Taggart v. Lorenzen

554

Syllabus TAGGART v. LORENZEN, executor of the ESTATE OF BROWN, et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit

No. 18–489. Argued April 24, 2019—Decided June 3, 2019

Petitioner Bradley Taggart formerly owned an interest in an Oregon com- pany. That company and two of its other owners, who are among the respondents here, fled suit in Oregon state court, claiming that Taggart had breached the company's operating agreement. Before trial, Tag- gart fled for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. At the conclusion of that proceeding, the Federal Bankruptcy Court issued a discharge order that released Taggart from liability for most prebank- ruptcy debts. After the discharge order issued, the Oregon state court entered judgment against Taggart in the prebankruptcy suit and awarded attorney's fees to respondents. Taggart returned to the Fed- eral Bankruptcy Court, seeking civil contempt sanctions against re- spondents for collecting attorney's fees in violation of the discharge order. The Bankruptcy Court ultimately held respondents in civil con- tempt. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel vacated the sanctions, and the Ninth Circuit affrmed the panel's decision. Applying a subjective standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a “creditor's good faith be- lief ” that the discharge order “does not apply to the creditor's claim precludes a fnding of contempt, even if the creditor's belief is unreason- able.” 888 F. 3d 438, 444.

Held: A court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a dis- charge order if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor's conduct. Pp. 559–565.

When a statutory term is “ `obviously transplanted from another legal source,' ” it “ `brings the old soil with it.' ” Hall v. Hall, 584 U. S. 59,

73. Here, the bankruptcy statutes specifying that a discharge order

“operates as an injunction,” 11 U. S. C. § 524(a)(2), and that a court may issue any “order” or “judgment” that is “necessary or appropriate” to “carry out” other bankruptcy provisions, § 105(a), bring with them the “old soil” that has long governed how courts enforce injunctions.

In cases outside the bankruptcy context, this Court has said that civil contempt “should not be resorted to where there is [a] fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.” California

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Artifcial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U. S. 609, 618. This stand- ard is generally an objective one. A party's subjective belief that she was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate her from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable. Subjective intent, however, is not always irrelevant. Civil contempt sanctions may be warranted when a party acts in bad faith, and a party's good faith may help to determine an appropriate sanction. These traditional civil con- tempt principles apply straightforwardly to the bankruptcy discharge context. Under the fair ground of doubt standard, civil contempt may be appropriate when the creditor violates a discharge order based on an objectively unreasonable understanding of the discharge order or the statutes that govern its scope. Pp. 560–562.

(b) The standard applied by the Ninth Circuit is inconsistent with traditional civil contempt principles, under which parties cannot be insu- lated from a fnding of civil contempt based on their subjective good faith. Taggart, meanwhile, argues for a standard that would operate much like a strict-liability standard. But his proposal often may lead creditors to seek advance determinations as to whether debts have been discharged, creating the risk of additional federal litigation, additional costs, and additional delays. His proposal, which follows the standard some courts have used to remedy violations of automatic stays, also ignores key differences in text and purpose between the statutes gov- erning automatic stays and discharge orders. Pp. 562–565.

888 F. 3d 438, vacated and remanded.

Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Daniel L. Geyser argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was John M. Berman.

Sopan Joshi argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging vacatur. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Francisco, Assistant Attorney General Hunt, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, Mark B. Stern, Sarah Carroll, Thomas J. Clark, and Paul A. Allulis.

Nicole A. Saharsky argued the cause for respondents.

With her on the brief were Andrew E. Tauber, Michael B.

Kimberly, Matthew A. Waring, Janet M. Schroer, and Hollis

K. McMilan.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the National Consumer Bankruptcy Rights Center et al. by Tara Twomey and Mat-

556

Opinion of the Court Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.

At the conclusion of a bankruptcy proceeding, a bank- ruptcy court typically enters an order releasing the debtor from liability for most prebankruptcy debts. This order, known as a discharge order, bars creditors from attempting to collect any debt covered by the order. See 11 U. S. C. § 524(a)(2). The question presented here concerns the crite- ria for determining when a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for attempting to collect a debt that a discharge order has immunized from collection.

The Bankruptcy Court, in holding the creditors here in civil contempt, applied a standard that it described as akin to “strict liability” based on the standard's expansive scope.

In re Taggart, 522 B. R. 627, 632 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Ore. 2014). It held that civil contempt sanctions are permissible, irrespec- tive of the creditor's beliefs, so long as the creditor was “ `aware of the discharge' ” order and “ `intended the actions which violate[d]' ” it. Ibid. (quoting In re Hardy, 97 F. 3d

thew J. Mason; and for Judge Eugene Wedoff (Ret.) et al. by David R.

Kuney.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of California et al. by Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of California, Ed- ward C. DuMont, Solicitor General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Diane S. Shaw, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Molly K. Mosley, Robert E. Asperger, Craig D. Rust, and Karli Eisenberg, Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respec- tive jurisdictions as follows: Kevin G. Clarkson of Alaska, Phil Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Karl A. Racine of the District of Columbia, Ashley Moody of Florida, Clare E. Connors of Hawaii, Law- rence G. Wasden of Idaho, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Curtis T. Hill, Jr., of Indiana, Tom Miller of Iowa, Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Doug Peterson of Nebraska, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Dave Yost of Ohio, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Jason Ravnsborg of South Dakota, Herbert H.

Slatery III of Tennessee, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., of Vermont, Mark R. Herring of Virginia, and Robert W. Ferguson of Washington; and for the National Creditors Bar Association by Nicole

M. Strickler.

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1384, 1390 (CA11 1996)). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed with that standard.

Applying a subjective standard instead, it concluded that a court cannot hold a creditor in civil contempt if the creditor has a “good faith belief ” that the discharge order “does not apply to the creditor's claim.” In re Taggart, 888 F. 3d 438, 444 (2018). That is so, the Court of Appeals held, “even if the creditor's belief is unreasonable.” Ibid.

We conclude that neither a standard akin to strict liability nor a purely subjective standard is appropriate. Rather, in our view, a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor's conduct. In other words, civil contempt may be appropriate if there is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor's conduct might be lawful.

Bradley Taggart, the petitioner, formerly owned an inter- est in an Oregon company, Sherwood Park Business Center.

That company, along with two of its other owners, brought a lawsuit in Oregon state court, claiming that Taggart had breached the business center's operating agreement.

(We use the name “Sherwood” to refer to the company, its two owners, and—in some instances—their former attorney, who is now represented by the executor of his estate. The com- pany, the two owners, and the executor are the respondents in this case.)

Before trial, Taggart fled for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, which permits insolvent debtors to discharge their debts by liquidating assets to pay credi- tors. See 11 U. S. C. §§ 704(a)(1), 726. Ultimately, the Fed- eral Bankruptcy Court wound up the proceeding and issued an order granting him a discharge. Taggart's discharge order, like many such orders, goes no further than the stat- ute: It simply says that the debtor “shall be granted a dis- charge under § 727.” App. 60; see United States Courts, Order of Discharge: Offcial Form 318 (Dec. 2015), http://

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www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/fles/form_b318_0.pdf (as last visited May 31, 2019). Section 727, the statute cited in the discharge order, states that a discharge relieves the debtor “from all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief,” “[e]xcept as provided in section 523.” § 727(b). Sec- tion 523 then lists in detail the debts that are exempt from discharge. §§ 523(a)(1)–(19). The words of the discharge order, though simple, have an important effect: A discharge order “operates as an injunction” that bars creditors from collecting any debt that has been discharged. § 524(a)(2).

After the issuance of Taggart's federal bankruptcy dis- charge order, the Oregon state court proceeded to enter judg- ment against Taggart in the prebankruptcy suit involving Sherwood. Sherwood then fled a petition in state court seek- ing attorney's fees that were incurred after Taggart fled his bankruptcy petition. All parties agreed that, under the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re Ybarra, 424 F. 3d 1018 (2005), a discharge order would normally cover and thereby discharge postpetition attorney's fees stemming from prepetition litiga- tion (such as the Oregon litigation) unless the discharged debtor “ `returned to the fray' ” after fling for bankruptcy.

Id., at 1027. Sherwood argued that Taggart had “returned to the fray” postpetition and therefore was liable for the postpetition attorney's fees that Sherwood sought to collect.

The state trial court agreed and held Taggart liable for roughly $45,000 of Sherwood's postpetition attorney's fees.

At this point, Taggart returned to the Federal Bankruptcy Court. He argued that he had not returned to the state- court “fray” under Ybarra, and that the discharge order therefore barred Sherwood from collecting postpetition at- torney's fees. Taggart added that the court should hold Sherwood in civil contempt because Sherwood had violated the discharge order. The Bankruptcy Court did not agree.

It concluded that Taggart had returned to the fray. Finding no violation of the discharge order, it refused to hold Sher- wood in civil contempt.

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Taggart appealed, and the Federal District Court held that Taggart had not returned to the fray. Hence, it concluded that Sherwood violated the discharge order by trying to col- lect attorney's fees. The District Court remanded the case to the Bankruptcy Court.

The Bankruptcy Court, noting the District Court's deci- sion, then held Sherwood in civil contempt. In doing so, it applied a standard it likened to “strict liability.” 522 B. R., at 632. The Bankruptcy Court held that civil contempt sanctions were appropriate because Sherwood had been “ `aware of the discharge' ” order and “ `intended the actions which violate[d]' ” it. Ibid. (quoting In re Hardy, 97 F. 3d, at 1390). The court awarded Taggart approximately $105,000 in attorney's fees and costs, $5,000 in damages for emotional distress, and $2,000 in punitive damages.

Sherwood appealed. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel va- cated these sanctions, and the Ninth Circuit affrmed the panel's decision. The Ninth Circuit applied a very different standard than the Bankruptcy Court. It concluded that a “creditor's good faith belief ” that the discharge order “does not apply to the creditor's claim precludes a fnding of con- tempt, even if the creditor's belief is unreasonable.” 888

F. 3d, at 444. Because Sherwood had a “good faith belief ”

that the discharge order “did not apply” to Sherwood's claims, the Court of Appeals held that civil contempt sanc- tions were improper. Id., at 445.

Taggart fled a petition for certiorari, asking us to decide whether “a creditor's good-faith belief that the discharge in- junction does not apply precludes a fnding of civil con- tempt.” Pet. for Cert. I. We granted certiorari.

The question before us concerns the legal standard for holding a creditor in civil contempt when the creditor at- tempts to collect a debt in violation of a bankruptcy dis- charge order. Two Bankruptcy Code provisions aid our

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efforts to fnd an answer. The frst, § 524, says that a dis- charge order “operates as an injunction against the com- mencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset” a discharged debt. 11 U. S. C. § 524(a)(2). The second, § 105, authorizes a court to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is nec- essary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” § 105(a).

In what circumstances do these provisions permit a court to hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order? In our view, these provisions authorize a court to impose civil contempt sanctions when there is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor's conduct might be lawful under the discharge order.

Our conclusion rests on a longstanding interpretive princi- ple: When a statutory term is “ `obviously transplanted from another legal source,' ” it “ `brings the old soil with it.' ” Hall v. Hall, 584 U. S. 59, 73 (2018) (quoting Frankfurter, Some Refections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L.

Rev. 527, 537 (1947)); see Field v. Mans, 516 U. S. 59, 69– 70 (1995) (applying that principle to the Bankruptcy Code).

Here, the statutes specifying that a discharge order “oper- ates as an injunction,” § 524(a)(2), and that a court may issue any “order” or “judgment” that is “necessary or appropriate” to “carry out” other bankruptcy provisions, § 105(a), bring with them the “old soil” that has long governed how courts enforce injunctions.

That “old soil” includes the “potent weapon” of civil con- tempt. Longshoremen v. Philadelphia Mar ine Trade Assn., 389 U. S. 64, 76 (1967). Under traditional principles of equity practice, courts have long imposed civil contempt sanctions to “coerce the defendant into compliance” with an injunction or “compensate the complainant for losses” stem- ming from the defendant's noncompliance with an injunction.

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United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 303–304 (1947); see D. Dobbs & C. Roberts, Law of Remedies § 2.8, p. 132 (3d ed. 2018); J. High, Law of Injunctions § 1449, p. 940 (2d ed. 1880).

The bankruptcy statutes, however, do not grant courts un- limited authority to hold creditors in civil contempt. In- stead, as part of the “old soil” they bring with them, the bankruptcy statutes incorporate the traditional standards in equity practice for determining when a party may be held in civil contempt for violating an injunction.

In cases outside the bankruptcy context, we have said that civil contempt “should not be resorted to where there is [a] fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the defend- ant's conduct.” California Artifcial Stone Paving Co. v.

Molitor, 113 U. S. 609, 618 (1885) (emphasis added). This standard refects the fact that civil contempt is a “severe remedy,” ibid., and that principles of “basic fairness requir[e] that those enjoined receive explicit notice” of “what conduct is outlawed” before being held in civil contempt, Schmidt v.

Lessard, 414 U. S. 473, 476 (1974) (per curiam). See Long- shoremen, supra, at 76 (noting that civil contempt usually is not appropriate unless “those who must obey” an order “will know what the court intends to require and what it means to forbid”); 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2960, pp. 430–431 (2013) (suggest- ing that civil contempt may be improper if a party's attempt at compliance was “reasonable”).

This standard is generally an objective one. We have ex- plained before that a party's subjective belief that she was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate her from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable.

As we said in McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U. S. 187 (1949), “[t]he absence of wilfulness does not relieve from civil contempt.” Id., at 191.

We have not held, however, that subjective intent is al- ways irrelevant. Our cases suggest, for example, that civil

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contempt sanctions may be warranted when a party acts in bad faith. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U. S. 32, 50 (1991). Thus, in McComb, we explained that a party's “rec- ord of continuing and persistent violations” and “persistent contumacy” justifed placing “the burden of any uncertainty in the decree . . . on [the] shoulders” of the party who vio- lated the court order. 336 U. S., at 192–193. On the fip side of the coin, a party's good faith, even where it does not bar civil contempt, may help to determine an appropriate sanction. Cf. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils

S. A., 481 U. S. 787, 801 (1987) (“[O]nly the least possible

power adequate to the end proposed should be used in con- tempt cases” (quotation altered)).

These traditional civil contempt principles apply straight- forwardly to the bankruptcy discharge context. The typical discharge order entered by a bankruptcy court is not de- tailed. See supra, at 557–558. Congress, however, has carefully delineated which debts are exempt from discharge.

See §§ 523(a)(1)–(19). Under the fair ground of doubt stand- ard, civil contempt therefore may be appropriate when the creditor violates a discharge order based on an objectively unreasonable understanding of the discharge order or the statutes that govern its scope.

The Solicitor General, amicus here, agrees with the fair ground of doubt standard we adopt. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13–15. And the respondents stated at oral argument that it would be appropriate for courts to apply that standard in this context. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43.

The Ninth Circuit and petitioner Taggart, however, each be- lieve that a different standard should apply.

As for the Ninth Circuit, the parties and the Solicitor Gen- eral agree that it adopted the wrong standard. So do we.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that a “creditor's good faith be- lief ” that the discharge order “does not apply to the credi-

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tor's claim precludes a fnding of contempt, even if the credi- tor's belief is unreasonable.” 888 F. 3d, at 444. But this standard is inconsistent with traditional civil contempt prin- ciples, under which parties cannot be insulated from a fnding of civil contempt based on their subjective good faith. It also relies too heavily on diffcult-to-prove states of mind.

And it may too often lead creditors who stand on shaky legal ground to collect discharged debts, forcing debtors back into litigation (with its accompanying costs) to protect the dis- charge that it was the very purpose of the bankruptcy pro- ceeding to provide.

Taggart, meanwhile, argues for a standard like the one applied by the Bankruptcy Court. This standard would per- mit a fnding of civil contempt if the creditor was aware of the discharge order and intended the actions that violated the order. Brief for Petitioner 19; cf. 522 B. R., at 632 (applying a similar standard). Because most creditors are aware of discharge orders and intend the actions they take to collect a debt, this standard would operate much like a strict-liability standard. It would authorize civil contempt sanctions for a violation of a discharge order regardless of the creditor's subjective beliefs about the scope of the dis- charge order, and regardless of whether there was a reason- able basis for concluding that the creditor's conduct did not violate the order. Taggart argues that such a standard would help the debtor obtain the “fresh start” that bank- ruptcy promises. He adds that a standard resembling strict liability would be fair to creditors because creditors who are unsure whether a debt has been discharged can head to fed- eral bankruptcy court and obtain an advance determination on that question before trying to collect the debt. See Fed.

Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 4007(a).

We doubt, however, that advance determinations would provide a workable solution to a creditor's potential dilemma. A standard resembling strict liability may lead risk-averse creditors to seek an advance determination in bankruptcy

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court even where there is only slight doubt as to whether a debt has been discharged. And because discharge orders are written in general terms and operate against a complex statutory backdrop, there will often be at least some doubt as to the scope of such orders. Taggart's proposal thus may lead to frequent use of the advance determination procedure.

Congress, however, expected that this procedure would be needed in only a small class of cases. See 11 U. S. C. § 523(c)(1) (noting only three categories of debts for which creditors must obtain advance determinations). The wide- spread use of this procedure also would alter who decides whether a debt has been discharged, moving litigation out of state courts, which have concurrent jurisdiction over such questions, and into federal courts. See 28 U. S. C. § 1334(b); Advisory Committee's 2010 Note on subd. (c)(1) of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 776 (noting that “whether a claim was excepted from discharge” is “in most instances” not determined in bankruptcy court).

Taggart's proposal would thereby risk additional federal litigation, additional costs, and additional delays. That re- sult would interfere with “a chief purpose of the bankruptcy laws”: “ `to secure a prompt and effectual' ” resolution of bankruptcy cases “ `within a limited period.' ” Katchen v.

Landy, 382 U. S. 323, 328 (1966) (quoting Ex parte Christy, 3 How. 292, 312 (1844)). These negative consequences, espe- cially the costs associated with the added need to appear in federal proceedings, could work to the disadvantage of debt- ors as well as creditors.

Taggart also notes that lower courts often have used a standard akin to strict liability to remedy violations of auto- matic stays. See Brief for Petitioner 21. An automatic stay is entered at the outset of a bankruptcy proceeding.

The statutory provision that addresses the remedies for vio- lations of automatic stays says that “an individual injured by any willful violation” of an automatic stay “shall recover ac-

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tual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in ap- propriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”

11 U. S. C. § 362(k)(1). This language, however, differs from

the more general language in § 105(a). Supra, at 560. The

A stay aims to prevent damaging disruptions to the adminis- tration of a bankruptcy case in the short run, whereas a dis- charge is entered at the end of the case and seeks to bind creditors over a much longer period. These differences in language and purpose suffciently undermine Taggart's pro- posal to warrant its rejection.

(We note that the automatic stay provision uses the word “willful,” a word the law typically does not associate with strict liability but “ `whose construction is often dependent on the context in which it appears.' ” Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U. S. 47, 57 (2007) (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U. S. 184, 191 (1998)). We need not, and do not, decide whether the word “willful” supports a standard akin to strict liability.)

We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in applying a subjective standard for civil contempt. Based on the tra- ditional principles that govern civil contempt, the proper standard is an objective one. A court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order where there is not a “fair ground of doubt” as to whether the creditor's conduct might be lawful under the discharge order. In our view, that standard strikes the “careful balance between the interests of creditors and debtors” that the Bankruptcy Code often seeks to achieve. Clark v. Rameker, 573 U. S. 122, 129 (2014).

Because the Court of Appeals did not apply the proper standard, we vacate the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.