McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, ET AL. V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA No. 02-1674. Argued September 8, 2003-Decided December 10, 2003* The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), the Communica- tions Act of 1934, and other portions of the United States Code, is the most recent of nearly a century of federal enactments designed "to purge national politics of what [is] conceived to be the pernicious influ- ence of 'big money' campaign contributions." United States v. Automo- In enacting BCRA, Congress sought bile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 572. to address three important developments in the years since this Court's landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (per curian): the increased importance of "soft money," the proliferation of "issue ads,"

and the disturbing findings of a Senate investigation into campaign prac- tices related to the 1996 federal elections.

With regard to the first development, prior to BCRA, FECA's disclo- sure requirements and source and amount limitations extended only to so-called "hard money" contributions made for the purpose of influenc- ing an election for federal office. Political parties and candidates were able to circumvent FECA's limitations by contributing "soft money"- money as yet unregulated under FECA-to be used for activities

*Together with No. 02-1675, National Rifle Association et al. v. Fed- eral Election Commission et al., No. 02-1676, Federal Election Commis- sion et al. v. McConnell, United States Senator, et al., No. 02-1702, Mc- Cain, United States Senator, et al. v. McConnell, United States Senator, et al., No. 02-1727, Republican National Committee et al. v. Federal Elec- tion Commission et al., No. 02-1733, National Right to Life Committee, Inc., et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1734, American Civil Liberties Union v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1740, Adams et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1747, Paul, United States Congressman, et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1753, California Democratic Party et al. v. Federal Election Com- mission et al., No. 02-1755, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., and No. 02-1756, Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. v.

Federal Election Commission et al., also on appeal from the same court.

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intended to influence state or local elections; for mixed-purpose activi- ties such as get-out-the-vote (GOTV) drives and generic party advertis- ing; and for legislative advocacy advertisements, even if they mentioned a federal candidate's name, so long as the ads did not expressly advocate the candidate's election or defeat. With regard to the second develop- ment, parties and candidates circumvented FECA by using "issue ads" that were specifically intended to affect election results, but did not contain "magic words," such as "Vote Against Jane Doe," which would have subjected the ads to FECA's restrictions. Those developments were detailed in a 1998 Senate Committee Report summarizing an in- vestigation into the 1996 federal elections, which concluded that the soft-money loophole had led to a meltdown of the campaign finance sys- tem; and discussed potential reforms, including a soft-money ban and restrictions on sham issue advocacy by nonparty groups.

Congress enacted many of the committee's proposals in BCRA: Title I regulates the use of soft money by political parties, officeholders, and candidates; Title II primarily prohibits corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for communications that are intended to, or have the effect of, influencing federal election outcomes; and Titles III, IV, and V set out other requirements. Eleven actions challenging BCRA's constitutionality were filed. A three-judge District Court held some parts of BCRA unconstitutional and upheld others. The parties challenging the law are referred to here as plaintiffs, and those who intervened in support of the law are intervenor-defendants.

Held: The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 251 F. Supp. 2d 948, affirmed in part and reversed

in part.

JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the Court's opin- ion with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, concluding that the statute's two principal, complementary features-Congress' effort to plug the soft-money loophole and its regulation of electioneering communica- tions-must be upheld in the main. Pp. 133-224.

1. New FECA §323 survives plaintiffs' facial First Amendment chal-

lenge. Pp. 133-189.

(a) In evaluating § 323, the Court applies the less rigorous standard of review applicable to campaign contribution limits under Buckley and its progeny. Such limits are subject only to "closely drawn" scrutiny, see 424 U. S., at 25, rather than to strict scrutiny, because, unlike restric- tions on campaign expenditures, contribution limits "entai[l] only a mar- ginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free com- munication," e. g., id., at 20-21. Moreover, contribution limits are grounded in the important governmental interests in preventing "both

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the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption." E.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Na- tional Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 208. The less rigorous review standard shows proper deference to Congress' ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys par- ticular expertise, and provides it with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the political process' integrity. Finally, because Congress, in its lengthy deliberations leading to BCRA's enactment, properly relied on Buckley and its progeny, stare decisis considerations, buttressed by the respect that the Legislative and Judicial Branches owe one an- other, provide additional powerful reasons for adhering to the analysis of contribution limits the Court has consistently followed since Buckley.

The Court rejects plaintiffs' argument that the type of speech and associational burdens that § 323 imposes are fundamentally differ- ent from the burdens that accompanied Buckley's contribution limits.

Pp. 134-142.

(b) New FECA § 323(a)-which forbids national party committees and their agents to "solicit, receive .... direct..., or spend any funds, that are not subject to [FECA's] limitations, prohibitions, and report- ing requirements," 2 U. S. C. § 441i(a)(1)--does not violate the First Amendment. Pp. 142-161.

(1) The governmental interest underlying §323(a)-preventing

the actual or apparent corruption of federal candidates and officehold- ers-constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify contribution limits. That interest is not limited to the elimination of quid pro quo, cash-for-votes exchanges, see Buckley, supra, at 28, but extends also to "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influence," Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed- eral Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 441 (Colorado II). These inter- ests are sufficient to justify not only contribution limits themselves, but also laws preventing the circumvention of such limits.

Id., at 456.

While the quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments varies with the novelty or plausibility of the justification raised, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov- ernment PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 391, the idea that large contributions to a national party can corrupt or create the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor implausible, see,

e. g., Buckley, supra, at 38. There is substantial evidence in these cases

to support Congress' determination that such contributions of soft money give rise to corruption and the appearance of corruption. For instance, the record is replete with examples of national party commit-

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tees peddling access to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large soft-money donations. Pp. 143-154.

(2) Section 323(a) is not impermissibly overbroad because it sub-

jects all funds raised and spent by national parties to FECA's hard- money source and amount limits, including, e. g., funds spent on purely state and local elections in which no federal office is at stake. The rec- ord demonstrates that the close relationship between federal officehold- ers and the national parties, as well as the means by which parties have traded on that relationship, have made all large soft-money contribu- tions to national parties suspect, regardless of how those funds are ulti- mately used. The Government's strong interests in preventing corrup- tion, and particularly its appearance, are thus sufficient to justify subjecting all donations to national parties to FECA's source, amount, and disclosure limitations. Pp. 154-156.

(3) Nor is §323(a)'s prohibition on national parties' soliciting or

directing soft-money contributions substantially overbroad. That pro- hibition's reach is limited, in that it bars only soft-money solicitations by national party committees and party officers acting in their official capacities; the committees themselves remain free to solicit hard money on their own behalf or that of state committees and state and local candi- dates and to contribute hard money to state committees and candidates.

Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that the solicitation ban's overbreadth is demonstrated by § 323(e), which allows federal candidates and office- holders to solicit limited amounts of soft money from individual donors under certain circumstances. The differences between §§323(a) and 323(e) are without constitutional significance, see National Right to Work, supra, at 210, reflecting Congress' reasonable and expert judg- ments about national committees' functions and their interactions with officeholders. Pp. 157-158.

(4) Section 323(a) is not substantially overbroad with respect to

the speech and associational rights of minor parties, even though the It is reasonable latter may have slim prospects for electoral success. to require that all parties and candidates follow the same rules designed to protect the electoral process' integrity. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 34-35. A nascent or struggling minor party can bring an as-applied challenge if § 323(a) prevents it from amassing the resources necessary to engage in effective advocacy. Id., at 21. Pp. 158-159.

(5) Plaintiffs' argument that § 323(a) unconstitutionally interferes

with the ability of national committees to associate with state and local committees is unpersuasive because it hinges on an unnaturally broad reading of the statutory terms "spend," "receive," "direct," and "solicit."

Nothing on §323(a)'s face prohibits national party officers from sit- ting down with state and local party committees or candidates to plan

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and advise how to raise and spend soft money, so long as the national officers do not personally spend, receive, direct, or solicit soft money.

Pp. 159-161.

(c) On its face, new FECA § 323(b)-which prohibits state and local party committees from using soft money for activities affecting federal elections, 2 U. S. C. § 441i(b)-is closely drawn to match the important governmental interest of preventing corruption and its appearance.

Pp. 161-173.

(1) Recognizing that the close ties between federal candidates

and state party committees would soon render § 323(a)'s anticorruption measures ineffective if state and local committees remained available as a conduit for soft-money donations, Congress designed § 323(b) to pre- vent donors from contributing nonfederal funds to such committees to help finance "Federal election activity," which is defined to encompass

(1) voter registration activity during the 120 days before a federal elec-

tion; (2) voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activity "con- ducted in connection with an election in which a [federal] candidate... appears on the ballot"; (3) any "public communication" that "refers to a clearly identified (federal] candidate" and "promotes," "supports," "at- tacks," or "opposes" such a candidate; and (4) the services of a state committee employee who dedicates more than 25% of his or her compen- sated time to "activities in connection with a Federal election," 2

U. S. C. §§431(20)(A)(i)-(iv). All activities that fall within this def-

inition must be funded with hard money. §441i(b)(1). The Levin Amendment carves out an exception to this general rule, allowing state and local party committees to pay for certain federal election activi- ties-namely, activities falling within categories (1) and (2) above that either do not refer to "a clearly identified candidate for Federal office," or, if they involve broadcast communications, refer "solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local office," §§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii)- with an allocated ratio of hard money and so-called "Levin funds."

Levin funds are subject only to state regulation, but for two additional restrictions. First, no contributor can donate more than $10,000 per year to a single committee's Levin account. §441i(b)(2)(B)(iii).

Sec- ond, both Levin funds and the allocated portion of hard money to pay for such activities must be raised by the state or local committee that spends them, though the committee can team up with other national, state, or the hard-money portion. §§441i(b)(2)(B)(iv), 441i(b)(2)(C). Pp. 161-164.

local committees to solicit

(2) In addressing soft-money contributions to state committees,

Congress both drew a conclusion and made a prediction.

It concluded from the record that soft money's corrupting influence insinuates itself into the political process not only through national party committees,

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but also through state committees, which function as an alternate ave- Indeed, the evidence nue for precisely the same corrupting forces. shows that both candidates and parties already ask donors who have reached their direct contribution limit to donate to state committees.

Congress' reasonable prediction, based on the history of campaign fi- nance regulation, was that donors would react to § 323(a) by directing soft-money contributions to state committees for the purpose of influ- encing federal candidates and elections, and that federal candidates would be just as indebted to these contributors as they had been to those who had formerly contributed to the national parties. Preventing corrupting activity from shifting wholesale to state committees and thereby eviscerating FECA clearly qualifies as an important govern- mental interest. Pp. 164-166.

(3) Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that, even if § 323(b) serves a

legitimate interest, its restrictions are so unjustifiably burdensome and overbroad that they cannot be considered "closely drawn" to match the Government's objectives. P. 166.

(i) Section 323(b) is not substantially overbroad. Although § 323(b) captures some activities that affect state campaigns for nonfed- eral offices, these are the same activities that were covered by the Fed- eral Election Commission's (FEC) pre-BCRA allocation rules, and so had to be funded in part by hard money because they affected both federal and state elections. As a practical matter, BCRA merely codi- fies the FEC's allocation regime principles while justifiably adjusting the applicable formulas in order to restore the efficacy of FECA's long- standing restriction on contributions to state and local committees for the purpose of influencing federal elections. By limiting its reach to "Federal election activities," § 323(b) is narrowly focused on regulating contributions that directly benefit federal candidates and thus pose the greatest risk of corruption or its appearance. The first two categories of "Federal election activity"-voter registration efforts and voter iden- tification, GOTV, and generic campaign activities conducted in connec- tion with a federal election--clearly capture activities that confer a sub- stantial benefit on federal candidates by getting like-minded voters to If a voter registration drive does not specifically mention a the polls.

federal candidate, state committees can take advantage of the Levin Amendment's higher contribution limits and relaxed source restrictions.

Moreover, because the record demonstrates abundantly that the third category of "Federal election activity," "public communication[s]" that promote or attack a federal candidate, directly affects the election in which that candidate is participating, application of § 323(b)'s contribu- tion caps to such communications is closely drawn to the anticorruption interest it is intended to address. Finally, Congress' interest in pre-

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venting circumvention of § 323(b)'s other restrictions justifies the re- quirement of the fourth category of "Federal election activity" that fed- eral funds be used to pay any state or local party employee who spends more than 25% of his or her compensated time on activities connected with a federal election. Pp. 166-171.

(ii) The Levin Amendment does not unjustifiably burden asso- ciation among party committees by forbidding transfers of Levin funds among state parties, transfers of hard money to fund the allocable fed- eral portion of Levin expenditures, and joint fundraising of Levin funds by state parties. While preserving parties' associational freedom is im- portant, not every minor restriction on parties' otherwise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitutional dimension. See Colorado II, 533

U. S., at 450, n. 11. Given the delicate and interconnected regulatory

scheme at issue here, any associational burdens imposed by the Levin Amendment restrictions are far outweighed by the need to prevent cir- cumvention of the entire scheme. Pp. 171-173.

(iii) The evidence supporting the argument that the Levin Amendment prevents parties from amassing the resources needed to engage in effective advocacy is speculative. The history of campaign finance regulation proves that political parties are extraordinarily flex- ible in adapting to new restrictions on their fundraising abilities. More- over, the mere fact that § 323(b) may reduce the money available to state and local parties to fund federal election activities is. largely inconse- quential. The question is not whether the amount available over previ- ous election cycles is reduced, but whether the reduction is so radical as to drive the sound of the recipient's voice below the level of notice.

If state or local parties can make Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 397. such a showing, as-applied challenges remain available. P. 173.

(d) New FECA §323(d)-which forbids national, state, and local party committees and their agents to "solicit any funds for, or make or direct any donations" to § 501(c) tax-exempt organizations that make expenditures in connection with a federal election, and to § 527 political organizations "other than a political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office," 2 U. S. C. §441i(d)-is not facially invalid. Pp. 174-181.

(1) Section 323(d)'s restriction on solicitations is a valid anti-

circumvention measure. Absent this provision, national, state, and local party committees would have significant incentives to mobilize their formidable fundraising apparatuses, including the peddling of ac- cess to federal officeholders, into the. service of like-minded tax-exempt organizations that conduct activities benefiting their candidates. All of the corruption and the appearance of corruption attendant on the opera-

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tion of those fundraising apparatuses would follow. Plaintiffs' argu- ment that §323(d)'s solicitations ban cannot be squared with §323(e), which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited soft- money donations to tax-exempt organizations engaged in federal elec- If § 323(d)'s solicitation restriction is tion activities, is not persuasive. otherwise valid, it is not rendered unconstitutional by the mere fact that Congress chose not to regulate the activities of another group as stringently as it might have. See National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 210. Furthermore, the difference between the two provisions is ex- plained by the fact that national party officers, unlike federal candidates and officeholders, remain free to solicit soft money on behalf of nonprofit organizations in their individual capacities. Given § 323(e)'s tight con- tent, source, and amount restrictions on soft-money solicitations by fed- eral candidates and officeholders, as well as the less rigorous standard of review, § 323(e)'s greater solicitation allowances do not render § 323(d)'s solicitation restriction facially invalid. Pp. 174-178.

(2) Section 323(d)'s restriction on donations to qualifying § 501(c)

or § 527 organizations is a valid anticircumvention measure insofar as it prohibits donations of funds not already raised in compliance with FECA. Absent such a restriction, state and local party committees could accomplish directly what the antisolicitation restrictions prevent them from doing indirectly-raising large sums of soft money to launder through tax-exempt organizations engaging in federal election activi- ties. Although the ban raises overbreadth concerns if read to restrict donations from a party's federal account-i. e., funds already raised in compliance with FECA's source, amount, and disclosure limitations- these concerns do not require that the facial challenge be sustained, given this Court's obligation to construe a statute, if possible, in such a way as to avoid constitutional questions, see, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62. Because the record does not compel the conclusion that Congress intended "donations" to include donations from a party's hard-money account, and because of the constitutional infirmities such an interpretation would raise, the Court narrowly construes § 323(d)s ban to apply only to donations of funds not raised in compliance with FECA. Pp. 178-181.

(e) New FECA §323(e)-which, with many exceptions, forbids fed- eral candidates and officeholders to "solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend" soft money in connection with federal elections, 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e)(1)(A), and limits their ability to do so for state and local elec- tions, §441i(e)(1)(B)-does not violate the First Amendment. No party seriously questions the constitutionality of the general ban on soft- money donations directly to federal candidates and officeholders and their agents. By severing the most direct link to the soft-money donor,

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the ban is closely drawn to prevent the corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. The solicita- tion restrictions are valid anticircumvention measures. Even before BCRA's passage, federal candidates and officeholders solicited donations to state and local parties, as well as tax-exempt organizations, in order to help their own, as well as their party's, electoral cause. See Colo- rado II, su'pra, at 458. The incentives to do so will only increase with Title I's restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money by na- tional, state, and local parties. Section 323(e) addresses these concerns while accommodating the individual speech and associational rights of federal candidates and officeholders. Pp. 181-184.

(f) New FECA §323(f)-which forbids state and local candidates or officeholders to raise and spend soft money to fund ads and other "public communications" that promote or attack federal candidates, 2

U. S. C. § 441i(f)-is a valid anticircumvention provision. The sec-

tion places no cap on the funds that such candidates can spend on any activity, but, rather, limits only the source and amount of contributions that they can draw on to fund expenditures that directly impact federal elections. And, by regulating only contributions used to fund "public communications," the section focuses narrowly on those soft-money do- nations with the greatest potential to corrupt or give rise to the appear- ance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. Plaintiffs' principal arguments against the section-(1) that the definition of "pub- lic communications" as communications that support or attack a clearly identified federal candidate is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and (2) that soft-money contributions to state and local candidates for "public communications" do not corrupt or appear to corrupt federal candidates-are rejected. Pp. 184-185.

2. Several plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that BCRA Title I exceeds

Congress' Election Clause authority to "make or alter" rules governing federal elections, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 4, and violates constitutional fed- eralism principles by impairing the States' authority to regulate their own elections.

In examining federal Acts for Tenth Amendment infir- mity, the Court focuses on whether States and state officials are com- mandeered to carry out federal regulatory schemes. See, e. g., Printz v.

United States, 521 U. S. 898. By contrast, Title I only regulates private parties' conduct, imposing no requirements upon States or state officials.

And, because it does not expressly pre-empt state legislation, Title I leaves States free to enforce their own restrictions on state electoral campaign financing. Moreover, while this Court has policed the abso- lute boundaries of Congress' Article I power, see, e. g., United States v.

Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, plaintiffs offer no reason to believe that Con- gress has overstepped its Elections Clause power in enacting BCRA.

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Indeed, as already found, Title I is closely drawn to match Congress' important interest in preventing the corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. That interest is suf- ficient to ground Congress' exercise of its Elections Clause power.

Pp. 186-187.

3. Also rejected is the argument that BCRA Title I violates equal

protection by discriminating against political parties in favor of special interest groups, which remain free to raise soft money to fund voter registration, GOTV activities, mailings, and broadcast advertising (other than electioneering communications). First, BCRA actually fa- vors political parties in many ways, e. g., by allowing party committees to receive individual contributions substantially exceeding FECA limits on contributions to nonparty political committees. More importantly, Congress is fully entitled to consider the salient, real-world differences between parties and interest groups when crafting a campaign finance regulation system, see National Right to Work, supra, at 210, including the fact that parties have influence and power in the legislature vastly exceeding any interest group's. Taken seriously, plaintiffs' equal pro- tection arguments would call into question not just BCRA Title I, but much of FECA's pre-existing structure. Pp. 187-188.

4. Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed insofar as it upheld

§§323(e) and 323(f) and reversed insofar as it invalidated §§323(a), 323(b), and 323(d). Pp. 188-189.

5. The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it up-

in amended FECA §304 and re- held the disclosure requirements jected the facial attack on the provisions relating to donors of $1,000 or more, but reversed to the extent that it invalidated FECA § 304(f)(5).

Pp. 189-202.

(a) BCRA §201 comprehensively amends FECA §304, which re- quires political committees to file detailed periodic financial reports with the FEC. The narrowing construction adopted in Buckley limited FECA's disclosure requirement to communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates. BCRA adopts a new term, "electioneering communication," which encompasses any "broad- cast, cable, or satellite communication" that clearly identifies a candidate for federal office, airs within a specific time period.(e. g., within 60 days of a general election and 30 days of a primary), and is targeted to the relevant electorate. 2 U.S. C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i). BCRA also amends § 304 to provide disclosure requirements for persons who fund election- eering communications (and BCRA §203 amends FECA §316(b)(2) to extend those requirements to corporations and labor unions).

Plaintiffs challenge the new term's constitutionality as it applies to both disclosures and expenditures, arguing primarily that Buckley drew

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a constitutionally mandated line between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy, and that speakers have an inviolable First Amendment right to engage in the latter category of speech. However, a plain read- ing of Buckley and Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (MCFL), shows that the express advocacy restriction is a product of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional command. Both the concept of express advocacy and the class of magic words were born of an effort to avoid constitutional problems of vague- ness and overbreadth in the statute before the Buckley Court. Con- sistent with the principle that a constitutional rule should never be for- mulated more broadly than required by the facts to which it is to be applied, Buckley and MCFL were specific to the statutory language before the Court and in no way drew a constitutional boundary that forever fixed the permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign- related speech. The notion that the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express and issue advocacy also cannot be squared with this Court's longstanding recognition that the presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true issue ad. Buckley's express advocacy line has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption, and Con- gress enacted BCRA to correct the flaws it found. Finally, because the components of new FECA § 304(f)(3)'s definition of "electioneering communication" are both easily understood and objectively determina- ble, the vagueness objection that persuaded the Buckley Court to limit FECA's reach to express advocacy is inapposite here. Pp. 189-194.

(b) With regard to plaintiffs' other concerns about the use of the phrase "electioneering communication," the District Court correctly re- jected their submission that new FECA §304 unnecessarily requires disclosure of the names of persons who contributed $1,000 or more to the individual or group paying for the communication, but erred in finding § 304(f)(5) invalid because it mandates disclosure of executory contracts for communications that have not yet aired. Because the important state interests identified in Buckley-providing the electorate with in- formation, deterring actual corruption and avoiding its appearance, and gathering data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering re- strictions-apply in full to BCRA, Buckley amply supports application of FECA § 304's disclosure requirements to the entire range of "election- eering communications." Buckley also forecloses a facial attack on the new § 304 provision that requires disclosure of the names of persons who contribute $1,000 or more to segregated funds or spend more than $10,000 in a calendar year on electioneering communications. Under Buckley's standard of proof, the evidence here did not establish the req- uisite reasonable probability of harm to any plaintiff group or its mem-

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bers resulting from compelled disclosure. However, the rejection of this facial challenge does not foreclose possible future challenges to par- ticular applications of that disclosure requirement.

This Court is also unpersuaded by plaintiffs' challenge to new FECA § 304(f)(5)'s requirement regarding the disclosure of executory contracts. The new provision mandates disclosure only when a person makes disbursements totaling more than $10,000 in any calendar year to pay for electioneering communications. Given the relatively short timeframes in which such communications are made, the interest in as- suring that disclosures are made in time to provide relevant information to voters is significant. Yet fixing the deadline for filing disclosure statements based on the date when aggregate disbursements exceed $10,000 would open a significant loophole without the advance disclosure requirement, for political supporters could avoid preelection disclosures about ads slated to run during a campaign's final weeks simply by mak- ing a preelection downpayment of less than $10,000, with the balance payable after the election. The record contains little evidence of any harm that might flow from the requirement's enforcement, and the Dis- trict Court's speculation about such harm cannot outweigh the public interest in ensuring full disclosure before an election actually takes place. Pp. 194-202.

6. The District Court's judgment is affirmed insofar as' it held that

plaintiffs advanced no basis for finding unconstitutional BCRA §202, which amends FECA §315(a)(7)(C) to provide that disbursements for electioneering communications that are coordinated with a candidate or party will be treated as contributions to, and expenditures by, that can- didate or party, 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(7)(C). That provision clarifies the scope of § 315(a)(7)(B), which provides that expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of a candidate or party constitute contributions. BCRA pre-empts a possible claim that the term "expenditure" in § 315(a)(7)(B) is limited to spending for express advocacy. Because Buckley' narrow interpretation of that term was only a statutory limitation on Congress' power to regulate federal elections, there is no reason why Congress may not treat coordinated disbursements for electioneering commu- nications in the same way it treats other coordinated expenditures.

Pp. 202-203.

7. The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it up-

held the constitutionality of new FECA § 316(b)(2), and reversed to the extent that it invalidated any part of that section. BCRA § 203 extends to all "electioneering communications" FECA §316(b)(2)'s restrictions on the use of corporate and union general treasury funds. 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2). Because those entities may still organize and administer

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segregated funds, or PACs, for such communications, the provision is a regulation of, not a ban on, expression. Federal Election Comm'n v.

Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146, 162. This Court's consideration of plaintiffs' claim that the expanded regulation is both overinclusive and underinclu- sive is informed by the conclusion that the distinction between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy is not constitutionally compelled.

Thus, the Court examines the degree to which BCRA burdens First Amendment expression and evaluates whether a compelling govern- mental interest justifies that burden. Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of proving that new FECA §316(b)(2) is overbroad. They argue that the justifications that adequately support regulation of ex- press advocacy do not apply to significant quantities of speech encom- passed by the electioneering communications definition. That argu- ment fails to the extent that issue ads broadcast during the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal primary and general elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The justifications for reg- ulating express advocacy apply equally to those ads if they have an electioneering purpose, which the vast majority do. Also rejected is plaintiffs' argument that new FECA §316(b)(2)'s segregated-fund re- quirement is underinclusive because it does not apply to print or In- ternet advertising. The record here reflects that corporations and unions used soft money to finance a virtual torrent of televised election- related ads during the relevant period. Congress justifiably concluded that remedial legislation was needed to stanch that flow of money. Fi- nally, § 304(f)(3)(B)(i), which excludes news items and commentary from the electioneering communications definition, is wholly consistent with First Amendment principles as applied to the media. Pp. 203-209.

8. The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it up-

held new FECA §316(c)(6), as limited to nonprofit entities that are not so-called MCFL organizations. BCRA §204, which adds §316(c)(6), 2

U. S. C. § 441b(c)(2), extends to nonprofit corporations the prohibition

on the use of general treasury funds to pay for electioneering communi- cations. This Court upheld a similar restriction in Beaumont, supra, except as it applied to organizations that are formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, have no shareholders, are not es- tablished by a business corporation or labor union, and do not accept contributions from those entities, MCFL, 479 U. S., at 264. The same constitutional objection to applying the pre-BCRA restrictions to such organizations necessarily applies with equal force to FECA §316(c)(6).

That §316(c)(6) does not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations is not a sufficient reason to invalidate it. This Court presumes that the to legislators were fully aware that the provision could not apply

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MCFL-type entities, and the Government concedes that it does not. As so construed, the provision is plainly valid. Pp. 209-211.

9. Because this Court has already found BCRA § 201's executory con-

tract disclosure requirement constitutional, plaintiffs' challenge to a sim- ilar disclosure requirement in BCRA § 212, which added FECA § 304(g), 2 U. S. C. § 434, is essentially moot. Pp. 211-212.

10. The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it

invalidated BCRA §213, which amends FECA §315(d)(4) to require political parties to choose between coordinated and independent ex- penditures during the postnomination, preelection period. 2 U. S. C. §441a(d)(4). That provision places an unconstitutional, burden on the parties' right to make unlimited independent expenditures. Although the category of burdened speech is limited to independent expenditures for express advocacy-and therefore is relatively small-it plainly is entitled to First Amendment protection. The governmental interest in requiring parties to avoid using magic words is not sufficient to support the burden imposed by §315(d)(4). The fact that the provision is cast as a choice rather than an outright prohibition on independent expendi- tures does not make it constitutional. Pp. 213-219.

11. The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that

it rejected plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA §214, which adds FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii), 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(7)(B)(ii). FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(i) long has provided that expenditures that are controlled by or coordi- nated with a candidate will be treated as contributions to the candidate.

BCRA § 214(a) extends that rule to expenditures coordinated with polit- ical parties; and §§214 (b) and (c) direct the FEC to promulgate new regulations that do not "require agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination," 2 U. S. C. §441a(a) note. FECA §315(a)(7) (B)(ii) is not overbroad simply because it permits a finding of coordina- tion in the absence of a pre-existing agreement. Congress has always treated expenditures made after a wink or nod as coordinated. Nor does the absence of an agreement requirement render § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) unconstitutionally vague. An agreement has never been required under §315(a)(7)(B)(i), which uses precisely the same language as the new provision to address coordination with candidates, and which has survived without constitutional challenge for almost three decades.

Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that the definition has chilled politi- cal speech, and have made no attempt to explain how an agreement requirement would prevent the FEC from engaging in what they fear will be intrusive and politically motivated investigations. Finally, in this facial challenge to BCRA, plaintiffs' challenge to §§214(b) and (c) is not ripe to the extent that they allege constitutional infirmities in the FEC's new regulations rather than the statute. Pp. 219-224.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Syllabus

THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to miscellaneous BCRA Title III and IV provisions, concluding that the District Court's judgment with respect to these provisions must be af- firmed. Pp. 224-233.

1. The plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA § 305, § 307, and the millionaire

provisions are nonjusticiable. Pp. 224-230.

(a) The McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to challenge BCRA § 305, which amends the federal Communications Act of 1934 requirement that, 45 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election, broadcast stations sell air time to a qualified candidate at their "lowest unit charge," 47 U. S. C. § 315(b). Section 305's amendment, in turn, denies a candidate the benefit of that charge in specified circumstances.

47 U. S. C. §§315(b)(2)(A), (C). Senator McConnell's testimony that he plans to run ads critical of his opponents and had run them in the past is too remote temporally to satisfy the Article III standing require- ment that a plaintiff demonstrate an "injury in fact" that is "actual or imminent," Whitmnore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155, 158, given that the lowest unit charge requirement is not available until 45 days before a primary, that Senator McConnell's current term does not expire until 2009, and that, therefore, the earliest day he could be affected by § 305 is 45 days before the 2008 Republican primary election. Pp. 224-226. (b) The Adams and Paul plaintiffs lack standing to challenge BCRA § 307, which amends FECA § 315(a)(1) to increase and index for inflation certain contribution limits. Neither injury alleged by the Adams plain- tiffs, a group of voters, voter organizations, and candidates, is sufficient to confer standing. First, their assertion that § 307 deprives them of an equal ability to participate in the election process based on their economic status does not satisfy the standing requirement that a plain- tiff's alleged injury be an invasion of a concrete and particularized le- gally protected interest, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560, since political "free trade" does not necessarily require that all who participate in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal re- sources, e. g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 257 (MCFL). Second, the Adams plaintiffs- candidates' contention that § 307 puts them at a "fundraising disadvan- tage" compared to their opponents because they do not wish to solicit or accept the large campaign contributions BCRA permits does not meet the standing requirement that their alleged injury be "fairly trace- able" to § 307, see Lujan, supra, at 562, since their alleged inability to compete stems not from § 307's operation, but from their own personal choice not to solicit or accept large contributions. Also inadequate for standing purposes is the Paul plaintiffs' contention that their congres- sional campaigns and public interest advocacy involve traditional press

108 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Syllabus

activities, such that §307's contribution limits, together with FECA § 315's individual and political action committee contribution limitations, impose unconstitutional editorial control on them in violation of the First Amendment's Freedom of the Press Clause. These plaintiffs can- not show the requisite substantial likelihood their requested relief will remedy their alleged injury in fact, see Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 771, since, even if the Court were to strike down BCRA § 307's increases and indexes, as they ask, both FECA's contribution limits and an exemption for insti- tutional news media would remain unchanged. Pp. 226-229.

(c) The Adams plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the so-called "millionaire provisions," BCRA §§ 304, 316, and 319, which provide for a series of staggered increases in otherwise applicable contribution-to- candidate limits if the candidate's opponent spends a triggering amount of his personal funds, and eliminate the coordinated expenditure limits in certain circumstances. Because these plaintiffs allege the same in- juries that they alleged with regard to BCRA § 307, they fail to state a cognizable injury that is fairly traceable to BCRA. Additionally, none of them is a candidate in an election affected by the millionaire provi- sions, and it would be purely conjectural to assume that any of them ever will be. Pp. 229-230.

2. The District Court's decision upholding BCRA § 311's expansion of

FECA §318(a) to include mandatory electioneering-communications- disbursements disclosure is affirmed because such inclusion bears a suf- ficient relationship to the important governmental interest of "shed- [ding] the light of publicity" on campaign financing, Buckley, 424 U. S., at 81. Assuming, as the Court must, that FECA §318 is valid both to begin with and as amended by BCRA §311's amendments other than the electioneering-communications inclusion, the latter inclusion is not itself unconstitutional. Pp. 230-231.

3. BCRA §318-which forbids individuals "17 years old or younger"

to make contributions to candidates and political parties, 2 U. S. C. § 441k-violates the First Amendment rights of minors, see, e. g., Tinker

v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 511-

513. Because limitations on an individual's political contributions im-

pinge on the freedoms of expression and association, see Buckley, supra, at 20-22, the Court applies heightened scrutiny to such a limitation, asking whether it is justified by a "sufficiently important interest" and "closely drawn" to avoid unnecessary abridgment of the First Amend- ment, see, e.g., post, at 136 (joint opinion of STEVENS and O'CONNOR, JJ.). The Government offers scant evidence for its assertion that § 318 protects against corruption by conduit-i. e., donations by parents through their minor children to circumvent contribution limits applica-

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Syllabus

ble to the parents. Absent a more convincing case of the claimed evil, this interest is simply too attenuated for § 318 to withstand heightened scrutiny. See Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 391. Even assuming, ar- guendo, the Government advances an important interest, the provision is overinclusive, as shown by the States' adoption of more tailored ap- proaches. Pp. 231-232.

4. Because the FEC clearly has standing, the Court need not address

whether the intervenor-defendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC's, were properly granted intervention pursuant to, inter alia, BCRA § 403(b). See, e. g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U. S. '417, 431-432, n. 19. P. 233.

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the Court's opinion with respect to BCRA Title V-§ 504 of which amends the Communications Act of 1934 to re- quire broadcasters to keep publicly available records of politically re- lated broadcasting requests, 47 U.S. C. § 315(e)--concluding that the portion of the judgment below invalidating § 504 as facially violative of the First Amendment must be reversed. Pp. 233-245.

broadcasters to keep records of broadcast requests "made by or on be- candidate," 47 U. S. C. §315(e)(1)(A)-are upheld. They half of a ... are virtually identical to those contained in a longstanding Federal Com- munications Commission (FCC) regulation. The McConnell plaintiffs' argument that the requirements are intolerably burdensome and inva- sive is rejected. The FCC has consistently estimated that its regula- tion imposes upon a licensee a comparatively small additional adminis- trative burden. Moreover, the § 504 requirement is supported by significant governmental interests in verifying that licensees comply with their obligations to allow political candidates "equal time," 47

U. S. C. § 315(a), and to sell such time at the "lowest unit charge,"

§ 315(b); in evaluating whether they are processing candidate requests in an evenhanded fashion to help assure broadcasting fairness, § 315(a); in making the public aware of how much candidates spend on broadcast messages, 2 U. S. C. § 434; and in providing an independently com- piled set of data for verifying candidates' compliance with BCRA's and FECA's disclosure requirements and source limitations, ibid. Because the Court cannot, on the present record, find the longstanding FCC regulation unconstitutional, it cannot strike down BCRA § 504's "candi- date request" provision, which simply embodies the regulation in a stat- ute, thereby blocking any agency attempt to repeal it. Pp. 234-238.

2. Because § 504's "candidate request" requirements are constitutional,

its "election message" requirements-which serve similar governmental interests and impose only a small incremental burden in requiring broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast

110 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Syllabus

"message[s]" that refer either to a "legally qualified candidate" or to "any election to Federal office," 47 U. S. C. §§ 315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii)-must be constitutional as well. Pp. 238-240.

3. BCRA § 504's "issue request" requirements-which call for broad-

casters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast "mes- sage[s]" related to a "national legislative issue of public importance," 47

U. S. C. § 315(e)(1)(B)(iii), or a "political matter of national impor-

tance," §315(e)(1)(B)-survive the McConnell plaintiffs' facial challenge.

These recordkeeping requirements seem likely to help determine whether broadcasters are fulfilling their obligations under the FCC's regulations to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of con- flicting views on important public issues or whether they too heavily favor entertainment, discriminating against public affairs broadcasts.

The plaintiffs' claim that the above-quoted statutory language is uncon- stitutionally vague or overbroad is unpersuasive, given that it is no more general than language Congress has used to impose other ob- ligations upon broadcasters and is roughly comparable to other BCRA language upheld in this litigation. Whether the "issue request" re- quirements impose disproportionate administrative burdens will depend on how the FCC interprets and applies them. The parties remain free to challenge the provisions, as interpreted by the FCC's regulations, or as otherwise applied. Without the greater information any such chal- lenge will likely provide, the Court cannot say that the provisions' ad- ministrative burdens are so great, or their justifications so minimal, as to warrant finding them facially unconstitutional. Similarly, the argu- ment that the "issue request" requirement will force the purchasers to disclose information revealing their political strategies to opponents does not show that BCRA § 504 is facially unconstitutional, but the plaintiffs remain free to raise this argument when § 504 is applied.

Pp. 240-246.

STEVENS and O'CONNOR, JJ., delivered the opinion of the Court with in which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and respect to BCRA Titles I and II, BREYER, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined, in which STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined except with respect to BCRA §305, and in which THOMAS, J., joined with respect to BCRA §§ 304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and 403(b), post, p. 224. BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Title V, in which STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined, post, p. 233. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V, and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Syllabus

part with respect to BCRA Title II, post, p. 247. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, except for BCRA §§311 and 318, concurring in the result with respect to BCRA §318, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with re- spect to BCRA Title II, and dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I, V, and § 311, in which opinion SCALIA, J., joined as to Parts I, II-A, and II-B, post, p. 264. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., joined, in which SCALIA, J., joined except to the extent the opinion upholds new FECA §323(e) and BCRA §202, and in which THOMAS, J., joined with respect to BCRA § 213, post, p. 286. REHNQUIST,

which SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, post, p. 350. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion dissenting with respect to BCRA §305, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined, post, p. 363.

Kenneth W Starr and Floyd Abrams argued the cause for plaintiffs below, Senator Mitch McConnell et al., appellants in No. 02-1674 and cross-appellees in Nos. 02-1676 and 02-1702.

With them on the briefs were Edward W Warren, Susan Buckley, Brian Markley, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Valle Simms Dutcher, L. Lynn Hogue, Jan Witold Baran, Lee E.

Goodman, G. Hunter Bates, Jack N. Goodman, and Jeri- anne Timmerman.

Bobby R. Burchfield argued the cause for the political party plaintiffs below. With him on the briefs for the Republican National Committee et al., appellants in No. 02-1727, the California Democratic Party et al., appel- lants in No. 02-1753, and the Libertarian National Commit- tee, Inc., one of the appellants in No. 02-1733, were Thomas

0. Barnett, Robert K. Kelner, Richard W Smith, Lance H.

Olson, Deborah B. Caplan, Joseph E. Sandler, John Hardin Young, Charles H. Bell, Jr., Jan Witold Baran, Lee E. Good- man, Thomas J. Josefiak, Benjamin L. Ginsberg, Eric A.

Kuwana, Michael A. Carvin, James Bopp, Jr., Richard E.

Coleson, and Thomas J Marzen.

Solicitor General Olson and Deputy Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for federal defendants below, the Federal Election Commission et al. With them on the briefs

112 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Counsel

were Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Malcolm L. Stew- art, Gregory G. Garre, Douglas N. Letter, Dana J. Martin, Terry M. Henry, Lawrence H. Norton, Richard B. Bader, and David Kolker.

Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for the intervenor- defendants below, Senator John McCain et al. With him on the briefs were Randolph D. Moss, Edward C. DuMont, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Roger M. Witten, Burt Neuborne, Fred- erick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Charles G. Curtis, Jr., David J.

Harth, Bradley S. Phillips, E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Alan B.

Morrison, Scott L. Nelson, Eric J. Mogilnicki, Michael D.

Leffel, Fred Wertheimer, Alexandra Edsall, and Trevor Potter.

Laurence E. Gold argued the cause for plaintiffs below, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al., appellants in No. 02-1755 and appellees in Nos. 02-1676 and 02-1702. With him on the briefs were Jonathan P. Hiatt, Michael B. Trister, and Larry P.

Weinberg.

Jay Alan Sekulow argued the cause for plaintiffs below, Emily Echols et al. With him on the brief were James M.

Henderson, Sr., Stuart J Roth, Colby M. May, Joel H.

Thornton, Walter M. Weber, James Bopp, Jr., Richard E.

Coleson, and Thomas J Marzen.

Briefs in No. 02-1675 were filed for appellants National Rifle Association et al. by Charles J. Cooper, David H.

Thompson, Hamish P. M. Hume, Brian S. Koukoutchos, and Cleta Mitchell.

Briefs in No. 02-1733 were filed for plaintiffs-appellants/ cross-appellees National Right to Life Committee, Inc., et al. by James Bopp, Jr., Richard E. Coleson, and Thomas J Marzen.

Briefs in No. 02-1734 were filed for appellant American Civil Liberties Union by Mark J. Lopez, Steven R. Shapiro, and Joel M. Gora.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Counsel

Briefs in No. 02-1740 were filed for appellants Victoria Jackson Gray Adams et al. by John C. Bonifaz, Bonita P.

Tenneriello, Lisa J. Danetz, Brenda Wright, and David A.

Wilson.

Briefs in No. 02-1747 were filed for appellants Congress- man Ron Paul et al. by William J Olson, John S. Miles, Herbert W Titus, and Gary G. Kreep.

Briefs in No. 02-1756 were filed for appellants Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. by Jan Witold Baran, Lee E. Goodman, Stephen A. Bokat, and Jan Amundson.t

tA brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the Common- wealth of Virginia et al. by Jerry Kilgore, Attorney General of Virginia, and Craig Engle, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Lawrence Wasden of Idaho, Steve Carter of Indiana, Phill Kline of Kansas, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Jim Petro of Ohio, Henry McMaster of South Carolina, Larry Long of South Dakota, and Mark Shurtleff of Utah.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Center for Governmental Studies by Richard L. Hasen; and for Thomas D. Grant et al. by Christopher J Wright and Timothy J. Simeone.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Iowa et al. by Thomas J Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, and Thomas Andrews, Assistant At- torney General, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, and Bridget C. Asay, Assistant Attorney General, and Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Terry Goddard of Arizona, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Albert B. Chandler III of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, Thomas F Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Eliot Spitzer of New York,

W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Anabelle Rodriguez of Puerto Rico,

Patrick Lynch of Rhode Island, Christine 0. Gregoire of Washington, Peggy Lautenschlager of Wisconsin, and Iver A Stridiron of the Virgin Islands; for the Allen Temple Baptist Church et al. by Martin R. Glick; for the American Civil Rights Union by John C. Armor and Peter Ferrara; for Bipartisan Former Members of the United States Congress by Randy

Research Group, Inc., et al. by Bonita Tenneriello, John C. Bonifaz, Brenda Wright, Lisa J. Danetz, and David A Wilson; for the Cato Insti-

114 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles I and II.* The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81, contains a series of amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA or Act), 86 Stat. 11, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 431 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. II), the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 315 (2000 ed. and Supp. II), and other portions of the United States Code, 18 U. S. C. § 607 (Supp. II), 36

U. S. C. §§ 510-511 (Supp. II), that are challenged in these

In this opinion we discuss Titles I and II of BCRA. cases.'

The opinion of the Court delivered by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, post, p. 224, discusses Titles III and IV, and the opinion of the Court delivered by JUSTICE BREYER, post, p. 233, dis- cusses Title V.

tute et al. by Erik S. Jaffe; for the Center for Responsive Politics by Lawrence M. Noble and Paul Sanford; for the Committee for Economic Development et al. by Steven Alan Reiss, R. Bruce Rich, and Jonathan Bloom; for Common Cause et al. by Donald J Simon, Daniel B. Kohr- man, and Michael Schuster; for Former Leaders of the American Civil Liberties -Union by Norman Dorsen and Eric M. Lieberman; for the In- terfaith Alliance Foundation et al. by Evan A. Davis; for the League of Women Voters by Daniel R. Ortiz; for Delaware State Representative Michael Castle et al. by Richard Briffault, Charles Tie fer, and Jonathan W Cuneo; for the Honorable J. Dennis Hastert by J Randolph Evans and Stefan C. Passantino; for Dr. David Moshman by Kevin H. Theriot; for Norman J. Ornstein et al. by Teresa W Roseborough and Judith A O'Brien; for Rodney A. Smith by Clark Bensen; and for the Honorable Fred Thompson by David C. Frederick.

*JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join this opinion in its entirety.

1 The parties to the litigation are described in the findings of the District Court. 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 221-226 (DC 2003) (per curiam). For the sake of clarity, we refer to the parties who challenged the law in the Dis- trict Court as the "plaintiffs," referring to specific plaintiffs by name where necessary. We refer to the parties who intervened in defense of the law as the "intervenor-defendants."

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

More than a century ago the "sober-minded Elihu Root" advocated legislation that would prohibit political contribu- tions by corporations in order to prevent "'the great aggre- gations of wealth, from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly,'" to elect legislators who would "'vote for their protection and the advancement of their interests as against those of the public."' United States v. Automobile Work- ers, 352 U. S. 567, 571 (1957) (quoting E. Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship 143 (R. Bacon & J. Scott eds.

In Root's opinion, such legislation would "'strik[e] 1916)). at a constantly growing evil which has done more to shake the confidence of the plain people of small means of this coun- try in our political institutions than any other practice which has ever obtained since the foundation of our Government."' 352 U. S., at 571. The Congress of the United States has repeatedly enacted legislation endorsing Root's judgment.

BCRA is the most recent federal enactment designed "to purge national politics of what was conceived to be the perni- Id., cious influence of 'big money' campaign contributions." at 572. As Justice Frankfurter explained in his opinion for the Court in Automobile Workers, the first such enactment responded to President Theodore Roosevelt's call for legisla- tion forbidding all contributions by corporations "'to any po- Ibid. (quot- litical committee or for any political purpose."' In his annual message to ing 40 Cong. Rec. 96 (1905)).

Congress in December 1905, President Roosevelt stated that "'directors should not be permitted to use stockholders' money"' for political purposes, and he recommended that "'a prohibition"' on corporate political contributions "'would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts."' 352 U. S., at 572. The resulting 1907 statute completely banned corporate contribu- tions of "money ... in connection with" any federal election.

Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. Congress soon amended

116 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of the Court

the statute to require the public disclosure of certain con- tributions and expenditures and to place "maximum limits on the amounts that congressional candidates could spend in seeking nomination and election." Automobile Workers, supra, at 575-576.

In 1925 Congress extended the prohibition of "contribu- tions" "to include 'anything of value,' and made acceptance of a corporate contribution as well as the giving of such a contribution a crime." Federal Election Comm'n v. Na- tional Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 209 (1982) (citing Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, §§301, 313, 43 Stat.

1070, 1074). During the debates preceding that amendment, a leading Senator characterized "'the apparent hold on polit- ical parties which business interests and certain organiza- tions seek and sometimes obtain by reason of liberal cam- paign contributions' as "'one of the great political evils of the time."' Automobile Workers, supra, at 576 (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 9507-9508 (1924)). We upheld the amended stat- ute against a constitutional challenge, observing that "[t]he power of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress." Burroughs v. United States,

Congress' historical concern with the "political potentiali- ties of wealth" and their "untoward consequences for the democratic process," Automobile Workers, supra, at 577- 578, has long reached beyond corporate money. During and shortly after World War II, Congress reacted to the "enor- mous financial outlays" made by some unions in connection with national elections. 352 U. S., at 579. Congress first restricted union contributions in the Hatch Act, 18 U. S. C. § 610,2 and it later prohibited "union contributions in connec-

2 The Hatch Act also limited both the amount political committees could expend and the amount they could receive in contributions. Act of July

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

tion with federal elections ... altogether." National Right to Work, supra, at 209 (citing War Labor Disputes Act (Smith-Connally Anti-Strike Act), ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 167).

Congress subsequently extended that prohibition to cover unions' election-related expenditures as well as contribu- tions, and it broadened the coverage of federal campaigns to include both primary and general elections. Labor Manage- ment Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136.

See Automobile Workers, supra, at 578-584. During the consideration of those measures, legislators repeatedly voiced their concerns regarding the pernicious influence of large campaign contributions. See 93 Cong. Rec. 3428, 3522 (1947); H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947);

S. Rep. No. 1, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2. (1947); H. R. Rep.

No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1945). As we noted in a unanimous opinion recalling this history, Congress' "careful legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws, in a 'cau- tious advance, step by step,' to account for the particu- lar legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor organizations warrants considerable deference." National Right to Work, supra, at 209 (citations omitted).

In early 1972 Congress continued its steady improvement of the national election laws by enacting FECA, 86 Stat. 3.

As first enacted, that statute required disclosure of all contri-

19, 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767. Senator Bankhead, in offering the amend-

"'We all know that money is the chief source of corruption. We all know that large contributions to political campaigns not only put the politi- cal party under obligation to the large contributors, who demand pay in the way of legislation, but we also know that large sums of money are used for the purpose of conducting expensive campaigns through the newspapers and over the radio; in the publication of all sorts of literature, true and untrue; and for the purpose of paying the expenses of campaign- ers sent out into the country to spread propaganda, both true and un- true."' United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 577-578 (1957) (quoting 86 Cong. Rec. 2720 (1940)).

118 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of the Court Id., at 11-19.

butions exceeding $100 and of expenditures by candidates and political committees that spent more than $1,000 per year.

It also prohibited contributions made in the name of another person, id., at 19, and by Government contractors, id., at 10. The law ratified the earlier prohibi- tion on the use of corporate and union general treasury funds for political contributions and expenditures, but it expressly permitted corporations and unions to establish and adminis- ter separate segregated funds (commonly known as political action committees, or PACs) for election-related contribu- Id., at 12-13.3 See Pipefitters v. tions and expenditures.

United States, 407 U. S. 385, 409-410 (1972).

As the 1972 Presidential elections made clear, however, FECA's passage did not deter unseemly fundraising and campaign practices. Evidence of those practices persuaded Congress to enact the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263. Reviewing a constitu- tional challenge to the amendments, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit described them as "by far the most comprehensive . . . reform legislation [ever] passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-President and members of Congress." Buckley v.

Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821, 831 (1975) (en banc) (per curiam).

The 1974 amendments closed the loophole that had allowed candidates to use an unlimited number of political commit- tees for fundraising purposes and thereby to circumvent the limits on individual committees' receipts and disbursements.

They also limited individual political contributions to any single candidate to $1,000 per election, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor; imposed ceilings on spending by candidates and political parties for national con-

3As a general rule, FECA permits corporations and unions to solicit contributions to their PACs from their shareholders or members, but not from outsiders. 2 U. S. C. §§441b(b)(4)(A), (C); see Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 198-199, and

n. 1 (1982).

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ventions; required reporting and public disclosure of con- tributions and expenditures exceeding certain limits; and established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to administer and enforce the legislation.

Id., at 831-834.

The Court of Appeals upheld the 1974 amendments almost in their entirety.4 It concluded that the clear and compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process provided a sufficient basis for sustaining the substantive pro- visions of the Act.

Id., at 841. The court's opinion relied heavily on findings that large contributions facilitated access to public officials 5 and described methods of evading the con-

4 The court held that one disclosure provision was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821, 832 (CADC 1975) (en banc) (per curiam) (invalidating 2 U. S. C. § 437a (1970 ed., Supp. V)).

No appeal was taken from that holding. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 10,

n. 7 (1976) (per curiam).

"Large contributions are intended to, and do, gain access to the elected official after the campaign for consideration of the contributor's particular concerns. Senator Mathias not only describes this but also the corollary, that the feeling that big contributors gain special treatment produces a reaction that the average American has no significant role in the political process." Buckley, 519 F. 2d, at 838 (footnotes omitted).

"Congress found and the District Court confirmed that such contributions were often made for the purpose of furthering business or private inter- ests by facilitating access to government officials or influencing govern- mental decisions, and that, conversely, elected officials have tended to af- ford special treatment to large contributors. See S. Rep. No. 93-689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5; Findings I, Id., at 838, n. 32.

108, 110, 118, 170."

"The disclosures of illegal corporate contributions in 1972 included the testimony of executives that they were motivated by the perception that this was necessary as a 'calling card, something that would get us in the door and make our point of view heard,' Hearings before the Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5442 (1973) (Ashland Oil Co.-Orin Atkins, Chairman) or 'in response to pres- sure for fear of a competitive disadvantage that might result,' id. at 5495, 5514 (American Airlines-George Spater, former chairman); see Findings I, 105. The record before Congress was replete with specific examples

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tribution limits that had enabled contributors of massive sums to avoid disclosure.

Id., at 837-841.6

The Court of Appeals upheld the provisions establishing contribution and expenditure limitations on the theory that they should be viewed as regulations of conduct rather than Id., at 840-841 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 speech.

U. S. 367, 376-377 (1968)). This Court, however, concluded

that each set of limitations raised serious-though differ- ent-concerns under the First Amendment. Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14-23 (1976) (per curiam). We treated the limitations on candidate and individual expenditures as direct restraints on speech, but we observed that the contri- bution limitations, in contrast, imposed only "a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free Id., at 20-21. Considering the "deeply communication." disturbing examples" of corruption related to candidate con- tributions discussed in the Court of Appeals' opinion, we de- termined that limiting contributions served an interest in protecting "the integrity of our system of representative de- In the end, the Act's primary pur- mocracy." pose-"to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions"-pro-

Id., at 26-27.

of improper attempts to obtain governmental favor in return for large Id., at 839, n. 37. campaign contributions. See Findings I, 6The court cited the intricate scheme of the American Milk Producers, Inc., as an example of the lengths to which contributors went to avoid

159-64."

"Since the milk producers, on legal advice, worked on a $2500 limit per committee, they evolved a procedure, after consultation in November 1970 with Nixon fund raisers, to break down [their $2 million donation] into numerous smaller contributions to hundreds of committees in various states which could then hold the money for the President's reelection cam- paign, so as to permit the producers to meet independent reporting re- quirements without disclosure."

Id., at 839, n. 36.

The milk producers contributed large sums to the Nixon campaign "in order to gain a meeting with White House officials on price supports."

Ibid.

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vided "a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 Id., at 26. contribution limitation."

We prefaced our analysis of the $1,000 limitation on ex- penditures by observing that it broadly encompassed every to a clearly identified candidate."' expenditure "'relative Id., at 39 (quoting 18 U. S. C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)).

To avoid vagueness concerns we construed that phrase to apply only to "communications that in express terms advo- cate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office." 424 U. S., at 42-44. We concluded, how- ever, that as so narrowed, the provision would not provide effective protection against the dangers of quid pro quo ar- rangements, because persons and groups could eschew ex- penditures that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate while remaining "free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his views."

Id., at 45. We also rejected the argument that the expenditure limits were necessary to prevent attempts to circumvent the Act's contribution limits, because FECA al- ready treated expenditures controlled by or coordinated with the candidate as contributions, and we were not persuaded that independent expenditures posed the same risk of real or apparent corruption as coordinated expenditures.

Id., at 46-47. We therefore held that Congress' interest in pre- venting real or apparent corruption was inadequate to jus- tify the heavy burdens on the freedoms of expression and association that the expenditure limits imposed.

We upheld all of the disclosure and reporting requirements in the Act that were challenged on appeal to this Court after finding that they vindicated three important interests: pro- viding the electorate with relevant information about the candidates and their supporters; deterring actual corruption and discouraging the use of money for improper purposes; and facilitating enforcement of the prohibitions in the Act.

Id., at 66-68.

In order to avoid an overbreadth problem, however, we placed the same narrowing construction on the

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term "expenditure" in the disclosure context that we had adopted in the context of the expenditure limitations. Thus, we construed the reporting requirement for persons making expenditures of more than $100 in a year "to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election Id., at 80 (foot- or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." note omitted).

Our opinion in Buckley addressed issues that primarily related to contributions and expenditures by individuals, since none of the parties challenged the prohibition on contri- butions by corporations and labor unions. We noted, how- ever, that the statute authorized the use of corporate and union resources to form and administer segregated funds that could be used for political purposes.

Id., at 28-29, n. 31; see also n. 3, supra.

Three important developments in the years after our deci- sion in Buckley persuaded Congress that further legislation was necessary to regulate the role that corporations, unions, and wealthy contributors play in the electoral process. As a preface to our discussion of the specific provisions of BCRA, we comment briefly on the increased importance of "soft money," the proliferation of "issue ads," and the dis- turbing findings of a Senate investigation into campaign practices related to the 1996 federal elections.

Soft Money

Under FECA, "contributions" must be made with funds that are subject to the Act's disclosure requirements and source and amount limitations. Such funds are known as "federal" or "hard" money. FECA defines the term "con- tribution," however, to include only the gift or advance of anything of value "made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office."

§ 431(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Donations made solely for the purpose of influencing state or local elections are there- fore unaffected by FECA's requirements and prohibitions.

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As a result, prior to the enactment of BCRA, federal law permitted corporations and unions, as well as individuals who had already made the maximum permissible contri- butions to federal candidates, to contribute "nonfederal money"-also known as "soft money"-to political parties for activities intended to influence state or local elections.

Shortly after Buckley was decided, questions arose con- cerning the treatment of contributions intended to influence both federal and state elections. Although a literal reading of FECA's definition of "contribution" would have required such activities to be funded with hard money, the FEC ruled that political parties could fund mixed-purpose activities- including get-out-the-vote drives and generic party advertis- ing-in part with soft money.7 In 1995 the FEC concluded that the parties could also use soft money to defray the costs of "legislative advocacy media advertisements," even if the ads mentioned the name of a federal candidate, so long as

7 In 1977 the FEC promulgated a rule allowing parties to allocate their administrative expenses "on a reasonable basis" between accounts con- taining funds raised in compliance with FECA and accounts containing nonfederal funds, including corporate and union donations.

In advisory opinions issued in 1978 and 1979, the FEC al- § 102.6(a)(2). lowed parties similarly to allocate the costs of voter registration and get- out-the-vote drives between federal and nonfederal accounts. FEC Advi- sory Op. 1978-10; FEC Advisory Op. 1979-17. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 195-197 (per curiam).

In 1990 the FEC clarified the phrase "on a reasonable basis" by promul- gating fixed allocation rates.

11 CFR § 106.5 (1991). The regulations re- quired the Republican National Committee (RNC) and Democratic Na- tional Committee (DNC) to pay for at least 60% of mixed-purpose activities (65% in Presidential election years) with funds from their federal accounts. § 106.5(b)(2). By contrast, the regulations required state and local committees to allocate similar expenditures based on the ratio of federal to nonfederal offices on the State's ballot, § 106.5(d)(1), which in practice meant that they could expend a substantially greater proportion of soft money than national parties to fund mixed-purpose activities affect- ing both federal and state elections. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 198-199 (per curiam).

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they did not expressly advocate the candidate's election or defeat. FEC Advisory Op. 1995-25.

As the permissible uses of soft money expanded, the amount of soft money raised and spent by the national politi- cal parties increased exponentially. Of the two major par- ties' total spending, soft money accounted for 5% ($21.6 mil- lion) in 1984, 11% ($45 million) in 1988, 16% ($80 million) in 1992, 30% ($272 million) in 1996, and 42% ($498 million) in

their soft money to the state parties, which were allowed to use a larger percentage of soft money to finance mixed- purpose activities under FEC rules.9 In the year 2000, for example, the national parties diverted $280 million-more than half of their soft money-to state parties.

Many contributions of soft money were dramatically larger than the contributions of hard money permitted by FECA.

For example, in 1996 the top five corporate soft-money do- nors gave, in total, more than $9 million in nonfederal funds to the two national party committees.1" In the most re- cent election cycle the political parties raised almost $300 million-60% of their total soft-money fundraising-from just 800 donors, each of which contributed a minimum of $120,000.11 Moreover, the largest corporate donors often made substantial contributions to both parties.12 Such prac- tices corroborate evidence indicating that many corporate contributions were motivated by a desire for access to candi-

1 Defs. Exhs., Tab 1, Tbl. 2 (report of Thomas E. Mann, Chair & Sr.

Fellow, Brookings Institution (hereinafter Mann Expert Report)); 251

F. Supp. 2d, at 197-201 (per curiam).

9 Mann Expert Report 26; 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 441 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).

10 Id., at 494 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).

11 Mann Expert Report 24.

12 In the 2000 election cycle, 35 of the 50 largest soft-money donors gave to both parties; 28 of the 50 gave more than $100,000 to both parties.

Mann Expert Report Tbl. 6; see also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 509 (Kollar- Kotelly, J.); id., at 785, n. 77 (Leon, J.).

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dates and a fear of being placed at a disadvantage in the legislative process relative to other contributors, rather than by ideological support for the candidates and parties. 13

Not only were such soft-money contributions often de- signed to gain access to federal candidates, but they were in many cases solicited by the candidates themselves. Candi- dates often directed potential donors to party committees and tax-exempt organizations that could legally accept soft money. For example, a federal legislator running for reelec- tion solicited soft money from a supporter by advising him that even though he had already "'contributed the legal max- imum"' to the campaign committee, he could still make an additional contribution to a joint program supporting fed- eral, state, and local candidates of his party.14 Such solicita- tions were not uncommon. 15

"Business and labor leaders believe, based on their experience, that dis- appointed Members, and their party colleagues, may shun or disfavor them because they have not contributed. Equally, these leaders fear that if they refuse to contribute (enough), competing interests who do contribute generously will have an advantage in gaining access to and influencing key Congressional leaders on matters of importance to the company or union."

App. 283, 9 (declaration of Gerald Greenwald, United Airlines (herein- after Greenwald Decl.)).

Amici Curiae Committee for Economic Development and various busi- ness leaders attest that corporate soft-money contributions are "coerced and, at bottom, wholly commercial" in nature, and that "[business leaders increasingly wish to be freed from the grip of a system in which they fear the adverse consequences of refusing to fill the coffers of the major par- ties." Brief for Committee for Economic Development et al. as Amici Curiae 28.

14 See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 842 (Leon, J.).

15 Seeid., at 479-480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 842-843 (Leon, J.). One

"'Once you've helped a federal candidate by contributing hard money to his or her campaign, you are sometimes asked to do more for the candidate by making donations of hard and/or soft money to the national party com- mittees, the relevant state party (assuming it can accept corporate contri-

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The solicitation, transfer, and use of soft money thus en- abled parties and candidates to circumvent FECA's limita- tions on the source and amount of contributions in connection with federal elections.

Issue Advertising

In Buckley we construed FECA's disclosure and reporting requirements, as well as its expenditure limitations, "to reach only funds used for communications that expressly ad- vocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candi- date." 424 U. S., at 80 (footnote omitted). As a result of that strict reading of the statute, the use or omission of "magic words" such as "Elect John Smith" or "Vote Against Jane Doe" marked a bright statutory line separating "ex- press advocacy" from "issue advocacy." See id., at 44, n. 52.

Express advocacy was subject to. FECA's limitations and could be financed only using hard money. The political par- ties, in other words, could not use soft money to sponsor ads that used any magic words, and corporations and unions could not fund such ads out of their general treasuries. So- called issue ads, on the other hand, not only could be financed with soft money, but could be aired without disclosing the identity of, or any other information about, their sponsors.

While the distinction between "issue" and express advo- cacy seemed neat in theory, the two categories of advertise- ments proved functionally identical in important respects.

Both were used to advocate the election or defeat of clearly identified federal candidates, even though the so-called issue ads eschewed the use of magic words. 16 Little difference

butions), or an outside group that is planning on doing an independent expenditure or issue advertisement to help the candidate's campaign."' Id., at 479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).

"1Id., at 532-537 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875-879 (Leon, J.). As the former chair of one major advocacy organization's PAC put it: "'It is foolish to believe there is any practical difference between issue advocacy and advocacy of a political candidate. What separates issue advocacy and po- Id., at litical advocacy is a line in the sand drawn on a windy day."' 536-537 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Tanya K. Metaksa, Opening Remarks

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

existed, for example, between an ad that urged viewers to "vote against Jane Doe" and one that condemned Jane Doe's record on a particular issue before exhorting viewers to "call Jane Doe and tell her what you think." 1 7 Indeed, campaign professionals testified that the most effective campaign ads, like the most effective commercials for products such as Coca-Cola, should, and did, avoid the use of the magic words.1 8 Moreover, the conclusion that such ads were spe- cifically intended to affect election results was confirmed by the fact that almost all of them aired in the 60 days im- mediately preceding a federal election.19 Corporations and unions spent hundreds of millions of dollars of their general funds to pay for these ads,20 and those expenditures, like

at the American Assn. of Political Consultants Fifth General Session on, "Issue Advocacy," Jan. 17, 1997, p. 2); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 878-879 (Leon, J.) (same).

17Id., at 304 (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissent-

ing in part); id., at 534 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875-879 (Leon, J.).

18 It is undisputed that very few ads-whether run by candidates, par- ties, or interest groups-used words of express advocacy.

Id., at 303 (Henderson, J.); id., at 529 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 874 (Leon, J.).

In the 1998 election cycle, just 4% of candidate advertisements used magic words; in 2000, that number was a mere 5%. App. 1334 (report of Jonathan S.

Krasno, Yale University, & Frank J. Sorauf, University of Minnesota, pp. 53-54 (hereinafter Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report); see 1 Defs. Exhs., Tab 2, pp. 53-54).

19251 F. Supp. 2d, at 564, and n. 96 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing report of Kenneth M. Goldstein, University of Wisconsin-Madison, App. A, Tbl. 16; see 3-R Defs. Exhs., Tab 7); Tr. of Oral Arg. 202-203; see also 251 F. Supp.

2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.).

20 The spending on electioneering communications climbed dramatically during the last decade.

In the 1996 election cycle, $135 to $150 million was spent on multiple broadcasts of about 100 ads.

In the next cycle (1997-1998), 77 organizations aired 423 ads at a total cost between $270 and $340 million. By the 2000 election, 130 groups spent over an esti- mated $500 million on more than 1,100 different ads. Two out of every three dollars spent on issue ads in the 2000 cycle were attributable to the two major parties and six major interest groups.

Id., at 303-304 (Hender- son, J.) (citing Annenberg Public Policy Center, Issue Advertising in the 1999-2000 Election Cycle 1-15 (2001) (hereinafter Annenberg Report); see

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soft-money donations to the political parties, were unregu- lated under FECA.

Indeed, the ads were attractive to or- ganizations and candidates precisely because they were be- yond FECA's reach, enabling candidates and their parties to work closely with friendly interest groups to sponsor so- called issue ads when the candidates themselves were run- ning out of money.21

Because FECA's disclosure requirements did not apply to so-called issue ads, sponsors of such ads often used mislead- ing names to conceal their identity. "Citizens for Better Medicare," for instance, was not a grassroots organization of citizens, as its name might suggest, but was instead a plat- form for an association of drug manufacturers.' And "Re- publicans for Clean Air," which ran ads in the 2000 Repub- lican Presidential primary, was actually an organization consisting of just two individuals-brothers who together spent $25 million on ads supporting their favored candidate.2 While the public may not have been fully informed about issue ads, the record indi-

the sponsorship of so-called

38 Defs. Exhs., Tab 22); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 527 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same); id., at 879 (Leon, J.) (same).

21 1d., at 540 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing internal AFL-CIO Memorandum from Brian Weeks to Mike Klein, Electronic Buy for Illinois Senator (Oct.

9, 1996), AFL-CIO 005244); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 886 (Leon, J.) (same).

22 The association was known as the Pharmaceutical Research and Manu- facturers of America (PhRMA).

Id., at 232 (per curiam).

2 Id., at 232-233. Other examples of mysterious groups included "Vot- ers for Campaign Truth," "Aretino Industries," 'Montanans for Common Sense Mining Laws," "American Seniors, Inc.," "American Family Voices," App. 1355 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report 71-77), and the "Coalition to Make our Voices Heard," 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 538 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Some of the actors behind these groups frankly acknowledged that "'in some places it's much more effective to run an ad by the "Coalition to Make Our Voices Heard" than it is to say paid for by "the men and women of the

Ibid. (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting report of David B. Ma- gleby, Brigham Young University 18-19 (hereinafter Magleby Expert Re- port), App. 1484-1485).

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cates that candidates and officeholders often were. A for- mer Senator confirmed that candidates and officials knew who their friends were and "'sometimes suggest[ed] that cor- porations or individuals make donations to interest groups that run "issue ads."' "2 As with soft-money contributions, political parties and candidates used the availability of so- called issue ads to circumvent FECA's limitations, asking do- nors who contributed their permitted quota of hard money to give money to nonprofit corporations to spend on "issue" advocacy.25

Senate Committee Investigation In 1998 the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs issued a six-volume report summarizing the results of an ex- tensive investigation into the campaign practices in the 1996 federal elections. The report gave particular attention to the effect of soft money on the American political system, including elected officials' practice of granting special access in return for political contributions.

The committee's principal findings relating to Democratic Party fundraising were set forth in the majority's report, while the minority report primarily described Republican practices. The two reports reached consensus, however, on certain central propositions. They agreed that the "soft money loophole" had led to a "meltdown" of the campaign finance system that had been intended "to keep corporate, union and large individual contributions from influencing the electoral process." 26 One Senator stated that "the hearings provided overwhelming evidence that the twin loopholes of soft money and bogus issue advertising have virtually de-

24251 F. Supp. 2d, at 518-519 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). I Id., at 478-479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing declaration of Robert Hick- mott, Senior V. P., Smith-Free Group 8 (hereinafter Hickmott Decl.); see 6-R Defs. Exhs., Tab 19, 8).

1S. Rep. No. 105-167, vol. 4, p. 4611 (1998) (hereinafter 1998 Senate Report); 5 id., at 7515.

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stroyed our campaign finance laws, leaving us with little more than a pile of legal rubble. '2

The report was critical of both parties' methods of raising It concluded soft money, as well as their use of those funds. that both parties promised and provided special access to candidates and senior Government officials in exchange for large soft-money contributions. The committee majority described the White House coffees that rewarded major do- nors with access to President Clinton,2 and the courtesies extended to an international businessman named Roger Tamraz, who candidly acknowledged that his donations of about $300,000 to the DNC and to state parties were moti- vated by his interest in gaining the Federal Government's support for an oil-line project in the Caucasus. 29 The minor- ity described the promotional materials used by the RNC's two principal donor programs, "Team 100" and the "Republi- can Eagles," which promised "special access to high-ranking Republican elected officials, including governors, senators, and representatives." 3 1 One fundraising letter recited that the chairman of the RNC had personally escorted a donor on

3 id., at 4535 (additional views of Sen. Collins).

1 id., at 41-42, 195-200. The report included a memorandum written by the DNC finance chairman suggesting the use of White House coffees and "overnights" to give major donors "quality time" with the President, and noted that the guests accounted for $26.4 million in contributions.

Id., at 194, 196.

2 id., at 2913-2914, 2921. Despite concerns about Tanaz's back- ground and a possible conflict with United States foreign policy interests, he was invited to six events attended by the President.

Id., at 2920-2921.

Similarly, the minority noted that in exchange for Michael Kojima's contri- bution of $500,000 to the 1992 President's Dinner, he and his wife had been placed at the head table with President and Mrs. Bush. Moreover, Ko- jima received several additional meetings with the President, other admin- istration officials, and United States embassy officials. 4 id., at 5418, 5422, 5428.

30 The former requires an initial contribution of $100,000, and $25,000 for each of the next three years; the latter requires annual contributions of $15,000.

5 id., at 7968.

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appointments that "'turned out to be very significant in the legislation affecting public utility holding companies"' and made the donor "'a hero in his industry.'-31

In 1996 both parties began to use large amounts of soft money to pay for issue advertising designed to influence fed- eral elections. The committee found such ads highly prob- lematic for two reasons. Since they accomplished the same purposes as express advocacy (which could lawfully be funded only with hard money), the ads enabled unions, corpo- rations, and wealthy contributors to circumvent protections that FECA was intended to provide. Moreover, though os- tensibly independent of the candidates, the ads were often actually coordinated with, and controlled by, the campaigns.3 2 The ads thus provided a means for evading FECA's candi- date contribution limits.

The report also emphasized the role of state and local par- ties. While the FEC's allocation regime permitted national parties to use soft money to pay for up to 40% of the costs of both generic voter activities and issue advertising, they allowed state and local parties to use larger percentages of soft money for those purposes.3 For that reason, national parties often made substantial transfers of soft money to "state and local political parties for 'generic voter activities' that in fact ultimately benefit[ed] federal candidates because the funds for all practical purposes remain[ed] under the con- trol of the national committees." The report concluded that "[t]he use of such soft money thus allow[ed] more corporate, union treasury, and large contributions from wealthy individ- uals into the system." 3

The report discussed potential reforms, including a ban on soft money at the national and state party levels and restric-

•'Id., at 7971. : 1 id., at 49; 3 id., at 3997-4006.

SId., at 4466.

.4 Ibid.

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tions on sham issue advocacy by nonparty groups.35 The majority expressed the view that a ban on the raising of soft money by national party committees would effectively address the use of union and corporate general treasury funds in the federal political process only if it required that candidate-specific ads be funded with hard money.36 The mi- nority similarly recommended the elimination of soft-money contributions to political parties from individuals, corpora- tions, and unions, as well as "reforms addressing candidate advertisements masquerading as issue ads." 7

In BCRA, Congress enacted many of the committee's pro- posed reforms. BCRA's central provisions are designed to address Congress' concerns about the increasing use of soft money and issue advertising to influence federal elections.

Title I regulates the use of soft money by political parties, officeholders, and candidates. Title II primarily prohibits corporations and labor unions from using general treasury funds for communications that are intended to, or have the effect of, influencing the outcome of federal elections.

Section 403 of BCRA provides special rules for actions challenging the constitutionality of any of the Act's provi- sions. 2 U. S. C. § 437h note (Supp. II). Eleven such ac- tions were filed promptly after the statute went into effect in March 2002. As required by § 403, those actions were filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia and heard by a three-judge court. Section 403 directed the Dis- trict Court to advance the cases on the docket and to expe- dite their disposition "to the greatest possible extent." The court received a voluminous record compiled by the parties and ultimately delivered a decision embodied in a two-judge per curiam opinion and three separate, lengthy opinions,

Id., at 4468-4470, 4480-4481, 4491-4494.

Id., at 4492.

37 6 id., at 9394.

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each of which contained extensive commentary on the facts and a careful analysis of the legal issues. 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (2003). The three judges reached unanimity on certain issues but differed on many. Their judgment, entered on May 1, 2003, held some parts of BCRA unconstitutional and upheld others. 251 F. Supp. 2d 948.

As authorized by § 403, all of the losing parties filed direct appeals to this Court within 10 days. 2 U. S. C. § 437h note. On June 5, 2003, we noted probable jurisdiction and ordered the parties to comply with an expedited briefing schedule and present their oral arguments at a special hear- ing on September 8, 2003. 539 U. S. 911. To simplify the presentation, we directed the parties challenging provisions of BCRA to proceed first on all issues, whether or not they prevailed on any issue in the District Court. Ibid. Mindful of §403's instruction that we expedite our disposition of these appeals to the greatest extent possible, we also con- sider each of the issues in order. Accordingly, we first. turn our attention to Title I of BCRA.

Title I is Congress' effort to plug the soft-money loophole.

The cornerstone of Title I is new FECA .§323(a), which prohibits national party committees and their agents from soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending any soft money.

In short, § 323(a) takes na- 2 U. S. C. § 441i(a) (Supp. 11).38 tional parties out of the soft-money business.

The remaining provisions of new FECA § 323 largely re- inforce the restrictions in § 323(a). New FECA § 323(b) prevents the wholesale shift of soft-money influence from

: The national party committees of the two major political parties are: the RNC; the DNC; the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC); the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC); the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC); and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 468 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).

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national to state party committees by prohibiting state and local party committees from using such funds for activ- that affect federal elections. 2 U. S. C. § 441i(b). ities These "Federal election activit[ies]," defined in new FECA § 301(20)(A), are almost identical to the mixed-purpose activ- ities that have long been regulated under the FEC's pre- BCRA allocation regime. 2 U.S.C. §431(20)(A). New FECA §323(d) reinforces these soft-money restrictions by prohibiting political parties from soliciting and donating in elec- funds to tax-exempt organizations that engage tioneering activities. 2 U.S.C. §441i(d). New FECA § 323(e) restricts federal candidates and officeholders from receiving, spending, or soliciting soft money in connection with federal elections and limits their ability to do so in con- 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e). nection with state and local elections.

Finally, new FECA § 323(f) prevents circumvention of the restrictions on national, state, and local party committees by prohibiting state and local candidates from raising and spending soft money to fund advertisements and other public communications that promote or attack federal candidates.

2 U. S. C. §441i(f).

Plaintiffs mount a facial First Amendment challenge to new FECA § 323, as well as challenges based on the Elec- tions Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 4, principles of federalism, and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause. We address these challenges in turn.

In Buckley and subsequent cases, we have subjected re- strictions on campaign expenditures to closer scrutiny than limits on campaign contributions. See, e. g., Federal Elec- tion Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146, 161 (2003); see also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, In these cases we 387-388 (2000); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 19. have recognized that contribution limits, unlike limits on ex- penditures, "entai[l] only a marginal restriction upon the

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Id., contributor's ability to engage in free communication." at 20; see also, e. g., Beaumont, supra, at 161; Shrink Mis- souri, supra, at 386-388.

"A contribution serves as a general expression of sup- port for the candidate and his views, but does not com- municate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of the contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate. A limita- tion on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it per- mits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.

While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor." 424 U. S., at 21 (footnote omitted).

Because. the communicative value of large contributions in- heres mainly in their ability to facilitate the speech of their recipients, we have said that contribution limits impose seri- ous burdens on free speech only if they are so low as to "pre- ven[t] candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy."

Ibid.

We have recognized that contribution limits may bear "more heavily on the associational right than on freedom to speak," Shrink Missouri, supra, at 388, since contributions serve "to affiliate a person with a candidate" and "enabl[e] like-minded persons to pool their resources," Buckley, 424

U. S., at 22. Unlike expenditure limits, however, which

136 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of the Court "preclud[e] most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents," contribution limits both "leave the contributor free to become a member of any political associa- tion and to assist personally in the association's efforts on behalf of candidates," and allow associations "to aggregate large sums of money to promote effective advocacy."

Ibid.

The "overall effect" of dollar limits on contributions is "merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons."

Id., at 21-

interference"' with associational rights is nevertheless valid if it satisfies the "lesser demand" of being "'closely drawn'" to match a "'sufficiently important interest."' Beaumont, supra, at 162 (quoting Shrink Missouri, supra, at 387-388).39 Our treatment of contribution restrictions reflects more than the limited burdens they impose on First Amendment freedoms. It also reflects the importance of the interests that underlie contribution limits-interests in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial con- tributions and the eroding of public confidence in the elec- toral process through the appearance of corruption." Na- tional Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 208; see also Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Cam- paign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 440-441 (2001) (Colorado II).

We have said that these interests directly implicate "'the integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsi- bility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning

9 JUSTICE KENNEDY accuses us of engaging in a sleight of hand by conflating "unseemly corporate speech" with the speech of political parties and candidates, and then adverting to the "corporate speech rationale as if it were the linchpin of the case." Post, at 290-291 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). This is incorrect. The prin- ciples set forth here and relied upon in assessing Title I are the same principles articulated in Buckley and its progeny that regulations of con- tributions to candidates, parties, and political committees are subject to less rigorous scrutiny than direct restraints on speech-including "un- seemly corporate speech."

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of that process."' National Right to Work, supra, at 208 (quoting Automobile Workers, 352 U. S., at 570). Because the electoral process is the very "means through which a free society democratically translates political speech into con- crete governmental action," Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 401 (BREYER, J., concurring), contribution limits, like other measures aimed at protecting the integrity of the process, tangibly benefit public participation in political debate. For that reason, when reviewing Congress' decision to enact con- tribution limits, "there is no place for a strong presumption against constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accom-" Id., at 400 (BREYER, J., pany the words 'strict scrutiny."' concurring). The less rigorous standard of review we have applied to contribution limits (Buckley's "closely drawn" scrutiny) shows proper deference to Congress' ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which It also provides Congress it enjoys particular expertise.

with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the political process.

Our application of this less rigorous degree of scrutiny has given rise to significant criticism in the past from our dis- senting colleagues. See, e. g., Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 405-410 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting); id., at 410-420 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U. S. 604, 635-644 (1996) (Colorado I) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). We have re- jected such criticism in previous cases for the reasons identi- fied above. We are also mindful of the fact that in its lengthy deliberations leading to the enactment of BCRA, Congress properly relied on the .recognition of its authority contained in Buckley and its progeny. Considerations of stare decisis, buttressed by the respect that the Legislative and Judicial Branches owe to one another, provide additional powerful reasons for adhering to the analysis of contribution limits that the Court has consistently followed since Buckley

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was decided. See Hilton v. South Carolina Public Rail- ways Comm'n, 502 U. S. 197, 202 (1991).40

Like the contribution limits we upheld in Buckley, § 323's restrictions have only a marginal impact on the ability of contributors, candidates, officeholders, and parties to engage in effective political speech. Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 161.

Complex as its provisions may be, § 323, in the main, does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence federal elections, federal candidates, and fed- eral officeholders.

Plaintiffs contend that we must apply strict scrutiny to § 323 because many of its provisions restrict not only contri- butions but also the spending and solicitation of funds raised outside of FECA's contribution limits. But for purposes of determining the level of scrutiny, it is irrelevant that Con- gress chose in § 323 to regulate contributions on the demand rather than the supply side. See, e. g., National Right to Work, supra, at 206-211 (upholding a provision restrict- ing PACs' ability to solicit funds). The relevant inquiry is whether the mechanism adopted to implement the contribu-

40 Since our decision in Buckley, we have consistently applied less rigor- ous scrutiny to contribution restrictions aimed at the prevention of corrup- tion and the appearance of corruption. See, e. g., 424 U. S., at 23-36 (applying less rigorous scrutiny to FECA's $1,000 limit on individual con- tributions to a candidate and FECA's $5,000 limit on PAC contributions to a candidate); id., at 38 (applying less rigorous scrutiny to FECA's $25,000 aggregate yearly limit on contributions to candidates, political party com- mittees, and political committees); California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U. S. 182, 195-196 (1981) (plurality opinion) (apply- ing less rigorous scrutiny to FECA's $5,000 limit on contributions to multi- candidate political committees); National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 208-211 (applying less rigorous scrutiny to antisolicitation provision buttressing an otherwise valid contribution limit); Colorado II, 533 U. S. 431, 456 (2001) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to expenditures coordi- nated with a candidate); Federal Election Commn v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146, 161-162 (2003) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to provisions intended to prevent circumvention of otherwise valid contribution limits).

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tion limit, or to prevent circumvention of that limit, burdens speech in a way that a direct restriction on the contribution itself would not. That is not the case here.

For example, while § 323(a) prohibits national parties from receiving or spending nonfederal money, and § 323(b) prohib- its state party committees from spending nonfederal money on federal election activities, neither provision in any way limits the total amount of money parties can spend. 2

U. S. C. §§ 441i(a), (b) (Supp. II). Rather, they simply limit

the source and individual amount of donations. That they do so by prohibiting the spending of soft money does not render them expenditure limitations. 41

Similarly, the solicitation provisions of §§ 323(a) and 323(e), which restrict the ability of national party committees, fed- eral candidates, and federal officeholders to solicit nonfederal funds, leave open ample opportunities for soliciting federal funds on behalf of entities subject to FECA's source and amount restrictions. Even § 323(d), which on its face enacts a blanket ban on party solicitations of funds to certain tax- exempt organizations, nevertheless allows parties to solicit funds to the organizations' federal PACs. 2 U. S. C. § 441i(d). As for those organizations that cannot or do not administer PACs, parties remain free to donate federal funds directly to such organizations, and may solicit funds ex- pressly for that purpose. See infra, at 180-181 (construing § 323(d)'s restriction on donations by parties to apply only to donations from a party committee's nonfederal or soft-money account). And as with § 323(a), § 323(d) places no limits on other means of endorsing tax-exempt organizations or any restrictions on solicitations by party officers acting in their individual capacities. 2 U. S. C. 88 441i(a), (d).

Section 323 thus shows "due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative

"' Indeed, Congress structured §323(b) in such a way as to free individ- ual, corporate, and union donations to state committees for nonfederal elections from federal source and amount restrictions.

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and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particu- lar causes or for particular views." Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632 (1980). The fact that party committees and federal candidates and of- ficeholders must now ask only for limited dollar amounts or request that a corporation or union contribute money through its PAC in no way alters or impairs the political message "intertwined" with the solicitation. Cf. Riley v.

National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 795 (1988) (treating solicitation restriction that required fundraisers to disclose particular information as a content- based regulation subject to strict scrutiny because it "neces- sarily alter[ed] the content of the speech"). And rather than chill such solicitations, as was the case in Schaumburg, the restriction here tends to increase the dissemination of infor- mation by forcing parties, candidates, and officeholders to solicit from a wider array of potential donors. As with di- rect limits on contributions, therefore, § 323's spending and solicitation restrictions have only a marginal impact on polit- ical speech.4

42 JUSTICE KENNEDY'S contention that less rigorous scrutiny applies only to regulations burdening political association, rather than political speech, misreads Buckley.

In Buckley, we recognized that contribution limits burden both protected speech and association, though they gener- ally have more significant impacts on the latter. 424 U. S., at 20-22. We nevertheless applied less rigorous scrutiny to FECA's contribution limits because neither burden was sufficiently weighty to overcome Congress' countervailing interest in protecting the integrity of the political process.

See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 388 (2000) ("While we did not [in Buckley] attempt to parse [the] distinctions be- tween the speech and association standards of scrutiny for contribution limits, we did make it clear that those restrictions bore more heavily on the associational right than on [the] freedom to speak. We consequently proceeded on the understanding that a contribution limitation surviving a claim of associational abridgment would survive a speech challenge as well, and we held the standard satisfied by the contribution limits under review" (citation omitted)).

It is thus simply untrue in the campaign fi- nance context that all "burdens on speech necessitate strict scrutiny re- view." Post, at 312.

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Finally, plaintiffs contend that the type of associational burdens that § 323 imposes are fundamentally different from the burdens that accompanied Buckley's contribution limits, and merit the type of strict scrutiny we have applied to at- tempts to regulate the internal processes of political parties.

E. g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567,

In making this argument, plaintiffs greatly 573-574 (2000). exaggerate the effect of § 323, contending that it precludes any collaboration among national, state, and local commit- tees of the same party in fundraising and electioneering ac- tivities. We do not read the provisions in that way. See infra, at 161. Section 323 merely subjects a greater per- centage of contributions to parties and candidates to FECA's source and amount limitations. Buckley has already ac- knowledged that such limitations "leave the contributor free to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's efforts on behalf of candi- dates." 424 U. S., at 22. The modest impact that § 323 has on the ability of committees within a party to associate with each other does not independently occasion strict scrutiny.

None of this is to suggest that the alleged associational bur- dens imposed on parties by § 323 have no place in the First Amendment analysis; it is only that we account for them in the application, rather than the choice, of the appropriate level of scrutiny.4

With these principles in mind, we apply the less rigorous scrutiny applicable to contribution limits to evaluate the the five constitutionality of new FECA §323. Because

43 JUSTICE KENNEDY is no doubt correct that the associational burdens imposed by a particular piece of campaign-finance regulation may at times be so severe as to warrant strict scrutiny. Post, at 311.

In light of our interpretation of § 323(a), however, see infra, at 161, § 323 does not present such a case. As JUSTICE KENNEDY himself acknowledges, even "signifi- cant interference" with "protected rights of association" are subject to less rigorous scrutiny. Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 162; see post, at 311.

There is thus nothing inconsistent in our decision to account for the partic- ular associational burdens imposed by § 323(a) when applying the appro- priate level of scrutiny.

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challenged provisions of § 323 implicate different First Amendment concerns, we discuss them separately. We are mindful, however, that Congress enacted § 323 as an in- tegrated whole to vindicate the Government's important interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.

New FECA §323(a)'s Restrictions on National Party Committees The core of Title I is new FECA § 323(a), which provides that "national committee[s] of a political party . . may not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act." 2

U. S. C. § 441i(a)(1) (Supp. II). The prohibition extends to

''any officer or agent acting on behalf of such a national committee, and any entity that is directly or indirectly estab- lished, financed, maintained, or controlled by such a national committee." § 441i(a)(2).

.

The main goal of § 323(a) is modest.

In large part, it sim- ply effects a return to the scheme that was approved in Buckley and that was subverted by the creation of the FEC's allocation regime, which permitted the political parties to fund federal electioneering efforts with a combination of hard and soft money. See supra, at 123-125, and n. 7.

Under that allocation regime, national parties were able to use vast amounts of soft money in their efforts to elect fed- eral candidates. Consequently, as long as they directed the money to the political parties, donors could contribute large amounts of soft money for use in activities designed to influ- ence federal elections." New § 323(a) is designed to put a stop to that practice.

4The fact that the post-1990 explosion in soft-money spending on fed- eral electioneering was accompanied by a series of efforts in Congress to clamp down on such uses of soft money (culminating, of course, in BCRA)

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FECA § 323(a) The Government defends § 323(a)'s ban on national parties' involvement with soft money as necessary to prevent the actual and apparent corruption of federal candidates and of- ficeholders. Our cases have made clear that the prevention of corruption or its appearance constitutes a sufficiently im- portant interest to justify political contribution limits. We have not limited that interest to the elimination of cash-for- In Buckley, we expressly rejected the ar- votes exchanges. gument that antibribery laws provided a less restrictive al- ternative to FECA's contribution limits, noting that such laws "deal[t] with only the most blatant and specific attempts

424

of those with money to influence governmental action."

U. S., at 28. Thus, "[i]n speaking of 'improper influence' and

'opportunities for abuse' in addition to 'quid pro quo arrange- ments,' we [have] recognized a concern not confined to brib- ery of public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large con- tributors." Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 389; see also Col- orado II, 533 U. S., at 441 (acknowledging that corruption extends beyond explicit cash-for-votes agreements to "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment").

Of "almost equal" importance has been the Government's interest in combating the appearance or perception of corruption engendered by large campaign contributions.

underscores the fact that the FEC regulations permitted more than Con- gress, in enacting FECA, had ever intended. See J. Cantor, Congres- sional Research Service Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legisla- tion in the 101st Congress (1990) (9 bills seeking to limit the influence of soft money introduced); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 102d Congress (1991) (10 such bills intro- duced); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legisla- tion in the 103d Congress (1993) (16 bills); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Con- gress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 104th Congress (1996) (18 bills); see also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 201-206 (per curiam) (discussing legisla- tive efforts to curb soft money in 105th and subsequent Congresses).

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Buckley, supra, at 27; see also Shrink Missouri, supra, at 390; Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Po- litical Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 496-497 (1985). Take away Congress' authority to regulate the appearance of undue influence and "the cynical assumption that large do- nors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance." Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 390; see also id., at 401 (BREYER, J., concurring).

And because the First Amendment does not require Con- gress to ignore the fact that "candidates, donors, and par- ties test the limits of the current law," Colorado 11, 533

U. S., at 457, these interests have been sufficient to justify

not only contribution limits themselves, but laws preventing the circumvention of such limits, id., at 456 ("[A]ll Members of the Court agree that circumvention is a valid theory of corruption").

"The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the jus- tification raised." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 391. The idea that large contributions to a national party can corrupt or, at the very least, create the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor im- plausible. For nearly 30 years, FECA has placed strict dol- lar limits and source restrictions on contributions that indi- viduals and other entities can give to national, state, and local party committees for the purpose of influencing a fed- eral election. The premise behind these restrictions has been, and continues to be, that contributions to a federal can- didate's party in aid of that candidate's campaign threaten to create-no less than would a direct contribution to the candidate-a sense of obligation. See Buckley, supra, at 38 (upholding FECA's $25,000 limit on aggregate yearly contri- butions to a candidate, political committee, and political party committee as a "quite modest restraint.., to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation" by, among

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other things, "huge contributions to the candidate's political party"). This is particularly true of contributions to na- tional parties, with which federal candidates and officehold- ers enjoy a special relationship and unity of interest. This close affiliation has placed national parties in a unique posi- tion, "whether they like it or not," to serve as "agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders." Colorado II, supra, at 452; see also Shrink Missouri, supra, at 406 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) ("[Re- spondent] asks us to evaluate his speech claim in the context of a system which favors candidates and officeholders whose campaigns are supported by soft money, usually funneled through political parties" (emphasis added)). As discussed below, rather than resist that role, the national parties have actively embraced it.

The question for present purposes is whether large soft- money contributions to national party committees have a cor- rupting influence or give rise to the appearance of corruption.

Both common sense and the ample record in these cases con- firm Congress' belief that they do. As set forth above, supra, at 123-125, and n. 7, the FEC's allocation regime has invited widespread circumvention of FECA's limits on contributions to parties for the purpose of influencing federal elections. Under this system, corporate, union, and wealthy individual donors have been free to contribute substantial sums of soft money to the national parties, which the parties can spend for the specific purpose of influencing a particular candidate's federal election. It is not only plausible, but likely, that candidates would feel grateful for such donations and that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude.45

4 5JUSTICE KENNEDY contends that the plurality's observation in Colo- rado I that large soft-money donations to a political party pose little threat of corruption "establish[es] that" such contributions are not corrupting.

Post, at 301 (citing Colorado I, 518 U. S. 604, 616, 617-618 (1996)). The cited dictum has no bearing on the present cases. Colorado I addressed an entirely different question-namely, whether Congress could permissi-

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The evidence in the record shows that candidates and do- nors alike have in fact exploited the soft-money loophole, the former to increase their prospects of election and the latter to create debt on the part of officeholders, with the national parties serving as willing intermediaries. Thus, despite FECA's hard-money limits on direct contributions to candi- dates, federal officeholders have commonly asked donors to make soft-money donations to national and state committees "'solely in order to assist federal campaigns,"' including the officeholder's own. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 472 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Wade Randlett, CEO, Dashboard Technology 6-9 (hereinafter Randlett Decl.), App. 713- 714); see also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 471-473, 478-479 (Kollar- Kotelly, J.); id., at 842-843 (Leon, J.). Parties kept tallies of the amounts of soft money raised by each officeholder, and "the amount of money a Member of Congress raise[d] for the national political party committees often affect[ed] the amount the committees g[a]ve to assist the Member's cam- paign."

Id., at 474-475 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Donors often asked that their contributions be credited to particular candi- dates, and the parties obliged, irrespective of whether the funds were hard or soft. Id., at 477-478 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 824, 847 (Leon, J.). National party committees often teamed with individual candidates' campaign committees to create joint fundraising committees, which enabled the candi- dates to take advantage of the party's higher contribution limits while still allowing donors to give to their preferred candidate.

Id., at 478 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 847-848 (Leon, J.); see also App. 1286 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Re- port (characterizing the joint fundraising committee as one

bly limit a party's independent expenditures-and did so on an entirely different set of facts. It also had before it an evidentiary record frozen in 1990-well before the soft-money explosion of the 1990's. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839

F. Supp. 1448, 1451 (Colo. 1993).

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"in which Senate candidates in effect rais[e] soft money for use in their own races")). Even when not participating di- rectly in the fundraising, federal officeholders were well aware of the identities of the donors: National party commit- tees would distribute lists of potential or actual donors, or donors themselves would report their generosity to office- holders. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 487-488 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("[F]or a Member not to know the identities of these donors, he or she must actively avoid such knowledge as it is pro- vided by the national political parties and the donors them- selves"); id., at 853-855 (Leon, J.).

For their part, lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy individuals alike all have candidly admitted donating substantial sums of soft money to national committees not on ideological grounds, but for the express purpose of securing influence over federal officials. For example, a former lobbyist and partner at a lobbying firm in Washington, D. C., stated in

"'You are doing a favor for somebody by making a large [soft money] donation and they appreciate it. Ordi- narily, people feel inclined to reciprocate favors. Do a bigger favor for someone-that is, write a larger check-and they feel even more compelled to recipro- In my experience, overt words are rarely ex- cate. changed about contributions, but people do have under- Id., at 493 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting standings."' declaration of Robert Rozen, partner, Ernst & Young

14; see 8-R Defs. Exhs., Tab 33).4 46Other business leaders agreed. For example, the chairman of the

"'Many in the corporate world view large soft money donations as a cost of doing business .... I remain convinced that in some of the more publicized cases, federal officeholders actually appear to have sold them- selves and the party cheaply. They could have gotten even more money, because of the potential importance of their decisions to the affected busi-

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Particularly telling is the fact that, in 1996 and 2000, more than half of the top 50 soft-money donors gave substantial sums to both major national parties, leaving room for no other conclusion but that these donors were seeking influ- ence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any par- ticular ideology. See, e. g., 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 508-510 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing Mann Expert Report Thls. 5-6); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 509 (" 'Giving soft money to both parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, makes no sense at all (quot- unless the donor feels that he or she is buying access' 15, App. ing declaration of former Sen. Dale Bumpers 175)). 47

ness."' 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 491 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Alan G. Hassenfeld, CEO, Hasbro, Inc., 16; see 6-R Defs. Exhs., Tab 17).

"'Though a soft money check might be made out to a political party, labor and business leaders know that those checks open the doors to the offices of individual and important Members of Congress and the Administra- tion. ... Labor and business leaders believe-based on experience and with good reason-that such access gives them an opportunity to shape and affect governmental decisions and that their ability to do so derives from the fact that they have given large sums of money to the parties."' 12, 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 498 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Greenwald Decl.

App. 283-284); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 858-859 (Leon, J.) (same).

47 Even more troubling is evidence in the record showing that national parties have actively exploited the belief that contributions purchase in- fluence or protection to pressure donors into making contributions. As

"'[I]f you're giving a lot of soft money to one side, the other side knows.

For many economically-oriented donors, there is a risk in giving to only one side, because the other side may read through FEC reports and have staff or a friendly lobbyist call and indicate that someone with interests before a certain committee has had their contributions to the other side noticed. They'll get a message that basically asks: "Are you sure you want to be giving only to one side? Don't you want to have friends on If your interests are subject to anger from the both sides of the aisle?" other side of the aisle, you need to fear that you may suffer a penalty if you don't give.... [Diuring the 1990's, it became more and more acceptable to call someone, saying you saw he gave to this person, so he should also

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The evidence from the federal officeholders' perspective is similar. For example, one former Senator described the

"'Too often, Members' first thought is not what is right or what they believe, but how it will affect fundraising.

Who, after all, can seriously contend that a $100,000 do- nation does not alter the way one thinks about-and quite possibly votes on-an issue? ... When you don't pay the piper that finances your campaigns, you will never get any more money from that piper. Since money is the mother's milk of politics, you never want to be in that situation."' 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 481 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of former Sen.

10 (hereinafter Simpson Decl.), App.

Alan Simpson 811); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 851 (Leon, J.) (same).

See also id., at 489 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("'The majority of those who contribute to political parties do so for business reasons, to gain access to influential Members of Congress and to get to know new Members"' (quoting Hickmott Decl., Exh. A, 46)). By bringing soft-money donors and federal candidates and officeholders together, "[p]arties are thus nec- essarily the instruments of some contributors whose object is not to support the party's message or to elect party candi- dates across the board, but rather to support a specific candi- date for the sake of a position on one narrow issue, or even to support any candidate who will be obliged to the contribu- tors." Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 451-452.

Plaintiffs argue that without concrete evidence of an in- stance in which a federal officeholder has actually switched a vote (or, presumably, evidence of a specific instance where the public believes a vote was switched), Congress has not shown that there exists real or apparent corruption. But

give to you or the person's opponent.'" (quoting Randlett Decl. J.) (same).

Id., at 510 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)

12, App. 715); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 868 (Leon,

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the record is to the contrary. The evidence connects soft money to manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress' failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco legislation. See,

e. g., 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 482 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 852

(Leon, J.); App. 390-394 (declaration of Sen. John McCain 5, 8-11 (hereinafter McCain Deci.)); App. 811 (Simpson

10) ("Donations from the tobacco industry to Republi-

Decl. cans scuttled tobacco legislation, just as contributions from the trial lawyers to Democrats stopped tort reform"); App.

13-14). To 805 (declaration of former Sen. Paul Simon claim that such actions do not change legislative outcomes surely misunderstands the legislative process.

More importantly, plaintiffs conceive of corruption too nar- rowly. Our cases have firmly established that Congress' le- gitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash- for-votes corruption to curbing "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influ- ence." Colorado II, supra, at 441. Many of the "deeply disturbing examples" of corruption cited by this Court in Buckley, 424 U. S., at 27, to justify FECA's contribution lim- its were not episodes of vote buying, but evidence that vari- ous corporate interests had given substantial donations to gain access to high-level government officials. See Buckley, 519 F. 2d, at 839-840, n. 36; nn. 5-6, supra. Even if that access did not secure actual influence, it certainly gave the "appearance of such influence." Colorado II, supra, at 441; see also 519 F. 2d, at 838.

The record in the present cases is replete with similar examples of national party committees peddling access to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large soft-money donations. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 492-506

interests who give large amounts of soft "'Special money to political parties do in fact achieve their objec- tives. They do get special access. Sitting Senators

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

and House Members have limited amounts of time, but they make time available in their schedules to meet with representatives of business and unions and wealthy indi- viduals who gave large sums to their parties. These are 'not idle chit-chats about the philosophy of democ- racy.... Senators are pressed by their benefactors to introduce legislation, to amend legislation, to block legis- lation, and to vote on legislation in a certain way."' Id., at 496 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of former 7 (hereinafter Rudman Decl.), Sen. Warren Rudman App. 742); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 858 (Leon, J.) (same).

So pervasive is this practice that the six national party com- mittees actually furnish their own menus of opportunities for access to would-be soft-money donors, with increased prices reflecting an increased level of access. For example, the DCCC offers a range of donor options, starting with the $10,000-per-year Business Forum program, and going up to the $100,000-per-year National Finance Board program.

The latter entitles the donor to bimonthly conference calls with the Democratic House leadership and chair of the DCCC, complimentary invitations to all DCCC fundraising events, two private dinners with the Democratic House lead- ership and ranking Members, and two retreats with the Democratic House leader and DCCC chair in Telluride, Col- orado, and Hyannisport, Massachusetts.

Id., at 504-505 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); see also id., at 506 (describing records indicating that DNC offered meetings with President in re- turn for large donations); id., at 502-503 (describing RNC's various donor programs); id., at 503-504 (same for NRSC); id., at 500-503 (same for DSCC); id., at 504 (same for NRCC).

Similarly, "the RNC's donor programs offer greater access to federal office holders as the donations grow larger, with the highest level and most personal access offered to the Id., at 500-503 (finding, fur- largest soft money donors." ther, that the RNC holds out the prospect of access to of- ficeholders to attract soft-money donations and encourages

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officeholders to meet with large soft-money donors); accord, id., at 860-861 (Leon, J.).

Despite this evidence and the close ties that candidates and officeholders have with their parties, JUSTICE KENNEDY would limit Congress' regulatory interest only to the pre- vention of the actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption "inherent in" contributions made directly to, contributions made at the express behest of, and expenditures made in coordination with, a federal officeholder or candidate. Post, at 292, 298. Regulation of any other donation or expendi- ture-regardless of its size, the recipient's relationship to the candidate or officeholder, its potential impact on a candidate's election, its value to the candidate, or its unabashed and ex- plicit intent to purchase influence--would, according to JuS- TICE KENNEDY, simply be out of bounds. This crabbed view of corruption, and particularly of the appearance of corrup- tion, ignores precedent, common sense, and the realities of political fundraising exposed by the record in this litigation.48 48 In addition to finding no support in our recent cases, see, e. g., Colo- rado II, 533 U. S., at 441 (defining corruption more broadly than quid pro quo arrangements); Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 389 (same), JUSTICE KENNEDY's contention that Buckley limits Congress to regulating contri- butions to a candidate ignores Buckley itself. There, we upheld FECA's $25,000 limit on aggregate yearly contributions to candidates, political committees, and party committees out of recognition that FECA's $1,000 limit on candidate contributions would be meaningless if individuals could instead make "huge contributions to the candidate's political party." 424

U. S., at 38. Likewise, in California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election

Comm'n, 453 U. S. 182 (1981), we upheld FECA's $5,000 limit on contribu- tions to multicandidate political committees.

It is no answer to say that such limits were justified as a means of preventing individuals from using parties and political committees as pass-throughs to circumvent FECA's $1,000 limit on individual contributions to candidates. Given FECA's definition of "contribution," the $5,000 and $25,000 limits restricted not only the source and amount of funds available to parties and political com- mittees to make candidate contributions, but also the source and amount of funds available to engage in express advocacy and numerous other non- coordinated expenditures. If indeed the First Amendment prohibited Congress from regulating contributions to fund the latter, the otherwise- easy-to-remedy exploitation of parties as pass-throughs (e. g., a strict limit

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE KENNEDY'S interpretation of the First Amend- ment would render Congress powerless to address more sub- tle but equally dispiriting forms of corruption. Just as trou- bling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made large finan- cial contributions valued by the officeholder. Even if it oc- curs only occasionally, the potential for such undue influence is manifest. And unlike straight cash-for-votes transac- tions, such corruption is neither easily detected nor practical to criminalize. The best means of prevention is to identify and to remove the temptation. The evidence set forth above, which is but a sampling of the reams of disquieting evidence contained in the record, convincingly demonstrates that soft-money contributions to political parties carry with them just such temptation.

JUSTICE KENNEDY likewise takes too narrow a view of the appearance of corruption. He asserts that only those transactions with "inherent corruption potential," which he again limits to contributions directly to candidates, justify the inference "that regulating the conduct will stem the ap- pearance of real corruption." Post, at 297-298. 41 In our view, however, Congress is not required to ignore historical evidence regarding a particular practice or to view conduct in isolation from its context. To be sure, mere political favoritism or opportunity for influence alone is insufficient to justify regulation.

Ibid. As the record demonstrates, it is the manner in which parties have sold access to federal

on donations that could be used to fund candidate contributions) would have provided insufficient justification for such overbroad legislation.

"At another point, describing our "flawed reasoning," JUSTICE KEN- NEDY seems to suggest that Congress' interest in regulating the appear- ance of corruption extends only to those contributions that actually "create ... corrupt donor favoritism among ... officeholders." Post, at 299-300.

This latter formulation would render Congress' interest in stemming the appearance of corruption indistinguishable from its interest in preventing actual corruption.

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candidates and officeholders that has given rise to the ap- pearance of undue influence.

Implicit (and, as the record shows, sometimes explicit) in the sale of access is the sugges- tion that money buys influence.

It is no surprise then that purchasers of such access unabashedly admit that they are seeking to purchase just such influence.

It was not unwar- ranted for Congress to conclude that the selling of access gives rise to the appearance of corruption.

In sum, there is substantial evidence to support Congress' determination that large soft-money contributions to na- tional political parties give rise to corruption and the appear- ance of corruption.

and Receiving Soft Money Plaintiffs and THE CHIEF JUSTICE contend that § 323(a) is impermissibly overbroad because it subjects all funds raised and spent by national parties to FECA's hard-money source and amount limits, including, for example, funds spent on purely state and local elections in which no federal office is at stake.50 Post, at 353-354 (REHNQUIST, C. J., dissenting).

Such activities, THE CHIEF JUSTICE asserts, pose "little or no potential to corrupt... federal candidates and officehold- ers." Post, at 353 (dissenting opinion). This observation is beside the point. Section 323(a), like the remainder of § 323, regulates contributions, not activities. As the record dem- onstrates, it is the close relationship between federal office- holders and the national parties, as well as the means by which parties have traded on that relationship, that have

5 In support of this claim, the political party plaintiffs assert that, in 2001, the RNC spent $15.6 million of nonfederal funds (30% of the nonfed- eral amount raised that year) on purely state and local election activity, including contributions to state and local candidates, transfers to state parties, and direct spending. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 102-103 (statement of counsel Bobby R. Burchfield); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 336-337 (Henderson, J.); id., at 464-465 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 830 (Leon, J.).

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court made all large soft-money contributions to national parties suspect.

As one expert noted, "'[t]here is no meaningful separation between the national party committees and the public of- ficials who control them."' 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 468-469 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Mann Expert Report 29). The national committees of the two major parties are both run by, and largely composed of, federal officeholders and candidates.

Indeed, of the six national committees of the two major par- ties, four are composed entirely of federal officeholders.

Ibid. The nexus between national parties and federal of-

"Because the national parties operate at the national level, and are inextricably intertwined with federal of- ficeholders and candidates, who raise the money for the national party committees, there is a close connection between the funding of the national parties and the cor- rupting dangers of soft money on the federal political process. The only effective way to address this [soft- money] problem of corruption is to ban entirely all rais- ing and spending of soft money by the national parties."

148 Cong. Rec. H409 (Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep.

Shays).

Given this close connection and alignment of interests, large soft-money contributions to national parties are likely to create actual or apparent indebtedness on the part of fed- eral officeholders, regardless of how those funds are ulti- mately used.

This close affiliation has also placed national parties in a position to sell access to federal officeholders in exchange for soft-money contributions that the party can then use for its own purposes. Access to federal officeholders is the most valuable favor the national party committees are able to give in exchange for large donations. The fact that officeholders comply by donating their valuable time indicates either that

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officeholders place substantial value on the soft-money con- tribution themselves, without regard to their end use, or that national committees are able to exert considerable control over federal officeholders. See, e. g., App. 1196-1198 (Ex- pert Report of Donald P. Green, Yale University) (herein- after Green Expert Report) ("Once elected to legislative of- fice, public officials enter an environment in which political parties-in-government control the resources crucial to subse- quent electoral success and legislative power. Political par- ties organize the legislative caucuses that make committee assignments"); App. 1298 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report) (indicating that officeholders' reelection prospects are sig- nificantly influenced by attitudes of party leadership).

Either. way, large soft-money donations to national party committees are likely to buy donors preferential access to federal officeholders no matter the ends to which their con- tributions are eventually put. As discussed above, Con- gress had sufficient grounds to regulate the appearance of undue influence associated with this practice. The Govern- ment's strong interests in preventing corruption, and in par- ticular the appearance of corruption, are thus sufficient to justify subjecting all donations to national parties to the source, amount, and disclosure limitations of FECA.51

51 The close relationship of federal officeholders and candidates to their parties answers not only THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S concerns about § 323(a), but also his fear that our analysis of § 323's remaining provisions bespeaks no limiting principle. Post, at 355-356 (dissenting opinion). As set forth in our discussion of those provisions, the record demonstrates close ties between federal officeholders and the state and local committees of their parties. That close relationship makes state and local parties effective conduits for donors desiring to corrupt federal candidates and officehold- ers. Thus, in upholding §§323(b), (d), and (f), we rely not only on the fact that they regulate contributions used to fund activities influencing federal elections, but also that they regulate contributions to, or at the behest of, entities uniquely positioned to serve as conduits for corruption. We agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that Congress could not regulate financial con- tributions to political talk show hosts or newspaper editors on the sole

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

or Directing Soft Money

Plaintiffs also contend that § 323(a)'s prohibition on na- tional parties' soliciting or directing soft-money contri- butions is substantially overbroad. The reach of the so- licitation prohibition, however, is limited.

It bars only solicitations of soft money by national party committees and by party officers in their official capacities. The committees remain free to solicit hard money on their own behalf, as well as to solicit hard money on behalf of state committees and state and local candidates. 52 They also can contribute hard money to state committees and to candidates.

In accord- ance with FEC regulations,. furthermore, officers of national parties are free to solicit soft money in their individual ca- pacities, or, if they are also officials of state parties, in that capacity. See 67 Fed. Reg. 49083 (2002).

This limited restriction on solicitation follows sensibly from the prohibition on national committees' receiving soft money. The same observations that led us to approve the latter compel us to reach the same conclusion regarding the former. A national committee is likely to respond favorably to a donation made at its request regardless of whether the

basis that their activities conferred a benefit on the candidate. Post, at 355 (dissenting opinion).

52 Plaintiffs claim that the option of soliciting hard money for state and local candidates is an illusory one, since several States prohibit state and local candidates from establishing multiple campaign accounts, which would preclude them from establishing separate accounts for federal funds. See Cal. Fair Pol. Practs. Comm'n Advisory Op. A-91-448 (Dec.

16, 1991), 1991 WL 772902; Colo. Const., Art. XXVIII, §2(3); Iowa Code §56.5A (2003); and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.10(J) (Anderson Supp.

2002). Plaintiffs maintain that § 323(a) combines with these state laws to make it impossible for state and local candidates to receive hard-money donations. But the challenge we are considering is a facial one, and on its face § 323(a) permits solicitations. The fact that a handful of States might interfere with the mechanism Congress has chosen for such solicita- tions is an argument that may be addressed in an as-applied challenge.

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recipient is the committee itself or another entity. This principle accords with common sense and appears elsewhere in federal laws. E. g., 18 U. S. C. § 201(b)(2) (prohibition on public officials "demand[ing] [or] seek[ing] . . . anything of value personally or for any other person or entity.. ." (em- phasis added)); 5 CFR § 2635.203(f)(2) (2003) (restriction on gifts to federal employees encompasses gifts "[g]iven to any other person, including any charitable organization, on the basis of designation, recommendation, or other specification by the employee").

Plaintiffs argue that BCRA itself demonstrates the over- breadth of § 323(a)'s solicitation ban. They point in par- ticular to § 323(e), which allows federal candidates and of- ficeholders to solicit limited amounts of soft money from individual donors under certain circumstances. Compare 2

U. S. C. § 441i(a) with § 441i(e) (Supp. II). The differences

between §§ 323(a) and 323(e), however, are without constitu- tional significance. We have recognized that "the 'differing structures and purposes' of different entities 'may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process,"' National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 210, and we respect Congress' decision to proceed in incre- mental steps in the area of campaign finance regulation, see Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 258, n. 11 (1986) (MCFL); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 105. The differences between the two provi- sions reflect Congress' reasonable judgments about the func- tion played by national committees and the interactions be- tween committees and officeholders, subjects about which Members of Congress have vastly superior knowledge.

4. New FECA § 323(a)'s Application to Minor Parties

The McConnell and political party plaintiffs contend that § 323(a) is substantially overbroad and must be stricken on its face because it impermissibly infringes the speech and

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

associational rights of minor parties such as the Libertarian National Committee, which, owing to their slim prospects for electoral success and the fact that they receive few large soft-money contributions from corporate sources, pose no threat of corruption comparable to that posed by the RNC and DNC.

In Buckley, we rejected a similar argument con- cerning limits on contributions to minor-party candidates, noting that "any attempt to exclude minor parties and inde- pendents en masse from the Act's contribution limitations overlooks the fact that minor-party candidates may win elec- tive office or have a substantial impact on the outcome of an election."

424 U. S., at 34-35. We have thus recognized that the relevance of the interest in avoiding actual or appar- ent corruption is not a function of the number of legislators a given party manages to elect. It applies as much to a minor party that manages to elect only one of its members to federal office as it does to a major party whose members make up a majority of Congress.

It is therefore reasonable to require that all parties and all candidates follow the same set of rules designed to protect the integrity of the elec- toral process.

We add that nothing in § 323(a) prevents individuals from pooling resources to start a new national party. Post, at 289 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Only when an organization has gained official sta- tus, which carries with it significant benefits for its members, will the proscriptions of § 323(a) apply. Even then, a nascent or struggling minor party can bring an as-applied challenge if § 323(a) prevents it from "amassing the resources neces- sary for effective advocacy." Buckley, supra, at 21.

Finally, plaintiffs assert that §323(a) is unconstitutional because it impermissibly interferes with the ability of na- tional committees to associate with state and local commit- tees. By way of example, plaintiffs point to the Republican

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Victory Plans, whereby the RNC acts in concert with the state and local committees of a given State to plan and imple- ment joint, full-ticket fundraising and electioneering pro- grams. See App. 693, 694-697 (declaration of John Pesch- ong, RNC Western Reg. Political Dir. (describing the Republican Victory Plans)). The political parties assert that §323(a) outlaws any participation in Victory Plans by RNC officers, including merely sitting down at a table and engag- ing in collective decisionmaking about how soft money will be solicited, received, and spent. Such associational bur- dens, they argue, are too great for the First Amendment to bear.

We are not persuaded by this argument because it hinges on an unnaturally broad reading of the terms "spend," "receive," "direct," and "solicit."

2 U. S. C. § 441i(a) (Supp.

II). Nothing on the face of § 323(a) prohibits national party officers, whether acting in their official or individual capacities, from sitting down with state and local party com- mittees or candidates to plan and advise how to raise and spend soft money. As long as the national party officer does not personally spend, receive, direct, or solicit soft money, § 323(a) permits a wide range of joint planning and election- eering activity.

Intervenor-defendants, the principal draft- ers and proponents of the legislation, concede as much.

Brief for Intervenor-Defendants Sen. John McCain et al. in No. 02-1674 et al., p. 22 ("BCRA leaves parties and candi- dates free to coordinate campaign plans and activities, politi- cal messages, and fundraising goals with one another").

The FEC's current definitions of § 323(a)'s terms are consist- ent with that view. See, e. g., 11 CFR §300.2(m) (2002) (de- fining "solicit" as "to ask . . . another person" (emphasis added)); § 300.2(n) (defining "direct" as "to ask a person who has expressed an intent to make a contribution ... to make that contribution ... including through a conduit or interme- diary" (emphasis added)); § 300.2(c) (laying out the factors

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

that determine whether an entity will be considered to be controlled by a national committee).

Given the straightforward meaning of this provision, Jus- TICE KENNEDY is incorrect that "[a] national party's mere involvement in the strategic planning of fundraising for a state ballot initiative" or its assistance in developing a state party's Levin-money fundraising efforts risks a finding that the officers are in "'indirect control'" of the state party and to criminal penalties. Post, at 289. Moreover, subject § 323(a) leaves national party committee officers entirely free to participate, in their official capacities, with state and local in soliciting and spending hard parties and candidates money; party officials may also solicit soft money in their unofficial capacities.

Accordingly, we reject the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge to new FECA § 323(a).

New FECA § 323(b)'s Restrictions on State and Local Party Committees

In constructing a coherent scheme of campaign finance regulation, Congress recognized that, given the close ties between federal candidates and state party committees, BCRA's restrictions on national committee activity would rapidly become ineffective if state and local committees re- mained available as a conduit for soft-money donations. 3 Section 323(b) is designed to foreclose wholesale evasion of § 323(a)'s anticorruption measures by sharply curbing state committees' ability to use large soft-money contributions to influence federal elections. The core of § 323(b) is a straight- forward contribution regulation: It prevents donors from

SEven opponents of campaign finance reform acknowledged that "a prohibition of soft money donations to national party committees alone

Hearings on S. 522 before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administra- tion, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 301 (2000) (statement of Bobby R. Burchfield, Partner, Covington & Burling).

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contributing nonfederal funds to state and local party com- mittees to help finance "Federal election activity." 2

U. S. C. §441i(b)(1) (Supp. II). The term "Federal elec-

tion activity" encompasses four distinct categories of elec- tioneering: (1) voter registration activity during the 120 days preceding a regularly scheduled federal election; (2) voter identification, get-out-the-vote (GOTV), and generic cam- paign activityM that is "conducted in connection with an election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on the ballot"; (3) any "public communication" 55 that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office" and "pro- motes," "supports," "attacks," or "opposes" a candidate for that office; and (4) the services provided by a state commit- tee employee who dedicates more than 25% of his or her time to "activities in connection with a Federal election." §§431(20)(A)(i)-(iv). The Act explicitly excludes several categories of activity from this definition: public communica- tions that refer solely to nonfederal candidates; 56 contribu- tions to nonfederal candidates;5 7 state and local political conventions; and the cost of grassroots campaign materials like bumper stickers that refer only to state candidates.

§431(20)(B). All activities that fall within the statutory definition must be funded with hard money. § 441i(b)(1).

Section 323(b)(2), the so-called Levin Amendment, carves out an exception to this general rule. A refinement on the pre-BCRA regime that permitted parties to pay for certain activities with a mix of federal and nonfederal funds, the

54Generic campaign activity promotes a political party rather than a specific candidate. 2 U. S. C. § 431(21) (Supp. II).

5 A public communication is "a communication by means of any broad- cast, cable, or satellite communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor ad- vertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, or any other form of general public political advertising."

§ 431(22).

So long as the communication does not constitute voter registration, voter identification, GOTV, or generic campaign activity. § 431(20)(B)(i).

57Unless the contribution is earmarked for federal election activity.

§ 431(20)(B)(ii).

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

Levin Amendment allows state and local party committees to pay for certain types of federal election activity with an allocated ratio of hard money and "Levin funds"-that is, funds raised within an annual limit of $10,000 per person. 2

U. S. C. § 441i(b)(2). Except for the $10,000 cap and cer-

tain related restrictions to prevent circumvention of that limit, §323(b)(2) leaves regulation of such contributions to the States.8

The scope of the Levin Amendment is limited in two ways.

First, state and local parties can use Levin money to fund only activities that fall within categories (1) and (2) of the statute's definition of federal election activity-namely, voter registration activity, voter identification drives, GOTV drives, and generic campaign activities. 2 U. S. C. § 441i(b)(2)(A). And not all of these activities qualify: Levin funds cannot be used to pay for any activities that refer to "a clearly identified candidate for Federal office"; they like- wise cannot be used to fund broadcast communications unless they refer "solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local office."

88 441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

Second, both the Levin funds and the allocated portion of hard money used to pay for such activities must be raised entirely by the state or local committee that spends them. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(iv). This means that a state party committee cannot use Levin funds transferred from other party commit- tees to cover the Levin funds portion of a Levin Amendment It also means that a state party committee expenditure. cannot use hard money transferred from other party commit- tees to cover the hard-money portion of a Levin Amendment expenditure. Furthermore, national committees, federal candidates, and federal officeholders generally may not so- licit Levin funds on behalf of state committees, and state committees may not team up to raise Levin funds.

'8The statute gives the FEC responsibility for setting the allocation ratio. §441i(b)(2)(A); see also 11 CFR §300.33(b) (2003) (defining alloca- tion ratios).

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§441i(b)(2)(C). They can, however, jointly raise the hard money used to make Levin expenditures.

1. Governmental Interests Underlying New

FECA 323(b) We begin by noting that, in addressing the problem of soft-money contributions to state committees, Congress both Its conclusion, drew a conclusion and made a prediction. based on the evidence before it, was that the corrupting influence of soft money does not insinuate itself into the political process solely through national party committees.

Rather, state committees function as an alternative avenue for precisely the same corrupting forces. 59 Indeed, both can- didates and parties already ask donors who have reached the limit on their direct contributions to donate to state commit- tees. ° There is at least as much evidence as there was in

"'The fact is that much of what state and local parties do helps to elect federal candidates. The national parties know it; the candidates know it; If state and local parties can use soft the state and local parties know it. money for activities that affect federal elections, then the problem will not be solved at all. The same enormous incentives to raise the money will exist; the same large contributions by corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals will be made; the federal candidates who benefit from state party use of these funds will know exactly whom their benefactors are; the same degree of beholdenness and obligation will arise; the same distor- tions on the legislative process will occur; and the same public cynicism will erode the foundations of our democracy-except it will all be worse in the public's mind because a perceived reform was undercut once again by a loophole that allows big money into the system."' 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 467 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Rudman Decl.

19, App. 746).

60 E.g., 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("'It is... not uncom- mon for the RNC to put interested donors in touch with various state parties. This often occurs when a donor has reached his or her federal dollar limits to the RNC, but wishes to make additional contributions to the state party"' (quoting declaration of Thomas Josefiak, RNC Chief Counsel 68, App. 308)); see also Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 458 (quoting Congressman Wayne Allard's Aug. 27, 1996, fundraising letter informing the recipient that "'you are at the limit of what you can directly contribute

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

Buckley that such donations have been made with the in- tent-and in at least some cases the effect-of gaining influ- ence over federal officeholders. 61 Section 323(b) thus pro- motes an important governmental interest by confronting the corrupting influence that soft-money donations to politi- cal parties already have.

Congress also made a prediction. Having been taught the hard lesson of circumvention by the entire history of cam- paign finance regulation, Congress knew that soft-money do- nors would react to § 323(a) by scrambling to find another It was "neither novel nor im- way to purchase influence. plausible," Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 391, for Congress to conclude that political parties would react to § 323(a) by directing soft-money contributors to the state committees, and that federal candidates would be just as indebted to these contributors as they had been to those who had for- merly contributed to the national parties. We "must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Con- gress," Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S.

622, 665 (1994) (plurality opinion), particularly when, as here, those predictions are so firmly rooted in relevant history and common sense. Preventing corrupting activity from shift-

to my campaign,"' but "'you can further help my campaign by assisting the Colorado Republican Party' "); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 454 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("'Both political parties have found spending soft money with its accom- panying hard money match through their state parties to work smoothly, for the most part, and state officials readily acknowledge they are simply "pass throughs" to the vendors providing the broadcast ads or direct mail"' (quoting Magleby Expert Report 37, App. 1510-1511)).

61 The 1998 Senate Report found that, in exchange for a substantial do- nation to state Democratic committees and candidates, the DNC arranged meetings for the donor with the President and other federal officials. 1 1998 Senate Report 43-44; 2 id., at 2907-2931; 5 id., at 7519. That same Report also detailed how Native American tribes that operated casinos made sizable soft-money contributions to state Democratic committees in lid., at 44-46; 2 id., at 3167- apparent exchange for access and influence.

3194; see also McCain Decl., Exh. I (Weisskopf, The Busy Back-Door Men, Time, Mar. 31, 1997, p. 40).

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ing wholesale to state committees and thereby eviscerat- ing FECA clearly qualifies as an important governmental interest.

Plaintiffs argue that even if some legitimate interest might be served by § 323(b), the provision's restrictions are un- justifiably burdensome and therefore cannot be considered "closely drawn" to match the Government's objectives.

They advance three main contentions in support of this prop- osition. First, they argue that the provision is substantially overbroad because it federalizes activities that pose no con- ceivable risk of corrupting or appearing to corrupt federal officeholders. Second, they argue that the Levin Amend- ment imposes an unconstitutional burden on the associational rights of political parties. Finally, they argue that the pro- vision prevents them from amassing the resources they need to engage in effective advocacy. We address these points in turn.

a. § 323(b)'s Application to Federal Election Activity

Plaintiffs assert that § 323(b) represents a new brand of pervasive federal regulation of state-focused electioneering activities that cannot possibly corrupt or appear to corrupt federal officeholders and thus goes well beyond Congress' concerns about the corruption of the federal electoral proc- ess. We disagree.

It is true that § 323(b) captures some activities that affect state campaigns for nonfederal offices. But these are the same sorts of activities that already were covered by the FEC's pre-BCRA allocation rules, and thus had to be funded in part by hard money, because they affect federal as well as state elections. See 11 CFR § 106.5 (2002). As a practical matter, BCRA merely codifies the principles of the FEC's allocation regime while at the same time justifiably adjusting the formulas applicable to these activities in order to restore

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the efficacy of FECA's longtime statutory restriction-ap- proved by the Court and eroded by the FEC's allocation re- gime-on contributions to state and local party committees for the purpose of influencing federal elections. See 2

U. S.C. §§431(8)(A), 441a(a)(1)(C); see also Buckley, 424

U. S., at 38 (upholding FECA's $25,000 limit on aggregate

to candidates and political committees); cf. contributions California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453

U. S. 182 (1981) (upholding FECA's $5,000 limit on contribu-

tions to multicandidate political committees).

Like the rest of Title I, § 323(b) is premised on Congress' judgment that if a large donation is capable of putting a fed- eral candidate in the debt of the contributor, it poses a threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption. As we ex- plain below, § 323(b) is narrowly focused on regulating contri-

those contributions to state and local parties that can be used to benefit federal candidates directly. Further, these regu- lations all are reasonably tailored, with various temporal and substantive limitations designed to focus the regulations on the important anticorruption interests to be served. We conclude that § 323(b) is a closely drawn means of countering both corruption and the appearance of corruption.

The first two categories of "Federal election activity," voter registration efforts, § 301(20)(A)(i), and voter identifi- cation, GOTV, and generic campaign activities conducted in connection with a federal election, § 301(20)(A)(ii), clearly capture activity that benefits federal candidates. Common sense dictates, and it was "undisputed" below, that a party's efforts to register voters sympathetic to that party directly assist the party's candidates for federal office. 251 F. Supp.

It is equally clear that federal 2d, at 460 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). candidates reap substantial rewards from any efforts that increase the number of like-minded registered voters who

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See, e. g., id., at 459 ("'[The evi- actually go to the polls.6 dence] shows quite clearly that a campaign that mobilizes residents of a highly Republican precinct will produce a harvest of votes for Republican candidates for both state and federal offices. A campaign need not mention federal candidates to have a direct effect on voting for such a candidate.... [G]eneric campaign activity has a direct effect on federal elections"' (quoting Green Expert Report 14)).

Representatives of the four major congressional campaign committees confirmed that they "'transfe[r] federal and non- federal funds to state and/or local party committees for"' both voter registration and GOTV activities, and that "'[t]hese efforts have a significant effect on the election of 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 459, 461 (citations federal candidates."' omitted).

The record also makes quite clear that federal officeholders are grateful for contributions to state and local parties that can be converted into GOTV-type efforts. See id., at 459 (quoting a letter thanking a California Democratic Party donor and noting that CDP's voter registration and GOTV the number of Californian efforts would help "'increase and "'deliver Democrats in the United States Congress' California's 54 electoral votes"' to the Democratic Presiden- tial candidate).

Because voter registration, voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activity all confer substantial benefits on federal candidates, the funding of such activities creates a significant risk of actual and apparent corruption. Section 323(b) is a reasonable response to that risk. Its contribution limitations are focused on the subset of voter registration activity that is most likely to affect the election prospects of federal candidates: activity that occurs within 120 days be- fore a federal election. And if the voter registration drive

62Since voter identification is a necessary precondition of any GOTV program, the findings regarding GOTV funding obviously apply with equal force to the funding of voter identification efforts.

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does not specifically mention a federal candidate, state com- mittees can take advantage of the Levin Amendment's higher contribution limits and relaxed source restrictions. 2

U. S. C. §§ 441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (Supp. II). Similarly, the con-

tribution limits applicable to § 301(20)(A)(ii) activities tar- get only those voter identification, GOTV, and generic cam- paign efforts that occur "in connection with an election in which a candidate for a Federal office appears on the ballot."

2 U. S. C. § 431(20)(A)(ii). Appropriately, in implementing this subsection, the FEC has categorically excluded all activity that takes place during the runup to elections when no federal office is at stake.6 Furthermore, state commit- tees can take advantage of the Levin Amendment's higher contribution limits to fund any §301(A)(20)(i) and §301(A)(20)(ii) activities that do not specifically mention a federal candidate. 2 U. S. C. §§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). The prohibition on the use of soft money in connection with these activities is therefore closely drawn to meet the sufficiently important governmental interests of avoiding corruption and its appearance.

"Public communications" that promote or attack a candi- date for federal office-the third category of "Federal elec- tion activity," § 301(20)(A)(iii)-also undoubtedly have a dra- matic effect on federal elections. Such ads were a prime motivating force behind BCRA's passage. See 3 1998 Sen- ate Report 4535 (additional views of Sen. Collins) ("[T]he

"' With respect to GOTV, voter identification, and other generic cam- paign activity, the FEC has interpreted §323(b) to apply only to those activities conducted after the earliest filing deadline for access to the fed- eral election ballot or, in States that do not conduct primaries, after Janu- ary 1 of even-numbered years.

11 CFR § 100.24(a)(1) (2002). Any activi- ties conducted outside of those periods are completely exempt from regulation under § 323(b). Of course, this facial challenge does not pre- sent the question of the FEC regulations' constitutionality. But the fact that the statute provides this basis for the FEC reasonably to narrow §301(20)(A)(ii) further calls into question plaintiffs' claims of facial over- breadth. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 613 (1973).

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hearings provided overwhelming evidence that the twin loopholes of soft money and bogus issue advertising have virtually destroyed our campaign finance laws, leaving us with little more than a pile of legal rubble"). As explained below, any public communication that promotes or attacks a clearly identified federal candidate directly affects the elec- tion in which he is participating. The record on this score could scarcely be more abundant. Given the overwhelming tendency of public communications, as carefully defined in §301(20)(A)(iii), to benefit directly federal candidates, we hold that application of § 323(b)'s contribution caps to such communications is also closely drawn to the anticorruption interest it is intended to address. 6

As for the final category of "Federal election activity," § 301(20)(A)(iv), we find that Congress' interest in preventing circumvention of § 323(b)'s other restrictions justifies the re- quirement that state and local parties spend federal funds to pay the salary of any employee spending more than 25% of his or her compensated time on activities in connection with

"'We likewise reject the argument that §301(20)(A)(iii) is unconstitu- tionally vague. The words "promote," "oppose," "attack," and "support" clearly set forth the confines within which potential party speakers must act in order to avoid triggering the provision. These words "provide ex- plicit standards for those who apply them" and "give the person of ordi- nary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited."

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109 (1972). This is partic- ularly the case here, since actions taken by political parties are presumed to be in connection with election campaigns. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 79 (noting that a general requirement that political committees disclose their expenditures raised no vagueness problems because the term "politi- cal committee" "need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate" and thus a political committee's expenditures "are, by definition, campaign related"). Furthermore, should plaintiffs feel that they need further guidance, they are able to seek advisory opinions for clarification, see 2 U. S. C. § 437f(a)(1), and thereby "remove any doubt there may be as to the meaning of the law," Civil Service Comm'n v.

Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 580 (1973).

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In the absence of this provision, a party a federal election. might use soft money to pay for the equivalent of a full-time employee engaged in federal electioneering, by the simple expedient of dividing the federal workload among multiple employees. Plaintiffs have suggested no reason for us to strike down this provision. Accordingly, we give "deference to [the] congressional determination of the need for [this] prophylactic rule." National Conservative Political Ac- tion Comm., 470 U. S., at 500.

b. Associational Burdens Imposed by the Levin

Amendment Plaintiffs also contend that § 323(b) is unconstitutional be- cause the Levin Amendment unjustifiably burdens associ- ation among party committees by forbidding transfers of Levin funds among state parties, transfers of hard money to fid the allocable federal portion of Levin expenditures, and joint fundraising of Levin funds by state parties. We recog- nize, as we have in the past, the importance of preserving the associational freedom of parties. See, e. g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567 (2000); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214 (1989). But not every minor restriction on parties' other- wise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitutional di- mension. See Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 450, n. 11.

As an initial matter, we note that state and local parties can avoid these associational burdens altogether by forgoing the Levin Amendment option and electing to pay for federal election activities entirely with hard money. But in any event, the restrictions on the use, transfer, and raising of Levin funds are justifiable anticircumvention measures.

Without the ban on transfers of Levin funds among state committees, donors could readily circumvent the $10,000 limit on contributions to a committee's Levin account by making multiple $10,000 donations to various committees that could then transfer the donations to the committee of

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choice.6 The same anticircumvention goal undergirds the ban on joint solicitation of Levin funds. Without this re- striction, state and local committees could organize "all hands" fundraisers at which individual, corporate, or union donors could make large soft-money donations to be divided In that case, the purpose, if not between the committees.

Donors could make large, visible contributions at fund- raisers, which would provide ready means for corrupting fed- eral officeholders. Given the delicate and interconnected regulatory scheme at issue here, any associational burdens imposed by the Levin Amendment restrictions are far out- weighed by the need to prevent circumvention of the entire scheme.

Section 323(b)(2)(B)(iv)'s apparent prohibition on the transfer of hard money by a national, state, or local commit- tee to help fund the allocable hard-money portion of a sepa- rate state or local committee's Levin expenditures presents a closer question. 2 U. S. C. §441i(b)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. II).

The Government defends the restriction as necessary to pre- vent the donor committee, particularly a national committee, from leveraging the transfer of federal money to wrest con- trol over the spending of the recipient committee's Levin funds. This purported interest is weak, particularly given the fact that § 323(a) already polices attempts by national parties to engage in such behavior. See 2 U. S. C. §441i(a)(2) (extending §323(a)'s restrictions to entities con- trolled by national party committees). However, the associ- ational burdens posed by the hard-money transfer restriction are so insubstantial as to be de minimis. Party committees, including national party committees, remain free to transfer

65Any doubts that donors would engage in such a seemingly complex scheme are put to rest by the record evidence in Buckley itself. See n. 6, supra (setting forth the Court of Appeals' findings regarding the efforts of milk producers to obtain a meeting with White House officials).

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unlimited hard money so long as it is not used to fund Levin expenditures. State and local party committees can thus dedicate all "homegrown" hard money to their Levin activi- ties while relying on outside transfers to defray the costs of other hard-money expenditures. Given the strong anticir- cumvention interest vindicated by § 323(b)(2)(B)(iv)'s restric- tion on the transfer of Levin funds, we will not strike down the entire provision based upon such an attenuated claim of associational infringement.

c. New FECA § 323(b)'s Impact on Parties' Ability

to Engage in Effective Advocacy

Finally, plaintiffs contend that § 323(b) is unconstitutional because its restrictions on soft-money contributions to state and local party committees will prevent them from engaging in effective advocacy. As Judge Kollar-Kotelly noted, the political parties' evidence regarding the impact of BCRA on their revenues is "speculative and not based on any analy- If the history of campaign sis." 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 524. finance regulation discussed above proves anything, it is that political parties are extraordinarily flexible in adapting to new restrictions on their fundraising abilities. Moreover, the mere fact that § 323(b) may reduce the relative amount of money available to state and local parties to fund federal election activities is largely inconsequential. The question is not whether § 323(b) reduces the amount of funds available over previous election cycles, but whether it is "so radical in effect as to ... drive the sound of [the recipient's] voice below If the level of notice." Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 397.

indeed state or local parties can make such a showing, as- applied challenges remain available.

We accordingly conclude that § 323(b), on its face, is closely drawn to match the important governmental interests of preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.

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New FECA §323(d)'s Restrictions on Parties' Solicitations for, and Donations to, Tax-Exempt Organizations

Section 323(d) prohibits national, state, and local party' committees, and their agents or subsidiaries, from "solicit- [ing] any funds for, or mak[ing] or direct[ing] any donations" to, any organization established under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code 66 that makes expenditures in connection with an election for federal office, and any political organizations established under § 527 "other than a political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office."' 67 2 U. S. C. § 441i(d) (Supp. II). The District Court struck down the provision on its face. We reverse and uphold § 323(d), narrowly construing the section's ban on donations to apply only to the donation of funds not raised in compliance with FECA.

The Government defends §323(d)'s ban on solicitations to tax-exempt organizations engaged in political activity as pre- venting circumvention of Title I's limits on contributions of soft money to national, state, and local party committees.

That justification is entirely reasonable. The history of Con- gress' efforts at campaign finance reform well demonstrates that "candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the

6 Section 501(c) organizations are groups generally exempted from tax- ation under the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U. S. C. § 501(a). These include §501(c)(3) charitable and educational organizations, as well as § 501(c)(4) social welfare groups.

67Section 527 "political organizations" are, unlike § 501(c) groups, orga- nized for the express purpose of engaging in partisan political activity.

They include any "party, committee, association, fund, or other organiza- tion (whether or not incorporated) organized and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures" for the purpose of "influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public office." 26 U. S. C. § 527(e).

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current law." Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 457. Absent the solicitation provision, national, state, and local party commit- tees would have significant incentives to mobilize their for- midable fundraising apparatuses, including the peddling of access to federal officeholders, into the service of like-minded tax-exempt organizations that conduct activities benefiting their candidates.6 All of the corruption and appearance of corruption attendant on the operation of those fundraising apparatuses would follow. Donations made at the behest of party committees would almost certainly be regarded by party officials, donors, and federal officeholders alike as bene- fiting the party as well as its candidates. Yet, by soliciting the donations to third-party organizations, the parties would avoid FECA's source and amount limitations, as well as its disclosure restrictions. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 348 (Hender- son, J.) (citing various declarations demonstrating that, prior to BCRA, most tax-exempt organizations did not disclose

6 The record shows that many of the targeted tax-exempt organizations engage in sophisticated and effective electioneering activities for the pur- pose of influencing federal elections, including waging broadcast cam- paigns promoting or attacking particular candidates and conducting large-scale voter registration and GOTV drives. For instance, during the final weeks of the 2000 Presidential campaign, the NAACP's National Voter Fund registered more than 200,000 people, promoted a GOTV hot- line, ran three newspaper print ads, and made several direct mailings.

251 F. Supp. 2d, at 348-349 (Henderson, J.). The NAACP reports that the program turned out one million additional African-American voters and increased turnout over 1996 among targeted groups by 22% in New Ibid. The effort, which cost York, 50% in Florida, and 140% in Missouri. $10 million, was funded primarily by a $7 million contribution from an anonymous donor. Id., at 349 (citing cross-examination of Donald P.

Green, Yale University 15-20, Exh. 3; see I Defs. Refiling Trs. on Pub.

Record); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 522 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same); id., at 851 (Leon, J.) (same); see also id., at 349 (Henderson, J.) (stating that in 2000 the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL) spent $7.5 million and mobilized 2.1 million pro-choice voters (citing decla- ration of Mary Jane Gallagher, Exec. V. P., NARAL 8, App. 271-272, 24)); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 522 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same).

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the source or amount of contributions); id., at 521 (Kollar- Kotelly, J.) (same).

Experience under the current law demonstrates that Con- gress' concerns about circumvention are not merely hypo- thetical. Even without the added incentives created by Title I, national, state, and local parties already solicit unreg- ulated soft-money donations to tax-exempt organizations for the purpose of supporting federal electioneering activity.

See, e. g., 3 1998 Senate Report 4013 ("In addition to direct contributions from the RNC to nonprofit groups, the senior leadership of the RNC helped to raise funds for many of the coalition's nonprofit organizations"); 4 id., at 5983 (minority views) ("Tax-exempt 'issue advocacy' groups and other con- duits were systematically used to circumvent the federal campaign finance laws"); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 517 (Kollar- Kotelly, J.); id., at 848 (Leon, J.). Parties and candidates have also begun to take advantage of so-called "politician 527s," which are little more than soft-money fronts for the promotion of particular federal officeholders and their inter- ests. See id., at 519 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("'Virtually every member of Congress in a formal leadership position has his or her own 527 group ....

In all, Public Citizen found 63 current members of Congress who have their own 527s"' (quoting Public Citizen Congress Watch, Congressional Leaders' Soft Money Accounts Show Need for Campaign Fi- nance Reform Bills, Feb. 26, 2002, p. 6)); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 849-850 (Leon, J.). These 527s have been quite successful at raising substantial sums of soft money from corporate in- terests, as well as from the national parties themselves.

See id., at 519-520 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (finding that 27 indus- tries had each donated over $100,000 in a single year to the top 25 politician 527 groups and that the DNC was the single largest contributor to politician 527 groups (citing Public Cit- izen Congress Watch, supra, at 10-11)); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 850 (Leon, J.) (same). Given BCRA's tighter restrictions on

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the raising and spending of soft money, the incentives for parties to exploit such organizations will only increase.

Section 323(d)'s solicitation restriction is closely drawn to prevent political parties from using tax-exempt organiza- tions as soft-money surrogates. Though phrased as an abso- lute prohibition, the restriction does nothing more than sub- ject contributions solicited by parties to FECA's regulatory regime, leaving open substantial opportunities for solicita- tion and other expressive activity in support of these organi- zations. First, and most obviously, § 323(d) restricts solicita- tions only to those §501(c) groups "mak[ing] expenditures or disbursements in connection with an election for Federal office," 2 U. S. C. § 441i(d)(1) (Supp. II), and to § 527 organi- zations, which by definition engage in partisan political activity, § 441i(d)(2); 26 U. S. C. § 527(e). Second, parties re- main free to solicit hard-money contributions to a § 501(c)'s federal PAC, as well as to § 527 organizations that already qualify as federal PACs.69 Third, § 323(d) allows parties to endorse qualifying organizations in ways other than direct solicitations of unregulated donations. For example, with respect to § 501(c) organizations that are prohibited from ad- ministering PACs, parties can solicit hard-money donations to themselves for the express purpose of donating to these organizations. See infra, at 180-181. Finally, as with § 323(a), § 323(d) in no way restricts solicitations by party officers acting in their individual capacities. 2 U. S. C.

§ 441i(d) (extending restrictions to solicitations and donations

69Notably, the FEC has interpreted § 323(d)(2) to permit state, district, and local party committees to solicit donations to § 527 organizations that are state-registered PACs, that support only state or local candidates, and that do not make expenditures or disbursements in connection with fed- 11 CFR § 300.37(a)(3)(iv) (2003). The agency determined eral elections. that this interpretation of "political committee"-at least with respect to state, district, and local committees--was consistent with BCRA's funda- mental purpose of prohibiting soft money from being used in connection with federal elections. 67 Fed. Reg. 49106 (2002).

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made by "an officer or agent acting on behalf of any such party committee" (emphasis added)).

In challenging §323(d)'s ban on solicitations, plaintiffs renew the argument they made with respect to § 323(a)'s so- licitation restrictions: that it cannot be squared with § 323(e), which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited donations of soft money to tax-exempt organiza- tions that engage in federal election activities. Compare 2

U. S. C. § 441i(d) with § 441i(e)(4). But if § 323(d)'s restric-

tions on solicitations are otherwise valid, they are not ren- dered unconstitutional by the mere fact that Congress chose not to regulate the activities of another group as stringently as it might have. See National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 210; see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 656-657 (1966).

In any event, the difference between the two provi- sions is fully explained by the fact that national party offi- cers, unlike federal candidates and officeholders, are able to solicit soft money on behalf of nonprofit organizations in their individual capacities. Section 323(e), which is designed to accommodate the individual associational and speech in- terests of candidates and officeholders in lending personal support to nonprofit organizations, also places tight content, source, and amount restrictions on solicitations of soft money by federal candidates and officeholders. Given those limits, as well as the less rigorous standard of review, the greater allowances of § 323(e) do not render § 323(d)'s solicitation re- striction facially invalid.

Section 323(d) also prohibits national, state, and local party committees from making or directing "any donatio[n]" to qualifying § 501(c) or § 527 organizations. 2 U. S. C. §441i(d) (Supp. II). The Government again defends the restriction as an anticircumvention measure. We agree in- sofar as it prohibits the donation of soft money. Absent such a restriction, state and local party committees could

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accomplish directly what the antisolicitation restrictions pre- vent them from doing indirectly-namely, raising large sums of soft money to launder through tax-exempt organizations engaging in federal election activities. Because the party itself would be raising and collecting the funds, the potential for corruption would be that much greater. We will not dis- turb Congress' reasonable decision to close that loophole, particularly given a record demonstrating an already robust practice of parties making such donations. See 251 F. Supp.

2d, at 517-518 (Kollar-Kotelly); id., at 848-849 (Leon, J.).

The prohibition does raise overbreadth concerns if read to restrict donations from a party's federal account-i. e., funds that have already been raised in compliance with FECA's source, amount, and disclosure limitations. Parties have many valid reasons for giving to tax-exempt organizations, not the least of which is to associate themselves with certain causes and, in so doing, to demonstrate the values espoused by the party. A complete ban on donations prevents parties from making even the "general expression of support" that a contribution represents. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 21. At the same time, prohibiting parties from donating funds already raised in compliance with FECA does little to further Con- gress' goal of preventing corruption or the appearance of cor- ruption of federal candidates and officeholders.

The Government asserts that the restriction is necessary to prevent parties from leveraging their hard money to gain control over a tax-exempt group's soft money. Even if we accepted that rationale, it would at most justify a dollar limit, not a flat ban. Moreover, any legitimate concerns over cap- ture are diminished by the fact that the restrictions set forth in §§ 323(a) and (b) apply not only to party committees, but to entities under their control. See 2 U. S. C. § 441i(a)(2) (extending prohibitions on national party committees to "any entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by such a national committee" (em-

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phasis added)); § 441i(b)(1) (same for state and local party committees).

These observations do not, however, require us to sustain plaintiffs' facial challenge to § 323(d)'s donation restriction.

"When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in . . a serious doubt of constitutionality is question, and . raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first as- certain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possi- ble by which the question may be avoided." Crowell v. Ben- son, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S.

312, 331 (1988); New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982). Given our obligation to avoid constitutional prob- lems, we narrowly construe § 323(d)'s ban to apply only to donations of funds not raised in compliance with FECA.

This construction is consistent with the concerns animating Title I, whose purpose is to plug the soft-money loophole.

Though there is little legislative history regarding BCRA generally, and almost nothing on § 323(d) specifically, the abuses identified in the 1998 Senate Report regarding cam- paign finance practices involve the use of nonprofit organiza- tions as conduits for large soft-money donations. See, e. g., 3 1998 Senate Report 4565 ("The evidence indicates that the soft-money loophole is fueling many of the campaign abuses investigated by the Committee.... Soft money also supplied the funds parties used to make contributions to tax-exempt groups, which in turn used the funds to pay for election- related activities"); id., at 4568-4569 (describing as an "egre- gious exampl[e]" of misuse a $4.6 million donation of nonfed- eral funds by the RNC to Americans for Tax Reform, which the organization spent on "direct mail and phone bank opera- tions to counter anti-Republican advertising"). We have found no evidence that Congress was concerned about, much less that it intended to prohibit, donations of money already fully regulated by FECA. Given Title I's exclusive focus on abuses related to soft money, we would expect that if Con- gress meant § 323(d)'s restriction to have this dramatic and

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Because there is nothing that compels us to conclude that Congress intended "donations" to include transfers of federal money, and because of the constitutional infirmities such an interpretation would raise, we decline to read § 323(d) in that way. Thus, political parties remain free to make or direct donations of money to any tax-exempt organization that has otherwise. been raised in compliance with FECA.

New FECA § 323(e)'s Restrictions on Federal Candidates and Officeholders

New FECA § 323(e) regulates the raising and soliciting of

2

soft money by federal candidates and officeholders.

It prohibits federal candidates

U. S. C. § 441i(e) (Supp. II).

and officeholders from "solicit[ing], receiv[ing], direct[ing], transfer[ing], or spend[ing]" any soft money in connection It also limits the with federal elections. §441i(e)(1)(A). ability of federal candidates and officeholders to solicit, re- ceive, direct, transfer, or spend soft money in connection with state and local elections. § 441i(e)(1)(B).70

Section 323(e)'s general prohibition on solicitations admits of a number of exceptions. For instance, federal candidates and officeholders are permitted to "attend, speak, or be a featured guest" at a state or local party fundraising event.

2 U. S. C. § 441i(e)(3). Section 323(e) specifically provides

70 Section 323(e)(1)(B) tightly constrains the ability of federal candidates and officeholders to solicit or spend nonfederal money in connection with state or local elections. Contributions cannot exceed FECA's analogous In ef- hard-money contribution limits or come from prohibited sources. fect, § 323(e)(1)(B) doubles the limits on what individuals can contribute to or at the behest of federal candidates and officeholders, while restricting the use of the additional funds to activities not related to federal elections.

If the federal candidate or officeholder is also a candidate for state or local office, he or she may solicit, receive, and spend an unlimited amount of nonfederal money in connection with that election, subject only to state regulation and the requirement that such solicitation or expenditures refer only to the relevant state or local office. 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e)(2).

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that federal candidates and officeholders may make solicita- tions of soft money to § 501(c) organizations whose primary purpose is not to engage in "Federal election activit[ies]" as long as the solicitation does not specify how the funds will be spent, 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e)(4)(A); to § 501(c) organizations whose primary purpose is to engage in "Federal election ac- tivit[ies]" as long as the solicitations are limited to individu- als and the amount solicited does not exceed $20,000 per year per individual, 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e)(4)(B); and to § 501(c) or- ganizations for the express purpose of carrying out such ac- tivities, again so long as the amount solicited does not exceed $20,000 per year per individual, 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e)(4)(B).

No party seriously questions the constitutionality of § 323(e)'s general ban on donations of soft money made di- rectly to federal candidates and officeholders, their agents, or entities established or controlled by them. Even on the narrowest reading of Buckley, a regulation restricting dona- tions to a federal candidate, regardless of the ends to which those funds are ultimately put, qualifies as a contribution limit subject to less rigorous scrutiny. Such donations have only marginal speech and associational value, but at the same time pose a substantial threat of corruption. By severing the most direct link between the soft-money donor and the federal candidate, § 323(e)'s ban on donations of soft money is closely drawn to prevent the corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders.

Section 323(e)'s restrictions on solicitations are justified as valid anticircumvention measures. Large soft-money dona- tions at a candidate's or officeholder's behest give rise to all of the same corruption concerns posed by contributions made directly to the candidate or officeholder. Though the candi- date may not ultimately control how the funds are spent, the value of the donation to the candidate or officeholder is evi- dent from the fact of the solicitation itself. Without some restriction on solicitations, federal candidates and office- holders could easily avoid FECA's contribution limits by so-

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

liciting funds from large donors and restricted sources to like-minded organizations engaging in federal election activi- ties. As the record demonstrates, even before the passage of BCRA, federal candidates and officeholders had already begun soliciting donations to state and local parties, as well as tax-exempt organizations, in order to help their own, as well as their party's, electoral cause. See Colorado II, 533

U. S., at 458 (quoting fundraising letter from a Congressman

explaining to contributor that "'you are at the limit of what you can directly contribute to my campaign,' but 'you can further help my campaign by assisting the Colorado Republi- can Party' "); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 479-480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (surveying evidence of federal officeholders soliciting funds to state and local parties); id., at 848 (Leon, J.) (same); id., at 518 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (surveying evidence of federal office- holders soliciting funds for nonprofits for electioneering pur- poses); id., at 849 (Leon, J.) (same). The incentives to do so, at least with respect to solicitations to tax-exempt organiza- tions, will only increase with Title I's restrictions on the rais- ing and spending of soft money by national, state, and local parties.

Section 323(e) addresses these concerns while accommo- dating the individual speech and associational rights of federal candidates and officeholders. Rather than place an outright ban on solicitations to tax-exempt organizations, § 323(e)(4) permits limited solicitations of soft money. 2

U. S. C. § 441i(e)(4). This allowance accommodates individ-

uals who have long served as active members of nonprofit organizations in both their official and individual capacities.

Similarly, §§ 323(e)(1)(B) and 323(e)(3) preserve the tradi- tional fundraising role of federal officeholders by providing limited opportunities for federal candidates and officeholders to associate with their state and local colleagues through joint fundraising activities. 2 U. S. C. §§441i(e)(1)(B), 441i(e)(3). Given these many exceptions, as well as the sub- stantial threat of corruption or its appearance posed by dona-

184 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of the Court

tions to or at the behest of federal candidates and officehold- ers, § 323(e) is clearly constitutional. We accordingly uphold § 323(e) against plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge.

New FECA § 323(f)'s Restrictions on State Candidates and Officeholders

The final provision of Title I is new FECA § 323(f). 2

U. S. C. § 441i(f) (Supp. II). Section 323(f) generally pro-

hibits candidates for state or local office, or state or local officeholders, from spending soft money to fund "public com- munications" as defined in § 301(20)(A)(iii)-i. e., a communi- cation that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Fed- eral office ... and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office."

2 U. S. C. § 441i(f)(1); § 431(20)(A)(iii). Exempted from this restriction are communications made in connection with an election for state or local office which refer only to the state or local candidate or officeholder making the expendi- ture or to any other candidate for the same state or local office. § 441i(f)(2).

Section 323(f) places no cap on the amount of money that state or local candidates can spend on any activity. Rather, like §§ 323(a) and 323(b), it limits only the source and amount of contributions that state and local candidates can draw on to fund expenditures that directly impact federal elections.

And, by regulating only contributions used to fund "public communications," § 323(f) focuses narrowly on those soft- money donations with the greatest potential to corrupt or give rise to the appearance of corruption of federal candi- dates and officeholders.

Plaintiffs advance two principal arguments against § 323(f). We have already rejected the first argument, that in new FECA the definition of "public communications" § 301(20)(A)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

See n. 64, supra. We add only that, plaintiffs' and JUSTICE KENNEDY'S contrary reading notwithstanding, post, at 316-

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

317, this provision does not prohibit a state or local candidate from advertising that he has received a federal officehold- er's endorsement.

71

The second argument, that soft-money contributions to state and local candidates for "public communications" do not corrupt or appear to corrupt federal candidates, ignores both the record in this litigation and Congress' strong interest in preventing circumvention of otherwise valid contribution limits. The proliferation of sham issue ads has driven the soft-money explosion. Parties have sought out every possi- ble way to fund and produce these ads with soft money: They have labored to bring them under the FEC's allocation re- gime; they have raised and transferred soft money from na- tional to state party committees to take advantage of favor- able allocation ratios; and they have transferred and solicited funds to tax-exempt organizations for production of such ads.

We will not upset Congress' eminently reasonable prediction that, with these other avenues no longer available, state and local candidates and officeholders will become the next con- duits for the soft-money funding of sham issue advertising.

We therefore uphold § 323(f) against plaintiffs' First Amend- ment challenge. 72

71 See 148 Cong. Rec. S2143 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (Section 323(f) does not prohibit "spending non-Federal money to run ad- vertisements that mention that [state or local candidates] have been en- dorsed by a Federal candidate or say that they identify with a position of a named Federal candidate, so long as those advertisements do not sup- port, attack, promote or oppose the Federal candidate").

72 JUSTICE KENNEDY faults our "unwillingness" to confront that "Title look[s] very much like an incumbency protection plan," I's entirety .. citing § 323(e), which provides officeholders and candidates with greater opportunities to solicit soft money than §§ 323(a) and (d) permit party offi- cers. Post, at 306, 307. But, § 323(e) applies to both officeholders and candidates and allows only minimally greater opportunities for solicita- tion out of regard for the fact that candidates and officeholders, unlike party officers, can never step out of their official roles. Supra, at 183; 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e). Any concern that Congress might opportunistically

186 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of the Court

Several plaintiffs contend that Title I exceeds Congress' Election Clause authority to "make or alter" rules governing federal eleftions, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 4, and, by impairing the authority of the States to regulate their own elections, violates constitutional principles of federalism.

In examin- ing congressional enactments for infirmity under the Tenth Amendment, this Court has focused its attention on laws that commandeer the States and state officials in carrying out federal regulatory schemes. See Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505

U. S. 144 (1992). By contrast, Title I of BCRA only regu-

lates the conduct of private parties.

It imposes no require- ments whatsoever upon States or state officials, and, because it does not expressly pre-empt state legislation, it leaves the States free to enforce their own restrictions on the financing of state electoral campaigns.

It is true that Title I, as amended, prohibits some fundraising tactics that would oth- erwise be permitted under the laws of various States, and that it may therefore have an indirect effect on the financing of state electoral campaigns. But these indirect effects do not render BCRA unconstitutional.

It is not uncommon for federal law to prohibit private conduct that is legal in some States. See, e. g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buy-

pass campaign-finance regulation for self-serving ends is taken into ac- count by the applicable level of scrutiny. Congress must show concrete evidence that a particular type of financial transaction is corrupting or gives rise to the appearance of corruption and that the chosen means of regulation are closely drawn to address that real or apparent corruption.

It has done so here. At bottom, JUSTICE KENNEDY has long disagreed with the basic holding of Buckley and its progeny that less rigorous scru- tiny-which shows a measure of deference to Congress in an area where it enjoys particular expertise-applies to assess limits on campaign contri- butions. Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 465 (THomAS, J., dissenting) (joining JUSTICE THOMAS for the proposition that "Buckley should be overruled" (citation omitted)); Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 405-410 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting).

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court ers' Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483 (2001).

Indeed, such conflict is inevitable in areas of law that involve both state and fed- eral concerns.

It is not in and of itself a marker of constitu- tional infirmity. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 392 (1880).

Of course, in maintaining the federal system envisioned by the Founders, this Court has done more than just prevent Congress from commandeering the States. We have also policed the absolute boundaries of congressional power under Article I. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995). But plaintiffs offer no reason to believe that Congress has over- stepped its Elections Clause power in enacting BCRA.

Congress has a fully legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of federal officeholders and preventing corruption of federal electoral processes through the means it has cho- sen.

Indeed, our above analysis turns on our finding that those interests are sufficient to satisfy First Amendment scrutiny. Given that finding, we cannot conclude that those interests are insufficient to ground Congress' exercise of its Elections Clause power. See Morrison, supra, at 607 (re- spect owed to coordinate branches "demands that we invali- date a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds").

Finally, plaintiffs argue that Title I violates the equal pro- tection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it discriminates against political parties in favor of special interest groups such as the National Rifle Association, American Civil Liberties Union, and Sierra Club. As explained earlier, BCRA imposes numerous re- strictions on the fundraising abilities of political parties, of which the soft-money ban is only the most prominent.

In- terest groups, however, remain free to raise soft money to fund voter registration, GOTV activities, mailings, and

188 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

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broadcast advertising (other than electioneering communica- tions). We conclude that this disparate treatment does not offend the Constitution.

As an initial matter, we note that BCRA actually favors political parties in many ways. Most obviously, party com- mittees are entitled to receive individual contributions that substantially exceed FECA's limits on contributions to non- party political committees; individuals can give $25,000 to political party committees whereas they can give a maximum In addition, of $5,000 to nonparty political committees. party committees are entitled in effect to contribute to candi- dates by making coordinated expenditures, and those ex- penditures may greatly exceed the contribution limits that apply to other donors. See 2 U. S. C. § 441a(d) (Supp. II).

More importantly, however, Congress is fully entitled to consider the real-world differences between political parties and interest groups when crafting a system of campaign fi- nance regulation. See National Right to Work, 459 U. S., Interest groups do not select slates of candidates for at 210.

Interest groups do not determine who will serve elections. on legislative committees, elect congressional leadership, or organize legislative caucuses. Political parties have influ- ence and power in the Legislature that vastly exceeds that of any interest group. As a result, it is hardly surprising that party affiliation is the primary way by which voters identify candidates, or that parties in turn have special ac- cess to and relationships with federal officeholders. Con- gress' efforts at campaign finance regulation may account for these salient differences. Taken seriously, plaintiffs' equal protection arguments would call into question not just Title I of BCRA, but much of the pre-existing structure of FECA as well. We therefore reject those arguments.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it upheld §§323(e) and 323(f). We reverse the

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

judgment of the District Court insofar as it invalidated §§ 323(a), 323(b), and 323(d).

Title II of BCRA, entitled "Noncandidate Campaign Ex- penditures," is divided into two subtitles: "Electioneering Communications" and "Independent and Coordinated Ex- penditures." We consider each challenged section of these subtitles in turn.

BCRA § 201 's Definition of "Electioneering Communications" The first section of Title II, § 201, comprehensively amends FECA §304, which requires political committees to file de- tailed periodic financial reports with the FEC. The amend- ment coins a new term, "electioneering communications," to replace the narrowing construction of FECA's disclosure provisions adopted by this Court in Buckley. As discussed further below, that construction limited the coverage of FECA's disclosure requirement to communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates.

By contrast, the term "electioneering communication" is not so limited, but is defined to encompass any "broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that

"(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; "(II) is made within-

"(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff elec- tion for the office sought by the candidate; or

"(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and "(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for -an office other than President or Vice

190 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of the Court President, is targeted to the relevant electorate." 2

U. S. C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. II).13

New FECA §304(f)(3)(C) further provides that a commu- if it nication is "'targeted "can be received by 50,000 or more persons" in the dis- trict or State the candidate seeks to represent. 2 U. S. C. § 434(f)(3)(C).

to the relevant electorate'"

In addition to setting forth this definition, BCRA's amend- ments to FECA § 304 specify significant disclosure require- ments for persons who fund electioneering communications.

BCRA's use of this new term is not, however, limited to the disclosure context: A later section of the Act (BCRA §203, which amends FECA § 316(b)(2)) restricts corporations' and labor unions' funding of electioneering communications.

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the new term as it applies in both the disclosure and the expenditure contexts.

The major premise of plaintiffs' challenge to BCRA's use of the term "electioneering communication" is that Buckley drew a constitutionally mandated line between express advo- cacy and so-called issue advocacy, and that speakers possess an inviolable First Amendment right to engage in the latter category of speech. Thus, plaintiffs maintain, Congress can- not constitutionally require disclosure of, or regulate expend- itures for, "electioneering communications" without making an exception for those "communications" that do not meet Buckley's definition of express advocacy.

That position misapprehends our prior decisions, for the express advocacy restriction was an endpoint of statutory In interpretation, not a first principle of constitutional law.

71 BCRA also provides a "backup" definition of "electioneering communi- cation," which would become effective if the primary definition were "held to be constitutionally insufficient by final judicial decision to support the 2 U. S.C. §434(f)(3)(A)(ii). We uphold regulation provided herein." all applications of the primary definition and accordingly have no occasion to discuss the backup definition.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

Buckley we began by examining then-18 U. S. C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which restricted expenditures "'relative to a clearly identified candidate,"' and we found that the phrase "'relative to"' was impermissibly vague. 424 U. S., at 40-42. We concluded that the vagueness deficiencies could "be avoided only by reading § 608(e)(1) as limited to communications that include explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate." 74 Id., at 43. We pro- vided examples of words of express advocacy, such as "'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' .... 'defeat,' [and] 'reject,"' id., at 44,

n. 52, and those examples eventually gave rise to what is

now known as the "magic words" requirement.

We then considered FECA's disclosure provisions, includ- ing 2 U. S. C. § 431(f) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which defined "'expenditur[e]"' to include the use of money or other assets . . influencing"' a federal election. "'for the purpose of .

Buckley' 424 U. S., at 77. Finding that the "ambiguity of this phrase" posed "constitutional problems," ibid., we noted our "obligation to construe the statute, if that can be done consistent with the legislature's purpose, to avoid the shoals "To insure of vagueness," id., at 77-78 (citations omitted). that the reach" of the disclosure requirement was "not im- permissibly broad, we construe[d] 'expenditure' for purposes of that section in the same way we construed the terms of § 608(e)-to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identi- fied candidate."

Id., at 80 (footnote omitted).

Thus, a plain reading of Buckley makes clear that the ex- press advocacy limitation, in both the expenditure and the

74 We then held that, so construed, the expenditure restriction did not advance a substantial government interest, because independent express advocacy did not pose a danger of real or apparent corruption, and the line between express advocacy and other electioneering activities was easily circumvented. Concluding that § 608(e)(1)'s heavy First Amendment bur- den was not justified, we invalidated the provision. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 45-48.

192 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

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disclosure contexts, was the product of statutory interpreta-' tion rather than a constitutional command. 5 In narrowly reading the FECA provisions in Buckley to avoid problems of vagueness and overbreadth, we nowhere suggested that a statute that was neither vague nor overbroad would be re- quired to toe the same express advocacy line. Nor did we suggest as much in MCFL, 479 U. S. 238 (1986), in which we addressed the scope of another FECA expenditure limitation and confirmed the understanding that Buckley's express ad- vocacy category was a product of statutory construction.76 In short, the concept of express advocacy and the concomi- tant class of magic words were born of an effort to avoid constitutional infirmities. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 500 (1979) (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804)). We have long "'rigidly adhered"' to the tenet "'never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied,"' United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 21 (1960) (citation omitted), for "[t]he nature of judicial review constrains us to consider the case that is actu- ally before us," James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501

U. S. 529, 547 (1991) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Consistent

with that principle, our decisions in Buckley and MCFL were specific to the statutory language before us; they in no way drew a constitutional boundary that forever fixed the

75 Our adoption of a narrowing construction was consistent with our vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. See Broadrick, 413 U. S., at 613; Grayned, 408 U. S., at 108-114.

76The provision at issue in MCFL-2 U. S. C. § 441b (1982 ed.)-re- quired corporations and unions to use separate segregated funds, rather than general treasury moneys, on expenditures made "'in connection with"' a federal election. 479 U. S., at 241. We noted that Buckley had limited the statutory term "'expenditure"' to words of express advocacy "in order to avoid problems of overbreadth." 479 U. S., at 248. We held that "a similar construction" must apply to the expenditure limitation before us in MCFL and that the reach of 2 U. S. C. §441b was therefore constrained to express advocacy. 479 U. S., at 249 (emphasis added).

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign-related speech.

Nor are we persuaded, independent of our precedents, that the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy. That notion cannot be squared with our longstanding recognition that the pres- ence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distin- guish electioneering speech from a true issue ad. See Buck- Indeed, the unmistakable lesson from the ley, supra, at 45. record in this litigation, as all three judges on the District Court agreed, is that Buckley's magic-words requirement is functionally meaningless. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 303-304 (Hen- derson, J.); id., at 534 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875-879 (Leon, J.). Not only can advertisers easily evade the line by eschewing the use of magic words, but they would seldom choose to use such words even if permitted.77 And although the resulting advertisements do not urge the viewer to vote for or against a candidate in so many words, they are no less clearly intended to influence the election. 78 Buckley's

77 As one major-party political consultant testified, "'it is rarely advis- able to use such clumsy words as "vote for" or "vote against.""' 251

F. Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.) (quoting declaration of Douglas L. Bai-

"'All advertising professionals understand that the most effective adver- tising leads the viewer to his or her own conclusion without forcing it down their throat."' 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.). Other polit- ical professionals and academics confirm that the use of magic words has become an anachronism. See id., at 531 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing declara- 4, 9 Defs. tion of Raymond D. Strother, Pres., Strother/Duffy/Strother Exhs., Tab 40); see Unsealed Pp. Vol., Tab 7; App. 1334-1335 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report); see also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.); id., at 532 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875-876 (Leon,-J.).

7 8 0ne striking example is an ad that a group called "Citizens for Re- form" sponsored during the 1996 Montana congressional race, in which Bill Yellowtail was a candidate. The ad stated:

"'Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values but took a swing at his wife. And Yellowtail's response? He only slapped her. But "her nose was not broken." He talks law and order.., but is himself a con-

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express advocacy line, in short, has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption, and Congress enacted BCRA to correct the flaws it found in the existing system.

Finally we observe that new FECA § 304(f)(3)'s definition of "electioneering communication" raises none of the vague- ness concerns that drove our analysis in Buckley. The term "electioneering communication" applies only (1) to a broad- cast (2) clearly identifying a candidate for federal office,

(3) aired within a specific time period, and (4) targeted to

an identified audience of at least 50,000 viewers or listeners.

These components are both easily understood and objectively determinable. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-114 (1972). Thus, the constitutional objection that persuaded the Court in Buckley to limit FECA's reach to express advocacy is simply inapposite here.

BCRA § 201 's Disclosure Requirements

Having rejected the notion that the First Amendment re- quires Congress to treat so-called issue advocacy differently from express advocacy, we turn to plaintiffs' other concerns about the use of the term "electioneering communication" in amended FECA § 304's disclosure provisions. Under those provisions, whenever any person makes disbursements total- ing more than $10,000 during any calendar year for the direct costs of producing and airing electioneering communications, he must file a statement with the FEC identifying the pertinent elections and all persons sharing the costs of the disbursements. 2 U. S. C. §§ 434(f)(2)(A), (B), and (D) (Supp.

If the disbursements are made from a corporation's

victed felon. And though he talks about protecting children, Yellowtail failed to make his own child support payments-then voted against child support enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail. Tell him to support family values."' 5 1998 Senate Report 6305 (minority views).

The notion that this advertisement was designed purely to discuss the issue of family values strains credulity.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

or labor union's segregated account, 79 or by a single indi- vidual who has collected contributions from others, the state- ment must identify all persons who contributed $1,000 or more to the account or the individual during the calendar year. §§434(f)(2)(E), (F). The statement must be filed within 24 hours of each "disclosure date"-a term defined to include the first date and all subsequent dates on which a person's aggregate undisclosed expenses for electioneer- ing communications exceed $10,000 for that calendar year. §§434(f)(1), (2), and (4). Another subsection further pro- vides that the execution of a contract to make a disburse- ment is itself treated as a disbursement for purposes of FECA's disclosure requirements. §434(f)(5).

In addition to the failed argument that BCRA's amend- ments to FECA § 304 improperly extend to both express and issue advocacy, plaintiffs challenge amended FECA §304's disclosure requirements as unnecessarily (1) requiring disclo- sure of the names of persons who contributed $1,000 or more to the individual or group that paid for a communication, and

(2) mandating disclosure of executory contracts for communi-

cations that have not yet aired. The District Court rejected the former submission but accepted the latter, finding invalid new FECA § 304(f)(5), which governs executory contracts.

Relying on BCRA's severability provision,80 the court held that invalidation of the executory contracts subsection did

79As discussed below, infra, at 203-209, BCRA §203 bars corporations and labor unions from funding electioneering communications with money from their general treasuries, instead requiring them to establish a "sepa- rate segregated fund" for such expenditures. 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2).

"If any provision of this Act or amendment made by this Act .... or the application of a provision or amendment to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions and amendment to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding." 2

U. S. C. § 454 note.

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Opinion of the Court

not render the balance of BCRA's amendments to FECA § 304 unconstitutional. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 242 (per curiam).

We agree with the District Court that the important state interests that prompted the Buckley Court to uphold FECA's disclosure requirements-providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions-apply in full to BCRA.8' Accordingly, Buckley amply supports ap- plication of FECA § 304's disclosure requirements to the en- tire range of "electioneering communications." As the au- thors of the District Court's per curiam opinion concluded after reviewing evidence concerning the use of purported

"The factual record demonstrates that the abuse of the present law not only permits corporations and labor unions to fund broadcast advertisements designed to influence federal elections, but permits them to do so while concealing their identities from the public.

BCRA's disclosure provisions require these organiza- tions to reveal their identities so that the public is able to identify the source of the funding behind broadcast advertisements influencing certain elections. Plaintiffs' disdain for BCRA's disclosure provisions is nothing short of surprising. Plaintiffs challenge BCRA's re- strictions on electioneering communications on the premise that they should be permitted to spend corpo- rate and labor union general treasury funds in the sixty

8'The disclosure requirements that BCRA §201 added to FECA §304

are actually somewhat less intrusive than the comparable requirements that have long applied to persons making independent expenditures. For example, the previous version of §304 required groups making inde- pendent expenditures to identify donors who contributed more than $200.

2 U. S. C. § 434(c)(2)(C). The comparable requirement in the amendments applies only to donors of $1,000 or more. §§434(f)(2)(E), (F) (Supp. II).

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days before the federal elections on broadcast advertise- ments, which refer to federal candidates, because speech needs to be 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' Mc- Connell Br. at 44 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sulli- van, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964)). Curiously, Plaintiffs want to preserve the ability to run these advertisements

'The Coalition-Americans Working for Real Change' (funded by business organizations opposed to organized labor), 'Citizens for Better Medicare' (funded by the pharmaceutical industry), 'Republicans for Clean Air' (funded by brothers Charles and Sam Wyly). Findings 44, 51, 52. Given these tactics, Plaintiffs never satis- factorily answer the question of how 'uninhibited, ro- bust, and wide-open' speech can occur when organiza- tions hide themselves from the scrutiny of the voting public. McConnell Br. at 44. Plaintiffs' argument for striking down BCRA's disclosure provisions does not re- inforce the precious First Amendment values that Plain- tiffs argue are trampled by BCRA, but ignores the com- peting First Amendment interests of individual citizens seeking to make informed choices in the political mar- ketplace." 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 237.

The District Court was also correct that Buckley fore- closes a facial attack on the new provision in § 304 that re- quires disclosure of the names of persons contributing $1,000 or more to segregated funds or individuals that spend more than $10,000 in a calendar year on electioneering communica- tions. Like our earlier decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958),s2 Buckley recognized

8 NAACP v. Alabama arose out of a judgment holding the NAACP in contempt for refusing to produce the names and addresses of its members and agents in Alabama. The NAACP "made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file mem- bers ha[d] exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employ- ment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostil-

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that compelled disclosures may impose an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular cause. Nevertheless, Buckley rejected the contention that FECA's disclosure requirements could not constitutionally be applied to minor parties and independent candidates be- cause the Government's interest in obtaining information from such parties was minimal and the danger of infringing In Buckley, unlike NAACP, we their rights substantial. found no evidence that any party had been exposed to eco- nomic reprisals or physical threats as a result of the com- pelled disclosures. 424 U. S., at 69-70. We acknowledged that such a case might arise in the future, however, and ad-

"We recognize that unduly strict requirements of proof could impose a heavy burden, but it does not follow that a blanket exemption for minor parties is necessary.

Minor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of injury to assure a fair consideration of their claim. The evidence offered need show only a reason- able probability that the compelled disclosure of a par- ty's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government offi- cials or private parties."

Id., at 74.

A few years later we used that standard to resolve a minor party's challenge to the constitutionality of the State of Ohio's disclosure requirements. We held that the First Amendment prohibits States from compelling disclosures that would subject identified persons to "threats, harass- ment, and reprisals," and that the District Court's findings

ity." 357 U. S., at 462. We thought it apparent that the compelled disclosure would "affect adversely" the NAACP and its members' ability "to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly Id., at 462-463. Under these circum- have the right to advocate." stances, we concluded that Alabama's interest in determining whether the NAACP was doing business in the State was plainly insufficient to justify its production order.

Id., at 464-466.

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Opinion of the Court had established a "reasonable probability" of such a result. s3 Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio),

In this litigation the District Court applied Buckley's evi- dentiary standard and found-consistent with our conclusion in Buckley, and in contrast to that in Brown-that the evi- dence did not establish the requisite "reasonable probability" of harm to any plaintiff group or its members. The District Court noted that some parties had expressed such concerns, but it found a "lack of specific evidence about the basis for these concerns."

251 F. Supp. 2d, at 247 (per curiam). We agree, but we note that, like our refusal to recognize a blan- ket exception for minor parties in Buckley, our rejection of plaintiffs' facial challenge to the requirement to disclose indi- vidual donors does not foreclose possible future challenges to particular applications of that requirement.

We also are unpersuaded by plaintiffs' challenge to new FECA § 304(f)(5), which requires disclosure of executory

"The District Court properly applied the Buckley test to the facts of this case. The District Court found 'substantial evidence of both govern- mental and private hostility toward and harassment of [Socialist Workers Party (SWP)] members and supporters.' Appellees introduced proof of specific incidents of private and government hostility toward the SWP and its members within the four years preceding the trial. These incidents, many of which occurred in Ohio and neighboring States, included threaten- ing phone calls and hate mail, the burning of SWP literature, the destruc- tion of.SWP members' property, police harassment of a party candidate, and the firing of shots at an SWP office. There was also evidence that in the 12-month period before trial 22 SWP members, including 4 in Ohio, were fired because of their party membership. Although appellants con- tend that two of the Ohio firings were not politically motivated, the evi- dence amply supports the District Court's conclusion that 'private hostility and harassment toward SWP members make it difficult for them to main- tain employment.' The District Court also found a past history of Gov- ernment harassment of the SWP." Brown V. Socialist Workers '74 Cam- paign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U. S. 87, 98-99 (1982) (paragraph break omitted).

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Opinion of the Court "Contracts to disburse

"For purposes of this subsection, a person shall be treated as having made a disbursement if the person has executed a contract to make the disbursement." 2

U. S. C. § 434(f)(5) (Supp. II).

In our view, this provision serves an important purpose the District Court did not advance. BCRA's amendments to FECA § 304 mandate disclosure only if and when a person makes disbursements totaling more than $10,000 in any cal- endar year to pay for electioneering communications. Plain- tiffs do not take issue with the use of a dollar amount, rather than the number or dates of the ads, to identify the time when a person paying for electioneering communications must make disclosures to the FEC. Nor do they question the need to make the contents of parties' disclosure state- ments available to curious voters in advance of elections.

Given the relatively short timeframes in which electioneer- ing communications are made, the interest in assuring that disclosures are made promptly and in time to provide rel- evant information to voters is unquestionably significant.

Yet fixing the deadline for filing disclosure statements based on the date when aggregate disbursements exceed $10,000 would open a significant loophole if advertisers were not re- In the absence of quired to disclose executory contracts. that requirement, political supporters could avoid preelec- tion disclosures concerning ads slated to run during the final week of a campaign simply by making a preelection down- payment of less than $10,000, with the balance payable after Indeed, if the advertiser waited to pay that the election. balance until the next calendar year then, as long as the bal- ance did not itself exceed $10,000, the advertiser might avoid the disclosure requirements completely.

The record contains little evidence identifying any harm that might flow from the enforcement of §304(f)(5)'s "ad- vance" disclosure requirement. The District Court specu- lated that disclosing information about contracts "that have

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not been performed, and may never be performed, may lead to confusion and an unclear record upon which the public will evaluate the forces operating in the political marketplace."

251 F. Supp. 2d, at 241 (per curiam). Without evidence re- lating to the frequency of nonperformance of executed con- tracts, such speculation cannot outweigh the public interest in ensuring full disclosure before an election actually takes It is no doubt true that § 304(f)(5) will sometimes re- place. quire the filing of disclosure statements in advance of the actual broadcast of an advertisement. 84 But the same would be true in the absence of an advance disclosure requirement, if a television station insisted on advance payment for all of the ads covered by a contract. Thus, the possibility that amended § 304 may sometimes require disclosures prior to the airing of an ad is as much a function of the use of dis- bursements (rather than the date of an ad) to trigger the disclosure requirement as it is a function of § 304(f)(5)'s treat- ment of executory contracts.

As the District Court observed, amended FECA § 304's disclosure requirements are constitutional because they "'dol not prevent anyone from speaking."' Ibid. (quoting Brief for FEC in Opposition in No. 02-582 et al. (DC), p. 112).

Moreover, the required disclosures "'would not have to re- veal the specific content of the advertisements, yet they would perform an important function in informing the public about various candidates' supporters before election day."' 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 241 (quoting Brief for FEC in Opposition, supra, at 112) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it upheld the disclosure requirements in amended FECA § 304 and re- jected the facial attack on the provisions relating to donors

14 We cannot judge the likelihood that this will occur, as the record con- tains little if any description of the contractual provisions that commonly govern payments for electioneering communications. Nor does the rec- ord contain any evidence relating to JUSTICE KENNEDY'S speculation, post, at 321, that advance disclosure may disadvantage an advertiser.

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of $1,000 or more, and reverse that judgment insofar as it .invalidated FECA § 304(f)(5).

BCRA §202's Treatment of "Coordinated Communications" as Contributions Section 202 of BCRA amends FECA § 315(a)(7)(C) to pro- vide that disbursements for "electioneering communica- tion[s]" that are coordinated with a candidate or party will be treated as contributions to, and expenditures by, that can- didate or party. 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(C) (Supp. II). s5 The amendment clarifies the scope of the preceding subsection, §315(a)(7)(B), which states more generally that "expend- itures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of" a can- didate or party will constitute contributions. 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(7)(B)(i)-(ii) (2000 ed. and Supp. II).

In Buckley we construed the statutory term "expenditure" to reach only spending for express advocacy. 424 U. S., at 40-44, and n. 52 (addressing 18 U. S. C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which placed a $1,000 cap on expenditures "'relative to a clearly identified candidate'"). BCRA §202 pre-empts a possible claim that § 315(a)(7)(B) is similarly limited, such that coordi- nated expenditures for communications that avoid express advocacy cannot be counted as contributions. As we ex-

"(i) any person makes, or contracts to make, any disbursement for any electioneering communication (within the meaning of section 434(f)(3) of this title); and

"(ii) such disbursement is coordinated with a candidate or an authorized committee of such candidate, a Federal, State, or local political party or committee thereof, or an agent or official of any such candidate, party, or committee; "such disbursement or contracting shall be treated as a contribution to the candidate supported by the electioneering communication or that candi- date's party and as an expenditure by that candidate or that candidate's party ....

" 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(7)(C).

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plained above, see supra, at 190-193, Buckley's narrow inter- pretation of the term "expenditure" was not a constitutional limitation on Congress' power to regulate federal elections.

Accordingly, there is no reason why Congress may not treat coordinated disbursements for electioneering communica- tions in the same way it treats all other coordinated expendi- tures. We affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it held that plaintiffs had advanced "no basis for finding Section 202 unconstitutional."

251 F. Supp. 2d, at 250.

BCRA § 203's Prohibition of Corporate and Labor Disbursements for Electioneering Communications

Since our decision in Buckley, Congress' power to prohibit corporations and unions from using funds in their treasuries to finance advertisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates in federal elections has been firmly embedded in our law. The ability to form and administer separate segregated funds authorized by FECA § 316, 2

U. S. C. § 441b (2000 ed. and Supp. II), has provided corpora-

tions and unions with a constitutionally sufficient opportu- nity to engage in express advocacy. That has been this Court's unanimous view,86 and it is not challenged in this litigation.

"The statutory purpose of §441b . .

. is to prohibit contributions or expenditures by corporations or labor organizations in connection with federal elections. 2 U.S. C. § 441b(a). The section, however, permits some participation of unions and corporations in the federal electoral proc- ess by allowing them to establish and pay the administrative expenses of 'separate segregated fund[s],' which may be utilized for political purposes.'

2 U. S. C. § 441b(b)(2)(C). The Act restricts the operations of such segre- gated funds, however, by making it unlawful for a corporation to solicit contributions to a fund established by it from persons other than its 'stock- holders and their families and its executive or administrative personnel and their families.' 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(4)(A)." National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 201-202.

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Section 203 of BCRA amends FECA § 316(b)(2) to extend this rule, which previously applied only to express advocacy, to all "electioneering communications" covered by the defi- nition of that term in amended FECA § 304(f)(3), discussed above. 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2) (Supp. II).81 Thus, under BCRA, corporations and unions may not use their general treasury funds to finance electioneering communications, but they remain free to organize and administer segregated funds, or PACs, for that purpose. Because corporations can still fund electioneering communications with PAC money, it is "simply wrong" to view the provision as a "complete ban" on expression rather than a regulation. Beaumont, 539

"The PAC option allows corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for politi- cal influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and it lets the govern- ment regulate campaign activity through registration and disclosure, see [2 U. S. C.] §§ 432-434, without jeop- ardizing the associational rights of advocacy organiza- tions' members."

Id., at 163 (citation omitted).

See also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494

Rather than arguing that the prohibition on the use of gen- eral treasury funds is a complete ban that operates as a prior restraint, plaintiffs instead challenge the expanded regula- tion on the grounds that it is both overbroad and underinclu- sive. Our consideration of plaintiffs' challenge is informed by our earlier conclusion that the distinction between ex-

87The amendment is straightforward. Prior to BCRA, FECA § 316(a) made it "unlawful... for any corporation whatever, or any labor organiza- tion, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with" certain 2 U. S. C. §441b(a) (2000 ed.). BCRA amends FECA federal elections. § 316(b)(2)'s definition of the term "contribution or expenditure" to include "any applicable electioneering communication." §441b(b)(2) (Supp. II).

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press advocacy and so-called issue advocacy is not constitu- In that light, we must examine the de- tionally compelled. gree to which BCRA burdens First Amendment expression and evaluate whether a compelling governmental interest Id., at 657. The latter question-. justifies that burden. whether the state interest is compelling-is easily answered by our prior decisions regarding campaign finance regula- tion, which "represent respect for the 'legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure re- quire particularly careful regulation."' Beaumont, supra, at 155 (quoting National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 209- 210). We have repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega- tions of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." Aus- tin, supra, at 660; see Beaumont, supra, at 154-155; Na- tional Right to Work, supra, at 209-210. Moreover, recent cases have recognized that certain restrictions on corporate electoral involvement permissibly hedge against "'circum- vention of [valid] contribution limits."' Beaumont, supra, at 155 (quoting Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 456, and n. 18.)

In light of our precedents, plaintiffs do not contest that the Government has a compelling interest in regulating adver- tisements that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office. Nor do they contend that the speech involved in so-called issue advocacy is any more core political speech than are words of express advocacy. After all, "the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most ur- gent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office," Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272 (1971), and "[a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candi- dates for federal office is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation," Buckley, 424 U. S., at 48. Rather, plaintiffs argue that

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the justifications that adequately support the regulation of express advocacy do not apply to significant quantities of speech encompassed by the definition of electioneering communications.

This argument fails to the extent that the issue ads broad- cast during the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal pri- mary and general elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The justifications for the regulation of express advocacy apply equally to ads aired during those pe- riods if the ads are intended to influence the voters' decisions and have that effect. The precise percentage of issue ads that clearly identified a candidate and were aired during those relatively brief preelection timespans but had no elec- tioneering purpose is a matter of dispute between the parties and among the judges on the District Court. See 251

F. Supp. 2d, at 307-312 (Henderson, J.); id., at 583-587

(Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 796-798 (Leon, J.). Nevertheless, the vast majority of ads clearly had such a purpose. An- nenberg Report 13-14; App. 1330-1348 (Krasno & Sorauf Ex- pert Report); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 573-578 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 826-827 (Leon, J.). Moreover, whatever the precise percentage may have been in the past, in the future corpora- tions and unions may finance genuine issue ads during those timeframes by simply avoiding any specific reference to fed- eral candidates, or in doubtful cases by paying for the ad from a segregated fund. 8

88 As JUSTICE KENNEDY emphasizes in dissent, post, at 326-328, we as- sume that the interests that justify the regulation of campaign speech might not apply to the regulation of genuine issue ads. The premise that apparently underlies JUSTICE KENNEDY's principal submission is a conclu- sion that the two categories of speech are nevertheless entitled to the same constitutional protection.

If that is correct, JUSTICE KENNEDY must take issue with the basic holding in Buckley and, indeed, with our recognition in First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978), that unusually important interests underlie the regulation of corporations' campaign-related speech.

In Bellotti we cited Buckley, among other cases, for the proposition that "[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral

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We are therefore not persuaded that plaintiffs have car- ried their heavy burden of proving that amended FECA §316(b)(2) is overbroad. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413

U. S. 601, 613 (1973). Even if we assumed that BCRA will

inhibit some constitutionally protected corporate and union speech, that assumption would not "justify prohibiting all enforcement" of the law unless its application to protected speech is substantial, "not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the scope of the law's plainly legitimate applica- tions." Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U. S. 113, 120 (2003). Far from establishing that BCRA's application to pure issue ads is substantial, either in an absolute sense or relative to its application to election-related advertising, the record strongly supports the contrary conclusion.

Plaintiffs also argue that FECA § 316(b)(2)'s segregated- fund requirement for electioneering communications is un- derinclusive because it does not apply to advertising in the print media or on the Internet. 2 U. S. C. § 434(f) in this litiga- (3)(A) (Supp. II). The records developed tion and by the Senate Committee adequately explain the reasons for this legislative choice. Congress found that corporations and unions used soft money to finance a virtual torrent of televised election-related ads during the periods immediately preceding federal elections, and that remedial legislation was needed to stanch that flow of money. 251

F. Supp. 2d, at 569-573 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 799 (Leon,

J.); 3 1998 Senate Report 4465, 4474-4481; 5 id., at 7521-7525.

As we held in Buckley, "reform may take one step at a time,

process, preventing corruption, and 'sustain[ing] the active, alert responsi- bility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of the 435 U. S., at 788- government' are interests of the highest importance."

789 (citations and footnote omitted). "Preservation of the individual citi- Id., zen's confidence in government," we added, "is equally important." at 789. BCRA's fidelity to those imperatives sets it apart from the statute in Bellotti-and, for that matter, from the Ohio statute banning the distri- bution of anonymous campaign literature, struck down in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334 (1995).

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addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems 424 U. S., at 105 (inter- most acute to the legislative mind." nal quotation marks and citations omitted). One might just as well argue that the electioneering communication defini- tion is underinclusive because it leaves advertising 61 days in advance of an election entirely unregulated. The record amply justifies Congress' line-drawing.

In addition to arguing that §316(b)(2)'s segregated-fund requirement is underinclusive, some plaintiffs contend that it unconstitutionally discriminates in favor of media companies.

FECA § 304(f)(3)(B)(i) excludes from the definition of elec- tioneering communications any "communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such facil- ities are owned or controlled by any political party, po- 2 U. S. C. § 434(f)(3)(B)(i) litical committee, or candidate."

(Supp. II). Plaintiffs argue this provision gives free rein to media companies to engage in speech without resort to is PAC money. Section 304(f)(3)(B)(i)'s effect, however, much narrower than plaintiffs suggest. The provision ex- cepts news items and commentary only; it does not af- ford carte blanche to media companies generally to ig- nore FECA's provisions. The statute's narrow exception is wholly consistent with First Amendment principles. "A valid distinction ... exists between corporations that are part of the media industry and other corporations that are not involved in the regular business of imparting news to the public." Austin, 494 U. S., at 668. Numerous federal statutes have drawn this distinction to ensure that the law "does not hinder or prevent the institutional press from re- porting on, and publishing editorials about, newsworthy Ibid. (citations omitted); see, e. g., 2 U. S. C.

events." § 431(9)(B)(i) (exempting news stories, commentaries, and ed- itorials from FECA's definition of "expenditure"); 15 U. S. C. §§ 1801-1804 (providing a limited antitrust exemption for newspapers); 47 U. S. C. § 315(a) (excepting newscasts, news

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interviews, and news documentaries from the requirement that broadcasters provide equal time to candidates for pub- lic office). 89

We affirm the District Court's judgment to the extent that it upheld the constitutionality of FECA § 316(b)(2); to the extent that it invalidated any part of § 316(b)(2), we reverse the judgment.

BCRA §204's Application to Nonprofit Corporations Section 204 of BCRA, which adds FECA § 316(c)(6), ap- plies the prohibition on the use of general treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications to not-for-profit cor- porations 0 Prior to the enactment of BCRA, FECA re-

I In a different but somewhat related argument, one set of plaintiffs contends that political campaigns and issue advocacy involve press activi- ties, and that BCRA therefore interferes with speakers' rights under the Freedom of the Press Clause. U. S. Const., Amdt. 1. We affirm the Dis- trict Court's conclusion that this contention lacks merit.

I The statutory scheme is somewhat complex.

In its provision deal- ing with "Rules Relating to Electioneering Communications," BCRA § 203(c)(2) (adding FECA § 316(c)(2)) makes a blanket exception for desig-

"Exception

"Notwithstanding paragraph C), the term 'applicable electioneering communication' does not include a communication by a section 501(c)(4) organization or a political organization (as defined in section 527(e)(1) of title 26) made under section 434(f)(2)(E) or (F) of this title if the communi- cation is paid for exclusively by funds provided directly by individuals who are United States citizens or nationals or lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of title 8). For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term 'provided directly by individuals' does not include funds the source of which is an entity described in subsection (a) of this section." 2 U. S. C. §441b(c)(2) (Supp. II).

BCRA §204, however, amends FECA §316(c) to exclude "targeted communications" from that exception. New FECA § 316(c)(6) states that the §316(c)(2) exception "shall not apply in the case of a targeted com- munication that is made by an organization described" in §316(b)(2). 2

U. S. C. § 441b(c)(6)(A). Subparagraph (B) then defines the term "tar-

geted communication" for the purpose of the provision as including all

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quired such corporations, like business corporations, to pay for their express advocacy, from segregated funds rather than from their general treasuries. Our recent decision in Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146 (2003), confirmed that the requirement was valid except insofar as it applied to a subcategory of corporations described as "MCFL organizations," as defined by our decision in MCFL, 479 U. S. 238 (1986).91 The constitutional objection to apply- ing FECA's segregated-fund requirement to so-called MCFL organizations necessarily applies with equal force to FECA § 316(c)(6).

Our decision in MCFL related to a carefully defined cate- gory of entities. We identified three features of the organi- zation at issue in that case that were central to our holding-

"First, it was formed for the express purpose of promot- ing political ideas, and cannot engage in business activi- ties.

If political fundraising events are expressly de- nominated as requests for contributions that will be used for political purposes, including direct expendi- tures, these events cannot be considered business activi- ties. This ensures that political resources reflect politi- cal support. Second, it has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that persons connected with

electioneering communications. The parties and the judges on the Dis- trict Court have assumed that amended FECA § 316(c)(6) completely can- celed the exemption for nonprofit corporations set forth in § 316(c)(2). 251

F. Supp. 2d, at 804 (Leon, J.) ("Section 204 completely cancels out the

exemption for all nonprofit corporations provided by Section 203").

91 "[A] unanimous Court in National Right to Work did not think the regulatory burdens on PACs, including restrictions on their ability to so- licit funds, rendered a PAC unconstitutional as an advocacy corporation's sole avenue for making political contributions. See 459 U. S., at 201-202.

There is no reason to think the burden on advocacy corporations is any greater today, or to reach a different conclusion here." Beaumont, 539

U. S., at 163.

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the organization will have no economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political activity. Third, MCFL was not established by a busi- ness corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions from such entities. This pre- vents such corporations from serving as conduits for the type of direct spending that creates a threat to the polit- ical marketplace."

Id., at 264.

That FECA § 316(c)(6) does not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations from its prohibition is not a sufficient reason to invalidate the entire section. If a reasonable limiting con- struction "has been or could be placed on the challenged stat- ute" to avoid constitutional concerns, we should embrace it.

Broadrick, 413 U. S., at 613; Buckley, 424 U. S., at 44. Be- cause our decision in the MCFL case was on the books for many years before BCRA was enacted, we presume that the legislators who drafted § 316(c)(6) were fully aware that the provision could not validly apply to MCFL-type entities.

See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U. S. 879, 896 (1988); Can- non v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 696-697 (1979).

Indeed, the Government itself concedes that § 316(c)(6) does not apply to MCFL organizations. As so construed, the pro- vision is plainly valid. See Austin, 494 U. S., at 661-665 (holding that a segregated-fund requirement that did not ex- plicitly carve out an MCFL exception could apply to a non- profit corporation that did not qualify for MCFL status).

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court upholding § 316(c)(6) as so limited is affirmed.

BCRA § 212's Reporting Requirement for $1,000 Expenditures Section 212 of BCRA amends FECA § 304 to add a new disclosure requirement, FECA § 304(g), which applies to per- sons making independent expenditures of $1,000 or more during the 20-day period immediately preceding an election.

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Like FECA § 304(f)(5), discussed above, new § 304(g) treats the execution of a contract to make a disbursement as the functional equivalent of a payment for the goods or services covered by the contract.92 In challenging this provision, plaintiffs renew the argument we rejected in the context of § 304(f)(5): that they have a constitutional right to postpone any disclosure until after the performance of the services purchased by their expenditure.

The District Court held that the challenge to FECA § 304(g) was not ripe because the FEC has issued regulations "provid[ing] Plaintiffs with the exact remedy they seek"- that is, specifically declining to "require disclosure of inde- pendent express advocacy expenditures prior to their 'pub- li[c] disseminat[ion]."' 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 251, and n. 85 (per curiam) (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 404, 452 (2003) (codified at 11 CFR §§ 109.10(c), (d) (2003))). We are not certain that a regulation purporting to limit the range of circumstances in which a speech-burdening statute will be enforced can render nonjusticiable a facial challenge to the (concededly broader) underlying statute. Nevertheless, we need not separately address the constitutionality of § 304(g), for our ruling as to BCRA § 201, see supra, at 194-202, renders the issue essentially moot.

"Time for reporting certain expenditures "(1) Expenditures aggregating $1,000 "(A) Initial report "A person (including a political committee) that makes or contracts to make independent expenditures aggregating $1,000 or more after the 20th day, but more than 24 hours, before the date of an election shall file a report describing the expenditures within 24 hours.

"(B) Additional reports "After a person files a report under subparagraph (A), the person shall file an additional report within 24 hours after each time the person makes or contracts to make independent expenditures aggregating an additional $1,000 with respect to the same election as that to which the initial report relates." 2 U. S. C. §434(g) (Supp. II).

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

BCRA §213's Requirement that Political Parties Choose Between Coordinated and Independent Expenditures After Nominating a Candidate Section 213 of BCRA amends FECA § 315(d)(4) to impose certain limits on party spending during the postnomination, preelection period.9 3 At first blush, the text of § 315(d)(4)(A) appears to require political parties to make a straightfor- ward choice between using limited coordinated expenditures to support their or unlimited independent expenditures nominees. All three judges on the District Court concluded that the provision placed an unconstitutional burden on the parties' right to make unlimited independent expenditures.

"Independent versus coordinated expenditures by party "(A) In general "On or after the date on which a political party nominates a candidate,

no committee of the political party may make-

"(i) any coordinated expenditure under this subsection with respect to the candidate during the election cycle at any time after it makes any independent expenditure (as defined in section 431(17) of this title) with respect to the candidate during the election cycle; or

"(ii) any independent expenditure (as defined in section 431(17) of this title) with respect to the candidate during the election cycle at any time after it makes any coordinated expenditure under this subsection with respect to the candidate during the election cycle.

"(B) Application "For purposes of this paragraph, all political committees established and maintained by a national political party (including all congressional cam- paign committees) and all political committees established and maintained by a State political party (including any subordinate committee of a State committee) shall be considered to be a single political committee.

"(C) Transfers "A committee of a political party that makes coordinated expenditures under this subsection with respect to a candidate shall not, during an election cycle, transfer any funds to, assign authority to make coordinated expenditures under this subsection to, or receive a transfer of funds from, a committee of the political party that has made or intends to make an to the candidate." 2 U. S. C. independent expenditure with respect § 441a(d)(4) (Supp. II).

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251 F. Supp. 2d, at 388 (Henderson, J.); id., at 650-651 In the end, we (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), id., at 805-808 (Leon, J.). agree with that conclusion but believe it important to iden- tify certain complexities in the text of § 315(d)(4) that affect our analysis of the issue.

Section 315 of FECA sets forth various limitations on con- tributions and expenditures by individuals, political parties, and other groups. Section 315(a)(2) restricts "contributions" by parties to $5,000 per candidate. 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(2).

Because § 315(a)(7) treats expenditures that are coordinated with a candidate as contributions to that candidate, 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(7) (2000 ed. and Supp. II), the $5,000 limit also operates as a cap on parties' coordinated expenditures.

Section 315(d), however, provides that, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law with respect to limitations on ex- penditures or limitations on contributions," political parties may make "expenditures" in support of their candidates under a formula keyed to the voting-age population of the candidate's home State or, in the case of a candidate for President, the voting-age population of the United States.

In 2 U.S. C. §§ 441a(d)(1)-(3) (2000 ed. and Supp. II).94

After exempting political parties from the general contribution and expenditure limitations of the statute, 2 U. S. C. §441a(d)(1) (Supp. II), FECA §315(d) imposes the following substitute limitations on party

"(2) The national committee of a political party may not make any ex- penditure in connection with the general election campaign of any candi- date for President of the United States who is affiliated with such party which exceeds an amount equal to 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the United States (as certified under subsection (e) of this section). Any expenditure under this paragraph shall be in addition to any expenditure by a national committee of a political party serving as the principal campaign committee of a candidate for the office of President of the United States.

"(3) The national committee of a political party, or a State committee of a political party, including any subordinate committee of a State commit- tee, may not make any expenditure in connection with the general election

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

the year 2000, that formula permitted expenditures ranging from $33,780 to $67,650 for House of Representatives races, and from $67,650 to $1.6 million for Senate races. Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 439, n. 3. We held in Colorado I that parties have a constitutional right to make unlimited independent expenditures, and we invalidated § 315(d) to the extent that it restricted such expenditures. As a result of that decision, § 315(d) applies only to coordinated expenditures, replacing the $5,000 cap on contributions set out in § 315(a)(2) with the more generous limitations prescribed by §§ 315(d)(1)-(3).

We sustained that limited application in Colorado II, supra.

Section 213 of BCRA amends § 315(d) by adding a new paragraph (4). New § 315(d)(4)(A) provides that, after a party nominates a candidate for federal office, it must choose between two spending options. Under the first option, a party that "makes any independent expenditure (as de- fined in section [301(17)])" is thereby barred from making "any coordinated expenditure under this subsection." 2

U. S. C. § 441a(d)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. II). The phrase "this sub-

section" is a reference to subsection (d) of § 315. Thus, the consequence of making an independent expenditure is not a complete prohibition of any coordinated expenditure: Al- though the party cannot take advantage of the increased spending limits under §§315(d)(1)-(3), it still may make up to $5,000 in coordinated expenditures under § 315(a)(2). As the difference between $5,000 and $1.6 million demonstrates,

campaign of a candidate for Federal office in a State who is affiliated with such party which exceeds-

"(A) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of Senator, or of Representative from a State which is entitled to only one Representative, the greater of-

"(i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State (as certified under subsection (e) of this section); or

"(ii) $20,000; and "(B) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of Representa- tive, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner in any other State, $10,000." 2

U. S. C. §§441a(d)(2)-(3).

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however, that is a significant cost to impose on the exercise of a constitutional right.

The second option is the converse of the first.

It provides that a party that makes any coordinated expenditure "under this subsection" (i. e., one that exceeds the ordinary $5,000 limit) cannot make "any independent expenditure (as defined in section [301(17)]) with respect to the candidate." 2

U. S. C. § 441a(d)(4)(A)(ii). Section 301(17) defines "'inde-

pendent expenditure"' to mean a noncoordinated expendi- ture "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly 2 U. S. C. § 431(17)(A).' 5 Therefore, identified candidate." as was true of the first option, the party's choice is not as stark as it initially appears: The consequence of the larger coordinated expenditure is not a complete prohibition of any independent expenditure, but the forfeiture of the right to make independent expenditures for express advocacy. As we explained in our discussion of the provisions relating to electioneering communications, supra, at 189-194, express advocacy represents only a tiny fraction of the political com- munications made for the purpose of electing or defeating candidates during a campaign. Regardless of which option parties choose, they remain free to make independent ex-

"Independent expenditure "The term 'independent expenditure' means an expenditure by a

person-

"(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified

candidate; and

"(B) that is not made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate's authorized political com- mittee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents." 2

U. S. C. § 431(17) (Supp. II).

The version of the definition prior to its amendment by BCRA also included the phrase "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a 2 U. S. C. §431(17) (2000 ed.). That defini- clearly identified candidate." tion had been adopted in 1976, presumably to reflect the narrowing con- struction that the Court adopted in Buckley. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. 475.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

penditures for the vast majority of campaign ads that avoid the use of a few magic words.

In sum, the coverage of new FECA § 315(d)(4) is much more limited than it initially appears. A party that wishes to spend more than $5,000 in coordination with its nominee is forced to forgo only the narrow category of independent expenditures that make use of magic words. But while the category of burdened speech is relatively small, it plainly is entitled to First Amendment protection. See Buckley, 424

U. S., at 44-45, 48. Under § 315(d)(4), a political party's ex-

ercise of its constitutionally protected right to engage in "core First Amendment expression," id., at 48, results in the loss of a valuable statutory benefit that has been available to parties for many years. To survive constitutional scrutiny, a provision that has such consequences must be supported by a meaningful governmental interest.

The interest in requiring political parties to avoid the use of magic words is not such an interest. We held in Buckley that a $1,000 cap on expenditures that applied only to ex- press advocacy could not be justified as a means of avoiding circumvention of contribution limits or preventing corrup- tion and the appearance of corruption because its restrictions could easily be evaded: "So long as persons and groups es- chew expenditures that in express terms advocate the elec- tion or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and Id., at 45. The same is true in this litigation. his views."

Any claim that a restriction on independent express advo- cacy serves a strong Government interest is belied by the overwhelming evidence that the line between express advo- cacy and other types of election-influencing expression is, for Indeed, Con- Congress' purposes, functionally meaningless. gress enacted the new "electioneering communication[s]" provisions precisely because it recognized that the express advocacy test was woefully inadequate at capturing commu- In light nications designed to influence candidate elections. of that recognition, we are hard pressed to conclude that any

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meaningful purpose is served by § 315(d)(4)'s burden on a party's right to engage independently in express advocacy.

The Government argues that § 315(d)(4) nevertheless is constitutional because it is not an outright ban (or cap) on independent expenditures, but rather offers parties a volun- tary choice between a constitutional right and a statutory benefit. Whatever merit that argument might have in the abstract, it fails to account for new § 315(d)(4)(B), which

"For purposes of this paragraph, all political committees established and maintained by a national political party (including all congressional campaign committees) and all political committees established and maintained by a State political party (including any subordinate commit- tee of a State committee) shall be considered to be a single political committee."

2 U. S. C. § 441a(d)(4)(B) (Supp. II).

Given that provision, it simply is not the case that each party committee can make a voluntary and independent choice between exercising its right to engage in independent advocacy and taking advantage of the increased limits on coordinated spending under §§315(d)(1)-(3).

Instead, the decision resides solely in the hands of the first mover, such that a local party committee can bind both the state and na- tional parties to its chosen spending option. 6 It is one thing to say that Congress may require a party committee to give

. Although the District Court and all the parties to this litigation en- dorse the interpretation set forth in the text, it is not clear that subpara- graph (B) should be read so broadly: The reference to "a State" instead of "the States" suggests that Congress meant to distinguish between com- mittees associated with the party for each State (which would be grouped together by State, with each grouping treated as a single committee for purposes of the choice) and committees associated with a national party (which would likewise be grouped together and treated as a separate polit- ical committee). We need not resolve the interpretive puzzle, however, because even under the more limited reading a local party committee would be able to tie the hands of a state committee or other local commit- tees in the same State.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

up its right to make independent expenditures if it believes that it can accomplish more with coordinated expenditures.

It is quite another thing, however, to say that the RNC must limit itself to $5,000 in coordinated expenditures in support of its Presidential nominee if any state or local committee first makes an independent expenditure for an ad that uses magic words. That odd result undermines any claim that new § 315(d)(4) can withstand constitutional scrutiny simply because it is cast as a voluntary choice rather than an out- right prohibition on independent expenditures.

The portion of the judgment of the District Court invali- dating BCRA §213 is affirmed.

BCRA §214's Changes in FECA's Provisions Covering Coordinated Expenditures Ever since our decision in Buckley, it has been settled that expenditures by a noncandidate that are "controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and his campaign" may be treated as indirect contributions subject to FECA's source and amount limitations. 424 U. S.,. at 46. Thus, FECA § 315(a)(7)(B)(i) long has provided that "expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to 2 U. S. C. §441a(a) be a contribution to such candidate."

(7)(B)(i). Section 214(a) of BCRA creates a new FECA that applies the same rule to expendi- §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) tures coordinated with "a national, State, or local commit- tee of a political party." 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(7)(B)(ii) (Supp.

II)Y Sections 214(b) and (c) direct the FEC to repeal 17The italicized portion of the following partial quotation of FECA

§315(a)(7) was added by §214 of BCRA:

"For purposes of this subsection- "(A) contributions to a named candidate made to any political committee authorized by such candidate to accept contributions on his behalf shall be considered to be contributions made to such candidate;

"(B)(i) expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his author-

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its current regulations" and to promulgate new regulations dealing with "coordinated communications" paid for by per- sons other than candidates or their parties. Subsection (c) provides that the new "regulations shall not require agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination."

Note following 2 U. S. C. §441a(a) (Supp. II).

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Congress may apply the same coordination rules to parties as to candidates. They argue instead that new FECA § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) and its implement- ing regulations are overbroad and unconstitutionally vague because they permit a finding of coordination even in the absence of an agreement. Plaintiffs point out that political supporters may be subjected to criminal liability if they ex- ceed the contribution limits with expenditures that ulti- mately are deemed coordinated. Thus, they stress the im- portance of a clear definition of "coordination" and argue any definition that does not hinge on the presence of an agree- ment cannot provide the "precise guidance" that the First Amendment demands. Brief for Appellant Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. in No. 02-1756, p. 48.

As plaintiffs readily admit, that argument reaches beyond BCRA, calling into question FECA's pre-existing provisions governing expenditures coordinated with candidates.

ized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a con- tribution to such candidate;

"(ii) expenditures made by any person (other than a candidate or can- didate's authorized committee) in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a national, State, or local commit- tee of a political party, shall be considered to be contributions, made to such party committee...." 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(7) (2000 ed. and Supp. II).

98 Pre-BCRA FEC regulations defined coordinated expenditures to in- clude expenditures made "[alt the request or suggestion of" a candidate or party; communications in which a candidate or party "exercised control or decision-making authority over the content, timing, location, mode, in- tended audience, volume of distribution, or frequency of placement"; and communications produced "[a]fter substantial discussion or negotiation" with a party or candidate, "the result of which is collaboration or agree- ment."

11 CFR § 100.23(c)(2) (2001).

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We are not persuaded that the presence of an agreement marks the dividing line between expenditures that are coor- dinated-and therefore may be regulated as indirect contri- butions-and expenditures that truly are independent. We repeatedly have struck down limitations on expenditures "made totally independently of the candidate and his cam- paign," Buckley, 424 U. S., at 47, on the ground that such limitations "impose far greater restraints on the freedom of speech and association" than do limits on contributions and coordinated expenditures, id., at 44, while "fail[ing] to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the real- ity or appearance of corruption in the electoral process," id., at 47-48. See also Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 613-614 (strik- ing down limit on expenditure made by party officials prior to nomination of candidates and without any consultation

independent expenditures "Unlike contributions, may well provide little assistance to the candidate's cam- paign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an ex- penditure with the candidate or his agent not only un- dermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate."

424 U. S., at 47.

Thus, the rationale for affording special protection to wholly independent expenditures has nothing to do with the absence of an agreement and everything to do with the func- In- tional consequences of different types of expenditures. dependent expenditures "are poor sources of leverage for a spender because they might be duplicative or counterproduc- tive from a candidate's point of view." Colorado II, 533

U. S., at 446. By contrast, expenditures made after a "wink

or nod" often will be "as useful to the candidate as cash."

Id., at 442, 446. For that reason, Congress has always

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treated expenditures made "at the request or suggestion of"

a. candidate as coordinated.9 9 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(7)(B)(i). A

supporter easily could comply with a candidate's request or suggestion without first agreeing to do so, and the resulting expenditure would be "'virtually indistinguishable from [a] simple contributio[n],"' Colorado II, supra, at 444-445.

Therefore, we cannot agree with the submission that new FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is overbroad because it permits a finding of coordination or cooperation notwithstanding the absence of a pre-existing agreement.

Nor are we persuaded that the absence of an agreement requirement renders § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) unconstitutionally vague. An agreement has never been required to support a finding of coordination with a candidate under §315(a)(7) (B)(i), which refers to expenditures made "in cooperation, consultation, or concer[t] with, or at the request or sugges- tion of" a candidate. Congress used precisely the same lan- guage in new § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) to address expenditures coor- dinated with parties. FECA's longstanding definition of coordination "delineates its reach in words of common under- standing." Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611, 616 (1968).

Not surprisingly, therefore, the relevant statutory language has survived without constitutional challenge for almost three decades. Although that fact does not insulate the definition from constitutional scrutiny, it does undermine plaintiffs' claim that the language of § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is intol- erably vague. Plaintiffs do not present any evidence that

Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the statutory framework was not significantly different at the time of our decision in Buckley. The rele- vant provision, 18 U. S. C. §608(e)(1) (1970 ed.; Supp. IV), treated as coor- dinated any expenditures "authorized or requested by the candidate."

(Emphasis added.) And the legislative history, on which we relied for "guidance in differentiating individual expenditures that are contributions ... from those treated as independent expenditures," described as "inde- pendent" an expenditure made by a supporter "'completely on his own, and not at the request or suggestion of the candidate or his agen[t]."' 424

U. S., at 46-47, n. 53 (quoting S. Rep. No. 93-689, p. 18 (1974)).

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

the definition has chilled political speech, whether between candidates and their supporters or by the supporters to the general public. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 874 (1997) (noting risk that vague stat- utes may chill protected expression). And, although plain- tiffs speculate that the FEC could engage in intrusive and politically motivated investigations into alleged coordination, they do not even attempt to explain why an agreement re- quirement would solve that problem. Moreover, the only evidence plaintiffs have adduced regarding the enforcement of the coordination provision during its 27-year history con- cerns three investigations in the late 1990's into groups on different sides of the political aisle. Such meager evidence does not support the claim that §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) will "fos- ter 'arbitrary and discriminatory application."' Buckley, supra, at 41, n. 48 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408

U. S., at 108-109). We conclude that FECA's definition of

coordination gives "fair notice to those to whom [it] is di- rected," American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339

U. S. 382, 412 (1950), and is not unconstitutionally vague.

Finally, portions of plaintiffs' challenge to BCRA §214 focus on the regulations the FEC has promulgated under 11 CFR § 109.21 (2003). As the District Court ex- § 214(c). plained, issues concerning the regulations are not appropri- ately raised in this facial challenge to BCRA, but must be pursued in a separate proceeding. Thus, we agree with the District Court that plaintiffs' challenge to §§ 214(b) and (c) is not ripe to the extent that the alleged constitutional infirmi- ties are found in the implementing regulations rather than the statute itself.

The portions of the District Court judgment rejecting plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA § 214 are affirmed.

Many years ago we observed that "[t]o say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safe-

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guard . . . an election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particu- lar the power of self protection." Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S., at 545. We abide by that conviction in con- sidering Congress' most recent effort to confine the ill effects of aggregated wealth on our political system. We are under no illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional state- ment on the matter. Money, like water, will always find an outlet. What problems will arise, and how Congress will In the main we respond, are concerns for another day. uphold BCRA's two principal, complementary features: the control of soft money and the regulation of electioneering communications. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the District Court's judgment with respect to Titles I and II.

It is so ordered.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV.*

This opinion addresses issues involving miscellaneous Title III and IV provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the District Court with respect to these provisions.

BCRA § 305 amends the federal Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act) § 315(b), 48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 86 Stat. 4, which requires that, 45 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election, broadcast sta- tions must sell a qualified candidate the "lowest unit charge

SOUTER join this opinion in its entirety. JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join this opinion, except with respect to BCRA § 305. JUSTICE THoMAs joins this opinion with respect to BCRA §§ 304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and 403(b).

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

of the station for the same class and amount of time for the same period," 47 U. S. C. § 315(b)(1). Section 305's amend- ment, in turn, denies a candidate the benefit of that lowest unit charge unless the candidate "provides written certifica- tion to the broadcast station that the candidate (and any au- thorized committee of the candidate) shall not make any di- rect reference to another candidate for the same office," or the candidate, in the manner prescribed in BCRA § 305(a)(3), clearly identifies herself at the end of the broadcast and states that she approves of the broadcast. 47 U. S. C. §§ 315(b)(2)(A), (C) (Supp. II).

The McConnell plaintiffs challenge §305. They argue that Senator McConnell's testimony that he plans to run ad- vertisements critical of his opponents in the future and that he had run them in the past is sufficient to establish standing.

We think not.

Article III of the Constitution limits the "judicial power" to the resolution of "cases" and "controversies." One ele- ment of the "bedrock" case-or-controversy requirement is that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to sue.

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 818 (1997). On many occa- sions, we have reiterated the three requirements that consti- tute the "'irreducible constitutional minimum"' of standing.

Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 771 (2000). First, a plaintiff must demonstrate an "injury in fact," which is "concrete," "dis- tinct and palpable," and "actual or imminent." Whitmore v.

Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, a plaintiff must establish ''a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be 'fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not... th[e] result [of] some third party not before the court."' Lujan v. De- fenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560-561 (1992) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426

U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). Third, a plaintiff must show the

226 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of the Court "'substantial likelihood' that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact." Stevens, supra, at 771.

As noted above, § 305 amended the Communications Act's requirements with respect to the lowest unit charge for broadcasting time. But this price is not available to quali- fied candidates until 45 days before a primary election or 60 days before a general election. Because Senator McCon- nell's current term does not expire until 2009, the earliest day he could be affected by § 305 is 45 days before the Re- publican primary election in 2008. This alleged injury in fact is too remote temporally to satisfy Article III standing.

See Whitmore, supra, at 158 ("A threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Los Angeles

v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 102 (1983) (A plaintiff seeking injunc-

tive relief must show he is "'immediately in danger of sus- taining some direct injury' as [a] result" of the challenged conduct). Because we hold that the McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to challenge § 305, we affirm the District Court's dismissal of the challenge to BCRA § 305.

BCRA § 307, which amends § 315(a)(1) of the Federal Elec- tion Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 86 Stat. 3, as added, 90 Stat. 487, increases and indexes for inflation certain FECA contribution limits. The Adams and Paul plaintiffs chal- lenge §307 in this Court. Both groups contend that they have standing to sue. Again, we disagree.

The Adams plaintiffs, a group consisting of voters, organi- zations representing voters, and candidates, allege two in- juries, and argue each is legally cognizable, "as established by case law outlawing electoral discrimination based on eco- nomic status.., and upholding the right to an equally mean- ingful vote . . ." Brief for Appellant Adams et al. in No. 02-1740, p. 31.

.

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First, they assert that the increases in hard-money limits enacted by § 307 deprive them of an equal ability to partici- pate in the election process based on their economic status.

But, to satisfy our standing requirements, a plaintiff's al- leged injury must be an invasion of a concrete and particular- ized legally protected interest. Lujan, supra, at 560. We have noted that "[a]lthough standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular con- duct is illegal,... it often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We have never recognized a legal right comparable to the broad and diffuse injury asserted by the Adams plaintiffs. Their reliance on this Court's voting rights cases is misplaced.

They rely on cases requiring nondiscriminatory access to the ballot and a single, equal vote for each voter. See, e. g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U. S. 709 (1974) (invalidating a statute requiring a ballot-access fee fixed at a percentage of the sal- ary for the office sought because it unconstitutionally bur- dened the right to vote); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 666-668 (1966) (invalidating a state poll tax because it effectively denied the right to vote).

None of these plaintiffs claims a denial of equal access to the ballot or the right to vote.

Instead, the plaintiffs allege a curtailment of the scope of their participation in the elec- toral process. But we have noted that "[plolitical 'free trade' does not necessarily require that all who participate in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources."

Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 257 (1986); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam) (rejecting the asserted government interest of "equalizing the relative ability of in- dividuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections" to justify the burden on speech presented by expenditure limits). This claim of injury by the Adams plaintiffs is, therefore, not to a legally cognizable right.

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Second, the Adams plaintiffs-candidates contend that they have suffered a competitive injury. Their candidates "do not wish to solicit or accept large campaign contributions as permitted by BCRA" because "[t]hey believe such contribu- tions create the appearance of unequal access and influence."

Adams Complaint 53. As a result, they claim that BCRA § 307 puts them at a "fundraising disadvantage," making it more difficult for them to compete in elections. See id., 56.

The second claimed injury is based on the same premise as the first: BCRA § 307's increased hard-money limits allow plaintiffs-candidates' opponents to raise more money, and, consequently, the plaintiffs-candidates' ability to compete or participate in the electoral process is diminished. But they cannot show that their alleged injury is "fairly traceable" to BCRA § 307. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562. Their alleged inability to compete stems not from the operation of § 307, but from their own personal "wish" not to solicit or accept large contributions, i.e., their personal choice. Accordingly, the Adams plaintiffs fail here to allege an injury in fact that is "fairly traceable" to BCRA.

The Paul plaintiffs maintain that BCRA § 307 violates the Freedom of Press Clause of the First Amendment. They contend that their political campaigns and public interest ad- vocacy involve traditional press activities and that, there- fore, they are protected by the First Amendment's guaran- tee of the freedom of press. The Paul plaintiffs argue that the contribution limits imposed by BCRA §307, together with the individual and political action committee contribu- tion limitations of FECA § 315, impose unconstitutional edi- torial control upon candidates and their campaigns. The Paul plaintiffs argue that by imposing economic burdens upon them, but not upon the institutional media, see 2

U. S. C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (exempting "any news story, commen-

tary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodi- cal publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

by any political party, political committee, or candidate" from the definition of expenditure), BCRA § 307 and FECA § 315 violate the freedom of the press.

The Paul plaintiffs cannot show the "'substantial likeli- hood' that the requested relief will remedy [their] alleged injury in fact," Stevens, 529 U. S., at 771. The relief the Paul plaintiffs seek is for this Court to strike down the con- tribution limits, removing the alleged disparate editorial con- trols and economic burdens imposed on them. But § 307 merely increased and indexed for inflation certain FECA contribution limits. This Court has no power to adjudicate a challenge to the FECA limits in this litigation because challenges to the constitutionality of FECA provisions are subject to direct review before an appropriate en banc court of appeals, as provided in 2 U. S. C. § 437h, not in the three- judge District Court convened pursuant to BCRA § 403(a).

Although the Court has jurisdiction to hear a challenge to § 307, if the Court were to strike down the increases and indexes established by BCRA § 307, it would not remedy the Paul plaintiffs' alleged injury because both the limitations imposed by FECA and the exemption for news media would remain unchanged. A ruling in the Paul plaintiffs' favor, therefore, would not redress their alleged injury, and they accordingly lack standing. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Bet- ter Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 105-110 (1998).

For the reasons above, we affirm the District Court's dis- missal of the Adams and Paul plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA § 307 for lack of standing.

BCRA §§304, 316, and 319

BCRA §§304 and 316, which amend FECA § 315, and BCRA § 319, which adds FECA § 315A, collectively known as the "millionaire provisions," provide for a series of staggered increases in otherwise applicable contribution-to-candidate limits if the candidate's opponent spends a triggering amount

230 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

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of his personal funds.1 The provisions also eliminate the co- ordinated expenditure limits in certain circumstances.2

In their challenge to the millionaire provisions, the Adams plaintiffs allege the same injuries that they alleged with re- gard to BCRA § 307. For the reasons discussed above, they fail to allege a cognizable injury that is "fairly traceable" to BCRA. Additionally, as the District Court noted, "none of the Adams plaintiffs is a candidate in an election affected by the millionaire provisions-i. e., one in which an opponent chooses to spend the triggering amount in his own funds- and it would be purely 'conjectural' for the court to assume that any plaintiff ever will be." 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 431 (DC 2003) (case below) (Henderson, J., concurring in judg- ment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lujan, 504

U. S., at 560). We affirm the District Court's dismissal of

the Adams plaintiffs' challenge to the millionaire provisions for lack of standing.

FECA §318 requires that certain communications "au- thorized" by a candidate or his political committee clearly identify the candidate or committee or, if not so author- ized, identify the payor and announce the lack of authoriza- tion. 2 U.S. C. §441d (2000 ed. and Supp. II). BCRA §311 makes several amendments to FECA §318, among them the expansion of this identification regime to include disburse- ments for "electioneering communications" as defined in

'To qualify for increased candidate contribution limits, the "opposition personal funds amount," which depends on expenditures by a candidate and her self-financed opponent, must exceed a "threshold amount." 2

U. S. C. §§ 441a(i)(1)(D), 441a-l(a)(2)(A) (Supp. II).

21f the "opposition personal funds amount" is at least 10 times the "threshold amount" in a Senate race, or exceeds $350,000 in a House of Representatives race, the coordinated party expenditure limits do not apply. §§ 441a(i)(1)(C)(iii), 441a-1(a)(1)(C).

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

The McConnell and Chamber of Commerce plaintiffs chal- lenge BCRA § 311 by simply noting that § 311, along with all of the "electioneering communications" provisions of BCRA, is unconstitutional. We disagree. We think BCRA §311's in the FECA inclusion of electioneering communications § 318 disclosure regime bears a sufficient relationship to the important governmental interest of "shed[ding] the light of publicity" on campaign financing. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 81.

Assuming as we must that FECA § 318 is valid to begin with, and that FECA §318 is valid as amended by BCRA § 311's amendments other than the inclusion of electioneering communications, the challenged inclusion of electioneering communications is not itself unconstitutional. We affirm the District Court's decision upholding §311's expansion of FECA §318(a) to include disclosure of disbursements for electioneering communications.

BCRA § 318, which adds FECA § 324, prohibits individuals "17 years old or younger" from making contributions to can- didates and contributions or donations to political parties. 2

U. S. C. § 441k (Supp. II). The McConnell and Echols plain-

tiffs challenge the provision; they argue that § 318 violates the First Amendment rights of minors. We agree.

Minors enjoy the protection of the First Amendment.

See, e. g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 511-513 (1969). Limitations on the amount that an individual may contribute to a candidate or political committee impinge on the protected freedoms of expression and association. See Buckley, supra, at 20-22.

When the Government burdens the right to contribute, we apply heightened scrutiny. See ante, at 136 (joint opinion of STEVENS and O'CONNOR, JJ.) ("[A] contribution limit in- volving even "'significant interference"' with associational rights is nevertheless valid if it satisfies the 'lesser demand' of being "'closely drawn"' to match a "'sufficiently important

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(quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, interest" 539 U. S. 146, 162 (2003))). We ask whether there is a "suf- ficiently important interest" and whether the statute is "closely drawn" to avoid unnecessary abridgment of First Amendment freedoms. Ante, at 136; Buckley, supra, at 25.

The Government asserts that the provision protects against corruption by conduit; that is, donations by parents through their minor children to circumvent contribution limits appli- cable to the parents. But the Government offers scant evi- dence of this form of evasion.3 Perhaps the Government's slim evidence results from sufficient deterrence of such activ- ities by § 320 of FECA, which prohibits any person from "mak[ing] a contribution in the name of another person" or "knowingly accept[ing] a contribution made by one person in the name of another," 2 U. S. C. § 441f. Absent a more convincing case of the claimed evil, this interest is simply too attenuated for § 318 to withstand heightened scrutiny. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 391 (2000) ("The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised").

Even assuming, arguendo, the Government advances an important interest, the provision is overinclusive. The States have adopted a variety of more tailored approaches-

e. g., counting contributions by minors against the total

permitted for a parent or family unit, imposing a lower cap on contributions by minors, and prohibiting contribu- tions by very young children. Without deciding whether any of these alternatives is sufficiently tailored, we hold that the provision here sweeps too broadly. We therefore affirm the District Court's decision striking down §318 as unconstitutional.

" Although some examples were presented to the District Court, 251

F. Supp. 2d 176, 588-590 (DC 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), none were offered

to this Court.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court BCRA §403(b)

The National Right to Life plaintiffs argue that the Dis- trict Court's grant of intervention to the intervenor- defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and BCRA §403(b), must be reversed because the intervenor-defendants lack Article III standing. It is clear, however, that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has standing, and therefore we need not address the standing of the intervenor-defendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC's. See, e. g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524

U. S. 417, 431-432, n. 19 (1998); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S.

714, 721 (1986). Cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 68-69,

n. 21 (1986) (reserving the question for another day).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court's judgment finding the plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA § 305, § 307, and the millionaire provisions nonjusticiable, striking down as unconstitutional BCRA § 318, and upholding BCRA §311. The judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Title V.*

We consider here the constitutionality of § 504 of the Bi- partisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), amending the Communications Act of 1934. That section requires broadcasters to keep publicly available records of politically related broadcasting requests. 47 U. S. C. § 315(e) (Supp.

II). The McConnell plaintiffs, who include the National Association of Broadcasters, argue that § 504 imposes oner- ous administrative burdens, lacks any offsetting justification, and consequently violates the First Amendment. For simi- lar reasons, the three judges on the District Court found BCRA § 504 unconstitutional on its face. 251 F. Supp. 2d

GINSBURG join this opinion in its entirety.

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176, 186 (DC 2003) (per curiam) (case below). We disagree, and we reverse that determination.

BCRA § 504's key requirements are the following:

(1) A "candidate request" requirement calls for broadcast-

ers to keep records of broadcast requests "made by or' on behalf of" any "legally qualified candidate for public office."

47 U. S. C. § 315(e)(1)(A) (Supp. II).

(2) An "election message request" requirement calls for

broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast "message[s]" that refer either to a "legally qual- ified candidate" or to "any election to Federal office." §§ 315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii).

(3) An "issue request" requirement calls for broadcasters

to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast "message[s]" related to a "national legislative issue of public importance," § 315(e)(1)(B)(iii), or otherwise relating to a "political matter of national importance," § 315(e)(1)(B).

We shall consider each provision in turn.

BCRA § 504's "candidate request" requirements are virtu- ally identical to those contained in a regulation that the Fed- eral Communications Commission (FCC) promulgated as early as 1938 and which with slight modifications the FCC has maintained in effect ever since. 47 CFR § 73.1943 (2002); compare 3 Fed. Reg. 1692 (1938) (47 CFR § 36a4); 13 Fed. Reg. 7486 (1948) (47 CFR §§ 3.190(d), 3.290(d), 3.690(d)); 17 Fed. Reg. 4711 (1952) (47 CFR § 3.590(d)); 19 Fed. Reg.

5949 (1954); 23 Fed. Reg. 7817 (1958); 28 Fed. Reg. 13593 (1963) (47 CFR § 73.120(d)); 43 Fed. Reg. 32796 (1978) (47 CFR § 73.1940(d)); 57 Fed. Reg. 210

§ 73.1943). See generally Brief in Opposition to Motion of Appellee National Association of Broadcasters for Summary

(1992) Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

Affirmance in No. 02-1676, pp. 9-10 (hereinafter Brief Op- posing Summary Affirmance).

In its current form the FCC regulation requires broadcast licensees to "keep" a publicly available file "of all requests for broadcast time made by or on behalf of a candidate for public office," along with a notation showing whether the request was granted, and (if granted) a history that includes "classes of time," "rates charged," and when the "spots actu- ally aired." 47 CFR §73.1943(a) (2002); §76.1701(a) (same for cable systems). These regulation-imposed requirements mirror the statutory requirements imposed by BCRA § 504 with minor differences which no one here challenges. Com- pare 47 CFR § 73.1943 with 47 U. S. C. §315(e)(2) (Supp. II) (see Appendix, infra).

The McConnell plaintiffs argue that these requirements are "intolerabl[y]" "burdensome and invasive." Brief for Appellant/Cross-Appellee Sen. Mitch McConnell et al. in No. 02-1674 et al., p. 74 (hereinafter Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs). But we do not see how that could be so. The FCC has consistently estimated that its "candidate request" regulation imposes upon each licensee an additional adminis- trative burden of six to seven hours of work per year. See 66 Fed. Reg. 37468 (2001); id., at 18090; 63 Fed. Reg. 26593 (1998); id., at 10379; 57 Fed. Reg. 18492 (1992); see also 66 Fed, Reg. 29963 (2001) (total annual burden of one hour per cable system). That burden means annual costs of a few hundred dollars at most, a microscopic amount compared to the many millions of dollars of revenue broadcasters receive from candidates who wish to advertise.

Perhaps for this reason, broadcasters in the past did not strongly oppose the regulation or its extension. Cf., e. g., 17 Fed. Reg. 4711 (1952) ("No comments adverse to the adoption of the proposed rule have been received"); 43 Fed. Reg. 32794 Indeed in 1992, "CBS" itself (1978) (no adverse comments). "suggest[ed]" that the candidate file "include a record of all requests for time." 57 Fed. Reg. 206 (1992); cf. 63 Fed. Reg.

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49493 (1998) (FCC "not persuaded that the current retention period [two years] is overly burdensome to licensees").

In any event, as the FCC wrote in an analogous context, broadcaster recordkeeping requirements "'simply run with the territory."

40 Fed. Reg. 18398 (1975). Broadcasters must keep and make publicly available numerous records.

See 47 CFR § 73.3526 (2002) (general description of select recordkeeping requirements for commercial stations); see also §§ 73.1202, 73.3526(e)(9)(i) (retention of all "written com- ments and suggestions [including letters and e-mail] received from the public regarding operation of the station" for three years); § 73.1212(e) (sponsorship identification records, in- cluding the identification of a sponsoring entity's executive officers and board-level members when sponsoring "political matter or matter involving the discussion of a controversial issue of public importance"); § 73.1840 (retention of station logs); § 73.1942 (candidate broadcast records); § 73.2080 (equal employment opportunities records); § § 73.3526(e)(1 1)(i), (e)(12) ("list of programs that have provided the station's most significant treatment of community issues during the preceding three month period," including "brief narra- tive describing [the issues, and] time, date, duration, and title"); §§73.3526(e)(11)(ii), (iii) (reports of children's pro- gram, and retention of records sufficient to substantiate "compliance with the commercial limits on children's programming"); § 73.3613(a) (network affiliation contracts); §§73.3613(b), 73.3615, 73.3526(e)(5) (ownership-related re- ports); § 73.3613(c) ("[m]anagement consultant agreements"); § 73.3613(d) ("[t]ime brokerage agreements"). Compared to these longstanding recordkeeping requirements, an ad- ditional six to seven hours is a small drop in a very large bucket.

The McConnell plaintiffs also claim that the "candidate re- quests" requirement fails significantly to further any impor- tant governmental interest. Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs

74. But, again, we cannot agree. The FCC has pointed out

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

that "[these records are necessary to permit political candi- dates and others to verify that licensees have complied with their obligations relating to use of their facilities by candi- dates for political office" pursuant to the "equal time" provi- sion of 47 U. S. C. § 315(a). 63 Fed. Reg. 49493 (1998). They also help the FCC determine whether broadcasters have vio- lated their obligation to sell candidates time at the "lowest unit charge." 47 U. S. C. § 315(b). As reinforced by BCRA, the "candidate request" requirements will help the FCC, the Federal Election Commission, and "the public to evaluate whether broadcasters are-processing [candidate] requests in an evenhanded fashion," Brief Opposing Summary Affirm- ance 10, thereby helping to assure broadcasting fairness. 47

U. S. C. § 315(a); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S.

367, 390 (1969). They will help make the public aware of how much money candidates may be prepared to spend on broadcast messages. 2 U. S. C. § 434 (2000 ed. and Supp.

II); see ante, at 194-199 (joint opinion of STEVENS and O'CONNOR, JJ.) (hereinafter joint opinion). And they will provide an independently compiled set of data for purposes of verifying candidates' compliance with the disclosure re- quirements and source limitations of BCRA and the Fed- eral Election Campaign Act of 1971. 2 U. S. C. § 434; cf.

Adventure Communications, Inc. v. Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, 191 F. 3d 429, 433 (CA4 1999) (candidate compliance verification); 63 Fed. Reg. 49493 (1998) (FCC finding record retention provision provides public with "nec- essary and adequate access").

We note, too, that the FCC's regulatory authority is broad.

Red Lion, supra, at 380 ("broad" mandate to assure broad- casters operate in public interest); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 219 (1943) (same). And we have previously found broad governmental authority for agency information demands from regulated entities. Com- pare United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 642-643 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S.

238 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

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186, 209 (1946); Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U. S. 408, 414-415 (1984).

THE CHIEF JUSTICE suggests that the Government has not made these particular claims. But it has-though suc- cinctly-for it has cross-referenced the relevant regulatory rules. Compare post, at 359-361 (REHNQUIST, C. J., dis- senting), with Brief Opposing Summary Affirmance; Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs 73-74; Brief for FEC et al. in No. 02-1674 et al., pp. 132-133. And succinctness through cross-reference was necessary given our procedural require- ment that the Government set forth in a 140-page brief all its arguments concerning each of the 20 BCRA provisions here under contest. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 186-188.

In sum, given the Government's reference to the 65-year- old FCC regulation and the related considerations we have mentioned, we cannot accept the argument that the constitu- tionality of the "candidate request" provision lacks eviden- tiary support. The challengers have made no attempt to ex- plain away the FCC's own contrary conclusions and the mass of evidence in related FCC records and proceedings. E. g., 57 Fed. Reg. 189 (1992); cf. supra, at 235-236; ante, at 222- 223 (joint opinion) (upholding BCRA's coordination provision based, in part, on prior experience under similar provision).

Because we cannot, on the present record, find the long- standing FCC regulation unconstitutional, we likewise can- not strike down the "candidate request" provision in BCRA § 504; for the latter simply embodies the regulation in a stat- ute, thereby blocking any agency attempt to repeal it.

BCRA § 504's "election message request" requirements call for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by any member of the public) to broadcast a "message" about "a legally qualified candidate" or "any election to Fed- 47 U. S. C. §§ 315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii) (Supp. II). Al- eral office." though these requirements are somewhat broader than the

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)

Opinion of the Court "candidate request" requirement, they serve much the same purposes. A candidate's supporters or opponents account for many of the requests to broadcast "message[s]" about a "candidate." Requests to broadcast messages about an "election" may include messages that favor one candidate or another, along with other messages that may be more neutral.

Given the nature of many of the messages, recordkeeping can help both the regulatory agencies and the public evaluate broadcasting fairness, and determine the amount of money that individuals or groups, supporters or opponents, intend to spend to help elect a particular candidate. Cf. ante, at 206-207 (joint opinion) (upholding stringent restrictions on all election-time advertising that refers to a candidate be- cause such advertising will often convey message of support Insofar as the request is to broadcast neu- or opposition). tral material about a candidate or election, the disclosure can help the FCC carry out other statutory functions, for exam- ple, determining whether a broadcasting station is fulfilling its licensing obligation to broadcast material important t'o the community and the public. 47 U. S. C. § 315(a) ("obliga- tion ... to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance"); 47 CFR § 73.1910 (2002); §§ 73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) (recordkeeping re- quirements for issues important to the community).

For reasons previously discussed, supra, at 235-236, and on the basis of the material presented, we cannot say that these requirements will impose disproportionate administra- tive burdens. They ask the broadcaster to keep information about the disposition of the request, and information identi- fying the individual or company requesting the broadcast time (name, address, contact information, or, if the requester is not an individual, the names of company officials). 47 Insofar as the "request"

U. S. C. §315(e)(2) (Supp. II).

is made by a candidate's "supporters," the "candidate re- quest" regulation apparently already requires broadcasters

240 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

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to keep such records. 43 Fed. Reg. 32794 (1978). Regard- less, the information should prove readily available, for the individual requesting a broadcast must provide it to the broadcaster should the broadcaster accept the request. 47 CFR § 73.1212(e) (2002). And as we have previously pointed out, the recordkeeping requirements do not reach signifi- cantly beyond other FCC recordkeeping rules, for example, those requiring broadcasting licensees to keep material showing compliance with their license-related promises to broadcast material on issues of public importance. See, e. g., §§73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) (recordkeeping requirements for issues important to the community); supra, at 236 (collecting regulations); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F. 2d 1413, 1421-1422 (CADC 1983) (de- scribing FCC rules, in force during 1960-1981, that required nonentertainment programming in 14 specific areas and man- dated publicly available records detailing date, time, source, If, as we have and description to substantiate compliance).

held, the "candidate request" requirements are constitu- tional, supra, at 238, the "election message" requirements, which serve similar governmental interests and impose only a small incremental burden, must be constitutional as well.

The "issue request" requirements call for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by any member of the public) to broadcast "message[s]" about "a national legislative issue of public importance" or "any political matter of national importance." 47 U. S. C. §§ 315(e)(1)(B), (e)(1)(B)(iii) (Supp.

II). These recordkeeping requirements seem likely to help the FCC determine whether broadcasters are carrying out their "obligations to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public impor- tance," 47 CFR §73.1910 (2002), and whether broadcasters are too heavily favoring entertainment, and discriminating

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court against broadcasts devoted to public affairs, see ibid.; 47

U. S. C. § 315(a); Red Lion, 395 U. S., at 380.

language

The McConnell plaintiffs claim that the statutory lan- guage--"political matter of national importance" or "na- tional legislative issue of public importance"-is uncon- stitutionally vague or overbroad. Brief for McConnell is no more gen- Plaintiffs 74-75. But that eral than the language that Congress has used to impose other obligations upon broadcasters. Compare 47 U. S. C. §315(e)(1)(B) (Supp. II) ("political matter of national im- portance") and §315(e)(1)(B)(iii) ("national legislative issue of public importance") (both added by BCRA § 504), with to operate in the public 47 U. S. C. § 315(a) ("obligation ... interest" and to afford reasonable opportunity for discussion of "issues of public importance"); § 317(a)(2) (FCC disclosure requirements relating to any "political program" or "discus- sion of any controversial issue"); cf. 47 CFR §73.1212(e) (2002) ("political matter or... a controversial issue of public importance") and 9 Fed. Reg. 14734 (1944) ("public contro- versial issues"); ante, at 222-223 (joint opinion) (noting that the experience under longstanding regulations undermines claims of chilling effect). And that language is also roughly comparable to other language in BCRA that we uphold today. E. g., ante, at 169-170, and n. 64 (joint opinion) (upholding 2 U. S. C. §431(20)(A)(iii) (Supp. II) ("public communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate . and that promotes or. supports a for Federal office . .

candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office")); ante, at 222-223 (upholding 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(7)(B)(ii) (Supp. II) (counting as coordinated dis- bursements that are made "in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of [a political party]") against challenge and noting that an "agreement" is not necessary for precision).

Whether these requirements impose disproportionate ad- ministrative burdens is more difficult to say. On the one

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hand, the burdens are likely less heavy than many that other FCC regulations have imposed, for example, the burden of keeping and disclosing "[a]ll written comments and sugges- tions" received from the public, including every e-mail. 47 CFR §§ 73.1202, 73.3526(e)(9) (2002); see also supra, at

236. On the other hand, the burdens are likely heavier than

those imposed by BCRA § 504's other provisions, previously discussed.

The regulatory burden, in practice, will depend on how the FCC interprets and applies this provision. The FCC has adequate legal authority to write regulations that may limit, and make more specific, the provision's potential linguistic reach. 47 U. S. C. § 315(d).

It has often ameliorated regu- latory burdens by interpretation in the past, and there is no reason to believe it will not do so here. See 14 FCC Rcd.

4653, 4665, 25 (1999) (relaxing the recordkeeping require- ments in respect to cable systems that serve fewer than 5,000 subscribers); 14 FCC Rcd. 11113, 11121-11122, 1 20-22 (1999) (requiring candidates to inspect the political file at a station rather than requiring licensees to send out photocop- ies of the files to candidates upon telephone request). The parties remain free to challenge the provisions, as inter- preted by the FCC in regulations, or as otherwise applied.

Any such challenge will likely provide greater information about the provisions' justifications and administrative bur- dens. Without that additional information, we cannot now say that the burdens are so great, or the justifications so minimal, as to warrant finding the provisions unconstitu- tional on their face.

The McConnell plaintiffs and THE CHIEF JUSTICE make one final claim. They say that the "issue request" require- ment will force them to disclose information that will reveal their political strategies to opponents, perhaps prior to a broadcast. See post, at 362 (dissenting opinion). We are willing to assume that the Constitution includes some form of protection against premature disclosure of campaign strat-

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

egy-though, given the First Amendment interest in free and open discussion of campaign issues, we make this as- sumption purely for argument's sake. Nonetheless, even on that assumption we do not see how BCRA § 504 can be un- constitutional on its face.

For one thing, the statute requires disclosure of names, addresses, and the fact of a request; it does not require dis- closure of substantive campaign content. See 47 U. S. C. §315(e)(2) (Supp. II). For another, the statutory words "as soon as possible," § 315(e)(3), would seem to permit FCC disclosure-timing rules that would avoid any premature dis- closure that the Constitution itself would forbid. Further, the plaintiffs do not point to-and our own research cannot find-any specific indication of such a "strategy-disclosure" problem arising during the past 65 years in respect to the existing FCC "candidate request" requirement, where the strategic problem might be expected to be more acute. Fi- nally, we today reject an analogous facial attack-premised on speculations of "advance disclosure"-on a similar BCRA provision. See ante, at 200-201 (joint opinion). Thus, the "strategy disclosure" argument does not show that BCRA § 504 is unconstitutional on its face, but the plaintiffs remain free to raise this argument when § 504 is applied.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE makes two important arguments in response to those we have set forth. First, he says that we "approac[h] § 504 almost exclusively from the perspective of the broadcast licensees, ignoring the interests of candidates and other purchasers, whose speech and association rights are affected." Post, at 359 (dissenting opinion). THE CHIEF JUSTICE is certainly correct in emphasizing the im- portance of the speech interests of candidates and other po- tential speakers, but we have not ignored their First Amend- ment "perspective."

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To the contrary, we have discussed the speakers' interests together with the broadcasters' interests because the two sets of interests substantially overlap. For example, the speakers' vagueness argument is no different from the broadcasters', and it fails for the same reasons, e. g., the fact that BCRA § 504's language is just as definite and precise as other language that we today uphold. See supra, at 241.

We have separately discussed the one and only speech- related claim advanced on behalf of candidates (or other speakers) that differs from the claims set forth by the broad- casters. See supra, at 242-243. This is the claim that the statute's disclosure requirements will require candidates to reveal their political strategies to opponents. We just said, and we now repeat, that BCRA § 504 can be applied, in a significant number of cases, without requiring any such political-strategy disclosure-either because disclosure in many cases will not create any such risk or because the FCC may promulgate rules requiring disclosure only after any such risk disappears, or both.

Moreover, candidates (or other speakers) whom § 504 af- fects adversely in this way (or in other ways) remain free to challenge the lawfulness of FCC implementing regulations and to challenge the constitutionality of § 504 as applied. To find that the speech-related interests of candidates and oth- ers may be vindicated in an as-applied challenge is not to "ignor[e]" those interests.

Second, THE CHIEF JUSTICE says that "the Government, in its brief, proffers no interest whatever to support § 504 as a whole," adding that the existence of "pre-existing unchal- lenged agency regulations imposing similar disclosure re- quirements" cannot "compel the conclusion that § 504 is con- stitutional," nor somehow "relieve the Government of its burden of advancing a constitutionally sufficient justification for § 504." Post, at 359-360, 361 (dissenting opinion).

Again THE CHIEF JUSTICE is correct in saying that the mere existence of similar FCC regulation-imposed require-

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court

ments-even if unchallenged for at least 65 years-cannot prove that those requirements are constitutional. But the existence of those regulations means that we must read be- yond the briefs in these cases before holding those require- ments unconstitutional. Before evaluating the relevant bur- dens and justifications, we must at least become acquainted with the FCC's own view of the matter. We must follow the Government's regulation-related references to the relevant regulatory records, related FCC regulatory conclusions, and the FCC's enforcement experience. We must take into ac- count, for example, the likelihood that the reason there is "nothing in the record that indicates licensees have treated purchasers unfairly," post, at 361 (REHNQUIST, C. J., dissent- ing), is that for many decades similar FCC regulations have made that unfair treatment unlawful. And, if we are to avoid disrupting related agency law, we must evaluate what we find in agency records and related experience before hold- ing this similar statutory provision unconstitutional on its face.

Even a superficial examination of those relevant agency materials reveals strong supporting justifications, and a lack of significant administrative burdens. And any additional burden that the statute, viewed facially, imposes upon inter- ests protected by the First Amendment seems slight com- pared to the strong enforcement-related interests that it serves. Given the FCC regulations and their history, the statutory requirements must survive a facial attack under any potentially applicable First Amendment standard, in- cluding that of heightened scrutiny.

That is why the regulations are relevant. That is why the brevity of the Government's discussion here cannot be determinative. That is why we fear that THE CHIEF JUS- TICE'S contrary view would lead us into an unfortunate-and at present unjustified-revolution in communications law.

And that is why we disagree with his dissent.

246 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Appendix to opinion of the Court The portion of the judgment of the District Court invali-

dating BCRA § 504 is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Title 47 U. S. C. § 315(e) (Supp. II), as amended by BCRA

"Political record "(1) In general "A licensee shall maintain, and make available for pub-. lic inspection, a complete record of a request to purchase broadcast time that-

"(A) is made by or on behalf of a legally qualified can- didate for public office; or

"(B) communicates a message relating to any political matter of national importance, including-

"(i) a legally qualified candidate; "(ii) any election to Federal office; or "(iii) a national legislative issue of public importance. "(2) Contents of record "A record maintained under paragraph (1) shall con-

tain information regarding- "(A) whether the request to purchase broadcast time

is accepted or rejected by the licensee;

"(B) the rate charged for the broadcast time; "(C) the date and time on which the communication

is aired;

"(D) the class of time that is purchased; "(E) the name of the candidate to which the communi- cation refers and the office to which the candidate is seeking election, the election to which the communica- tion refers, or the issue to which the communication re- fers (as applicable);

"(F) in the case of a request made by, or on behalf of, a candidate, the name of the candidate, the authorized

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of SCALA, J.

committee of the candidate, and the treasurer of such committee; and

"(G) in the case of any other request, the name of the person purchasing the time, the name, address, and phone number of a contact person for such person, and a list of the chief executive officers or members of the executive committee or of the board of directors of such person.

"(3) Time to maintain file "The information required under this subsection shall be placed in a political file as soon as possible and shall be retained by the licensee for a period of not less than 2 years."

"Political file.

"(a) Every licensee shall keep and permit public in- spection of a complete and orderly record (political file) of all requests for broadcast time made by or on behalf of a candidate for public office, together with an appro- priate notation showing the disposition made by the li- censee of such requests, and the charges made, if any, if the request is granted. The 'disposition' includes the schedule of time purchased, when spots actually aired, the rates charged, and the classes of time purchased.

"(b) When free time is provided for use by or on behalf of candidates, a record of the free time provided shall be placed in the political file.

"(c) All records required by this paragraph shall be placed in the political file as soon as possible and shall be retained for a period of two years. As soon as possi- ble means immediately absent unusual circumstances."

JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V,

248 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

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and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title IL

With respect to Titles I, II, and V: I join in full the dissent of THE CHIEF JUSTICE; I join the opinion of JUSTICE KEN- NEDY, except to the extent it upholds new § 323(e) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and § 202 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) in part; and because I continue to believe that Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), was wrongly decided, I also join Parts I, II-A, and. II-B of the opinion of JUSTICE THOMAS. With respect to Titles III and IV, I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S opinion for the Court. Because these cases are of such extraordinary importance, I cannot avoid adding to the many writings a few words of my own.

This is a sad day for the freedom of speech. Who could have imagined that the same Court which, within the past four years, has sternly disapproved of restrictions upon such inconsequential forms of expression as virtual child pornog- raphy, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234 (2002), tobacco advertising, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U. S. 525 (2001), dissemination of illegally intercepted communications, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U. S. 514 (2001), and sexually explicit cable programming, United States v.

Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803 (2000), would smile with favor upon a law that cuts to the heart of what the First Amendment is meant to protect: the right to criticize the government. For that is what the most offen- sive provisions of this legislation are all about. We are gov- erned by Congress, and this legislation prohibits the criti- cism of Members of Congress by those entities most capable of giving such criticism loud voice: national political parties and corporations, both of the commercial and the not-for- profit sort.

It forbids pre-election criticism of incumbents by corporations, even not-for-profit corporations, by use of their general funds; and forbids national-party use of "soft" money to fund "issue ads" that incumbents find so offensive.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of SCAUA, J.

To be sure, the legislation is evenhanded: It similarly pro- hibits criticism of the candidates who oppose Members of Congress in their reelection bids. But as everyone knows, If this is an area in which evenhandedness is not fairness. all electioneering were evenhandedly prohibited, incumbents would have an enormous advantage. Likewise, if incum- bents and challengers are limited to the same quantity of In other words, electioneering, incumbents are favored. any restriction upon a type of campaign speech that is equally available to challengers and incumbents tends to favor incumbents.

Beyond that, however, the present legislation targets for prohibition certain categories of campaign speech that are particularly harmful to incumbents.

Is it accidental, do you think, that incumbents raise about three times as much "hard money"-the sort of funding generally not restricted by this legislation-as do their challengers? See FEC, 1999-2000 Financial Activity of All Senate and House Campaigns (Jan.

1, 1999-Dec. 31, 2000) (last modified on May 15, 2001), http:// www.fee.gov/press/051501congfinact/tables/allcong2000.xls (all Internet materials as visited Dec. 4, 2003, and avail- able in Clerk of Court's case file). Or that lobbyists (who seek the favor of incumbents) give 92 percent of their money in "hard" contributions? See U. S. Public Inter- est Research Group, The Lobbyist's Last Laugh: How K Street Lobbyists Would Benefit from the McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Bill 3 (July 5, 2001), http://www.pirg.org/ Is it an oversight, do democracy/democracy.asp?id2=5068. you suppose, that the so-called "millionaire provisions" raise the contribution limit for a candidate running against an indi- vidual who devotes to the campaign (as challengers often do) great personal wealth, but do not raise the limit for a candi- date running against an individual who devotes to the cam- paign (as incumbents often do) a massive election "war chest"? See BCRA §§ 304, 316, and 319. And is it mere happenstance, do you estimate, that national-party funding,

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which is severely limited by the Act, is more likely to assist cash-strapped challengers than flush-with-hard-money in- cumbents? See A. Gierzynski & D. Breaux, The Financing Role of Parties, in Campaign Finance in State Legislative Elections 195-200 (J. Thompson & S. Moncrief eds. 1998).

Was it unintended, by any chance, that incumbents are free personally to receive some soft money and even to solicit it for other organizations, while national parties are not? See new FECA §§ 323(a) and (e).

I wish to address three fallacious propositions that might be thought to justify some or all of the provisions of this legislation-only the last of which is explicitly embraced by the principal opinion for the Court, but all of which underlie, I think, its approach to these cases.

(a) Money is Not Speech

It was said by congressional proponents of this legislation, see 143 Cong. Rec. 20746 (1997) (remarks of Sen. Boxer); 145 Cong. Rec. S12612 (Oct. 14, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Cleland); 147 Cong. Rec. S2436 (Mar. 19, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Dodd), with support from the law reviews, see, e. g., Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech? 85 Yale L. J. 1001 (1976), that since this legislation regulates nothing but the expenditure of money for speech, as opposed to speech itself, the burden it imposes is not subject to full First Amendment scrutiny; the government may regulate the raising and spending of campaign funds just as it regulates other forms of conduct, such as burning draft cards, see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), or camping out on the National Mall, see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288 (1984). That proposition has been endorsed by one of the two authors of today's principal opinion: "The right to use one's own money to hire gladiators, [and] to fund 'speech by proxy,' .

. . [are] property rights ... not entitled to the same protection as the right to say what one pleases."

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)

Opinion of SCALIA, J.

399 (2000) (STEVENS, J., concurring). Until today, however, that view has been categorically rejected by our jurispru- dence. As we said in Buckley, 424 U. S., at 16, "this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny re- quired by the First Amendment."

Our traditional view was correct, and today's cavalier atti- tude toward regulating the financing of speech (the "exacting scrutiny" test of Buckley, see ibid., is not uttered in any majority opinion, and is not observed in the ones from which I dissent) frustrates the fundamental purpose of the First In any economy operated on even the most Amendment. rudimentary principles of division of labor, effective public communication requires the speaker to make use of the serv- ices of others. An author may write a novel, but he will seldom publish and distribute it himself. A freelance re- porter may write a story, but he will rarely edit, print, and deliver it to subscribers. To a government bent on sup- pressing speech- this mode of organization presents opportu- nities: Control any cog in the machine, and you can halt the whole apparatus. License printers, and it matters little whether authors are still free to write. Restrict the sale of books, and it matters little who prints them. Predictably, repressive regimes have exploited these principles by at- tacking all levels of the production and dissemination of ideas. See, e. g., Printing Act of 1662, 14 Car. II, ch. 33, §§ 1, 4, 7 (punishing printers, importers, and booksellers); Print- ing Act of 1649, 2 Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 245, 246, 250 (punishing authors, printers, booksellers, im- In response to this threat, we have porters, and buyers).

interpreted the First Amendment broadly. See, e. g., Ban- tam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 65, n. 6 (1963) ("The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press embraces the circulation of books as well as their publication...").

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Division of labor requires a means of mediating exchange, and in a commercial society, that means is supplied by money.

The publisher pays the author for the right to sell his book; it pays its staff who print and assemble the book; it demands payments from booksellers who bring the book to market.

This, too, presents opportunities for repression: Instead of regulating the various parties to the enterprise individually, the government can suppress their ability to coordinate by regulating their use of money. What good is the right to print books without a right to buy works from authors? Or the right to publish newspapers without the right to pay deliverymen? The right to speak would be largely inef- fective if it did not include the right to engage in financial transactions that are the incidents of its exercise.

This is not to say that any regulation of money is a regula- tion of speech. The government may apply general com- mercial regulations to those who use money for speech if it applies them evenhandedly to those who use money for other purposes. But where the government singles out money used to fund speech as its legislative object, it is acting against speech as such, no less than if it had targeted the paper on which a book was printed or the trucks that deliver it to the bookstore.

History and jurisprudence bear this out. The best early examples derive from the British efforts to tax the press after the lapse of licensing statutes by which the press was first regulated. The Stamp Act of 1712 imposed levies on all newspapers, including an additional tax for each adver- It was a response to unfa- tisement. 10 Anne, ch. 18, § 113. vorable war coverage, "obvious[ly] . . . designed to check the publication of those newspapers and pamphlets which depended for their sale on their cheapness and sensational- ism." F. Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England, 1476- It succeeded in killing off approxi- 1776, pp. 309-310 (1952). mately half the newspapers in England in its first year. Id., In 1765, Parliament applied a similar Act to the Col- at 312.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of SCALIA, J.

onies. 5 Geo. III, ch. 12, § 1. The colonial Act likewise placed exactions on sales and advertising revenue, the latter at 2s. per advertisement, which was "by any standard ... excessive, since the publisher himself received only from 3 to 5s. and still less for repeated insertions." A. Schlesinger, Prelude to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain, 1764-1776, p. 68 (1958). The founding generation saw these taxes as grievous incursions on the freedom of the press.

See, e. g., 1 D. Ramsay, History of the American Revolution 61-62 (L. Cohen ed. 1990); J. Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law (1765), reprinted in 3 Life and Works of John Adams 445, 464 (C. Adams ed. 1851). See generally Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 245-249 (1936); Schlesinger, supra, at 67-84.

We have kept faith with the Founders' tradition by pro- hibiting the selective taxation of the press. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460

U. S. 575 (1983) (ink and paper tax); Grosjean, supra (adver-

tisement tax). And we have done so whether the tax was the product of illicit motive or not. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., supra, at 592. These press-taxation cases belie the claim that regulation of money used to fund speech is not regulation of speech itself. A tax on a newspaper's adver- tising revenue does not prohibit anyone from saying any- thing, it merely appropriates part of the revenue that a speaker would otherwise obtain. That is even a step short of totally prohibiting advertising revenue-which would be analogous to the total prohibition of certain campaign-speech contributions in the present cases. Yet it is unquestionably a violation of the First Amendment.

Many other cases exemplify the same principle that an attack upon the funding of speech is an attack upon speech itself. In Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ- ment, 444 U. S. 620 (1980), we struck down an ordinance lim- In iting the amount charities could pay their solicitors.

Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y State Crime Vic-

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tims Bd., 502 U. S. 105 (1991), we held unconstitutional a state statute that appropriated the proceeds of criminals' bi- ographies for payment to the victims. And in Rosenberger

v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995),

we held unconstitutional a university's discrimination in the disbursement of funds to speakers on the basis of viewpoint.

Most notable, perhaps, is our famous opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), holding that paid advertisements in a newspaper were entitled to full First

"Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carrying 'editorial advertisements' of this type, and so might shut off an important outlet for the promulga- tion of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities-who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not members of the press. The effect would be to shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources."' Id., at 266 (ci- tations omitted).

This passage was relied on in Buckley for the point that re- strictions on the expenditure of money for speech are equiva- lent to restrictions on speech itself. 424 U. S., at 16-17.

That reliance was appropriate.

If denying protection to paid-for speech would "shackle the First Amendment," so also does forbidding or limiting the right to pay for speech.

It should be obvious, then, that a law limiting the amount a person can spend to broadcast his political views is a direct restriction on speech. That is no different from a law limit- ing the amount a newspaper can pay its editorial staff or the amount a charity can pay its leafletters.

It is equally clear that a limit on the amount a candidate can raise from any one individual for the purpose of speaking is also a direct limitation on speech. That is no different from a law limit-

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of SCALIA, J.

ing the amount a publisher can accept from any one share- holder or lender, or the amount a newspaper can charge any one advertiser or customer.

(b) Pooling Money is Not Speech Another proposition which could explain at least some of the results of today's opinion is that the First Amendment right to spend money for speech does not include the right to combine with others in spending money for speech. Such a proposition fits uncomfortably with the concluding words of our Declaration of Independence: "And for the support of this Declaration,... we mutually pledge to each other our (Emphasis Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor." added.) The freedom to associate with others for the dis- semination of ideas-not just by singing or speaking in uni- son, but by pooling financial resources for expressive pur- poses-is part of the freedom of speech.

"Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and association. This right was enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Exercise of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally been through the media of political associations. Any interference with the freedom of a party is simultane- ously an interference with the freedom of its adherents."

NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 431 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted).

"The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression. The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S.

449, 460 (1958), stemmed from the Court's recognition that '[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeni- ably enhanced by group association.' Subsequent deci- sions have made clear that the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee "'freedom to associate with oth-

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ers for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas,"' .... ." Buckley, supra, at 15.

We have said that "implicit in the right to engage in activi- ties protected by the First Amendment" is "a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622 (1984). That "right to associate.., in pursuit" includes the right to pool financial resources.

If it were otherwise, Congress would be empowered to enact legislation requiring newspapers to be sole proprietor- ships, banning their use of partnership or corporate form.

That sort of restriction would be an obvious violation of the First Amendment, and it is incomprehensible why the con- clusion should change when what is at issue is the pooling of funds for the most important (and most perennially threat- ened) category of speech: electoral speech. The principle that such financial association does not enjoy full First Amendment protection threatens the existence of all politi- cal parties.

(c) Speech by Corporations Can Be Abridged

The last proposition that might explain at least some of today's casual abridgment of free-speech rights is this: that the particular form of association known as a corporation does not enjoy full First Amendment protection. Of course the text of the First Amendment does not limit its applica- tion in this fashion, even though "[b]y the end of the eight- eenth century the corporation was a familiar figure in Amer- ican economic life." C. Cooke, Corporation, Trust and Company 92 (1951). Nor is there any basis in reason why First Amendment rights should not attach to corporate asso- In First Nat. Bank of Bos- ciations-and we have said so. ton v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978), we held unconstitutional a state prohibition of corporate speech designed to influence

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of SCALIA, J.

"[T]here

is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would sug- gest that the State could silence their proposed speech.

It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individ- ual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, associa- Id., at 776-777 (internal tion, union, or individual." quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted).

In NAACP v. Button, supra, at 428-429, 431, we held that the NAACP could assert First Amendment rights "on its own behalf, ... though a corporation," and that the activities of the corporation were "modes of expression and association In protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475

U. S. 1, 8 (1986), we held unconstitutional a state effort to

compel corporate speech. "The identity of the speaker," we said, "is not decisive in determining whether speech is pro- tected. Corporations and other associations, like individu- als, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dissemina- tion of information and ideas' that the First Amendment. seeks to foster." And in Buckley, 424 U. S. 1, we held un- constitutional FECA's limitation upon independent corpo- rate expenditures.

The Court changed course in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 (1990), upholding a state prohibi- tion of an independent corporate expenditure in support of a I dissented in that case, see id., candidate for state office. at 679, and remain of the view that it was error.

In the modern world, giving the government power to exclude cor- porations from the political debate enables it effectively to muffle the voices that best represent the most significant

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segments of the economy and the most passionately held so- cial and political views.. People who associate-who pool their financial resources-for purposes of economic enter- prise overwhelmingly do so in the corporate form; and with increasing frequency, incorporation is chosen by those who associate to defend and promote particular ideas-such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Rifle Association, parties to these cases.

Imagine, then, a gov- ernment that wished to suppress nuclear power-or oil and gas exploration, or automobile manufacturing, or gun owner- ship, or civil liberties-and that had the power to prohibit corporate advertising against its proposals. To be sure, the individuals involved in, or benefited by, those industries, or interested in those causes, could (given enough time) form political action committees or other associations to make their case. But the organizational form in which those en- terprises already exist, and in which they can most quickly and most effectively get their message across, is the corpo- rate form. The First Amendment does not in my view per- mit the restriction of that political speech. And the same holds true for corporate electoral speech: A candidate should not be insulated from the most effective speech that the major participants in the economy and major incorporated interest groups can generate.

But what about the danger to the political system posed by "amassed wealth"? The most direct threat from that source comes in the form of undisclosed favors and payoffs to elected officials-which have already been criminalized, and will be rendered no more discoverable by the legislation at issue here. The use of corporate wealth (like individual wealth) to speak to the electorate is unlikely to "distort" elections-especially if disclosure requirements tell the peo- ple where the speech is coming from. The premise of the First Amendment is that the American people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering both the substance of the speech presented to them and its proxi-

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of SCALIA, J.

mate and ultimate source.

If that premise is wrong, our de- mocracy has a much greater problem to overcome than merely the influence of amassed wealth. Given the premises of democracy, there is no such thing as too much speech.

But, it is argued, quite apart from its effect upon the elec- torate, corporate speech in the form of contributions to the candidate's campaign, or even in the form of independent ex- penditures supporting the candidate, engenders an obligation which is later paid in the form of greater access to the of- ficeholder, or indeed in the form of votes on particular bills.

Any quid-pro-quo agreement for votes would of course vio- late criminal law, see 18 U. S. C. § 201, and actual payoff votes have not even been claimed by those favoring the restric- tions on corporate speech.

It cannot be denied, however, that corporate (like noncorporate) allies will have greater access to the officeholder, and that he will tend to favor the same causes as those who support him (which is usually why they supported him). That is the nature of politics-if not indeed human nature-and how this can properly be consid- ered "corruption" (or "the appearance of corruption") with regard to corporate allies and not with regard to other allies is beyond me.

If the Bill of Rights had intended an excep- tion to the freedom of speech in order to combat this malign proclivity of the officeholder to agree with those who agree with him, and to speak more with his supporters than his opponents, it would surely have said so. It did not do so, I think, because the juice is not worth the squeeze. Evil corporate (and private affluent) influences are well enough checked (so long as adequate campaign-expenditure disclo- sure rules exist) by the politician's fear of being portrayed as "in the pocket" of so-called moneyed interests. The in- cremental benefit obtained by muzzling corporate speech is more than offset by loss of the information and persuasion that corporate speech can contain. That, at least, is the as- sumption of a constitutional guarantee which prescribes that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.

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But let us not be deceived. While the Government's briefs and arguments before this Court focused on the horri- ble "appearance of corruption," the most passionate floor statements during the debates on this legislation pertained to so-called attack ads, which the Constitution surely pro- tects, but which Members of Congress analogized to "crack cocaine," 144 Cong. Rec. 1601 (1998) (remarks of Sen.

Daschle), "drive-by shooting[s]," id., at 1613 (remarks of Sen.

Durbin), and "air pollution," 143 Cong. Rec. 20505 (1997) (re- marks of Sen. Dorgan). There is good reason to believe that the ending of negative campaign ads was the principal at- traction of the legislation. A Senate sponsor said, "I hope that we will not allow our attention to be distracted from the real issues at hand-how to raise the tenor of the debate in our elections and give people real choices. No one bene- fits from negative ads. They don't aid our Nation's political Id., at 20521-20522 (remarks of Sen. McCain). He dialog." assured the body that "[y]ou cut off the soft money, you are going to see a lot less of that [attack ads]. Prohibit unions and corporations, and you will see a lot less of that. If you demand full disclosure for those who pay for those ads, you " 147 Cong. Rec. S3116 are going to see a lot less of that ....

(Mar. 29, 2001). See also, e. g., 148 Cong. Rec. S2117 (Mar.

20, 2002) (remarks of Sen. Cantwell) ("This bill is about slow- It is about slowing political advertising ing the ad war ... and making sure the flow of negative ads by outside interest groups does not continue to permeate the airwaves"); 143 Cong. Rec. 20746 (1997) (remarks of Sen. Boxer) ("These so- called issues ads are not regulated at all and mention candi- dates by name. They directly attack candidates without any It is brutal.... We have an opportunity in accountability. . ."); 145 Cong. Rec. the McCain-Feingold bill to stop that . S12606-S12607 (Oct. 14, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Wellstone) I think ("I think these issue advocacy ads are a nightmare.

[By passing the legislation], all of us should hate them .... [w]e could get some of this poison politics off television").

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of SCAUA, J.

Another theme prominent in the legislative debates was the notion that there is too much money spent on elections.

The first principle of "reform" was that "there should be less 147 Cong. Rec. S3236 (Apr. 2, 2001) (re- money in politics." marks of Sen. Murray). "The enormous amounts of special interest money that flood our political system have become 148 Cong. Rec. S2151 (Mar. 20, a cancer in our democracy." "[L]arge sums of money 2002) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).

Id., at H373 drown out the voice of the average voter."

(Feb. 13, 2002) (remarks of Rep. Lang'evin). The system of Id., at H404 campaign finance is "drowning in money."

"Despite the ever-increasing sums spent on campaigns, we have not seen an improvement in campaign dis- course, issue discussion or voter education. More money does not mean more ideas, more substance Instead, it means more of what or more depth. voters complain about most. More 30-second spots, more negativity and an increasingly longer campaign Id., at S2150 (Mar. 20, 2002) (remarks of Sen. period."

Kerry).

Perhaps voters do detest these 30-second spots-though I suspect they detest even more hour-long campaign-debate interruptions of their favorite entertainment programming.

Evidently, however, these ads do persuade voters, or else they would not be so routinely used by sophisticated politi- cians of all parties. The point, in any event, is that it is not the proper role of those who govern us to judge which cam- paign speech has "substance" and "depth" (do you think it might be that which is least damaging to incumbents?) and to abridge the rest.

And what exactly are these outrageous sums frittered away in determining who will govern us? A report pre- pared for Congress concluded that the total amount, in hard and soft money, spent on the 2000 federal elections was be-

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tween $2.4 and $2.5 billion. J. Cantor, CRS Report for Con-

Overview and Estimates of the Flow of Money (2001). All campaign spending in the United States, including state elec- tions, ballot initiatives, and judicial elections, has been esti- mated at $3.9 billion for 2000, Nelson, Spending in the 2000 Elections, in Financing the 2000 Election 24, Thl. 2-1 (D.

Magleby ed. 2002), which was a year that "shattered spend- ing and contribution records," id., at 22. Even taking this last, larger figure as the benchmark, it means that Americans spent about half as much electing all their Nation's officials, state and federal, as they spent on movie tickets ($7.8 billion); about a fifth as much as they spent on cosmetics and perfume ($18.8 billion); and about a sixth as much as they spent on pork (the nongovernmental sort) ($22.8 billion). , See U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures, Thl. 2.6U If our democracy is drown- (col. AS; rows 356, 214, and 139). ing from this much spending, it cannot swim.

* * *

Which brings me back to where I began: This litigation is I cannot say about preventing criticism of the government. for certain that many, or some, or even any, of the Members of Congress who voted for this legislation did so not to produce "fairer" campaigns, but to mute criticism of their Indeed, I will stipulate records and facilitate reelection. that all those who voted for BCRA believed they were acting for the good of the country. There remains the problem of the Charlie Wilson Phenomenon, named after Charles Wil- son, former president of General Motors, who is supposed to have said during the Senate hearing on his nomination as Secretary of Defense that "what's good for General Motors

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is good for the country."* Those in power, even giving them the benefit of the greatest good will, are inclined to believe that what is good for them is good for the country. Whether in prescient recognition of the Charlie Wilson Phenomenon, or out of fear of good old-fashioned, malicious, self-interested manipulation, "[t]he fundamental approach of the First Amendment ... was to assume the worst, and to rule the regulation of political speech 'for fairness' sake' simply out of bounds." Austin, 494 U. S., at 693 (SCALIA, J., dissenting).

Having abandoned that approach to a limited extent in Buck- ley, we abandon it much further today.

We will unquestionably be called upon to abandon it fur- ther still in the future. The most frightening passage in the lengthy floor debates on this legislation is the following as- surance given by one of the cosponsoring Senators to his

"This is a modest step, it is a first step, it is an essential step, but it does not even begin to address, in some ways, the fundamental problems that exist with the hard money aspect of the system."

148 Cong. Rec. S2101 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold).

The system indeed. The first instinct of power is the reten- tion of power, and, under a Constitution that requires peri- odic elections, that is best achieved by the suppression of election-time speech. We have witnessed merely the second scene of Act I of what promises to be a lengthy tragedy.

In scene 3 the Court, having abandoned most of the First Amendment weaponry that Buckley left intact, will be even less equipped to resist the incumbents' writing of the rules

*It is disillusioning to learn that the fabled quote is inaccurate. Wilson actually said: "[Flor years I thought what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa. The difference did not exist."

Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1953).

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of political debate. The federal election campaign laws, which are already (as today's opinions show) so voluminous, so detailed, so complex, that no ordinary citizen dare run for office, or even contribute a significant sum, without hiring an expert adviser in the field, can be expected to grow more voluminous, more detailed, and more complex in the years to come-and always, always, with the objective of reducing the excessive amount of speech.

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, except for BCRA §§311 and 318, concurring in the result with respect to BCRA § 318, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title II, and dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I, V, and §311.*

The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Nevertheless, the Court today upholds what can only be described as the most significant abridgment of the freedoms of speech and association since the Civil War. With breathtaking scope, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), di- rectly targets and constricts core political speech, the "pri- mary object of First Amendment protection." Nixon v.

Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 410-411 (2000) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Because "the First Amend- ment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign for political office," Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S.

265, 272 (1971)), our duty is to approach these restrictions "with the utmost skepticism" and subject them to the "strict- est scrutiny." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 412 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).

* JUSTICE SCALIA joins Parts I, II-A, and II-B of this opinion.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of THOMAS, J.

In response to this assault on the free exchange of ideas and with only the slightest consideration of the appropriate standard of review or of the Court's traditional role of pro- tecting First Amendment freedoms, the Court has placed its imprimatur on these unprecedented restrictions. The very "purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an unin- hibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969). Yet today the fundamental principle that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market," Abrams v.

United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent- ing), is cast aside in the purported service of preventing "cor- ruption," or the mere "appearance of corruption." Buckley

v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam). Apparently,

the marketplace of ideas is to be fully open only to defamers, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); nude dancers, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion); pornographers, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234 (2002); flag burners, United States v.

Eichman, 496 U. S. 310 (1990); and cross burners, Virginia

v. Black, 538 U. S. 343 (2003).

Because I cannot agree with the treatment given by JUS- TICE STEVENS' and JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S opinion (herein- after joint opinion) to speech that is "indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular gov- ernment to shape the destiny of modern industrial society," Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 103 (1940), I respectfully I also dissent from JUSTICE BREYER'S opinion up- dissent. I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S opinion holding BCRA § 504. in regards to BCRA §§304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and 403(b); concur in the result as to § 318; and dissent from the opinion I also fully agree with JUSTICE KENNEDY'S dis- as to §311. cussion of § 213 and join that portion of his opinion. Post, at 320.

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"[C]ampaign finance laws are subject to strict scrutiny," Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146, 164 (2003) (THOMAS, J., dissenting), and thus Title I must satisfy that demanding standard even if it were (incorrectly) con- ceived of as nothing more than a contribution limitation.

The defendants do not even attempt to defend Title I under this standard, and for good reason: The various restrictions imposed by Title I are much less narrowly tailored to target only corrupting or problematic donations than even the con- tribution limits in Shrink Missouri. See 528 U. S., at 427- 430 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see also Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518

U. S. 604, 641-644 (1996) (Colorado I) (THOMAS, J., concur-

ring in judgment and dissenting in part). And, as I have previously noted, it is unclear why "[b]ribery laws [that] bar precisely the quid pro quo arrangements that are targeted here" and "disclosure laws" are not "less restrictive means of addressing [the Government's] interest in curtailing cor- ruption." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 428.

The joint opinion not only continues the errors of Buckley

v. Valeo, by applying a low level of scrutiny to contribution

ceilings, but also builds upon these errors by expanding the anticircumvention rationale beyond reason. Admittedly, ex- ploitation of an anticircumvention concept has a long pedi- gree, going back at least to Buckley itself. Buckley upheld a $1,000 contribution ceiling as a way to combat both the "actuality and appearance of corruption."

424 U. S., at .26.

The challengers in Buckley contended both that bribery laws represented "a less restrictive means of dealing with 'proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements,"' id., at 27, and that the $1,000 contribution ceiling was overbroad as "most large contributors do not seek improper influence over a can- didate's position or an officeholder's action," id., at 29. The

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of THOMAS, J.

Court rejected the first argument on the grounds that "laws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action," id., at 27-28, and rejected the second on the grounds that "it [is] difficult to isolate suspect contributions," id., at 30.1 But a broadly drawn bribery law 2 would cover even subtle and general at- tempts to influence government officials corruptly, eliminat- ing the Court's first concern. And, an effective bribery law would deter actual quid pro quos and would, in all likelihood, eliminate any appearance of corruption in the system.

Hence, at root, the Buckley Court was concerned that bribery laws could not be effectively enforced to prevent quid pro quos between donors and officeholders, and the only rational reading of Buckley is that it approved the $1,000 contribution ceiling on this ground. The Court then, how- ever, having at least in part concluded that individual contri- bution ceilings were necessary to prevent easy evasion of bribery laws, proceeded to uphold a separate contribution limitation, using, as the only justification, the "prevent[ion] Id., at 38. [of] evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation."

The need to prevent circumvention of a limitation that was itself an anticircumvention measure led to the upholding of

'The Court also rejected an overbreadth challenge, reasoning that "Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated." Buckley, 424 U. S., at 30. But this justification was inextri- cably intertwined with the Court's concern over the difficulty of isolating suspect contributions. If it were easy to isolate suspect contributions, and if bribery laws could be quickly and effectively enforced, then there would be no "opportunity for abuse inherent in the process," ibid., and hence no need for an otherwise overbroad contribution ceiling.

2 Arguably, the current antibribery statute, 18 U. S. C. § 201, is broad

enough to cover the unspecified other "attempts... to influence govern- mental action" that the Buckley Court seemed worried about. 424 U. S., at 28.

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another significant restriction on individuals' freedom of speech.

The joint opinion now repeats this process. New Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) § 323(a), 2 U. S. C. § 441i(a) (Supp. II), is intended to prevent easy circumvention of the (now) $2,000 contribution ceiling. The joint opinion even recognizes this, relying heavily on evidence that, for instance, "candidates and donors alike have in fact exploited the soft-money loophole, the former to increase their pros- pects of election and the latter to create debt on the part of officeholders, with the national parties serving as willing intermediaries." Ante, at 146. The joint opinion upholds § 323(a), in part, on the grounds that it had become too easy to circumvent the $2,000 cap by using the national parties as go-betweens.

And the remaining provisions of new FECA §323 are upheld mostly as measures preventing circumvention of other contribution limits, including § 323(a), ante, at 164-166 (§ 323(b)); ante, at 174-177 (§ 323(d)); ante, at 182-183 (§ 323(e)); ante, at 184-185 (§ 323(f)), which, as I have already explained, is a second-order anticircumvention measure.

The joint opinion's handling of § 323(f) is perhaps most tell- ing, as it upholds § 323(f) only because of "Congress' emi- nently reasonable prediction that ... state and local candi- dates and officeholders will become the next conduits for the soft-money funding of sham issue advertising." Ante, at 185 (emphasis added). That is, this Court upholds a third-order anticircumvention measure based on Congress' anticipation of circumvention of these second-order anticircumvention measures that might possibly, at some point in the future, pose some problem.

It is not difficult to see where this leads. Every law has limits, and there will always be behavior not covered by the law but at its edges; behavior easily characterized as "cir- cumventing" the law's prohibition. Hence, speech regula- tion will again expand to cover new forms of "circumven- tion," only to spur supposed circumvention of the new

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regulations, and so forth. Rather than permit this never- ending and self-justifying process, I would require that the Government explain why proposed speech restrictions are needed in light of actual Government interests, and, in par- ticular, why the bribery laws are not sufficient.

But Title I falls even on the joint opinion's terms. This Court has held that "[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plau- sibility of the justification raised." Shrink Missouri, 528

U. S., at 391. And three Members of today's majority have

observed that "the opportunity for corruption" presented by "[u]nregulated 'soft money' contributions" is, "at best, atten- uated." Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 616 (opinion of BREYER, J., joined by O'CONNOR and SOUTER, JJ.). Such an observation is quite clearly correct. A donation to a political party is a clumsy method by which to influence a candidate, as the party is free to spend the donation however it sees fit, and could easily spend the money as to provide no help to the candidate. And, a soft-money donation to a party will be of even less benefit to a candidate, "because of legal restrictions on how the money may be spent." Brief for FEC et al. in It follows that the defendants bear No. 02-1674 et al., p. 43. an especially heavy empirical burden in justifying Title I.

The evidence cited by the joint opinion does not meet this standard and would barely suffice for anything more than rational-basis review. The first category of the joint opin- ion's evidence is evidence that "federal officeholders have commonly asked donors to make soft-money donations to na- tional and state committees solely in order to assist federal campaigns, including the officeholder's own." Ante, at 146 (internal quotation marks omitted). But to the extent that donors and federal officeholders have collaborated so that do- nors could give donations to a national party committee "for

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the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office," the alleged soft-money donation is in actuality a regular "contribution" as already defined and regulated by FECA.

See 2 U. S. C. § 431(8)(A)(i). Neither the joint opinion nor the defendants present evidence that enforcement of pre- BCRA law has proved to be impossible, ineffective, or even particularly difficult.

The second category is evidence that "lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy individuals" have "donat[ed] substantial sums of soft money to national committees not on ideological grounds, but for the express purpose of securing influence over federal officials." Ante, at 147.' Even if true (and the cited evidence consists of nothing more than vague allega- tions of wrongdoing), it is unclear why existing bribery laws could not address this problem. Again, neither the joint opinion nor the defendants point to evidence that the en- forcement of bribery laws has been or would be. ineffective.

If the problem has been clear and widespread, as the joint opinion suggests, I would expect that convictions, or at least prosecutions, would be more frequent.

The third category is evidence characterized by the joint opinion as "connect[ing] soft money to manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress' failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco legislation." Ante, at 150. But the evidence for this is no stronger than the evidence that there has been actual vote buying or vote switching for soft money. The joint opinion's citations to the record do not stand for the propositions that they claim. For instance, the McCain dec- laration does not provide any evidence of any exchange of legislative action for donations of any kind (hard or soft).3

3 Indeed, the principal contents of Senator McCain's declaration are his complaints that several bills he supported were defeated. The Senator also suggests, without evidence, that there had been some connection be- tween the defeat of his favored policy outcomes and certain soft-money donors. See, e.g., App. 393-394, 10 (declaration of Sen. John McCain

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of THOMAS, J.

Neither do the Simpson or Simon declarations, with perhaps one exception effectively addressed by JUSTICE KENNEDY'S opinion.4 See post, at 301-303.

In fact, the findings by two of the District Court's judges confirm that the evidence of any quid pro quo corruption is exceedingly weak, if not non- existent. See 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 349-352 (DC 2003) (Hen- derson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id., at 851-853 (Leon, J.). The evidence cited by the joint opinion is properly described as, "at best, [the Members of Congress'] personal conjecture regarding the impact of soft money donations on the voting practices of their present and former colleagues."

Id., at 852 (Leon, J.).

The joint opinion also places a substantial amount of weight on the fact that "in 1996 and 2000, more than half of the top 50 soft-money donors gave substantial sums to both major national parties," and suggests that this fact "leav[es] room for no other conclusion but that these donors were seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than pro- moting any particular ideology." Ante, at 148 (emphasis in original). But that is not necessarily the case. The two major parties are not perfect ideological opposites, and sup- porters or opponents of certain policies or ideas might find If donors feel substantial overlap between the two parties. that both major parties are in general agreement over an issue of importance to them, it is unremarkable that such

10) (noting Democratic "parliamentary procedural device" used to block

one of Senator McCain's proposed amendments to the Sarbanes-Oxley cor- porate governance bill). The possibility that his favored policy outcomes lost due to lack of public support, or because the opponents of the amend- ment honestly believed it would do harm to the public, does not appear to be addressed.

4 Former Senators Simpson and Simon both seem to have the same re- sponse as Senator McCain, see n. 3, supra, in having their favored inter- ests voted down, and similarly do not consider alternative explanations 11 (declaration of former for the failure of their proposals. See App. 811, Sen. Alan Simpson 11); id., at 805, 14 (declaration of former Sen. Paul Simon 14).

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donors show support for both parties. This commonsense explanation surely belies the joint opinion's too-hasty conclu- sion drawn from a relatively innocent fact.

The Court today finds such sparse evidence sufficient.

This cannot be held to satisfy even the "relatively complai- sant review" of Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 161, unless, as it appears, the Court intends to abdicate entirely its role.5

The Court is not content with "balanc[ing] away First Amendment freedoms," Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 410 (THOMAS, J., dissenting), in the context of the restrictions imposed by Title I, which could arguably (if wrongly) be thought to be mere contribution limits. The Court also, in upholding virtually all of Title II, proceeds to do the same for limitations on expenditures, which constitute "political expression 'at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment- freedoms,"' Buckley, 424 U. S., at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 32 (1968)). To- day's holding continues a disturbing trend: the steady de- crease in the level of scrutiny applied to restrictions on core political speech. See Buckley, supra, at 16 (First Amend- ment requires "exacting scrutiny"); Shrink Missouri, supra, at 387 (applying "Buckley's standard of scrutiny"); Beau- mont, supra, at 161 (referencing "relatively complaisant re- view").6 Although this trend is most obvious in the review of contribution limits, it has now reached what even this Court today would presumably recognize as a direct restric- tion on core political speech: limitations on independent expenditures.

6 Because there is not an iota of evidence supporting the Government's asserted interests in BCRA § 318, I concur in the Court's conclusion that this provision is unconstitutional.

6 The joint opinion continues yet another disturbing trend: the applica- tion of a complaisant level of scrutiny under the guise of "strict scrutiny."

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306 (2003).

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of THOMAS, J.

Of course, by accepting Congress' expansion of what con- stitutes "coordination" for purposes of treating expenditures as limitations, the Court can pretend that it is, in fact, still I need not say only restricting primarily "contributions." I have already discussed how the much about this illusion. language used in new FECA § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is, even under Buckley's framework, overly broad and restricts fully pro- tected speech. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 467- 468 (2001) (Colorado II) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). The par- ticular language used, "expenditures made by any person... in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the re- quest or suggestion of, a national, State, or local committee of a political party," BCRA § 214(a)(2), captures expenditures with "no constitutional difference" from "a purely independ- Id., at 468 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).7 And new ent one."

FECA § 315(a)(7)(C), although using the neutral term "coor- dinated," certainly has the purpose of "clarifiying] the scope of the preceding subsection, §315(a)(7)(B)," ante, at 202 (joint opinion), and thus should be read to be as expansive as the overly broad language in § 315(a)(7)(B). Hence, it too is unconstitutional.

As for H 203 and 204, the Court rests its decision on an- other vast expansion of the First Amendment framework de- scribed in Buckley, this time of the Court's, rather than Con- In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of gress', own making.

Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 659-660 (1990), the Court recog- nized a "different type of corruption" from the "'financial quid pro quo' "' the "corrosive and distorting effects of im-

7 This is doubly so now that the Court has decided that there is no consti- tutional need for the showing even of an "agreement" in order to trans- form an expenditure into a "coordinated expenditur[e]" and hence into a contribution for FECA purposes. Ante, at 220-223 (joint opinion).

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mense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correla- tion to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." The only effect, however, that the "immense aggre- gations" of wealth will have (in the context of independent expenditures) on an election is that they might be used to fund communications to convince voters to select certain can- didates over others.

In other words, the "corrosive and dis- torting effects" described in Austin are that corporations, on behalf of their shareholders, will be able to convince voters of the correctness of their ideas. Apparently, winning in the marketplace of ideas is no longer a sign that "the ultimate good" has been "reached by free trade in ideas," or that the speaker has survived "the best test of truth" by having "the thought.., get itself accepted in the competition of the mar- ket." Abrams, 250 U. S., at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

It is now evidence of "corruption." This conclusion is antithet- ical to everything for which the First Amendment stands.

See, e. g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S.

765, 790 (1978) ("[Tlhe fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it"); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N. Y, 360 U. S. 684, 689 (1959) ("[In the realm of ideas [the Constitution] protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing").

Because Austin's definition of "corruption" is incompatible with the First Amendment, I would overturn Austin and hold that the potential for corporations and unions to influ- ence voters, via independent expenditures aimed at convinc- ing these voters to adopt particular views, is not a form of corruption justifying any state regulation or suppression.

Without Austin's peculiar variation of "corruption," §§203 and 204 are supported by no compelling government inter- est. The joint opinion does not even argue that these provi-

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sions address quid pro quo corruption. And the share- holder protection rationale is equally unavailing. The "shareholder invests in a corporation of his own volition and is free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason," Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 794, n. 34. Hence, no compel- ling interest can be found in protecting minority sharehold- ers from the corporation's use of its general treasury, es- pecially where, in other contexts, "equally important and controversial corporate decisions are made by management or by a predetermined percentage of the shareholders."

Ibid.

I must now address an issue on which I differ from all of my colleagues: the disclosure provisions in BCRA § 201, now contained in new FECA § 304(f). The "historical evidence indicates that Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to require that anonymous authors reveal their identities on the ground that forced disclosure violated the 'freedom of the press."' McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334, 361 (1995) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment).9 Indeed, this Court has explicitly recognized that "the interest in hav- ing anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unques- tionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclo-

8The National Rifle Association (NRA) plaintiffs compellingly state that "[a]s a measure designed to prevent official corruption, of either the quid pro quo or the 'gratitude' variety, Title II ... makes no more sense than a bribery statute requiring corporations to pay for their bribes using funds from PACs." Brief for Appellant NRA et al. in No. 02-1675, pp. 24-25.

And, regarding the appearance of corruption: "Defendants' own witnesses concede that the public's perceptions of ads is not affected in the slightest by whether they are purchased with general treasury funds or with PAC money."

Id., at 25.

9 The fact that the Founders located the right to anonymous speech in the "freedom of the press" is of no moment, as "it makes little difference in terms of our analysis, which seeks to determine only whether the First Amendment, as originally understood, protects anonymous writing." Mc- Intyre, 514 U. S., at 360 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment).

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sure as a condition of entry," and thus that "an author's decision to remain anonymous ... is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment."

Id., at 342.

The Court now backs away from this principle, allowing the established right to anonymous speech to be stripped away based on the flimsiest of justifications.

The only plausible interest asserted by the defendants to justify the disclosure provisions is the interest in providing "information" about the speaker to the public. But we have already held that "[t]he simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant information does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or disclosures she would otherwise omit."

Id., at 348. Of course, Buckley upheld the disclosure requirement on expenditures for com- munications using words of express advocacy based on this informational interest. 424 U. S., at 81. And admittedly, McIntyre purported to distinguish Buckley. McIntyre, supra, at 355-356. But the two ways McIntyre distin- guished Buckley-one, that the disclosure of "an expenditure and its use, without more, reveals far less information [than a forced identification of the author of a pamphlet,]" 514

U. S., at 355; and two, that in candidate elections, the "Gov-

ernment can identify a compelling state interest in avoiding the corruption that might result from campaign expendi- tures," id., at 356-are inherently implausible. The first is simply wrong. The revelation of one's political expenditures for independent communications about candidates can be just as revealing as the revelation of one's name on a pamphlet for a noncandidate election. See also id., at 384 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). The second was outright rejected. in Buckley itself, where the Court concluded that independent expendi- tures did not create any substantial risk of real or apparent corruption. 424 U. S., at 47. Hence, the only reading of McIntyre that remains consistent with the principles it con- tains is that it overturned Buckley to the extent that Buck- ley upheld a disclosure requirement solely based on the gov- ernmental interest in providing information to the voters.

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The right to anonymous speech cannot be abridged based on the interests asserted by the defendants. I would thus hold that the disclosure requirements of BCRA §201 are unconstitutional. Because of this conclusion, the so-called advance disclosure requirement of § 201 necessarily falls as well. 10

I have long maintained that Buckley was incorrectly de- cided and should be overturned. See Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 465; Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 410; Colorado 1, 518

U. S., at 640. But, most of Title II should still be held un-

constitutional even under the Buckley framework. Under Buckley and Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), it is, or at least was, clear that any regulation of political speech be- yond communications using words of express advocacy is un- constitutional. Hence, even under the joint opinion's frame- work, most of Title II is unconstitutional, as both the "primary definition" and "backup definition" of "electioneer-

'0BCRA § 212(a) is also unconstitutional. Although the plaintiffs only challenge the advance disclosure requirement of § 212(a), by requiring dis- closure of communications using express advocacy, the entire reporting requirement is unconstitutional for the same reasons that § 201 is unconsti- tutional. Consequently, it follows that the advance disclosure provision is unconstitutional.

BCRA §§311 and 504 also violate the First Amendment. By requiring any television or radio advertisement that satisfies the definition of "elec- tioneering communication" to include the identity of the sponsor, and even a "full-screen view of a representative of the political committee or other person making the statement" in the case of a television advertisement, new FECA §318, §311 is a virtual carbon copy of the law at issue in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334 (1995) (the only differ- ence being the irrelevant distinction between a printed pamphlet and a television or radio advertisement). And § 504 not only has the precise flaws of § 201, but also sweeps broadly as well, covering any "message relating to any political matter of national importance, including.., a national legislative issue of public importance." Hence, both §§311 and 504 should be struck down.

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ing communications" cover a significant number of commu- nications that do not use words of express advocacy. 2

U. S. C. §434(f)(3)(A) (Supp. II).11

In Buckley, the Court was presented with the ambiguous language "'any expenditure ... relative to a clearly identified candidate."' 424 U. S., at 41. The Court noted that the "use of so indefinite a phrase as 'relative to' a candidate fails to clearly mark the boundary between permissible and im- permissible speech."

Ibid. Hence, the Court read the phrase to mean "advocating the election or defeat of a candi- date."

Id., at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted). But this construction did not complete the vagueness inquiry.

"IT]he distinction between discussion of issues and can- didates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public is- sues involving legislative proposals and governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of their positions on various public issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest."

Ibid.

The Court then recognized that the constitutional issues raised by the provision "can be avoided only by reading

11 The Court, in upholding most of its provisions by concluding that the "express advocacy" limitation derived by Buckley is not a constitutionally mandated line, has, in one blow, overturned every Court of Appeals that has addressed this question (except, perhaps, one). See Clifton v. FEC,

114 F. 3d 1309, 1312 (CA1 1997); Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v.

Sorrell, 221 F. 3d 376, 387 (CA2 2000); FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F. 3d 1049, 1064 (CA4 1997); Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 288 F. 3d 187, 193 (CA5 2000); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams,

187 F. 3d 963, 968-970 (CA8 1999); Citizens for Responsible Govt. State

Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F. 3d 1174, 1187 (CA10 2000).

The one possible exception is the Ninth Circuit. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F. 2d 857, 862-863 (1987).

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of THOMAS, J.

§ 608(e)(1) as limited to communications that include explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate."

Id., at 43.

The joint opinion argues that Buckley adopted this narrow reading only to avoid addressing a constitutional question. "[T]he concept of express advocacy and the concomitant class of magic words were born of an effort to avoid constitutional infirmities," concludes the joint opinion after examining the language of Buckley. Ante, at 192. This ignores the fact that the Court then struck down the expenditure limitation precisely because it was too narrow:

"The exacting interpretation of the statutory language necessary to avoid unconstitutional vagueness thus un- dermines the limitation's effectiveness as a loophole- closing provision by facilitating circumvention by those seeking to exert improper influence upon a candidate or officeholder.

It would naively underestimate the inge- nuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups desir- ing to buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the candidate's campaign. Yet no substantial societal interest would be served by a loophole-closing provision designed to check corruption that permitted unscrupulous persons and organizations to expend unlimited sums of money in order to obtain improper influence over candidates for elective office."

424 U. S., at 45.

Far from saving the provision from constitutional doubt, the Court read the provision in such a way as to guarantee its unconstitutionality. If there were some possibility that reg- ulation of communications without words of express advo- cacy were constitutional, the provision would have to have been read to include these communications, and the constitu-

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tional question addressed head on.12 Indeed, the exceed- ingly narrow reading of the relevant language in Buckley is far from mandated by the text; it is, in fact, a highly strained reading. "'[A]ny expenditure... relative to a clearly identi- fied candidate,"' id., at 41, would be better read to cover, for instance, any expenditure for an advertisement aired close to an election that is "intended to influence the voters' deci- sions and ha[s] that effect," a standard apparently endorsed by the joint opinion as being sufficiently "equivalent" to ex- press advocacy to justify its regulation. Ante, at 206. By deliberately adopting a strained and narrow reading of the statutory text and then striking down the provision in ques- tion for being too narrow, the Court made clear that regula- tion of nonexpress advocacy was strictly forbidden.

This reading is confirmed by other portions of Buckley and by other cases. For instance, in limiting FECA's disclosure provisions to expenditures involving express advocacy, the Court noted that it gave such a narrowing interpretation "[t]o insure that the reach of [the disclosure provision] is not impermissibly broad." 424 U. S., at 80 (emphasis added).

If overbreadth were a concern in limiting the scope of a dis- closure provision, it surely was equally a concern in the lim- itation of an actual cap on expenditures. And, in MCFL, the Court arguably eliminated any ambiguity remaining in Buckley when it explicitly stated that the narrowing inter- pretations taken in Buckley were necessary "in order to avoid problems of overbreadth." MCFL, 479 U. S., at 248.

The joint opinion's attempt to explain away MCFL's uncom- fortable language is unpersuasive. The joint opinion em- phasizes that the MCFL Court "held that a 'similar con-

12 After all, the constitutional avoidance doctrine counsels us to adopt

constructions of statutes to "avoid decision of constitutional questions," not to deliberately create constitutional questions. United States v.

Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 373 (1971); see also United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408 (1909).

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of THOMAS, J.

struction' must apply to the expenditure limitation," as if that somehow proved its point. Ante, at 192, n. 76 (emphasis in original). The fact that the MCFL Court said this does not establish anything, of course; adopting a narrow con- struction of a statute "in order to avoid problems of over- breadth," 479 U. S., at 248, is perfectly consistent with a holding that, lacking the narrowing construction, the statute would be overly broad, i. e., unconstitutional.

The defendants' principal argument in response is that

"it would be bizarre to conclude that the Constitutiofi permits Congress to prohibit the use of corporate or union general treasury funds for electioneering adver- tisements, but that the only standard that it can con- stitutionally use (express advocacy) is one that misses the vast majority (88.6 percent) of advertisements that candidates themselves use for electioneering." Brief for FEC et al. in No. 02-1674 et al., p. 103 (emphasis in original).

The joint opinion echoes this, stating that the express advo- cacy line "cannot be squared with our longstanding recogni- tion that the presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true issue ad." Ante, at 193. First, the presence of the "magic words" does differentiate in a meaningful way between cate- gories of speech. Speech containing the "magic words" is "unambiguously campaign related," Buckley, supra, at 81, while speech without these words is not. Second, it is far from bizarre to suggest that (potentially regulable) speech that is in practice impossible to differentiate from fully pro- tected speech must be fully protected. It is, rather, part and parcel of First Amendment first principles. See, e. g., Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S., at 255 ("The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech. Protected speech does not become unpro- tected merely because it resembles the latter. The Consti-

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tution requires the reverse").

In fact, First Amendment protection was extended to that fundamental category of ar- tistic and entertaining speech not for its own sake, but only because it was indistinguishable, practically, from speech in- tended to inform. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343

U. S. 495, 501 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510

(1948) (rejecting suggestion that "the constitutional protec- tion for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas" as the "line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right," noting that "[w]hat is one man's amusement, teaches another's doc- trine"). This principle clearly played a significant role in Buckley itself, see 424 U. S., at 42 (after noting that "the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dis- solve in practical application," holding that the "express ad- vocacy" standard must be adopted as the interpretation of the relevant language in FECA). The express-advocacy line was drawn to ensure the protection of the "discussion of issues and candidates," not out of some strange obsession of the Court to create meaningless lines. And the joint opin- ion misses the point when it notes that "Buckley's express advocacy line, in short, has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption." Ante, at 193-194.

Buckley did not draw this line solely to aid in combating real or apparent corruption, but rather also to ensure the protection of speech unrelated to election campaigns. 13

Nor is this to say that speech with words of express advo- cacy is somehow less protected, as the joint opinion implies.

These cases are an excellent example of why such a bright-line rule is necessary. The Court, having "rejected the notion that the First Amend- ment requires Congress to treat so-called issue advocacy differently from express advocacy," ante, at 194, proceeds to uphold significant new restric- tions on speech that is, in every sense of the word, pure issue-related speech. The Court abandons the bright-line rule, and now subjects politi- cal speech of virtually any kind to the risk of regulation by Congress.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of THOMAS, J.

Ante, at 205-206. The Court in Buckley recognized an in- formational interest that justified the imposition of a dis- closure requirement on campaign-related speech. See 424

U. S., at 81. This interest is not implicated with regard to

speech that is unrelated to an election campaign. Hence, it would be unconstitutional to impose such a disclosure re- quirement on non-election-related speech. And, as "the dis- tinction between discussion of issues and candidates ... may often dissolve in practical application," id., at 42, the only way to prevent the unjustified burdening of nonelection speech is to impose the regulation only on speech that is "unambiguously campaign related," id., at 81, i. e., speech using words of express advocacy. Hence, speech that uses words of express advocacy is protected under the same. standard, strict scrutiny, as all other forms of speech. The only difference is that, under Buckley, there is a governmen- tal interest supporting some regulation of those using words of express advocacy not present in other forms of speech.

The chilling endpoint of the Court's reasoning is not diffi- cult to foresee: outright regulation of the press. None of the rationales offered by the defendants, and none of the rea- soning employed by the Court, exempts the press. "This is so because of the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of distinguishing, either as a matter of fact or constitutional [nonmedia] corporations." law, media corporations from Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 796 (Burger, C. J., concurring). Media companies can run procandidate editorials as easily as non- media corporations can pay for advertisements. Candidates can be just as grateful to media companies as they can be In terms of "the corrosive and to corporations and unions. distorting effects" of wealth accumulated by corporations that has "little or no correlation to the public's support for ideas," Austin, 494 U. S., at the corporation's political 660, there is no distinction between a media corporation and

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a nonmedia corporation. 14 Media corporations are influen- tial. There is little doubt that the editorials and commen- tary they run can affect elections. Nor is there any doubt that media companies often wish to influence elections. One would think that the New York Times fervently hopes that its endorsement of Presidential candidates will actually in- fluence people. What is to stop a future Congress from de- termining that the press is "too influential," and that the "appearance of corruption" is significant when media organi- zations endorse candidates or run "slanted" or "biased" news stories in favor of candidates or parties? Or, even easier, what is to stop a future Congress from concluding that the availability of unregulated media corporations creates a loop- hole that allows for easy "circumvention" of the limitations of the current campaign finance laws? 5

Indeed, I believe that longstanding and heretofore unchal- lenged opinions such as Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tor- nillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), are in peril. There, the Court noted that "[c]hains of newspapers, national newspapers, na- tional wire and news services, and one-newspaper towns, are

14 Chief Justice Burger presciently commented on precisely this point in

First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 796-797 (1978) (concur-

"In terms of 'unfair advantage in the political process' and 'corporate domination of the electoral process,' it could be argued that such media conglomerates as I describe pose a much more realistic threat to valid interests than do appellants and similar entities not regularly concerned with shaping popular opinion on public issues. See Miami Herald Pub- lishing Co. v. Tornillo, [418 U. S. 241 (1974)].

In Tornillo, for example, we noted the serious contentions advanced that a result of the growth of modern media empires 'has been to place in a few hands the power to inform the American people and shape public opinion.'

418 U. S., at 250."

15 It appears that "circumvention" of the campaign finance laws by ex- ploiting media exemptions is already being planned by one of the plain- tiffs in this litigation. See Theimer, NRA Seeks Status as News Outlet, Washington Post, Dec. 7, 2003, p. A09 (reporting that the NRA is look- ing to acquire a broadcast outlet and seeking to be classified as a news organization).

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of THOMAS, J.

the dominant features of a press that has become noncompet- itive and enormously powerful and influential in its capacity to manipulate popular opinion and change the course of Id., at 249. Despite expressing some sympathy events." for those arguing for a legally created "right of access" to encourage diversity in viewpoints in the media, the Court struck down such laws, noting that these laws acted both to suppress speech and to "intru[de] into the function of edi- tors" by interfering with "the exercise of editorial control Id., at 257-258. Now, supporters of such and judgment." laws need only argue that the press' "capacity to manipulate popular opinion" gives rise to an "appearance of corruption," especially when this capacity is used to promote a particular candidate or party. After drumming up some evidence, 16 laws regulating media outlets in their issuance of editorials would be upheld under the joint opinion's reasoning (a result considered so beyond the pale in Miami Herald Publishing that the Court there used it as a reductio ad absurdum against the right-of-access law being addressed, see id., at 256). Nor is there anything in the joint opinion that would prevent Congress from imposing the Fairness Doctrine, not just on radio and television broadcasters, but on the entire media. See Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U. S., at 369 (defin- ing the "fairness doctrine" as a "requirement that discussion of public issues be presented... and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage").

16 Given the quality of the evidence the Court relies upon to uphold Title I, the evidence should not be hard to come by. See Kane & Preston, Fox Chief on Hot Seat, Roll Call, June 12, 2003 ("GOP leaders such as House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Texas) have labeled CNN as the 'Commu- nist News Network' and the 'Clinton News Network'-suggesting they only presented the liberal viewpoint and that of former President Clin- ton"); Jones, Fox News Moves from the Margins to the Mainstream, Shor- enstein Center, Harvard, Dec. 1, 2002 (quoting Al Gore as describing Fox News and the Washington Times as "part and parcel of the Republican Party").

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Hence, "the freedom of the press," described as "one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty," 1 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 335 (2d ed. 1876) (declaration of Rhode Island upon the ratification of the Constitution),17 could be next on the chopping block. Although today's opinion does not expressly strip the press of First Amendment protection, there is no principle of law or logic that would prevent the application of the Court's reasoning in that setting. The press now operates at the whim of Congress.

JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II.* The First Amendment guarantees our citizens the right to judge for themselves the most effective means for the ex- pression of political views and to decide for themselves which entities to trust as reliable speakers. Significant portions of Titles I and II of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA or Act) constrain that freedom. These new laws force speakers to abandon their own preference for speaking through parties and organizations. And they pro- vide safe harbor to the mainstream press, suggesting that the corporate media alone suffice to alleviate the burdens the Act places on the rights and freedoms of ordinary citizens.

Today's decision upholding these laws purports simply to follow Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), and to abide by stare decisis, see ante, at 137-138 (joint opinion of STEVENS and O'CONNOR, JJ. (hereinafter Court or ma- jority)); but the majority, to make its decision work, must abridge free speech where Buckley did not. Buckley did

17 See also 4 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 151 (1769) ("The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state").

*THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins this opinion in its entirety. JUSTICE SCALIA joins this opinion except to the extent it upholds new FECA § 328(e) and BCRA § 202. JUSTICE THOMAS joins this opinion with respect to BCRA § 213.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

not authorize Congress to decide what shapes and forms the national political dialogue is to take. To reach today's deci- sion, the Court surpasses Buckley's limits and expands Con- In so doing, it replaces discrete gress' regulatory power. and respected First Amendment principles with new, amor- phous, and unsound rules, rules which dismantle basic pro- tections for speech.

A few examples show how BCRA reorders speech rights and codifies the Government's own preferences for certain speakers. BCRA would have imposed felony punishment on Ross Perot's 1996 efforts to build the Reform Party. Com- pare Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) §§ 309(d)(1)(A), 315(a)(1)(B), and 323(a)(1) (prohibiting, by up to five years' imprisonment, any individual from giving over $25,000 annually to a national party), with Spending By Perot, The Houston Chronicle, Dec. 13, 1996, p. 43, 1996 WL 11581440 (reporting Perot's $8 million founding contribution to the Reform Party). BCRA makes it a felony for an envi- ronmental group to broadcast an ad, within 60 days of an election, exhorting the public to protest a Congressman's im- pending vote to permit logging in national forests. See BCRA §203. BCRA escalates Congress' discrimination in favor of the speech rights of giant media corporations and against the speech rights of other corporations, both profit and nonprofit. Compare BCRA § 203 with Austin v. Michi- gan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 659-660 (1990) (first sanctioning this type of discrimination).

To the majority, all this is not only valid under the First Amendment but also is part of Congress' "steady improve- ment of the national election laws." Ante, at 117. We should make no mistake. It is neither. It is the codification of an assumption that the mainstream media alone can pro- It is an effort by Congress to en- tect freedom of speech. sure that civic discourse takes place only through the modes of its choosing. And BCRA is only the beginning, as its con-

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"This is a modest step, it is a first step, it is an essential step, but it does not even begin to address, in some ways, the fundamental problems that exist with the hard 148 Cong. Rec. S2101 money aspect of the system," (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold).

Id., at S2097 (statement of Sen. Wellstone) ("[P]assing this legislation ... will whet people's appetite for more"); id., at S2101 (statement of Sen. Boxer) ("[T]his bill is not the be-all or the end-all, but it is a strong start"); id., at S2152 (state- ment of Sen. Corzine) ("[T]his should not and will not be the last time campaign finance reform is debated on the Senate floor. We have many more important campaign finance is- sues to explore"); id., at .S2157 (statement of Sen. Torricelli) ("Make [BCRA] the beginning of a reform, not the end of reform"); id., at H442 (Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Dog- gett) ("Mr. Chairman, if [BCRA] has any defect, it is that it does too little, not too much").

Our precedents teach, above all, that Government cannot be trusted to moderate its own rules for suppression of speech. The dangers posed by speech regulations have led the Court to insist upon principled constitutional lines and a rigorous standard of review. The majority now abandons these distinctions and limitations.

With respect, I dissent from the majority opinion uphold- I concur in the judgment as to ing BCRA Titles I and II.

BCRA § 213 and new FECA § 323(e) and concur in the judg- ment in part and dissent in part as to BCRA §§ 201, 202, and 214.

Title I principally bans the solicitation, receipt, transfer, and spending of soft money by the national parties (new It also bans FECA § 323(a), 2 U. S. C. §441i(a) (Supp. II)). certain uses of soft money by state parties (new FECA § 323(b)); the transfer of soft money from national parties to nonprofit groups (new FECA § 323(d)); the solicitation, re-

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

ceipt, transfer, and spending of soft money by federal candi- dates and officeholders (new FECA § 323(e)); and certain uses of soft money by state candidates (new FECA § 323(f)).

These provisions, and the other provisions with which this opinion is principally concerned, are* set out in full, see Appendix, infra. Even a cursory review of the speech and association burdens these laws create makes their First

Title I bars individuals with shared beliefs from pool- ing their money above limits set by Congress to form a new third party. See new FECA § 323(a).

Title I bars national party officials from soliciting or directing soft money to state parties for use on a state ballot initiative. This is true even if no federal office appears on the same ballot as the state initiative. See ibid.

A national party's mere involvement in the strategic planning of fundraising for a state ballot initiative risks a determination that the national party is exercising "in- direct control" of the state party. If that determination is made, the state party must abide by federal regula- tions. And this is so even if the federal candidate on the ballot, if there is one, runs unopposed or is so certain of election that the only voter interest is in the state and local campaigns. See ibid.

Title I compels speech. Party officials who want to engage in activity such as fundraising must now speak magic words to ensure the solicitation cannot be inter- preted as anything other than a solicitation for hard, not soft, money. See ibid.

Title I prohibits the national parties from giving any sort of funds to nonprofit entities, even federally regu- lated hard money, and even if the party hoped to sponsor the interest group's exploration of a particular issue in advance of the party's addition of it to their platform.

See new FECA § 323(d).

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By express terms, Title I imposes multiple different forms of spending caps on parties, candidates, and their agents. See new FECA §§ 323(a), (e), and (f).

Title I allows state parties to raise quasi-soft-money Levin funds for use in activities that might affect a fed- eral election; but the Act prohibits national parties from assisting state parties in developing and executing these fundraising plans, even when the parties seek only to advance state election interests. See new FECA § 323(b).

Until today's consolidated cases, the Court has accepted but two principles to use in determining the validity of cam- paign finance restrictions. First is the anticorruption ra- tionale. The principal concern, of course, is the agreement for a quid pro quo between officeholders (or candidates) and those who would seek to influence them. The Court has said the interest in preventing corruption allows limitations on receipt of the quid by a candidate or officeholder, regardless of who gives it or of the intent of the donor or officeholder.

See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 26-27, 45-48; infra, at 291-294.

Second, the Court has analyzed laws that classify on the basis of the speaker's corporate or union identity under the corporate speech rationale. The Court has said that the willing adoption of the entity form by corporations and unions justifies regulating them differently: Their ability to give candidates quids may be subject not only to limits but also to outright bans; their electoral speech may likewise be curtailed. See Austin, 494 U. S., at 659-660; Federal Elec- tion Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 201-211 (1982).

The majority today opens with rhetoric that suggests a conflation of the anticorruption rationale with the corporate speech rationale. See ante, at 115-118 (hearkening back to, among others, Elihu Root and his advocacy against the use of corporate funds in political campaigning). The conflation appears designed to cast the speech regulated here as un-

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

seemly corporate speech. The effort, however, is unwar- ranted, and not just because money is not per se the evil the majority thinks. Most of the regulations at issue, notably all of the Title I soft-money bans and the Title II coordina- tion provisions, do not draw distinctions based on corporate or union status. Referring to the corporate speech rationale as if it were the linchpin of the case, when corporate speech is not primarily at issue, adds no force to the Court's analy- sis.

Instead, the focus must be on Buckley's anticorrup- tion rationale and the First Amendment rights of individual citizens.

A. Constitutionally Sufficient Interest

In Buckley, the Court held that one, and only one, interest justified the significant burden on the right of association involved there: eliminating, or preventing, actual corruption or the appearance of corruption stemming from contributions to candidates.

"It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary pur- pose-to limit the actuality and appearance of corrup- tion resulting from large individual financial contribu- tions-in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation."

424

U. S., at 26.

See also ibid. (concluding this corruption interest was suffi- ciently "significant" to sustain "closely drawn" interference with protected First Amendment rights).

In parallel, Buckley concluded the expenditure limitations in question were invalid because they did not advance that same interest. See id., at 47-48 ("[T]he independent ex- penditure ceiling thus fails to serve any substantial govern- mental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of cor- ruption in the electoral process"); see also id., at 45, 46.

Thus, though Buckley subjected expenditure limits to strict scrutiny and contribution limits to less exacting re- view, it held neither could withstand constitutional challenge

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unless it was shown to advance the anticorruption interest.

In these consolidated cases, unless Buckley is to be repudi- ated, we must conclude that the regulations further that in- terest before considering whether they are closely drawn or If the interest is not advanced, the reg- narrowly tailored. ulations cannot comport with the Constitution, quite apart from the standard of review.

Buckley made clear, by its express language and its con- text, that the corruption interest only justifies regulating candidates' and officeholders' receipt of what we can call the "quids" in the quid pro quo formulation. The Court rested its decision on the principle that campaign finance regulation that restricts speech without requiring proof of particular corrupt action withstands constitutional challenge only if it regulates conduct posing a demonstrable quid pro quo

"To the extent that large contributions are given to se- cure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representa- tive democracy is undermined."

Id., at 26-27.

See also id., at 45 ("[A]ssuming, arguendo, that large inde- pendent expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or ap- parent quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions .. "). That Buckley rested its decision on this quid pro quo standard is not a novel observation. We have held this was

"The exception [of contribution limits being justified under the First Amendment] relates to the perception

'To the extent that large contributions are given to se- cure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of represent- is undermined."' Citizens Against ative democracy Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley,

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

454 U. S. 290, 297 (1981) (quoting Buckley, supra, at 26-27).

See also Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S.

146 (2003) (furthering this anticorruption rationale by up- holding limits on contributions given directly to candidates); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377 (2000) (same).

Despite the Court's attempt to rely on language from cases like Shrink Missouri to establish that the standard defining corruption is broader than conduct that presents a quid pro quo danger, see ante, at 152-153, n. 48, in those cases the Court in fact upheld limits on conduct possessing quid pro quo dangers, and nothing more. See also infra, at 296. For example, the Shrink Missouri Court's distinguishing of what was at issue there and quid pro quo, in fact, shows only that it used the term quid pro quo to refer to actual corrupt, vote-buying exchanges, as opposed to interactions that pos- sessed quid pro quo potential even if innocently undertaken.

"[W]e spoke in Buckley of the perception of corruption 'inherent in a regime of large individual financial contri- butions' to candidates for public office ... as a source of concern 'almost equal' to quid pro quo improbity."

528

U. S., at 390 (citations omitted).

Thus, the perception of corruption that the majority now as- serts is somehow different from the quid pro quo potential discussed in this opinion was created by an exchange fea- turing quid pro quo potential-contributions directly to a candidate.

In determining whether conduct poses a quid pro quo dan- ger the analysis is functional.

In Buckley, the Court con- fronted an expenditure limitation provision that capped the amount of money individuals could spend on any activity in- tended to influence a federal election (i. e., it reached to both independent and coordinated expenditures). See 424 U. S.,

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at 46-47. The Court concluded that though the limitation reached both coordinated and independent expenditures, there were other valid FECA provisions that barred coordi- nated expenditures. Hence, the limit at issue only added regulation to independent expenditures. On that basis it concluded the provision was unsupported by any valid cor- ruption interest. The conduct to which it added regulation (independent expenditures) posed no quid pro quo danger.

See ibid.

Placing Buckley's anticorruption rationale in the context

Congress' interest in preventing corruption provides a basis for regulating federal candidates' and officeholders' receipt of quids, whether or not the candidate or officeholder corruptly received them. Conversely, the rule requires the Court to strike down campaign finance regulations when they do not add regulation to "actual or apparent quid pro quo arrange- ments."

Id., at 45.

The Court ignores these constitutional bounds and in effect interprets the anticorruption rationale to allow regula- tion not just of "actual or apparent quid pro quo arrange- ments," ibid., but of any conduct that wins goodwill from It is not that there is or influences a Member of Congress. any quarrel between this opinion and the majority that the inquiry since Buckley has been whether certain conduct creates "undue influence." See ante, at 154. On that we agree. The very aim of Buckley's standard, however, was to define undue influence by reference to the presence of quid pro quo involving the officeholder. The Court, in con- trast, concludes that access, without more, proves influence is undue. Access, in the Court's view, has the same legal ramifications as actual or apparent corruption of officehold- ers. This new definition of corruption sweeps away all pro- tections for speech that lie in its path.

The majority says it is not abandoning our cases in this

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"More importantly, plaintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly. Our cases have firmly established that Congress' legitimate interest extends beyond prevent- ing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing 'undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appear- ance of such influence.'

[Federal Election Comm'n v.

Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001) (Colorado II)]. Many of the 'deeply disturbing examples' of corruption cited by this Court in Buckley to justify FECA's contribution limits were not episodes of vote buying, but evidence that vari- ous corporate interests had given substantial donations to gain access to high-level government officials. Even if that access did not secure actual influence, it certainly gave the 'appearance of such influence.' Colorado II, supra, at 441; see also [Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821,

"The record in the present case is replete with similar examples of national party committees peddling access to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large soft-money donations. See [251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 492-506 (DC 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)]." Ante, at 150 (some internal citations omitted).

The majority notes that access flowed from the regulated conduct at issue in Buckley and its progeny, then uses that fact as the basis for concluding that access peddling by the parties equals corruption by the candidates. That conclu- sion, however, is tenable only by a quick and subtle shift, and one that breaks new ground: The majority ignores the quid pro quo nature of the regulated conduct central to our earlier decisions.

It relies instead solely on the fact that access flowed from the conduct.

To ignore the fact that in Buckley the money at issue was given to candidates, creating an obvious quid pro quo danger as much as it led to the candidates also providing access to the donors, is to ignore the Court's comments in Buckley

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that show quid pro quo was of central importance to the analysis. See 424 U. S., at 26-27, 45. The majority also ig- nores that in Buckley, and ever since, those party contribu- tions that have been subject to congressional limit were not general party-building contributions but were only contribu- tions used to influence particular elections. That is, they were contributions that flowed to a particular candidate's benefit, again posing a quid pro quo danger. And it ignores that in Colorado II, the party spending was that which was coordinated with a particular candidate, thereby implicating In all of these ways the majority quid pro quo dangers. breaks the necessary tether between quid and access and assumes that access, all by itself, demonstrates corruption and so can support regulation. See also ante, at 156 ("[L]arge soft-money donations to national party committees are likely to buy donors preferential access to federal office- holders no matter the ends to which their contributions are .eventually put").

Access in itself, however, shows only that in a general sense an officeholder favors someone or that someone has influence on the officeholder. There is no basis, in law or in fact, to say favoritism or influence in general is the same as corrupt favoritism or influence in particular. By equating vague and generic claims of favoritism or influence with ac- tual or apparent corruption, the Court adopts a definition of corruption that dismantles basic First Amendment rules, permits Congress to suppress speech in the absence of a quid pro quo threat, and moves beyond the rationale that is Buck- ley's very foundation.

The generic favoritism or influence theory articulated by the Court is at odds with standard First Amendment analy- ses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting principle. Any given action might be favored by any given person, so by the Court's reasoning political loyalty of the purest sort can be prohibited. There is no remaining principled method for inquiring whether a campaign finance

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

regulation does in fact regulate corruption in a serious and meaningful way. We are left to defer to a congressional con- clusion that certain conduct creates favoritism or influence.

Though the majority cites common sense as the foundation for its definition of corruption, see ante, at 145, 152, in the context of the real world only a single definition of corrup- tion has been found to identify political corruption success- fully and to distinguish good political responsiveness from bad-that is quid pro quo. Favoritism and influence are not, as the Government's theory suggests, avoidable in repre- sentative politics.

It is in the nature of an elected repre- sentative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corol- lary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and legiti- mate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candidate will respond.by producing those political out- comes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on re- sponsiveness. Quid pro quo corruption has been, until now, the only agreed upon conduct that represents the bad form of responsiveness and presents a justiciable standard with a relatively clear limiting principle: Bad responsiveness may be demonstrated by pointing to a relationship between an official and a quid.

The majority attempts to mask its extension of Buckley under claims that BCRA prevents the appearance of corrup- tion, even if it does not prevent actual corruption, since some assert that any donation of money to a political party is sus- pect. See ante, at 149-152. Under Buckley's holding that Congress has a valid "interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption," 424 U. S., at 47-48, however, the inquiry does not turn on whether some persons assert that an appearance of corruption exists. Rather, the inquiry turns on whether the Legislature has established that the regulated conduct has inherent corruption potential, thus justifying the inference that regulating the conduct will stem

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the appearance of real corruption. Buckley was guided and In striking down expenditure constrained by this analysis. limits the Court in Buckley did not ask whether people thought large election expenditures corrupt, because clearly at that time many persons, including a majority of Congress and the President, did. See id., at 25 ("According to the par- ties and amici, the primary interest served ... by the Act as a whole, is the prevention of corruption and the appear- Instead, the Court asked whether the ance of corruption").

Government had proved that the regulated conduct, the ex- penditures, posed inherent quid pro quo corruption poten- tial. See id., at 46.

The Buckley decision made this analysis even clearer in It stated that even if ac- upholding contribution limitations. tual corrupt contribution practices had not been proved, Congress had an interest in regulating the appearance of cor- ruption that is "inherent in a regime of large individual fi- Id., at 27 (discussing contributions nancial contributions." to candidates). See also id., at 28, 30. The quid pro quo nature of candidate contributions justified the conclusion that the contributions pose inherent corruption potential; and this in turn justified the conclusion that their regulation would stem the appearance of real corruption.

From that it follows that the Court today should not ask, as it does, whether some persons, even Members of Con- gress, conclusorily assert that the regulated conduct appears corrupt to them. Following Buckley, it should instead in- quire whether the conduct now prohibited inherently poses a real or substantive quid pro quo danger, so that its regula- tion will stem the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.

Sections 323(a), (b), (d), and (f), 2 U. S. C. §§ 441i(a), (b), (d), and (f) (Supp. II), cannot stand because they do not add regulation to conduct that poses a demonstrable quid pro quo danger. They do not further Buckley's corruption interest.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

The majority, with a broad brush, paints § 323(a) as aimed at limiting contributions possessing federal officeholder cor- ruption potential. From there it would justify § 323's re- maining provisions as necessary complements to ensure the national parties cannot circumvent § 323(a)'s prohibitions.

The broad brush approach fails, however, when the provi- sions are reviewed under Buckley's proper definition of cor- ruption potential.

On its face § 323(a) does not regulate federal candidates' or officeholders' receipt of quids because it does not regulate contributions to, or conduct by, candidates or officeholders.

See BCRA § 101(a) (setting out new FECA § 323(a): National parties may not "solicit, receive, or direct to another person ... or spend any [soft money]").

The realities that underlie the statute, furthermore, do not support the majority's interpretation. Before BCRA's en- actment, parties could only use soft money for a candidate's "benefit" (e. g., through issue ads, which all parties now admit may influence elections) independent of that candidate.

And, as discussed later, § 323(e) validly prohibits federal can- didate and officeholder solicitation of soft-money party do- nations. See infra, at 314. Section 323(a), therefore, only adds regulation to soft-money party donations not solicited by, or spent in coordination with, a candidate or officeholder.

These donations (noncandidate or officeholder solicited soft-money party donations that are independently spent) do not pose the quid pro quo dangers that provide the basis for restricting protected speech. Though the Government argues § 323(a) does regulate federal candidates' and office- holders' receipt of quids, it bases its argument on this

(1) "[F]ederal elected officeholders are inextricably

linked to their political parties," Brief for Appellee/ Cross Appellant FEC et al. in No. 02-1674 et al., p. 21; cf. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v.

Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U. S. 604, 626 (1996) (Col-

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orado I) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment and dis- senting in part).

(2) All party receipts must be connected to, and

must create, corrupt donor favoritism among these officeholders.

(3) Therefore, regulation of party receipts equals reg-

ulation of quids to the party's officeholders.

The reasoning is flawed because the Government's reliance on reasoning parallel to the Colorado I concurrence only es- tablishes the first step in its chain of logic: that a party is a It does not establish the proxy for its candidates generally. second step: that as a proxy for its candidates generally, all moneys the party receives (not just candidate solicited, soft- money donations, or donations used in coordinated activity) represent quids for all the party's candidates and officehold- ers. The Government's analysis is inconsistent with what a majority of the Justices, in different opinions, have said.

JUSTICE THOMAS' dissent in Federal Election Comm'n v.

Colorado Republican Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 476- 477 (2001) (Colorado II), taken together with JUSTICE BREYER'S opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in Colorado I, rebuts the second step of the Government's ar- JUSTICE THOMAS demonstrated that a general gument. party-candidate corruption linkage does not exist. As he

"The dearth of evidence [of such corruption] is unsur- prising in light of the unique relationship between a political party and its candidates: 'The very aim of a political party is to influence its candidate's stance on issues and, if the candidate takes office or is reelected, If coordinated expenditures help achieve his votes.' . constitute this aim, the achievement 'does not . "a subversion of the political process."'" Colorado II, supra, at 476-477 (citations omitted).

.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

JUSTICE BREYER reached the same conclusion' about the corrupting effect general party receipts could have on partic- ular candidates, though on narrower grounds. He concluded that independent party conduct lacks quid pro quo corrup- tion potential. See Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 617-618; id., at 617 ("If anything, an independent [party] expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seem less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent ex- penditure made directly by that donor"); id., at 616 ("[T]he opportunity for corruption posed by [soft-money] contribu- tions is, at best, attenuated" because they may not be used for the purposes of influencing a federal election under

These opinions establish that independent party activity, which by definition includes independent receipt and spend- ing of soft money, lacks a possibility for quid pro quo corrup- tion of federal officeholders. This must be all the more true of a party's independent receipt and spending of soft-money donations neither directed to nor solicited by a candidate.

The Government's premise is also unsupported by the rec- ord before us. The record confirms that soft-money party contributions, without more, do not create quid pro quo cor- ruption potential. As a conceptual matter, generic party contributions may engender good will from a candidate or officeholder because, as the Government says: "[A] Member of Congress can be expected to feel a natural temptation to favor those persons who have helped the 'team,"' Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant FEC et al. in No. 02-1674 et al.,

p. 33. Still, no Member of Congress testified this favoritism

changed voting behavior.

The piece of record evidence the Government puts forward on this score comes by way of deposition testimony from for- mer Senator Simon and Senator Feingold. See 251 F. Supp.

2d, at 482 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Senator Simon reported an unidentified colleague indicated frustration with Simon's op-

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position t6 legislation that would benefit a party contributor on the grounds that "'we've got to pay attention to who is buttering our bread"' and testified he did not think there was any question "'this"' (i. e., "donors getting their way") was why the legislation passed. See App. 805. Senator Feingold, too, testified an unidentified colleague suggested he support the legislation because "'they [i. e., the donor] just gave us [i. e., the party] $100,000."' 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 482 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).

That evidence in fact works against the Government.

These two testifying Senators expressed disgust toward the favoring of a soft-money giver, and not the good will one would have expected under the Government's theory. That necessarily undercuts the inference of corruption the Gov- ernment would have us draw from the evidence.

Even more damaging to the Government's argument from the testimony is the absence of testimony that the Senator who allegedly succumbed to corrupt influence had himself solicited soft money from the donor in question. Equally, there is no indication he simply favored the company with his vote because it had, without any involvement from him, given funds to the party to which he belonged. This fact is If the Senator himself had been the solicitor of the crucial. soft-money funds in question, the incident does nothing more than confirm that Congress' efforts at campaign finance re- form ought to be directed to conduct that implicates quid pro quo relationships. Only if there was some evidence that the officeholder had not solicited funds from the donor could the Court extrapolate from this episode that general party contributions function as quids, inspiring corrupt favoritism among party members. The episode is the single one of its type reported in the record and does not seem sufficient basis for major incursions into settled practice. Given the Government's claim that the corrupt favoritism problem is widespread, its inability to produce more than a single in- stance purporting to illustrate the point demonstrates the

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

Government has not fairly characterized the general atti- tudes of Members toward soft-money donors from whom they have not solicited.

Other aspects of the record confirm the Government has not produced evidence that Members corruptly favor soft- money donors to their party as a per se matter. Most testi- mony from which the Government would have the Court infer corruption is testimony that Members are rewarded by their parties for soliciting soft money. See id., at 438-521 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). This says nothing about how Members feel about a party's soft-money donors from whom they have not solicited.

Indeed, record evidence on this point again

"'As a Member of the Senate Finance Committee, I experienced the pressure first hand. On several occa- sions when we were debating important tax bills, I needed a police escort to get into the Finance Com- mittee hearing room because so many lobbyists were crowding the halls, trying to get one last chance to make their pitch to each Senator. Senators generally knew which lobbyist represented the interests of which large I was often glad that I limited the amount of donor. soft money fundraising I did and did not take PAC con- tributions, because it would be extremely difficult not to feel beholden to these donors otherwise."' Id., at 482 (testimony of former Senator Boren; see 6-R Defs.

Exhs., Tab 8, 8).

Thus, one of the handful of Senators on whom the Govern- ment relies to make its case candidly admits the pressure of appeasing soft-money donors derives from the Members' solicitation of donors, not from those donors' otherwise giv- ing to their party.

In light of all this, § 323(a) has no valid anticorruption in- terest. The anticircumvention interests the Government of- fers in defense of §§ 323(b), (d), and (f) must also fall with the

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interests asserted to justify § 323(a). Any anticircumven- tion interest can be only as compelling as the interest justify- ing the underlying regulation.

None of these other sections has an independent justifying interest. Section 323(b), for example, adds regulation only to activity undertaken by a state party. In the District Court two of the three judges found as fact that particular state and local parties exist primarily to participate in state and local elections, that they spend the majority of their re- sources on those elections, and that their voter registration and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) activities, in particular, are directed primarily at state and local elections. See 251

F. Supp. 2d, at 301-302 (Henderson, J., concurring in judg-

ment in part and dissenting in part); id., at 837-840 (Leon, J.). These findings, taken together with BCRA's other, valid prohibitions barring coordination with federal candidates or officeholders and their soft-money solicitation, demonstrate that § 323(b) does not add regulation to conduct that poses a danger of a federal candidate's or officeholder's receipt of quids.

Even § 323(b)'s narrowest regulation, which bans state party soft-money funded ads that (1) refer to a clearly identi- fied federal candidate, and (2) either support or attack any candidate for the office of the clearly mentioned federal can- didate, see new FECA § 301(20)(A)(iii), fails the constitu- tional test. The ban on conduct that by the statute's own definition may serve the interest of a federal candidate sug- gests to the majority that it is conduct that poses quid pro quo danger for federal candidates or officeholders. Yet, even this effect-considered after excising the coordination and candidate-solicited funding aspects elsewhere prohibited by BCRA §§202 and 214(a) and new FECA § 323(a)-poses no danger of a federal candidate's or officeholder's receipt of a quid. That conduct is no different from an individ- ual's independent expenditure referring to and supporting

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

a clearly identified candidate-and this poses no regulable danger.

Section 323(d), which governs relationships between the national parties and nonprofit groups, fails for similar rea- It is worth noting that neither the record nor our own sons. experience tells us how significant these funds transfers are at this time. It is plain, however, that the First Amendment ought not to be manipulated to permit Congress to forbid a political party from aiding other speakers whom the party deems more effective in addressing discrete issues. One of the central flaws in BCRA is that Congress is determining what future course the creation of ideas and the expression Its attempt to foreclose new and cre- of views must follow. ative partnerships for speech, as illustrated here, is consist- ent with neither the traditions nor principles of our free speech guarantee, which insists that the people, and not the Congress, decide what modes of expression are the most le- gitimate and effective.

The majority's upholding § 323(d) is all the more unsettling because of the way it ignores the Act as Congress wrote it.

Congress said national parties "shall not solicit any funds for, or make or direct any donations to," § 501(c) nonprofit organizations that engage in federal election activity or to § 527 political committees. The Court, however, reads out the word "any" and construes the words "funds" and "dona- tions" to mean "soft-money funds" and "soft-money dona- tions." See ante, at 180 ("This construction is consistent with the concerns animating Title I, whose purpose is to plug the soft-money loophole"). The Court's statutory amend- ment may be consistent with its anti-soft-money rationale; it is not, however, consistent with the plain and unavoidable statutory text Congress has given us. Even as construed by the Court, moreover, it is invalid.

The majority strains to save the provision from what must It does so seem to it an unduly harsh First Amendment. by making a legislative determination Congress chose not to

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make: to prefer hard money to soft money within the con- struct of national party relationships with nonprofit groups.

Congress gave no indication of a preference to regulate either hard money or soft in this context. Rather, it simply proscribed all transfers of money between the two organiza- tions and all efforts by the national parties to raise any money on the nonprofit groups' behalf. The question the Court faces is not which part of a text to sever and strike, but whether Congress can prohibit such transfers altogether.

The answer, as the majority recognizes, is no. See ante, at 179 ("[P]rohibiting parties from donating funds already raised in compliance with FECA does little to further Con- gress' goal of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders").

Though § 323(f) in effect imposes limits on candidate con- tributions, it does not address federal candidate and of- ficeholder contributions. Yet it is the possibility of federal officeholder quid pro quo corruption potential that animates Buckley's rule as it relates to Acts of Congress (as opposed to Acts of state legislatures). See 424 U. S., at 13 ("The con- stitutional power of Congress to regulate federal elections is well established").

When one recognizes that §§ 323(a), (b), (d), and (f) do not serve the interest the anticorruption rationale contemplates, Title I's entirety begins to look very much like an in- cumbency protection plan. See J. Miller, Monopoly Politics 84-101 (1999) (concluding that regulations limiting election fundraising and spending constrain challengers more than incumbents). That impression is worsened by the fact that Congress exempted its officeholders from the more strin- gent prohibitions imposed on party officials. Compare new FECA §323(a) with new FECA §323(e). Section 323(a) raises an inflexible bar against soft-money solicitation, in any way, by parties or party officials. Section 323(e), in contrast, enacts exceptions to the rule for federal officeholders (the

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

very centerpiece of possible corruption), and allows them to solicit soft money for various uses and organizations.

The law in some respects even weakens the regulation of federal candidates and officeholders. Under former law, of- ficeholders were understood to be limited to receipt of hard money by their campaign committees. See 2 U. S. C. §§ 431, 441a (2000 ed. and Supp. II) (setting out the pre-BCRA FECA regime). BCRA, however, now allows them and their cam- paign committees to receive soft' money that fits the hard- money source-and-amount restrictions, so long as the office- holders direct that money on to other nonfederal candidates.

See new FECA §323(e)(1)(B). The majority's characteriza- tion of this weakening of the regime as "tightly constrain[ing]" candidates, ante, at 181, n. 70, is a prime example of its unwill- ingness to confront Congress' own interest or the persisting fact that the regulations violate First Amendment freedoms.

The more lenient treatment accorded to incumbency-driven politicians than to party officials who represent broad national constituencies must render all. the more suspect Congress' claim that the Act's sole purpose is to stop corruption.

The majority answers this charge by stating the obvious, that "§ 323(e) applies to both officeholders and candidates."

Ante, at 185, n. 72. The controlling point, of course, is the practical burden on challengers. That the prohibition ap- plies to both incumbents and challengers in no way estab- lishes that it burdens them equally in that regard. Name recognition and other advantages held by incumbents ensure that as a general rule incumbents will be advantaged by the legislation the Court today upholds.

The Government identifies no valid anticorruption interest justifying §§ 323(a), (b), (d), and (f). The very nature of the restrictions imposed by these provisions makes one all the more skeptical of the Court's explanation of the interests at stake. These provisions cannot stand under the First Amendment.

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Ultimately, only one of the challenged Title I provisions satisfies Buckley's anticorruption rationale and the First Amendment's guarantee.

It is § 323(e). This provision is the sole aspect of Title I that is a direct and necessary reg- ulation of federal candidates' and officeholders' receipt of quids. Section 323(e) governs "candidate[s], individual[s] holding Federal office, agent[s] of a candidate or an individual holding Federal office, or an entity directly or indirectly es- tablished, financed, maintained or controlled by or acting on behalf of 1 or more candidates or individuals holding Fed- eral office."

2 U. S. C. § 441i(e) (Supp. II). These provi-

sions, and the regulations that follow, limit candidates' and their agents' solicitation of soft money. The regulation of a candidate's receipt of funds furthers a constitutionally suf- ficient interest. More difficult, however, is the question whether regulation of a candidate's solicitation of funds also furthers this interest if the funds are given to another.

I agree with the Court that the broader solicitation regula- tion does further a sufficient interest. The making of a so- licited gift is a quid both to the recipient of the money and to the one who solicits the payment (by granting his request).

Rules governing candidates' or officeholders' solicitation of contributions are, therefore, regulations governing their re- ceipt of quids. This regulation fits under Buckley's anticor- ruption rationale.

B. Standard of Review

It is common ground between the majority and this opin- ion that a speech-suppressing campaign finance regulation, even if supported by a sufficient Government interest, is un- lawful if it cannot satisfy our designated standard of review.

See ante, at 134-137.

In Buckley, we applied "closely drawn" scrutiny to contribution limitations and strict scru- tiny to expenditure limitations. Compare 424 U. S., at 25, with id., at 44-45. Against that backdrop, the majority as-

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

sumes that because Buckley applied the rationale in the con- text of contribution and expenditure limits, its application gives Congress and the Court the capacity to classify any challenged campaign finance regulation as either a contribu- tion or an expenditure limit. Thus, it first concludes Title I's regulations are contribution limits and then proceeds to apply the lesser scrutiny.

"Complex as its provisions may be, § 323, in the main, does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy indi- viduals, corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence federal elections, federal can- didates, and federal officeholders." Ante, at 138.

Though the majority's analysis denies it, Title I's dynamics defy this facile, initial classification.

Title I's provisions prohibit the receipt of funds; and in most instances, but not all, this can be defined as a contribu- tion limit. They prohibit the spending of funds; and in most instances this can be defined as an expenditure limit. They prohibit the giving of funds to nonprofit groups; and this falls within neither definition as we have ever defined it. Finally, they prohibit fundraising activity; and the parties dispute the classification of this regulation (the challengers say it is core, political association, while the Government says it ultimately results only in a limit on contribution receipts).

The majority's classification overlooks these competing characteristics and exchanges Buckley's substance for a for- mulaic caricature of it. Despite the parties' and the majori- ty's best efforts on both sides of the question, it ignores real- ity to force these regulations into one of the two legal categories as either contribution or expenditure limitations.

Instead, these characteristics seem to indicate Congress has enacted regulations that are neither contribution nor ex- penditure limits, or are perhaps both at once.

Even if the laws could be classified in broad terms as only contribution limits, as the majority is inclined to do, that still

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leaves the question what "contribution limits" can include if they are to be upheld under Buckley. Buckley's application of a less exacting review to contribution limits must be con- fined to the narrow category of money gifts that are directed, in some manner, to a candidate or officeholder. Any broader definition of the category contradicts Buckley's quid pro quo rationale and overlooks Buckley's language, which contem- plates limits on contributions to a candidate or campaign committee in explicit terms. See 424 U. S., at 13 (applying less exacting review to "contribution ... limitations in the Act prohibit[ing] individuals from contributing more than $25,000 in a single year or more than $1,000 to any single candidate for an election campaign"); id., at 45 ("[T]he contri- bution limitation[s] [apply a] total ban on the giving of large amounts of money to candidates"). See also id., at 20, 25, 28..

The Court, it must be acknowledged, both in Buckley and on other occasions, has described contribution limits due some more deferential review in less than precise terms. At times it implied that donations to political parties would also qualify as contributions whose limitation too would be sub- ject to less exacting review. See id., at 23-24, n. 24 ("[Tihe general understanding of what constitutes a political contri- bution[:] Funds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly thr6ugh an intermediary constitute a contribution"). See also Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 161 (" '[C]ontri- butions may result in political expression if spent by a candi- date or an association"' (quoting Buckley, supra, at 21)).

These seemingly conflicting statements are best reconciled by reference to Buckley's underlying rationale for applying less exacting review.

In a similar, but more imperative, sense proper application of the standard of review to regula- tions that are neither contribution nor expenditure limits (or which are both at once) can only be determined by reference to that rationale.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

Buckley's underlying rationale is this: Less exacting re- view applies to Government regulations that "significantly interfere" with First Amendment rights of association. But any regulation of speech or associational rights crea'ting "markedly greater interference" than such significant inter- ference receives strict scrutiny. Unworkable and ill advised though it may be, Buckley unavoidably sets forth this test: "Even a' "significant interference" with protected rights of political association' may be sustained if the State demonstrates [1] a sufficiently important interest and [2] employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. Cousins v. Wi- goda, [419 U. S. 477, 488 (1975)]; NAACP v. Button, [371

U. S. 415, 438 (1963)]; Shelton v. Tucker, [364 U. S. 479,

488 (1960)]." 424 U. S., at 25.

"The markedly greater burden on basic freedoms [refer- ring to 'the freedom of speech and association'] caused by [expenditure limits] thus cannot be sustained simply by invoking the interest in maximizing the effectiveness of the less intrusive contribution limitations. Rather, the constitutionality of [the expenditure limits] turns on whether the governmental interests advanced in its sup- port satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limita- tions on core First Amendment rights of political ex- pression."

Id., at 44-45.* The majority, oddly enough, first states this standard with

* See also Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 (2003) ("[T]he basic premise we have followed in setting First Amendment standards for reviewing political financial restrictions [is that] the level of scrutiny is based on the importance of the 'political activity at issue' to effective speech or political association"); California Democratic Party v.

Jones, 530 U. S. 567, 582 (2000) ("We can think of no heavier burden on a political party's associational freedom. Proposition 198 is therefore un- constitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest").

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"The relevant inquiry [in determining the level of scru- tiny] is whether the mechanism adopted to implement the contribution limit, or to prevent circumvention of that limit, burdens speech in a way that a direct restric- tion on the contribution itself would not," ante, at 138-

"None of this is to suggest that the alleged associational burdens imposed on parties by § 323 have no place in the First Amendment analysis; it is only that we account for them in the application, rather than the choice, of the appropriate level of scrutiny," ante, at 141.

The majority's attempt to separate out how burdens on speech rights and burdens on associational rights affect the It is not even true to standard of review is misguided.

Buckley's unconventional test. Buckley, as shown in the quotations above, explained the lower standard of review by reference to the level of burden on associational rights, and it explained the need for a higher standard of review by ref- erence to the higher burdens on both associational and In light of Buckley's rationale, and in light speech rights. of this Court's ample precedent affirming that burdens on speech necessitate strict scrutiny review, see 424 U. S., at 44-45 ("[E]xacting scrutiny [applies] to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression"), "closely drawn" scrutiny should be employed only in review of a law that burdens rights of association, and only where that bur- den is significant, not markedly greater. Since the Court professes not to repudiate Buckley, it was right first to say we must determine how significant a burden BCRA's regula- tions place on First Amendment rights, though it should have specified that the rights implicated are those of asso- Its later denial of that analysis flatly contradicts ciation.

Buckley.

The majority makes Buckley's already awkward and im- If one precise test all but meaningless in its application.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

is viewing BCRA through Buckley's lens, as the majority purports to do, one must conclude the Act creates markedly greater associational burdens than the significant burden created by contribution limitations and, unlike contribution limitations, also creates significant burdens on speech itself.

While BCRA contains federal contribution limitations, which significantly burden association, it goes even further. The Act entirely reorders the nature of relations between na- tional political parties and their candidates, between national political parties and state and local parties, and between na- tional political parties and nonprofit organizations.

The many and varied aspects of Title I's regulations im- pose far greater burdens on the associational rights of the parties, their officials, candidates, and citizens than do regu- lations that do no more than cap the amount of money per- sons can contribute to a political candidate or committee.

The evidence shows that national parties have a long tradi- tion of engaging in essential associational activities, such as planning and coordinating fundraising with state and local parties, often with respect to elections that are not federal in nature. This strengthens the conclusion that the regula- tions now before us have unprecedented impact. It makes impossible, moreover, the contrary conclusion-which the Court's standard of review determination necessarily im- plies-that BCRA's soft-money regulations will not much change the nature of association between parties, candidates, nonprofit groups, and the like. Similarly, Title I now com- pels speech by party officials. These officials must be sure their words are not mistaken for words uttered in their offi- cial capacity or mistaken for soliciting prohibited soft, and not hard, money. Few interferences with the speech, asso- ciation, and free expression of our people are greater than attempts by Congress to say which groups can or cannot ad- vocate a cause, or how they must do it.

Congress has undertaken this comprehensive reordering of association and speech rights in the name of enforcing con-

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tribution limitations. Here, however, as in Buckley, "[t]he markedly greater burden on basic freedoms caused by [BCRA's pervasive regulation] cannot be sustained simply by invoking the interest in maximizing the effectiveness of the less intrusive contribution limitations."

Ibid. BCRA fun- damentally alters, and thereby burdens, protected speech and association throughout our society. Strict scrutiny ought apply to review of its constitutionality. Under strict scrutiny, the congressional scheme, for the most part, cannot survive. This is all but acknowledged by the Government, which fails even to argue that strict scrutiny could be met.

Because most of the Title I provisions discussed so far do not serve a compelling or sufficient interest, the standard of review analysis is only dispositive with respect to new FECA § 323(e). As to § 323(e), 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e) (Supp.

II), I agree with the Court that this provision withstands constitutional scrutiny.

Section 323(e) is directed solely to federal candidates and their agents; it does not ban all solicitation by candidates, but only their solicitation of soft-money contributions; and it incorporates important exceptions to its limits (candidates may receive, solicit, or direct funds that comply with hard- money standards; candidates may speak at fundraising events; candidates may solicit or direct unlimited funds to organizations not involved with federal election activity; and candidates may solicit or direct up to $20,000 per individual per year for organizations involved with certain federal elec- tion activity (e. g., GOTV, voter registration)). These provi- sions help ensure that the law is narrowly tailored to satisfy First Amendment requirements. For these reasons, I agree § 323(e) is valid.

2. New FECA §§ 323(a), (b), (d), and (f)

Though these sections do not survive even the first test of serving a constitutionally valid interest, it is necessary as

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

well to examine the vast overbreadth of the remainder of Title I, so the import of the majority's holding today is understood. Sections 323(a), (b), (d), and (f), 2 U. S. C. §§441i(a), (b), (d), and (f) (Supp. II), are not narrowly tai- lored, cannot survive strict scrutiny, and cannot even be con- sidered closely drawn, unless that phrase is emptied of all meaning.

First, the sections all possess fatal overbreadth. By reg- ulating conduct that does not pose quid pro quo dangers, they are incursions on important categories of protected speech by voters and party officials.

At the next level of analytical detail, § 323(a) is overly broad as well because it regulates all national parties, whether or not they present candidates in federal elections.

It also regulates the national parties' solicitation and direc- tion of funds in odd-numbered years when only state and local elections are at stake.

Likewise, while § 323(b) might prohibit some state party conduct that would otherwise be undertaken in conjunction with a federal candidate, it reaches beyond that to a consid- erable range of campaign speech by the state parties on non-

"The Democratic slate for state assembly opposes President Elect the Republican slate to tell Bush's tax policy ....

Washington, D. C. we don't want higher taxes." Section 323(b) encompasses this essential speech and prohibits it equally with speech that poses a federal officeholder quid quo pro danger.

Other predictable political circumstances further demon- It proscribes the use of soft strate § 323(b)'s overbreadth. money for all state party voter registration efforts occurring within 120 days of a federal election. So, the vagaries of election timing, not any real interest related to corruption, will control whether state parties can spend nonfederally regulated funds on ballot efforts. This overreaching contra- dicts important precedents that recognize the need to pro-

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tect political speech for campaigns related to ballot meas- ures. See generally Citizens Against Rent Control/ Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290 (1981); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978).

Section 323(b) also fails the narrow tailoring requirement because less burdensome regulatory options were available.

The Government justifies the provision as an attempt to stop national parties from circumventing the soft-money alloca- tion constraints they faced under the prior FECA regime.

We are told that otherwise the national parties would let the state parties spend money on their behalf. If, however, the problem were avoidance of allocation rates, Congress could have made any soft money transferred by a national party to a state party subject to the allocation rates that governed the national parties' similar use of the money.

Nor is § 323(d) narrowly tailored. The provision, proscrib- ing any solicitation or direction of funds, prohibits the par- ties from even distributing or soliciting regulated money (i. e., hard money).

It is a complete ban on this category of speech. To prevent circumvention of contribution limits by imposing a complete ban on contributions is to burden the circumventing conduct more severely than the underlying suspect conduct could be burdened.

By its own terms, the statute prohibits speech that does not implicate federal elections. The provision prohibits any transfer to a § 527 organization, irrespective of whether the organization engages in federal election activity. This is un- necessary, as well, since Congress enacted a much narrower provision in § 323(a)(2) to prevent circumvention by the par- ties via control of other organizations. Section 323(a)(2) makes "any entity that is directly or indirectly.., controlled by" the national parties subject to the same § 323(a) pro- hibitions as the parties themselves. 2 U. S. C. § 441i (Supp.

Section 323(f), too, is not narrowly tailored or even close to it. It burdens a substantial body of speech and expres-

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

sion made entirely independent of any federal candidate.

The record, for example, contains evidence of Alabama At- torney General Pryor's reelection flyers showing a picture of Pryor shaking hands with President Bush and stating: "Bush appointed Pryor to be Alabama co-chairman of the George

W. Bush for President campaign." A host of circumstances

could make such statements advisable for state candidates to use without any coordination with a federal candidate. Sec- tion 323(f) incorporates no distinguishing feature, such as an element of coordination, to ensure First Amendment pro- tected speech is not swept up within its bounds.

Compared to the narrowly tailored effort of § 323(e), which addresses in direct and specific terms federal candidates' and officeholders' quest for dollars, these sections cast a wide net not confined to the critical categories of federal candidate or officeholder involvement. They are not narrowly tailored; they are not closely drawn; they flatly violate the First Amendment; and even, if they do encompass some speech that poses a regulable quid pro quo danger, that little assur- ance does not justify or permit a regime which silences so many legitimate voices in this protected sphere.

Other BCRA Title II sections require analysis alongside the provisions of Title I, for they, too, are regulations that principally operate within the ambit of Buckley's anticorrup- tion principle. BCRA 88 202 and 214 are two of these provi- sions. They involve the Act's new definition of coordination.

BCRA § 213 is another. It institutes a new system in which the parties are forced to choose between two different types of relationships with their candidates.

1. I agree with the majority that 88214(b) and (c) do not merit our review because they are not now justiciable. See ante, at 223. I disagree, however, with the majority's view

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that § 214(a), § 214's sole justiciable provision, is valid. Nor can I agree that § 202 is valid in its entirety.

Section 214(a) amends FECA to define, as hard-money contributions to a political party, expenditures an individual makes in concert with the party. See ante, at 219. This provision, in my view, must fall. As the earlier discussion of Title I explains, individual contributions to the political parties cannot be capped in the soft-money context. Since an individual's soft-money contributions to a party may not be limited, it follows with even greater force that an individ- ual's expenditure of money, coordinated with the party for activities on which the party could spend unlimited soft money, cannot be capped.

This conclusion emerges not only from an analysis of Title I but also from Colorado L There, JUSTICE BREYER'S opin- ion announcing the judgment of the Court concluded political parties had a constitutional right to engage in independent advocacy on behalf of a candidate. 518 U. S. 604 (1996).

That parties can spend unlimited soft money on this activity follows by necessary implication. A political party's consti- tutional right to spend money on advocacy independent of a candidate is burdened by § 214(a) in a direct and substantial way. The statute commands the party to refrain from coor- dinating with an individual engaging in advocacy even if the individual is acting independently of the candidate.

Section 202 functions in a manner similar to the operation It directs that when persons make "electioneer- of § 214(a). ing communication," see new FECA § 304(f)(3), 2 U. S. C. §434(f)(3) (Supp. II), in a coordinated fashion with a candi- date or a party, the coordinated communication expense must be treated as a hard-money contribution by the person to that candidate or party. The trial court erroneously be- lieved it needed to determine whether § 304's definition of electioneering communications was itself unconstitutional to assess this provision. While a statutory definition may lead

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

to an unconstitutional result under one application, it may lead to a constitutional result under another. Compare It is infra this page and 321-322 with infra, at 333-337. unhelpful to talk in terms of the definition being unconsti- tutional or constitutional when the only relevant question is whether, as animated by a substantive prohibition, here §202, the definition leads to unconstitutional results. The other Title 1I provisions that employ § 304's electioneering communication definition are analyzed below, within the con- text of the corporate speech rationale and the disclosure pro- visions. Section 202, however, must be judged under the anticorruption rationale because it does not distinguish ac- cording to corporate or union status, and it does not in- volve disclosure requirements. Section 202 simply limits the speech of all "persons."

Section 202 does satisfy Buckley's anticorruption rationale in one respect: It treats electioneering communications ex- penditures made by a person in coordination with a candi- date as hard-money contributions to that candidate. For many of the same reasons that § 323(e) is valid, § 202, in this single way, is valid: It regulates conduct that poses a quid pro quo danger-satisfaction of a candidate's request.

Insofar as §202 regulates coordination with a political party, however, it suffers from the same flaws as §214(a).

Congress has instructed us, as much as possible, to sever any infirm portions of statutory text from the valid parts, see BCRA § 401. Following that instruction, I would up- hold §202's text as to its candidate coordination regulation (the first clause of new FECA § 315(a)(7)(C)(ii), 2 U. S. C.. §441a(a)(7)(C)(ii) (Supp. II), but rule invalid its text that applies the coordination provision to political parties.

This provision includes an "advance contracts" aspect as well. That aspect of the provision, on its own, would be in- valid, for many of the reasons discussed below with respect to the advance disclosure requirements embodied in BCRA §§ 201 and 212. See infra, at 321-322.

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2.