) The dissolutiQn of the combination and the proscription against acquiring firms in the accredited central station business are fully warranted. P. 580.

5. The claim of -bias and prejudice against the District Judge

who tried the case below is not made out. Pp. 580-583.

236 F. Supp. 244, affirmed and remanded.

Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for the United States in all cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Robert B. Hummel, Gerald Kadish and Noel E. Story.

John F. Sonnett argued the cause for appellant in No. 74 and for appellees in No. 73. With him on the briefs for Grinnell Corp. were Denis G. McInerney, Roger T.

Clapp, Harold F. Reindel, Jerrold G. Van Cise and Robert

F. Martin.

Macdonald Flinn argued the cause for appellant in No. 75 and for appellees in No. 73. With him on the briefs for American District Telegraph Co. were Robert

0. Donnelly and Thomas B. Leary.

John. W. Drye, Jr., argued the cause for appellant in No. 76 and for appellees in No. 73. With him on the briefs for Holmes Electric Protective Co. were Francis S.

Bensel and Bud G. Holman.

Opinion of the Court.

J. Francis Haydeni argued the cause for appellant in

No. 77 an4. for appellees in No. 73. Mr. Hayden also filed a brief for Automatic Fire Alarm Co. of Delaware.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents an important question under § 2 of the Sherman Act,' which makes it an offense for any person to "monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States." This is a civil suit brought by the United States against Grinnell Cor- poration (Grinnell), American District Telegraph Co.

(ADT), Holmes Electric Protective Co. (Holmes) and Automatic Fire Alarm Co. of Delaware (AFA). The District Court held for the Government and entered a decree. All parties appeal,2 the United States because it deems the relief inadequate and the defendants both on the merits and on the relief and on the ground that the District Court denied them a fair trial. We noted probable jurisdiction. 381 U. S. 910.

Grinnell manufactures plumbing supplies and fire sprinkler systems.

It also owns 76% of the stock of ADT, 89% of the stock 'of AFA, and 100% of the stock of Holmes. ADT provides both'burglary and fire pro- tection services; Holmes provides burglary services alone; AFA supplies only fire protection service. Each offers a central station service under which hazard-detect- ing devices installed on the protected premises automati-

126 Stat. 209, as.amended, 15 U. S. C. § 2 (1964 ed.).

2 Expediting Act § 2, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 29 (1964 ed.); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U. S. 38.

3 These are the record figures.- Since the time of the trial, Grin- nell's holdings have increased. Counsel for Grinnell has advised this Court that Grinnell now holds 80% of ADT's stock and 90% of the stock of AFA.

567 563

Opinion of the Court.

cally transmit an electric signal to a central station.4 The central station is manned 24 hours a day. Upon receipt of a signal. the central station, where appropriate, dispatches guards to the protected premises and notifies the police or fire department direct. There are other forms of protective services. But the record shows that subscribers to accredited central station service (i. e., that approved by the insurance underwriters) receive reduc- tions in their insurance premiums that are substantially greater than the reduction received by the users of other In 1961 accredited com- kinds of *protection service. panies in the central station service business grossed $65,000,000. ADT, Holmes, and AFA are the three larg- est companies in the business in terms of revenue: ADT (with 121 central stations in 115 cities) has 73% of the business; Holmes (with 12 central stations in three large cities) has 12.5%; AFA (with three central stations in three large cities) has 2%. Thus the three companies that Grinnell controls have over 87% of the business.

Over the years ADT purchased the stock or assets of 27 companies engaged in the business of providing bur- glar or fire alarm services. Holmes acquired the stock or assets of three burglar alarm companies in New York City using a central station. Of these 30, the officials

4 Among the various central station services offered are the

(1) automatic burglar alarms;

(2) automatic fire alarms;

(3) sprinkler supervisory service (any malfunctions in the fire

sprinkler system-e. g., changes in water pressure, dangerously low water temperatures, etc.-are reported to the central station); and

(4) watch signal service (night watchmen, by operating a key-

triggered device on the protected premises, indicate to the central station that they are making their rounds and that all is well; the failure of a watchman to make his electrical report alerts the central station that something may be amiss).

Opinion of the Court.

of seven agreed not to engage in the protective service business in the area for periods ranging from five years to permanently. After Grinnell acquired control of the other defendants, the latter continued in their attempts to acquire central station companies-offers being made to at least eight companies between the years 1955 and 1961, including four of the five largest nondefendant companies in the business. When' the present suit was filed, each of those defendants had- outstanding an offer to purchase one of the four largest nondefendant companies.

In 1906, prior to the affiliation of ADT and Holmes, they made a written agreement whereby ADT transferred to Holmes its burglar alarm business in a major part of the Middle Atlantic States and agreed to refrain forever from engaging in that business in that area, while Holmes transferred to ADT its watch signal business and agreed to limit its activities to burglar alarm service and night watch service for financial institutions. While this agreement was modified several times and terminated in 1947, in 1961 Holmes still restricted its business to burglar alarm service and operated only in those areas which had been allocated to it under the 1906 agreement.

Similarly, ADT continued to refrain from supplying burglar alarm service in those areas earlier allocated to Holmes.

In 1907 Grinnell entered into a series of agreements with the other defendant companies and with Automatic

AFA received the exclusive right to provide central station sprinkler supervisory and waterflow alarm and automatic fire alarm service in Ne - York City, Boston and' Philadelphia,. and agreed nQt to provide burglar alarm service in those cities or central station service elsewhere in the United States.

UNITED STATES v. GRINNELL CORP. 569 563

Opinion of the Court.

Automatic Fire Protection Co. obtained the exclusive right to provide central station sprinkler supervisory and waterflow alarm service everywhere else in the United States except for the three cities in which AFA received that exclusive right, and agreed not to engage in burglar alarm service.

ADT received the exclusive right to render burglar alarm and nightwatch service throughout the United (Under ADT's 1906 agreement with Holmes, States. however, it could not provide burglar alarm services in the areas for which it had given Holmes the exclusive It agreed not to furnish sprinkler super- right to do so.) visory and waterflow alarm service anywhere in the coun- try and not to furnish automatic fire alarm service in New York City, Boston or Philadelphia (the three cities to its allocated central stations the systems installed by AFA and Automatic.

to AFA). ADT agreed to connect

Grinnell agreed to furnish and install all sprinkler supervisory and waterflow alarm actuating devices used in systems that AFA and Automatic would install, and otherwise not to engage in the central station protection business.

AFA and Automatic received 25% of the revenue produced by the sprinkler supervisory waterflow alarm service which they provided in their respective terri- tories; ADT and Grinnell received 50% and 25 %, respec- tively, of the revenue which resulted from such service.

The agreements were to continue until February 1954.

The agreements remained substantially unchanged until 1949 when ADT purchased all of Automatic Fire Protection Co.'s rights under it for $13,500,000. After these 1907 agreements expired in 1954, AFA continued to honor the prior division of territories; and ADT and AFA entered into a new contract providing for the con- tinued -sharing of revenues on substantially the same

. 570

Opinion of the Court.

basis as before.'

In 1954 Grinnell and ADT renewed an agreement with a Rhode Island company which re- ceived the exclusive right to render central station service within Rhode Island at prices no lower than those of ADT and which agreed to use certain equipment supplied by Grinnell and ADT and to share its revenues with those companies. ADT had an informal agreement with a competing central station company in Washington,

D. C., "that we would not solicit each other's accounts."

ADT over the years reduced its minimum basic rates to meet competition and renewed contracts at substan- tially increased rates in cities where it had a monopoly of accredited -central station service. ADT threatened retaliation against firms that contemplated inaugurating central station service. And the record indicates that, in contemplating opening a new central station, ADT offi- cials frequently stressed that such action would deter their competitors from opening a new station in that area.

The District Court found that the defendant companies had committed per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act as well as § 2 and entered a decree. 236 F. Supp. 244.

The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acqui-

SIn 1959, ADT complained that AFA's share of the revenues was excessive. AFA replied, in a letter to the president of Grinnell (which by that'time controlled both ADT and AFA), that its share was just compensation for its continued observance of the service and territorial restrictions: "[T]he geographic restrictions placed upon -us plus the requirement that we confine our activities to sprinkler and fire alarm services exclusively, since 1907 and presum- ably into the future, has definitely retarded our expansion in the past to the benefit of ADT growth ....

[AFA's] contribution must also include the many things that helped make ADT big."

(Emphasis added.)

UNITED STATES v. GRINNELL CORP. 571 563

Opinion of the Court.

sition or maintenance of that power as distifiguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product. business acumen, or historic accident. We shall see that this second ingredient presents no major problem here, as what was done in building the empire was done In United plainly and explicitly for a single purpose.

States v. du Pont & Co., 351 U. S. 377, 391, we defined monopoly power as "the power to control prices or ex- clude competition." The existence of such power ordi- narily may be inferred from the predominant share of In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, the market.

328 U. S. 781, 797, we said that "over two-thirds of the entire domestic field of cigarettes, and ... over 80% of the field of comparable cigarettes" constithted "a substantial monopoly."

In United States v. Alumi- num Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 429, 90% of the In the present market constituted monopoly power. case, 87% of the accredited central station service busi- ness leaves no doubt that the congeries of these defend- ants have monopoly power-power which, as our discus- sion of the record indicates, they did not hesitate to wield-if that business is the relevant market. The only remaining question therefore is, what, is the relevant market?

In case of a product it may be of such a character that substitute products must also be considered, as customers may turn to them if there is a slight increase in the price .of the main product. That is the teaching of the du Pont case (supra, at 395, 404), viz., that .commodities reason- ably interchangeable make up that "part" of trade or commerce which § 2 protects against monopoly power.

The District Court treated the entire accredited cen- tral station service business as a single market and we think it was justified in so doing: Defendants argue that the different central station services offered are so diverse that they cannot under du Pont be lumped together to

Opinion of the Court.

make up the relevant market. For example, burglar alarm services are not interchangeable with fire alarm services. They further urge that du Pont requires that protective services other than those of the central station variety be included in the market definition.

But there is here a single use, i. e., the protection of property, through a central station that receives signals.

It is that service, accredited, that is unique and that com- petes with all the other forms of property protection.

We see no barrier to combining iln a single market a number of different products or services where that com- bination reflects commercial realities. To repeat, there is here a single basic service-the protection of property through use of a central service station-that must be compared with all other forms of property protection.

In § 2' cases under the Sherman Act, as in § 7 cases under the Clayton Act (Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, .370 U. S. 294. 325) there may be submarkets that are separate economic entities. We do not pursue that ques- tion here. First, we deal with services, not with prod- ucts; and second, "we conclude that the accredited central station is a type of service that makes up a relevant mar- ket and that doimination or control of it makes out a monopoly of a "part" of trade or commerce within the meaning of § 2 of the Sherman Act. The defendants have not made out a case for fragmentizing the types of services into lesser units.

Burglar alarm service is in a sense different from fire alarm service; from waterflow alarms; and so on, But it would be unrealistic on this record to break down the market into the various kinds of central station protec- tive services that are available. Central station com- panies recognize that to compete effectively, they must offer all or nearly all types of service.' The different 6 Thus, of the 38 nondefendant firms operating a central service station protective service in the United States in 1961, 24 offered

UNITED STATES v. GRINNELL CORP. 573 563

Opinion of the Court.

forms of accredited central station service are provided from a single office and customers utilize different serv-" ices in combination. We held in United States v. Phila- delphia Nat. Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 356. that "the cluster" of services denoted by the term "commercial banking" is "a distinct line of commerce." There is, in our view, a comparable cluster of services here. That bank case aroge under § 7 of the Clayton Act where the question was whether the effect of a merger "in any line of com- merce" may be "substantially to lessen competition."

We see no reason to differentiate between "line" of com- merce in the context of the Clayton Act and "part" of commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act. See United States v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 376 U. S. 665, In the § 7 national bank case just mentioned, 667-668. services, not products in the mercantile sense, were in- In our view the lumping together of various volved. kinds of services makes for the appropriate market here as it did in the § 7 case.

There are, to be sure, substitutes for the accredited' central station service. But none of them appears to operate on the same level as the central station service so as to meet the interchangeability test of the du Pont case.

Nonautomatic and automatic local alarm systems appear on this record to have marked differences, not the low degree of di4erentiation required of substitute services as well as substitute articles.

all of the following services: automatic fire alarm; waterflow alarm and sprinkler supervision; watchman's reporting and manual fire alarm; and burglar alarm. Of the other firms, 11 provided no watchman's reporting and manual fire alarm service; six provided no automatic fire alerm service; and two offered no sprinkler super - visory and waterflow alarm service. Moreover, of the 14 firms not providing the full panoply of services, 10 lacked only one of the above-described services. Appellant ADT's assertion that "very few accredited central stations furnish 'the full variety of services" is flatly contradicted by the record.

Opinion of the Court.

Watchman service is far more costly and less reliable.

Systems that set off an audible alarm at the site of a fire or burglary are cheaper but often less reliable. They may be inoperable without anyone's knowing it. More- over, there is a risk that the local ringing of an alarm will not attract the needed attention and help. Proprie- tary systems that a customer purchases and operates are available; but they can be used only by a very large busi- ness or by government and are not realistic alternatives for most concerns. There are also protective services connected directly to a municipal police or fire depart- ment. But most cities with an accredited central station do not permit direct, connected service for private busi- nesses. These alternate services and devices differ, we are told, in utility, efficiency, reliability, responsiveness, and continuity, and the record sustains that position.

And, as noted, insurance companies generally allow a greater reduction in premiums for accredited central station service than for other types of protection. " Defendants earnestly urge that despite these differ- ences, they face competition from these other modes of protection. They seem to us seriously to overstate the degree of competition, but we recognize that (as the Dis- trict Court found) they "do not have unfettered power to control the price of their services . . . due to the fringe competition of other alarm or watchmen services." 236

F. .Supp., at 254. What defendants overlook is that

the. high degree of differentiation between central sta- tion protection and the other irms means that for many customers, only central station protection will do.

Though some customers may be willing to accept higher insurance rates in favor of cheaper forms of protection, others will not be willing or able to risk serious interrup- tion to their businesses, even though covered by insur- ance, and will thus be unwilling to consider anything but central station protection.

UNITED STATES v. GRINNELL CORP. 575 563

Opinion of the Court.

The accredited, as distinguished from nonaccredited service, is a relevant part of commerce. Virtually the only central station companies in the status of the non- accredited are those that have not yet been able to meet the standards of the rating bureau. The accredited ones are indeed those that have achieved, in the eyes of under- writers, superiorities that other central stations do not have. The accredited central station is located in a building of approved design, provided with an emergency lighting system and two alternate main power sources, manned constantly by at least a required minimum of operators, provided with a direct line to fire headquarters and, where possible, a direct line to a police station; and equipped with all the devices, circuits and equipment meeting the requirements of the underwriters. These standards are important as insurance carriers oftea re- quire accredited central station service'as a condition to writing insurance. There is indeed evidence that cus- tomers consider-the unaccredited service as inferior.

We also agree with the District Court that the geo- graphic market for the accredited central station service is national. The activities of an individual station are in a sense local as it serves, ordinarily, only that area which is within a radius of 25 miles. - But the record amply supports the conclusion that the business of pro- viding such a service is operated on a national level.

There is national planning. The agreements we have discussed covered activities in many States. The inspec- tion, certification and rate-making is largely by national insurers. The appellant ADT has a national schedule of prices, rates, and terms, though the rates may be varied to meet local conditions.

It -deals with multistate busi- nesses on the basis of nationwide contracts.. The manu- facturing business of ADT is interstate. The fact that Holmes is more nearly local than the others does not

Opinion of the Court.

save it, for it is part and parcel of the combine presided over and controlled by Grinnell.

As the District Court found, the relevant market for the defendants have monopoly- determining whether power is not the several local areas which the individual stations serve, but the broader national market that re- -flects the reality of the way in which they built and con- duct their business.

We have said enough about the great hold that the' defendants have on this market. The'percentage is so high "as to justify the finding of monopoly. And, as the facts already, related indicate, this monopoly was * achieved in large part by unlawful and exclusionary prac- tices. TbIe, restrictive agreements that pre-empted for each',co.mpny a segment of the market where it was free of competition of the others were one device. Pricing practices that contained competitors were another. The acquisiiions by Grinnell of ADT, AFA, and Holmes were still another. Grinnell long faced a problem of compet- ing with ADT. That was one reason it acquired AFA and-Holmes.' Prior to settlement of its dispute hnd con- troversy with ADT, Grinnell prepared to go into 'the central station service business. Br acquiring ADT in 1953, Grinnell eliminated that alternative.

Its control of the three other defendants eliminated any ,possibility of an. outbreak of competition that might have occurred -when the 1907 agreements terminated. By-those acquisi- 'tions it perfected the. monopoly'power to exclude com- petitors and fix prices.7

7 Sin~e the record clearly shows that this monopoly power was consciously acquired, we have no reason to reach the further posi- tion of the District Court that once monopoly power is shown to exist, the burden is on 1he defendants to show that their dominance is due, to. skill, acumen, and the like.

UNITED STATES v. GRINNELL CORP. 577 563

Opinion of the Court.

The final -decree enjoins the defendants in general terms from restraining trade or attempting or conspiring to restrain trade in this particular market, from further .monopolizing, and attempting or conspiring to monop- olize. The court ordered the alarm companies to file with the Department of. Justice standard lists of prices and terms and every quotation to customers that devi- ated from those lists and enjoined the defendants fromi acquiring stock, assets, or business of any enterprise in the market. Grinnell was ordered to file, not later than 'April 1, 1966, a plan of divestiture of its'stock in each of .the other defendant companies. "It was given the option either to sell the stock or distribute it to its stockholders or combine or vary those methods.8 The court further enjoined any of 'the defendants from employing in ahi capacity the President and Chairman of the Board of Grinnell, James D. Fleming. Both the Government and the defendants challenge aspects of the decree.

.We start from the premise that adequate :relief in a monopolization, case should put an end to the combina- tion and deprive the defendants of aiy of Jhe benefits of the illegal conduct; and break up or render inipotent the monopoly -power found to be. in violation of the Act.

That is the teaching of our cases, notably'Schine Theatres

v. United States, 334 U. S. 110, 128-129.

We largely agree with the Government's views on the relief aspect of the case.

'We start with ADT,-which presently does 737 of, the business done by accredited central stationg throughout the country. It is indeed the keystone of the defendants' monopoly power. The mere

" Although the Government originally urged that the decree was inadequate-as to diiestiture in that-it permitted Grinnell to dis- tribute the stock of the other companies to Grinnell's shareholders, it has'aba d6ned 'that Ipoint in this Court.

Opinion of the Court.

dissolution of the combination through the divestiture by Grinnell of its interests in the other companies does not reach the root of the evil. In 92 of the 115 cities in which ADT operates there are no other accredited cen-. tral stations. Perhaps some cities could not.support more than one. Defendants recognized prior to trial that at least 13 cities can; the Government urged divesti- ture in 48 cities. That there should be some divestiture on the part of ADT seems clear; but the details of such divestiture must be determined by the District Court as the matter cannot be resolved on this record.

Two of the means by which ADT acquired and main- tained its large share of the market are the requirement that subscribers sign five-year contracts and the reten- tion by ADT of title to the protective services equipment installed on a subscriber's premises. On this record it appears that these practices constitute substantial bar- riers to competition and that relief against them is appropriate. The pros and cons are argued with con- siderable vehemence here.9 Again, we cannot resolve them on this record. The various aspects of this con- troversy must be explored by the District Court and suitable protective provisions included in the decree that deprive these two devices of the coercive power that they apparently have' had towards restraining competition and creating a monopoly.

9 Specifically, the areas .of disagreement are: (1) Defendants urge that barring them from offering five-year contracts would put them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis nondefendant firms; the Government responds that since they violated the law, they-may properly be subjected to restrictions not - borne by others. See United States v.,Bausch & Lomb Co. ' 321 U'S. 707, 723-724.

(2) Some customers of defendants may;wish to have long-term

contracts; the Government responds that this may be explored on remand.

(3) There is some dispute as to whether, if the central

station company cannot retain title to the equipment it installs, the insurance companies will accredit the system. This, too, is a proper subject for inquiry on remand.

UNITED STATES v. GRINNELL CORP. 579 563

Opinion of -the Court.

The Government proposed that the defendants be required to sell, on nondiscriminatory terms, any devices manufactured by-them for use in furnishing central sta- tion service.

It seems clear that if the competitors are to be able to compete effectively for the existing cus- tomers of the defendants when the present service con- tracts expire, they must be assured of replacement parts to maintain those systems.1"

The Government urges visitation rights, that is, re- quiring reports, examining documents, and interviewing company personnel, a relief commonly granted for the purpose of determining whether a defendant has com- plied with an antitrust decree. See United States v.

United States Gypsum Co., 340 U. S. 76, 95. The Dis- trict Court gave no explanation for its refusal to grant this relief."

It is so important and customary a provi- sion that the District Court should reconsider it.

Defendants urge and the Government concedes that the barring of Mr. Fleming from the employment of any of the defendants is unduly harsh and quite unnecessary on this record. While relief of that kind may be appro- priate where the predatory conduct is conspicuous, we cannot see that any such case was made out on this record.

The Government objects, as do the defendants, to the broad and generalized terms of the restraining order.

They properly point out, as we emphasized in Schine Theatres v. United States, supra, at 125-126, that the precise practices found to have violated the Act should 10 Prior to trial, the defendants agreed that this would be an appropriate provision in a decree were the Government to prevail in all its claims of antitrust violations. Although defendants now maintain that this pretrial discussion was "settlement talk," that earlier concession is a relevant factor that the District Judge can properly take into account on remand.

"IThis provision, too, gained pretrial acceptance. See n. 10, supra.

580.

Opinion of the Court.

be specifically enjoined. On remand we suggest that that course be taken.

The defendants object to the requirements that Grin- nell divest itself of its holdings in the three alarm is company defendants, but we think that provision is wholly- justified. Dissolution of the combination essential as indicated by many of our cases, starting with- Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 78. The defendants object t" that'portion of the decree'that bars them from acquiring interests'in firms in the accredited central station business. But since acquisition was one of the methods by which the defendants acquired their market power and was the method by which Grinnell put the combination together, an injunction against the repetition of the practice seems fully warranted. The defendants further object to the requirement in the de- cree that the alarm company defendants report to the De-' partment of Justice any deviation they make from their list prices. We make no comment on that because in view of the other extensive changes necessary in the de- cree, the District Court might well deem it to be unneces- In other words, sary in the fashioning of the new decree.

we leave that matter open, to rest finally in the discretion of the District Court.

The defendants contend that Judge Wyzanski, who tried the case, was personally biased and prejudiced and should have been disqualified from sitting in the case, and that he denied them a fair trial. We think this point is" without- merit.,

The complaint was filed in April 1961, the answers in July 1961. Shortly thereafter extensive taking of deppsitions began. The District Court in January 1963 - directed that no depositions be taken after September 1, In response to an inquiry from the court both 1963. sides suggested that the trial be set no earlier than January '1964.

581 563

Opinion of the Court.

At a pretrial conference in December 1963, govern- ment counsel told the court that the parties had been trying to reach agreement on a consent decree but were far apart and asked how the court would like to handle the presentation of the evidence in the event a settle- ment was not reached. Grinnell's lawyer suggested that, the next appropriate procedure would be a pretrial on the question of relief-a suggestion that the District Court construed as an invitation to the court to discuss the relief apart from the merits. The Government objected.

The court then asked for a brief from each side setting forth its views on relief if the Government prevailed on the merits. In response to the court's statement that "as I understand .it, you want to find out what kind of relief I would be likely to* allow if the government's case stood virtually uncontradicted," 'Grinnell's counsel re- plied: "That is what I had in'mind, your.Honor, yes."

Theieupon the court set a day for such a hearing. At the next pretrial conference Grinnell's counsel stated that "if your Honor would indicate the relief that might be appropriate in this case that would help both sides to come to a better understanding."

"THE COURT. I don't think it would help very much.

"MR. MCINERNEY. Well, your Hono0,

I think it would help both the plaintiff and the defendants to know what is really at stake here in this trial.'

"THE COURT. I assure you that you would not be helped by anything I would say. You would do better to get together with the government rather than run the risk of what I would say from what I have sect. Let *me just assure you of that .

The case was then set for trial on June 15, 1964. When Grinnell's counsel sought to argue further, the court stated: "There is no use in discussing it with ne.. I have

Opinion of the Court.

read enough to know that if I have to decide .this case on what I have seen from the government you will not be in a position at this stage to agree to it."

On June 3, 1964, defendants argued for a postponement of the trial, saying they needed more time. The court denied the motion. Then they argued that the relief 'issues to be tried be limited to those raised by the plead- ings so as to eliminate what they considered to be extra- neous issues raised by the Government. To that the

"I can't understand frankly why you don't, realize that you have forced me to look at the documents in this case. which I dislike doing in advance of trial. You. have invited me, therefore, into what I regard as, from your point of view, a rather unde- sirable situation. I think I made that clear at the beginning. I have told you that, forced by you to look, my views are more extreme than those of the government; and I have also made you realize that if I am required to make Findings and reach Con- clusions I am opening up third-party suits that will make, in view of the size of the industry, the percentage of people involved higher than in the electrical cases."

Shortly thereafter defendants filed a motion 12 for the

disqualification of Judge Wyzanski on -the grounds of personal bias and prejudice.13

"Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes ,and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him 'or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding."

"2X Judge Wyznnski referred

the question of his disqualification to Chief Judge Woodbury of the Court of Appeals for the First

UNITED STATES v. GRINNELL CORP. 583 563

HARLAN, J., dissenting.,

The alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Berger

v. United States, -255 U. S. 22, 31. Any adverse attitudes

that Judge Wyzanski evinced toward the defendants were based on his study of the depositions and briefs which the parties had requested him to make. What he said reflected no more than his view that, if the facts were as the Government alleged. .stringent relief was called for. D~uring the trial he repeatedly stated that he had not made up his mind on the merits. During' the trial 'he ruled certain evidence to be irrelevant to the issues and when the lawyer persisted in offering it Judge Wyzanski said. "Maybe- you will persuade somebody else. And if you think so, all right. I just assure you it is a great ceremonial act, as far as I am concerned." We do not read this statement as manifesting a closed'imind on the merits of the case but consider it merely a terse way of. repeating the previously stated ruling that this particular evidence was irrelevant.

We have examined all the. other cl'iins of the defend- alts made against Judge Wyzanskj and find that the claim of bias and prejudice is not made out. Our dis- cussion of the relief which he granted shows indeed tloat he was. in several critical respects, too lenient with those who. now charge him with bias and prejudice.

The judgment below

is affirmed except as to the decree. We remand for further hearings on the nature of the relief consistent with the views expressed herein.

It is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. I cannot agree with the Court that the relevant market I do not dispute that a

has been adequately proved.

Circuit who after hearing oral argument held that no case of bias and prejudice had been made out under § 144.

ItARLAN, J, dissenting.

national market may be found even though immediate competition takes place only within individual communi- ties, some of which are themselves natural monopolies.

For a national monopoly of such local enterprises may still have serious long-term impact on competition and be In vulnerable on its own plane to the antitrust laws. the product market also the Court seems to me to make out a good enough case for lumping together the different kinds of central station protective service (CSPS). But I cannot agree that the facts so far developed warrant restricting the product market to accredited CSPS.

Because the ultimate issue is the effective power to control price and competition, this Court has always rec- ognized that. the' market must include products or serv- interchangeable" with those of the ices "reasonably alleged monopolist. United States v. du Pont & Co., In this instance, there is no doubt

that the accredited CSPS business does compete in some

watchmen, local alarms, proprietary systems, telephone- connected services, unaccredited CSPS, direct-connected ,(to police and fire stations) systems, and so forth. The critical question, then, is the extent of competition from these rivals.

The Government. and the majority have stressed that differences in cost, reliability and insurance discounts may disqualify a competing form of protection for a particu- lar customer. For example, it is said that proprietary systems are too expensive for any but large companies and local alarms may go unanswered in some neighbor- hoods. But if in general a CSIZS customer has a feasible to CSPS, it does not much matter that alternative other ones are foreclosed to him, nor that other CSPS customers have different second choices. From this record, it may well be that other forms of protection are each competitive enough with segments of the CSPS

UNITED STATES v. GRINNELL CORP. 585 563

FORTAS, J., dissenting.

market so that in sum CSPS rarely has a monopoly position.

From the defense standpoint, there is substantial evi- dence showing that the defendants do feel-themselves under pressure from other forms of protection, that they do compete for customers, and that they do lower prices even in areas where no CSPS competition is present.

This concrete evidence of market behavior seems to me to rank higher than the kind of inference proof heavily relied on by the Government-physical diffeiences be- tween competing forms of protection, self-advertising claims of CSPS companies that they represent a superior service, and varying insurance discounts. Given. that the burden of proof rests upon the Government, the rec- ord leaves me with such misgivings as to the validity of the District Court's findings on this score that I am not prepared to agree that the Government has made the showing of market domination *that the law demands before a ,business is sundered.

At the same time the case must be recognized as. a close one, and I am not ready to say at this stage that- the findings and conclusions of the District Court might not be supportable. All things considered. I join with my Brothers FORTAS and STEwART to the extent of voting to remand the case for further proceedings so that new findings can be made as to the relevant product market.

This course seems to me'the more appropriate in light of the fact that because of the Expediting Act, 15 U. S. C. § 29 (1964 ed.). we have not had the benefit of any inter- mediate appellate sifting of this record.

Ini view of. the disposition I propose, I do not consider- any of the other questions in the case.

MiR. JUSTICE FORTAS. with whom M'IR. JUSTICE STEW- ART joins, dissenting.

I agree that the judgment below should be remanded. but I do not agree that the remand shquld be limnitedo.to

FORTAS, J., dissenting.

reshaping the decree. Because I believe that the defini- tion of the relevant market here cannot be sustained, I would reverse and remand for a new determination of this basic issue, subject to proper standards.

We have here a case under both § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act, which proscribe combinations in restraint of trade, and monopolies and attempts to monopolize.

The judicial task is not difficult to state: Does the record show a combination in restraint of trade or a monopoly or attempt to monopolize?

If so, what are its char- acteristics, scope and effect? And, finally, what is the appropriate remedy for a court of equity to decree?

Each of these inq the combination

ries depends upon two basic refer- ents: definition of the geographical area of trade or commerce restrained or monopolized, and of the products or services involved.

In § 1 cases this problem ordinarily presents little difficulty because in restraint of trade itself delineates the "market" with suf- ficient clarity to support the usual injunctive form of relief in those cases. See, e: g., United States-v. Griffith,

In the preent-case, however, the essence of the offense is monopolization, achieved or attempted, and the major relief is divestiture. For these purposes, "narket" definition is of the essence, just as in § 7.cases' , the kindred definition of the "line of commerce" is funda- mental. We must define the area of commerce that is allegedly engrossed before we can determine it engross- ment; and we must define it before a decree can be shaped to deal with the consequences of the monopoly, and to restore or produce competition. See United States

v. du Pont & Co. (the Cellooyhane Case), 351 U. S. 377,

'United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U. S. 441, 447-458; United States v. Alcoa, 377 U. S. 271, 273-277; United States v.

Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 356; Brown Shoe'Co. v.

United States, 370,U. S. 294, 324.

UNITED STATES v. GRINNELL CORP. 587 563

FORTAS, J., dissenting.

389-396; United States v. Aluminum, Co. of America,

148 F. 2d 416 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1945).

In § 2 cases, the search for "the relevant market" must be undertaken and pursued with relentless clarity.

It is. in essence, an economic task put to the uses of the law.

Ujnless this task is well done, the results will be distorted in terms of the conclusion as to whether the law has been violated and what the decree should contain.

In this case, the relevant geographical and product markets have not been defined on the basis of the eco- nomic facts of the industry concerned. They have been tailored precisely to fit defendants' business. The Gov- ernment proposed and the trial court concluded that the relevant market is not the business of fire protection, or burglary protection, or protection against waterflow, etc., or all of these together.

It is iiot even the business of furnishing these from a central location.

It is the busi- ness. viewed nationally, of supplying "insurance ac- credited central station protection services" (CSPS)-* that is, fire, burglary and other kinds of protection fur- nished from a central station which is acpredited by insurance companies. The business of defendants fits neatly into the product and geographic market so de- fined.

In fact, it comes close to filling the market so defined.2 This Court has now approved this Procrustean definition.

The geographical market is defined as nationwide.

But the need and the service are intensely local-more local by far, for example, than the market which this Court found to be local in United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U. S. 3.21, 357-362.3 The premises pro-

- The defendants constitute 87% of the market as defined. One of the defendants alone, ADT, has 73%.

See also United States v. First Nat. Bank, 376 U. S. 665, 668 (per DouGLAs, J.); American Cystpl-Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American S gar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 398 (D

S. D. N. Y. 1957), aff'd,

259 F. 2d 524 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1958). -

FORTAS, J., dissenting.

tected do not travel. They are fixed locations. They must be protected where they are. Protection must be provided on the spot.

It must be furnished by local per- sonnel able to bring help to the scene within minutes.

Even the central stations can provide service only within a 25-mile radius. Where the tenants of the premises turn to central stations for this service, they must make their contracts locally with the central station and purchase their services from it on the basis of local conditions.

But because these defendants, the trial court found, are connected by stock ownership, interlocking manage- ment and some degree of national corporate direction, and because there is some national participation in sell- ing as well as national financing, advertising, purchasing of equipment, and the like,' the court concluded that the competitive area to be considered is national. This Court now affirms that conclusion.

This is a non sequitur.

It is not permissible to seize upon the nationwide scope of defendants' operation and to bootstrap a geographical definition of the market from this. The purpose of the search for the relevant geo- graphical market is to find the area or areas to which a potential buyer may rationally look for the goods or services that he seeks. The test, as this Court said in United States v' Philadelphia Nat. Bank, is "the geo- graphic structure of supplier-customer relations," 374

U. S. 321, 357, quoting Kaysen & Turner, Antitrust

Policy 102 (1959). And, as MR. JusTiCE CLARK put it in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U. S. 320, 327, the definition of the relevant market requires

'There

is a danger that this Court's opinion, ante, at 575-576, will be read as somewhat overstating the case. There is neither find- ing nor record to support the implication that rates are to any sub- stantial extent fixed on a nationwide basis, or that there are nation- wide contracts ith multistate businesses in any significant degree, or that insurers inspect or certify central stations on a nationwide basis.

FORTAS, J., dissenting..

563

"careful selection of the market area in Which the seller operAtes. and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies." -, The central issue is where does a poten- tial buyer look for potential suppliers of the service- what is the geographical area in which the buyer has, 6r, in the absence of monopoly, Iwould have, a real choice as to price and alternative facilities? This depends upon the facts of the market place, taking into account such economic factors as the distance over which supplies and services may be feasibly furnished, consistently with cost and functional efficiency. I The incidental aspects of defendants' business which the court uses cannot control the outcome of this in- quiry. They do not measure the market area in which -buyer and sellers meet. ' They have little impact upon the ascertainment of the geographical areas in which the economic and legal questions must be answered: hdve defendants "monopolized" or "restrained" trade; have they eliminated or can they eliminate competitors or prevent or obstruct new entries into the business; -have they controlled or can they control price for the services?

'These are the issues; and, in defendants' business, a find- ing that the "relevant market" is national is nothing less than a studied failure to assess the effect of defendants' position and practices in the light of the competition which exists, or could exist, in economically defined areas-in the real world.

Here. there can be no doubt that the correct geographic market is local. " The services at issue are intensely local: they can be furnished only locally. The busines's as it. is done is local-not nationwide.

If, as might well be the case on this record,, defendants were found to -have violated the Sherman Act in a number of these local areas, a proper decree, directed to those markets, as well as to

5 See also Brown Shoe Co, v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 336-337..

590

FoRTs, J., dissenting.,

general corporate features relevant to the condemned practices, could be fashioned. On the other hand, a gross definition of the market as nationwide leads to a gross, nationwide decree which does not address itself to the realities of the market place. That is what happened here: The District Court's finding .that the market was nationwide logically led it to a decree which operated on the only national aspect of the situation, the parent com- pany nexus, instead of on the economically realistic areas--the local situations. This Court now directs the trial court to require "some [unspecified] divestiture" lo- cally by the alarm companies. This is a recognition of the economic reality that the relevant competitive areas are local.

In plain terms, the Court's direction to the trial court means a 'market-by-market" analysis for the pur- pose of breaking up defendants' monopoly position and creating competitors and competition wherever f~asible in particular cities. . In my view, however, by so direct- ing, the Court implies that which it does not coimand:, that ihe case should be reconsidered at the trial cout level because of the ir-proper standard it used'to define the relevant geographic markets.

The trial court's definition of -the "product" mar, ket even more dramatically demonstrates that its action has been Procrustean-that it has tailored the market t9 the dimensions of the defendants. , It recognizes that a/per- son seeking protective services has many alternative sources.

It lists "watchmen, watchdogs, automatic pro- prietary systems confined to one, site, (often, but not always,) alarm systems connected with sqme local police or fire station, often unaccredited CSPS [central station protective services], and often accredited CSPS." The court finds that even in the same city a single customer seeking protection for several premises may "exercise its option" differently for different lQcations.

It may choose

591 563

FORTAS; J., dissenting.

accredited CSPS for one of its locations and a different type of service for another.

But the court isolates from all of these alternatives only those services in which defendants engage.

It elim- inates all of the alternative sources despite its conscien- -tious emimeration of them. Its definition of the "rele- vant market" is not merely confined to "central station" protective services, but to those, central station protective services which are "accredited" by insurance companies.

There is no pretense that these furnish peculiar serv- ices for which there is no alternative in the market place, on either a price or a functional basis. The court relies solely upon its findihig that the services offered by ac- credited central stations are of better quality, and upon its conclusion that the insurance companies tend to give "noticeably larger" discounts to policyholders who use accredited central station protective services. This Court now approves this strage red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp classification.

The unreality of the trial court's market definition may best be illustrated by an example. Consider the situa- tion of a retail, merchant in Pittsburgh-who wishes to protect his store against burglary. The Holmes Electric Protective Company, a subsidiary of Grinnell, operates an accredited -central station service in Pittsburgh.

It provides only burglary protection.-

The gerrymandered market defiiition approved today totally excludes from the market consideration of the' availability in'Pittsburgh of cheaper but somewhat less reliable locil alarm systems, or of more expensive (although the expense is reduced by greater insurance discounts) watchman service, or even of unaccredited central station service which 'virtually duplicates the Holmes service.

Instead, and-in the name of "commercial realities," we are instructed that the-"relevant market"-which totally

FORTAS, J., dissenting.

,-excludes these locally available alternatives-requires us to look only to accredited central station service, and that we are to include in the "market" central stations which do not furnish burglary protection and even those which serve such places as Boston and Honolulu.'

Moreover, we are told that the "relevant market" must assume this strange and curious configuration despite evidence in the record and a finding of the trial court that "fringe competition" from such locally available alternatives as-,watchmen, local alarm systems, propri- etary systems, and unaccredited central stations has, in at least 20 cities, forced the defendants to operate at a "loss" even though. defendants have a total monopoly in these cities of the "market"-namely, the "accredited central station protective services." And we are led to * this odd result even though there is in the record abun- dant evidence that customers switch from one -form of property protection to another, and not always in the direction of accredited central station service.

I believe this approach ha§ no justification in eco- It might be supportable if it were nomics, reason or law. found that the accredited central stations offer services wh~ich are unique in the sense that potential buyers-or at least a substantial; identifiable part of the trade-look only to them for the services in question, and that neither cost, type, quality of service nor other factors bring competing services into the market. The findings here and the record do not permit this conclusion.

The Government's market definition, accepted by the trial court, is a distortion which inevitably leads to a superficial and distorted result even in the hands of a highly skilled judge. As this Court held in Brown Shoe, supra, the "reasonable interchangeability of use or the None of the stations operated by defendant Automatic Fire Alarm Company offers burglary protection,' just as none of Holmes' stations protects against the risk of fire.

UNITED STATES v. GRINNELL CORP. 593 563

FORTAS, J., dissenting.

cross-elasticit r of demand," deterrhines the boundaries of a product market. 370 U. S., at 325. See also the Cello- phane Case,. 351 U. S., at 380.

In plain language, this means that the court should have defined the relevant market here to include all services which, in light of geo- graphical availability, price and use characteristics, are in realistic rivalry for all or some part of the business of furnishing protectivre services to premises. In the present situation, however, the court's own findings show that practical alternatives are available to potential users-- although they vary from market to market and possibly from user to user. These have been arbitrarily excluded from the court's definition.

I do not suggest that wide disparities in quality, price and customer appeal could never affect the definition of the market. But this follows only-where the disparities are so great that they create separate and distinct cate- gories of buyers and sellers. The record here and the findings do not approach this standard. They fall far short of justifying the narrowing of the market as prac- ticed here. I need refer only to the exclusion of non- accredited central stations, which the court seeks to, justify by reference to differentials in insurance discounts.

These differentials may indeed affect the relative cost to the consumer of the competing modes of protection.

But, in the absence of proof that they result in eliminat- ing the competing services from the category of those to which the purchaser "can practicably turn" for sup- plies,7 they do not justify such total exclusion. This sort of exclusion of the supposedly not-quite-so-attractive service from the basic defiruition of the kinds of business and service against which defendants' activity will be measured, is entirely unjustified on this record.8

7 Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U. S., at 327.

8 The example used by the court in its findings is illuminating and disturbing. In explanation of its narrow market definition,

FOiTAS, J., (is.enting.

The importance of this kind of truncated market defi- nition vividly appears if we are to say. as the trial court here held, that if defendant has so large a fraction of the market as to constitute a "predominant" share, a. rebut- table presumption of monopolization follows. The frac- tion depends upon the denominator (the "market") as well as the numerator (the defendants' volume).

Clearly, this "presumption" is unwarranted unless the "market" is defined to include all competitors. The con- trary is not supported by this Court's decisions in either the Cellophane Case, supra, or United States v. du Pont & Co. (General Motors). 353 U. S. 586. The latter case defined the market in terms of the total products which could be used for the defined purposes: automobile fab- rics and finishes. This embraces the total range of op- tions for customers seeking these products. On the con- trary, as the record here shows and as the findings, candidly read, imply, substantial options exist for serv- ices other than through accredited central stations pro- viding protective services. Those options, whether for all or a part of the services in issue, must be included in the assessment of the market.

In the opinion which this Court hands down today, there is considerable discussion of defendants' argument that the market should be "broken down" by different

the court says that the difference between the accredited central station prbtective services and all others "could be compared" to the difference between a compact six-cylinder car and a chauffeur- driven sedan.

It is probably true that the degree of direct compe- tition between luxury automobiles and compacts is slight. But it is by no means as clear-cut as the trial court seems to suggest. The question would require careful analysis in light of the total facts and issues. For example, if the antitrust problem at hand involved an acquisition of the business of a manufacturer of compacts by a maker of luxury cars, it is by no means inconceivable that sufficient com- petitive overlap would be found to- place both products in the "relevant market.".

UNITED STATES v. GRINNELL CORP. 595 563

FORTAS, J., dissenting.

type of service: e. g., burglar protection, fire protection, etc. The Court rejects this on the ground that it is appropriate to evaluate a "cluster", of services as such.

It points to Philadelphia Nat. Bank, supra, for support for its approach.

In that case, MR. JusTIcE BRENNAN'S opinion, for the Court carefully set out the distinctive characteristics of banking services: that some of these services (e. g., checking accounts) are virtually free of competition from other types of institutions, and that other services are distinctive in cost or other character- istics. 374 U. S., at 356-357. See also United States v.

First Nat. Bank, 376 U. S. 665, 668 (per DOUGLAS, J.).

Similarly, in United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334

U. S. 131, and International Boxing Club v. United

States, 358 U. S. 242, 249-252, "first-run" moving pic- tures and championship boxing matches were held suffi- ciently distinctive in terms of demand in the market place to warrant consideration as separate markets.

But no such distinctiveness exists here. As I have dis- cussed, neither this record nor the'trial court's findings show either, a distinctive demand or a separable market for "insurance accredited central station protective serv- ices." The contrary is evident. None of the services furnished by accredited central stations is unique, as I have discussed. Nor is there even a common or pre- dominant "cluster" of services offered by the central sta- tions. One of the defendants, Holmes, is engaged only in the burglary alarm business. Another, AFA, furnishes only fire and waterflow service. Only ADT among the defendants makes available to its customers the full "cluster."

I do not mean to suggest that the Government must prove its case, service by service. But in defining the market, individual services., even if furnished in isola- tion, ought to be specified and here, as distinguished from the conclusion impelled by the circumstances in

FORT.S, J., dissenting.

Philadelphia Nat. Bank, supra, competitors for individual services ought to be taken into account.

I do not intend by any of the foregoing to suggest that, on this record, the relief granted by the trial court and the substantially more drastic relief ordered by this Court would necessarily be unjustified.

It is entirely possible that monopoly pr attempt to monopolize may be found- and perhaps found with greater force-in local situations.

Relief on a pervasive, system-wide, national basis might follow, as decreed by the trial court, as well as divestiture itn appropriate local situations, as airected by this Court.

It is impossible, I submit, to make these judgments on the findings before us because of the distortion due to an incorrect and unreal definition of the "relevant market."

Now, because of this. .0oirt's mandate, the market-by- market inquiry must begin for purposes of the decree.

But this should have been the foundation of judgment not its superimposed conclusion. This inquiry should- in my opinion, it must- , take into "account the total eco- nomic situation-all of the options available to one seek- ing protection services.

It should not be limited to cen- tral stations, and certainly not to "insurance accredited central station protective services" which this Court sanctions as the relevant market. Since -I am of the opinion that defendants and the courts are entitled to a reappraisal of the liability consequences as well as the appropriate provisions of the decree on the basis of a sound definition of the market, I would reverse and remand for these purposes.