Marinello v. United States

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit No. 16–1144. Argued December 6, 2017—Decided March 21, 2018 Between 2004 and 2009, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) intermit- tently investigated petitioner Marinello's tax activities. In 2012, the Government indicted Marinello for violating, among other criminal tax statutes, a provision in 26 U. S. C. § 7212(a) known as the Omnibus Clause, which forbids “corruptly or by force or threats of force . . . obstruct[ing] or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to obstruct or impede, the due administration of [the Internal Revenue Code].” The judge in- structed the jury that, to convict Marinello of an Omnibus Clause viola- tion, it must fnd that he “corruptly” engaged in at least one of eight specifed activities, but the jury was not told that it needed to fnd that Marinello knew he was under investigation and intended corruptly to interfere with that investigation. Marinello was convicted. The Sec- ond Circuit affrmed, rejecting his claim that an Omnibus Clause viola- tion requires the Government to show the defendant tried to interfere with a pending IRS proceeding, such as a particular investigation.

Held: To convict a defendant under the Omnibus Clause, the Government must prove the defendant was aware of a pending tax-related proceed- ing, such as a particular investigation or audit, or could reasonably fore- see that such a proceeding would commence. Pp. 6–14. (a) In United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, this Court interpreted a similarly worded criminal statute—which made it a felony “corruptly

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Syllabus or by threats or force . . . [to] infuenc[e], obstruc[t], or imped[e], or endeavo[r] to infuence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice,” 18 U. S. C. § 1503(a). There, the Court required the Govern- ment to show there was a “nexus” between the defendant's obstructive conduct and a particular judicial proceeding. The Court said that the defendant's “act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings.” 515 U. S., at 599. In reaching this con- clusion, the Court emphasized that it has “traditionally exercised re- straint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress and out of concern that `a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.' ” Id., at 600. That reasoning applies here with similar strength. The verbs “obstruct” and “impede” require an object. The taxpayer must hinder a particular person or thing. The object in § 7212(a) is the “due administration of [the Tax Code].” That phrase is best viewed, like the “due administration of justice” in Aguilar, as refer- ring to discrete targeted administrative acts rather than every conceiv- able task involved in the Tax Code's administration. Statutory context confrms this reading. The Omnibus Clause appears in the middle of a sentence that refers to efforts to “intimidate or impede any offcer or employee of the United States acting in an offcial capacity.” § 7212(a).

The frst part of the sentence also refers to “force or threats of force,” which the statute elsewhere defnes as “threats of bodily harm to the offcer or employee of the United States or to a member of his family.” Ibid. And § 7212(b) refers to the “forcibl[e] rescu[e]” of “any property after it shall have been seized under” the Internal Revenue Code. Sub- sections (a) and (b) thus refer to corrupt or forceful actions taken against individual identifable persons or property. In context, the Omnibus Clause logically serves as a “catchall” for the obstructive conduct the subsection sets forth, not for every violation that interferes with routine administrative procedures such as the processing of tax returns, receipt of tax payments, or issuance of tax refunds. The statute's legislative history does not suggest otherwise. The broader context of the full Internal Revenue Code also counsels against a broad reading. Inter- preting the Omnibus Clause to apply to all Code administration could transform the Code's numerous misdemeanor provisions into felonies, making them redundant or perhaps the subject matter of plea bargain- ing. It could also result in a similar lack of fair warning and related kinds of unfairness that led this Court to “exercise” interpretive “re- straint” in Aguilar. See 515 U. S., at 600. The Government claims that the “corrupt state of mind” requirement will cure any overbreadth problem, but it is diffcult to imagine a scenario when that requirement

Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 584 U. S. 1 (2018) 3 Syllabus will make a practical difference in the context of federal tax prosecu- tions. And to rely on prosecutorial discretion to narrow the otherwise wide-ranging scope of a criminal statute's general language places too much power in the prosecutor's hands. Pp. 6–11. (b) Following the same approach taken in similar cases, the Govern- ment here must show that there is a “nexus” between the defendant's conduct and a particular administrative proceeding, such as an investi- gation, an audit, or other targeted administrative action. See Aguilar, supra, at 599. The term “particular administrative proceeding” does not mean every act carried out by IRS employees in the course of their administration of the Tax Code. Just because a taxpayer knows that the IRS will review her tax return annually does not transform every Tax Code violation into an obstruction charge. In addition to satisfying the nexus requirement, the Government must show that the proceeding was pending at the time the defendant engaged in the obstructive con- duct or, at the least, was then reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.

See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 703, 707–708.

Pp. 11–14.

839 F. 3d 209, reversed and remanded.

Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch, JJ., joined.

Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined, post,

p. 16.

Matthew S. Hellman argued the cause for petitioner.

With him on the briefs were David Bitkower , Joseph M. La- Tona, David A. Strauss, and Sarah M. Konsky.

Robert A. Parker argued the cause for the United States .

With him on the brief were Solicitor General Francisco , Acting Assistant Attorney General Hubbert, Deputy Solici- tor General Dreeben, S. Robert Lyons, Stanley J. Okula, Jr., Gregory Victor Davis, and Gregory S. Knapp.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American College of Tax Counsel by Jenny L. Johnson, Guinevere M. Moore, Ar- mando Gomez, and David W . Foster; for the Cause of Action Institute et al. by Erica L. Marshall, John Vecchione, and Joshua L. Dratel; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Lewis J.

Liman, Nowell D . Bamberger, Kate Comerford Todd, Warren Postman, Karen R. Harned, and Elizabeth Milito; and for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers by Alexandra A. E. Shapiro.

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Opinion of the Court Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. A clause in § 7212(a) of the Internal Revenue Code makes it a felony “corruptly or by force” to “endeavo[r] to obstruct or imped[e] the due administration of this title.” 26 U. S. C. § 7212(a). The question here concerns the breadth of that statutory phrase. Does it cover virtually all governmental efforts to collect taxes? Or does it have a narrower scope?

In our view, “due administration of [the Tax Code]” does not cover routine administrative procedures that are near- universally applied to all taxpayers, such as the ordinary processing of income tax returns. Rather, the clause as a whole refers to specifc interference with targeted govern- mental tax-related proceedings, such as a particular investi- gation or audit.

The Internal Revenue Code provision at issue, § 7212(a), has two substantive clauses. The frst clause, which we shall call the “Offcer Clause,” forbids “corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) endeavor[ing] to intimidate or impede any offcer or employee of the United States acting in an offcial capacity under [the Internal Revenue Code].” Ibid. (emphasis added).

The second clause, which we shall call the “Omnibus Clause,” forbids “corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) obstruct[ing] or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to obstruct or impede, the due administration of [the Internal Revenue Code].” Ibid. (emphasis added).

As we said at the outset, we here consider the scope of the Omnibus Clause. (We have placed the full text of § 7212 in the Appendix, infra.)

Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 584 U. S. 1 (2018) 5 Opinion of the Court Between 2004 and 2009, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) opened, then closed, then reopened an investigation into the tax activities of Carlo Marinello, the petitioner here.

In 2012 the Government indicted Marinello, charging him with violations of several criminal tax statutes including the Omnibus Clause. In respect to the Omnibus Clause the Government claimed that Marinello had engaged in at least one of eight different specifed activities, including “failing to maintain corporate books and records,” “failing to pro- vide” his tax accountant “with complete and accurate” tax “information,” “destroying . . . business records,” “hiding in- come,” and “paying employees . . . with cash.” 839 F. 3d

Before the jury retired to consider the charges, the judge instructed it that, to convict Marinello of violating the Omni- bus Clause, it must fnd unanimously that he engaged in at least one of the eight practices just mentioned, that the jurors need not agree on which one, and that he did so “corruptly,” meaning “with the intent to secure an unlawful advantage or beneft, either for [himself] or for another.” App. in No. 15–2224 (CA2), p. 432. The judge, however, did not instruct the jury that it must fnd that Marinello knew he was under investigation and intended corruptly to inter- fere with that investigation. The jury subsequently con- victed Marinello on all counts.

Marinello appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. He argued, among other things, that a violation of the Omnibus Clause requires the Government to show that the defendant had tried to interfere with a “pending IRS proceeding,” such as a particular investigation. Brief for Appellant in No. 15–2224, pp. 23–25. The appeals court dis- agreed. It held that a defendant need not possess “ `an awareness of a particular [IRS] action or investigation.' ” 839 F. 3d, at 221 (quoting United States v. Wood, 384 Fed.

Appx. 698, 704 (CA10 2010); alteration in original). The full Page Proof Pending Publication

Opinion of the Court Court of Appeals rejected Marinello's petition for rehearing, two judges dissenting. 855 F. 3d 455 (CA2 2017).

Marinello then petitioned for certiorari, asking us to de- cide whether the Omnibus Clause requires the Government to prove the defendant was aware of “a pending IRS action or proceeding, such as an investigation or audit,” when he “engaged in the purportedly obstructive conduct.” Pet. for Cert. i. In light of a division of opinion among the Circuits on this point, we granted the petition. Compare United States v. Kassouf, 144 F. 3d 952 (CA6 1998) (requiring show- ing of a pending proceeding), with 839 F. 3d, at 221 (disagree- ing with Kassouf ).

In United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593 (1995), we inter- preted a similarly worded criminal statute. That statute made it a felony “corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, [to] infuenc[e], ob- struc[t], or imped[e], or endeavo[r] to infuence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice.” 18 U. S. C. § 1503(a). The statute concerned not (as here) “the due ad- ministration of” the Internal Revenue Code but rather “the due administration of justice.” (We have placed the full text of § 1503 in the Appendix, infra.)

In interpreting that statute we pointed to earlier cases in which courts had held that the Government must prove “an intent to infuence judicial or grand jury proceedings.” Aguilar, supra, at 599 (citing United States v. Brown, 688

F. 2d 596, 598 (CA9 1982)). We noted that some courts had

imposed a “ `nexus' requirement”: that the defendant's “act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings.” Aguilar, supra, at 599 (citing United States v. Wood, 6 F. 3d 692, 696 (CA10 1993), and United States v. Walasek, 527 F. 2d 676, 679, and n. 12 (CA3 1975)).

And we adopted the same requirement.

We set forth two important reasons for doing so. We wrote that we “have traditionally exercised restraint in as-

Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 584 U. S. 1 (2018) 7 Opinion of the Court sessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress and out of concern that `a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law in- tends to do if a certain line is passed.' ” Aguilar, supra, at 600 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931); citation omitted). Both reasons apply here with sim- ilar strength.

As to Congress' intent, the literal language of the statute is neutral. The statutory words “obstruct or impede” are broad. They can refer to anything that “block[s],” “make[s] diffcult,” or “hinder[s].” Black's Law Dictionary 1246 (10th ed. 2014) (obstruct); Webster's New International Dictionary 1248 (2d ed. 1957) (Webster's) (impede); id., at 1682 (ob- struct); accord, 5 Oxford English Dictionary 80 (1933) (im- pede); 7 id., at 36 (obstruct). But the verbs “obstruct” and “impede” suggest an object—the taxpayer must hinder a particular person or thing. Here, the object is the “due ad- ministration of this title.” The word “administration” can be read literally to refer to every “[a]ct or process of adminis- tering” including every act of “managing” or “conduct[ing]” any “offce,” or “perform[ing] the executive duties of” any “institution, business, or the like.” Webster's 34. But the whole phrase—the due administration of the Tax Code—is best viewed, like the due administration of justice, as refer- ring to only some of those acts or to some separable parts of an institution or business. Cf. Aguilar, supra, at 600–601 (concluding false statements made to an investigating agent rather than a grand jury do not support a conviction for ob- struction of justice).

Here statutory context confrms that the text refers to specific, targeted acts of administration. The Omnibus Clause appears in the middle of a statutory sentence that refers specifcally to efforts to “intimidate or impede any offcer or employee of the United States acting in an offcial capacity.” 26 U. S. C. § 7212(a) (emphasis added). The frst

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Opinion of the Court part of the sentence also refers to “force or threats of force,” which the statute elsewhere defnes as “threats of bodily harm to the offcer or employee of the United States or to a member of his family .” Ibid. (emphasis added). The fol- lowing subsection refers to the “forcibl[e] rescu[e]” of “any property after it shall have been seized under” the Internal Revenue Code. § 7212(b) (emphasis added). Subsections (a) and (b) thus refer to corrupt or forceful actions taken against individual identifable persons or property. And in that context the Omnibus Clause logically serves as a “catch- all” in respect to the obstructive conduct the subsection sets forth, not as a “catchall” for every violation that interferes with what the Government describes as the “continuous, ubiquitous, and universally known” administration of the In- ternal Revenue Code. Brief in Opposition 9.

Those who fnd legislative history helpful can fnd confr- mation of the more limited scope of the Omnibus Clause in the House and Senate Reports written when Congress frst enacted the Omnibus Clause. See H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.

(1954). According to the House Report, § 7212 “provides for the punishment of threats or threatening acts against agents of the Internal Revenue Service, or any other offcer or em- ployee of the United States, or members of the families of such persons, on account of the performance by such agents or offcers or employees of their offcial duties” and “will also punish the corrupt solicitation of an internal revenue em- ployee.” H. R. Rep. No. 1337, at A426 (emphasis added).

The Senate Report also refers to the section as aimed at targeting offcers and employees. It says that § 7212 “cov- ers all cases where the offcer is intimidated or injured; that is, where corruptly, by force or threat of force, directly or by communication, an attempt is made to impede the adminis- tration of the internal-revenue laws.” S. Rep. No. 1622, at 147 (emphasis added). We have found nothing in the stat- ute's history suggesting that Congress intended the Omnibus Clause as a catchall applicable to the entire Code including

Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 584 U. S. 1 (2018) 9 Opinion of the Court the routine processing of tax returns, receipt of tax pay- ments, and issuance of tax refunds.

Viewing the Omnibus Clause in the broader statutory con- text of the full Internal Revenue Code also counsels against adopting the Government's broad reading. That is because the Code creates numerous misdemeanors, ranging from willful failure to furnish a required statement to employees, § 7204, to failure to keep required records, § 7203, to misrep- resenting the number of exemptions to which an employee is entitled on IRS Form W–4, § 7205, to failure to pay any tax owed, however small the amount, § 7203. To interpret the Omnibus Clause as applying to all Code administration would potentially transform many, if not all, of these misde- meanor provisions into felonies, making the specifc provi- sions redundant, or perhaps the subject matter of plea bar- gaining. Some overlap in criminal provisions is, of course, inevitable. See, e. g., Sansone v. United States, 380 U. S.

343, 349 (1965) (affrming conviction for tax evasion despite overlap with other provisions). Indeed, as the dissent notes, post, at 22 (opinion of Thomas, J.), Marinello's preferred reading of § 7212 potentially overlaps with another provision of federal law that criminalizes the obstruction of the “due and proper administration of the law under which any pend- ing proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States,” 18 U. S. C. § 1505. But we have not found any case from this Court interpreting a statutory pro- vision that would create overlap and redundancy to the de- gree that would result from the Government's broad reading of § 7212—particularly when it would “ `render superfuous other provisions in the same enactment.' ” Freytag v. Com- missioner, 501 U. S. 868, 877 (1991) (quoting Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552, 562 (1990)); see also Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 543 (2015) (plurality opinion).

A broad interpretation would also risk the lack of fair warning and related kinds of unfairness that led this Court in Aguilar to “exercise” interpretive “restraint.” See 515

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U. S., at 600; see also Yates, supra, at 547–548; Arthur An-

dersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 703–704 (2005).

Interpreted broadly, the provision could apply to a person who pays a babysitter $41 per week in cash without with- holding taxes, see 26 CFR § 31.3102–1(a) (2017); IRS, Publi- cation 926, pp. 5–6 (2018), leaves a large cash tip in a restau- rant, fails to keep donation receipts from every charity to which he or she contributes, or fails to provide every record to an accountant. Such an individual may sometimes be- lieve that, in doing so, he is running the risk of having vio- lated an IRS rule, but we sincerely doubt he would believe he is facing a potential felony prosecution for tax obstruction.

Had Congress intended that outcome, it would have spoken with more clarity than it did in § 7212(a).

The Government argues that the need to show the defend- ant's obstructive conduct was done “corruptly” will cure any overbreadth problem. But we do not see how. The Gov- ernment asserts that “corruptly” means acting with “the specifc intent to obtain an unlawful advantage” for the de- fendant or another. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37; accord, 839

F. 3d, at 218. Yet, practically speaking, we struggle to

imagine a scenario where a taxpayer would “willfully” vio- late the Tax Code (the mens rea requirement of various tax crimes, including misdemeanors, see, e. g., 26 U. S. C. §§ 7203, 7204, 7207) without intending someone to obtain an unlawful advantage. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S. 192, 201 (1991) (“Willfulness . . . requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the de- fendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and inten- tionally violated that duty”). A taxpayer may know with a fair degree of certainty that her babysitter will not declare a cash payment as income—and, if so, a jury could readily fnd that the taxpayer acted to obtain an unlawful beneft for another. For the same reason, we fnd unconvincing the dissent's argument that the distinction between “willfully” and “corruptly”—at least as defned by the Government—

Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 584 U. S. 1 (2018) 11 Opinion of the Court refects any meaningful difference in culpability. See post, at 21.

Neither can we rely upon prosecutorial discretion to nar- row the statute's scope. True, the Government used the Omnibus Clause only sparingly during the frst few decades after its enactment. But it used the clause more often after the early 1990's. Brief for Petitioner 9. And at oral argu- ment the Government told us that, where more punitive and less punitive criminal provisions both apply to a defendant's conduct, the Government will charge a violation of the more punitive provision as long as it can readily prove that viola- tion at trial. Tr. of Oral Arg. 46–47, 55–57; see Offce of Atty. Gen., Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 10, 2017), online at http://www.justice.gov/opa/press- release/fle/965896/download (as last visited Mar. 16, 2018).

Regardless, to rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow the otherwise wide-ranging scope of a criminal stat- ute's highly abstract general statutory language places great power in the hands of the prosecutor. Doing so risks allow- ing “policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their per- sonal predilections,” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 575 (1974), which could result in the nonuniform execution of that power across time and geographic location. And insofar as the public fears arbitrary prosecution, it risks undermining necessary confdence in the criminal justice system. That is one reason why we have said that we “cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the Government will `use it responsibly.' ” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 576 (2016) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 480 (2010)). And it is why “[w]e have traditionally exer- cised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute.” Aguilar, supra, at 600.

In sum, we follow the approach we have taken in similar cases in interpreting § 7212(a)'s Omnibus Clause. To be

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Opinion of the Court sure, the language and history of the provision at issue here differ somewhat from that of other obstruction provisions we have considered in the past. See Aguilar, supra (interpret- ing a statute prohibiting the obstruction of “the due adminis- tration of justice”); Arthur Andersen, supra (interpreting a statute prohibiting the destruction of an object with intent to impair its integrity or availability for use in an offcial proceeding); Yates, supra, at 531 (interpreting a statute pro- hibiting the destruction, concealment, or covering up of any “ `record, document, or tangible object with the intent to' ” obstruct the “ `investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States' ”). The Government and the dissent urge us to ignore these precedents because of those differ- ences. The dissent points out, for example, that the prede- cessor to the obstruction statute we interpreted in Aguilar, 18 U. S. C. § 1503, prohibited infuencing, intimidating, or im- peding “any witness or offcer in any court of the United States” or endeavoring “to obstruct or imped[e] the due ad- ministration of justice therein.” Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197, 202 (1893) (citing Rev. Stat. § 5399; emphasis added); see post, at 23. But Congress subsequently deleted the word “therein,” leaving only a broadly worded prohibi- tion against obstruction of “the due administration of jus- tice.” Act of June 25, 1948, § 1503, 62 Stat. 769–770. Con- gress then used that same amended formulation when it enacted § 7212, prohibiting the obstruction of “the due ad- ministration” of the Tax Code. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 855. Given this similarity, it is helpful to consider how we have interpreted § 1503 and other obstruc- tion statutes in considering § 7212. The language of some and the underlying principles of all these cases are similar.

We consequently fnd these precedents—though not control- ling—highly instructive for use as a guide toward a proper resolution of the issue now before us. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U. S. 228, 233 (2005).

Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 584 U. S. 1 (2018) 13 Opinion of the Court We conclude that, to secure a conviction under the Omni- bus Clause, the Government must show (among other things) that there is a “nexus” between the defendant's conduct and a particular administrative proceeding, such as an investiga- tion, an audit, or other targeted administrative action. That nexus requires a “relationship in time, causation, or logic with the [administrative] proceedings.” Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 599 (citing Wood, 6 F. 3d, at 696). By “particular adminis- trative proceeding” we do not mean every act carried out by IRS employees in the course of their “continuous, ubiquitous, and universally known” administration of the Tax Code.

Brief in Opposition 9. While we need not here exhaustively itemize the types of administrative conduct that fall within the scope of the statute, that conduct does not include rou- tine, day-to-day work carried out in the ordinary course by the IRS, such as the review of tax returns. The Govern- ment contends the processing of tax returns is part of the administration of the Internal Revenue Code and any cor- rupt effort to interfere with that task can therefore serve as the basis of an obstruction conviction. But the same could have been said of the defendant's effort to mislead the inves- tigating agent in Aguilar. The agent's investigation was, at least in some broad sense, a part of the administration of justice. But we nevertheless held the defendant's conduct did not support an obstruction charge. 515 U. S., at 600. In light of our decision in Aguilar, we fnd it appropriate to construe § 7212's Omnibus Clause more narrowly than the Government proposes. Just because a taxpayer knows that the IRS will review her tax return every year does not transform every violation of the Tax Code into an obstruc- tion charge.

In addition to satisfying this nexus requirement, the Gov- ernment must show that the proceeding was pending at the time the defendant engaged in the obstructive conduct or, at the least, was then reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.

See Arthur Andersen, 544 U. S., at 703, 707–708 (requiring Page Proof Pending Publication

Appendix to opinion of the Court the Government to prove a proceeding was foreseeable in order to convict a defendant for persuading others to shred documents to prevent their “use in an offcial proceeding”).

It is not enough for the Government to claim that the defend- ant knew the IRS may catch on to his unlawful scheme even- tually. To use a maritime analogy, the proceeding must at least be in the offng.

For these reasons, the Second Circuit's judgment is re- versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

26 U. S. C. § 7212: “Attempts to interfere with admini- stration of internal revenue laws “(a) Corrupt or forcible interference “Whoever corruptly or by force or threats of force (includ- ing any threatening letter or communication) endeavors to intimidate or impede any offcer or employee of the United States acting in an offcial capacity under this title, or in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) obstructs or im- pedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due adminis- tration of this title, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fned not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, except that if the offense is committed only by threats of force, the person convicted thereof shall be fned not more than $3,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. The term `threats of force', as used in this subsection, means threats of bodily harm to the offcer or employee of the United States or to a member of his family.

“(b) Forcible rescue of seized property “Any person who forcibly rescues or causes to be rescued any property after it shall have been seized under this title, or shall attempt or endeavor so to do, shall, excepting in cases otherwise provided for, for every such offense, be fned

Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 584 U. S. 1 (2018) 15 Appendix to opinion of the Court not more than $500, or not more than double the value of the property so rescued, whichever is the greater, or be impris- oned not more than 2 years.” 18 U. S. C. § 1503: “Infuencing or injuring offcer or juror generally “(a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to infuence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or offcer in or of any court of the United States, or offcer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States magistrate judge or other committing magis- trate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any such offcer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his per- son or property on account of the performance of his offcial duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threat- ening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to infuence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). If the offense under this section occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case, and the act in violation of this section involves the threat of physical force or physical force, the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any offense charged in such case.

“(b) The punishment for an offense under this section is— “(1) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in sections 1111 and 1112; “(2) in the case of an attempted killing, or a case in which the offense was committed against a petit juror and in which a class A or B felony was charged, imprisonment for not more than 20 years, a fne under this title, or both; and

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Thomas, J., dissenting “(3) in any other case, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fne under this title, or both.” Justice Thomas , with whom Justice Alito joins, dissenting.

The Omnibus Clause of 26 U. S. C. § 7212(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (Tax Code) makes it a felony to “corruptly . . . endeavo[r] to obstruct or imped[e] the due administration of this title.” “[T]his title” refers to Title 26, which contains the entire Tax Code and authorizes the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to calculate, assess, and collect taxes. I would hold that the Omnibus Clause does what it says: forbid cor- rupt efforts to impede the IRS from performing any of these activities. The Court, however, reads “this title” to mean “a particular [IRS] proceeding.” Ante, at 13. And that proceeding must be either “pending” or “in the offng.” Ante, at 13–14. The Court may well prefer a statute writ- ten that way, but that is not what Congress enacted. I re- spectfully dissent.

Petitioner Carlo J. Marinello, II, owned and managed a company that provided courier services. Marinello, how- ever, kept almost no records of the company's earnings or expenditures. He shredded or discarded most business records. He paid his employees in cash and did not give them tax documents. And he took tens of thousands of dollars from the company each year to pay his personal expenses.

Unbeknownst to Marinello, the IRS began investigating him in 2004. The IRS learned that he had not fled a tax return—corporate or individual—since at least 1992. But the investigation came to a standstill because the IRS did not have enough information about Marinello's earnings.

This was not surprising given his diligent efforts to avoid creating a paper trail. After the investigation ended, Ma- rinello consulted a lawyer and an accountant, both of whom

Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 584 U. S. 1 (2018) 17 Thomas, J., dissenting advised him that he needed to fle tax returns and keep busi- ness records. Despite these warnings, Marinello did neither for another four years.

In 2009, the IRS decided to investigate Marinello again.

In an interview with an IRS agent, Marinello initially claimed he was exempt from fling tax returns because he made less than $1,000 per year. Upon further questioning, however, Marinello changed his story. He admitted that he earned more than $1,000 per year, but said he “ `never got around' ” to paying taxes. 839 F. 3d 209, 212 (CA2 2016).

He also admitted that he shredded documents, did not keep track of the company's income or expenses, and used the company's income for personal bills. His only excuse was that he “took the easy way out.” Ibid. After just a few hours of deliberation, a jury convicted Marinello of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct or impede the due administration of the Tax Code, § 7212(a).

Section 7212(a)'s Omnibus Clause prohibits “corruptly . . . obstruct[ing] or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title.” I agree with the Court's interpretations of “obstruct or impede” and “due administration,” which together refer to conduct that hin- ders the IRS' performance of its offcial duties. See ante, at

7. I also agree that the object of these words—the thing a

person is prohibited from obstructing the due administration of—is “this title,” i. e., Title 26, which contains the entire Tax Code. See ibid. But I part ways when the Court con- cludes that the whole phrase “due administration of the Tax Code” means “only some of” the Tax Code—specifcally “par- ticular [IRS] proceeding[s], such as an investigation, an audit, or other targeted administrative action.” Ante, at 7, 13.

That limitation has no basis in the text. In my view, the plain text of the Omnibus Clause prohibits obstructing the due administration of the Tax Code in its entirety, not just particular IRS proceedings.

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The words “this title” cannot be read to mean “only some of this title.” As this Court recently reiterated, phrases such as “this title” most naturally refer to the cited provision “as a whole.” Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 583 U. S.

202, 212 (2018). Congress used “this title” throughout Title 26 to refer to the Tax Code in its entirety. See, e. g., § 7201 (“[a]ny person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title”); § 7203 (“[a]ny per- son required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by this title . . . to make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to [do so]”). And “[w]hen Congress wanted to refer only to a par- ticular subsection or paragraph, it said so.” NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S. 288, 300 (2017); see, e. g., § 7204 (crim- inalizing willfully failing to furnish a statement “required under section 6051”); § 7207 (criminalizing willfully furnish- ing fraudulent or materially false information “required pur- suant to section 6047(b), section 6104(d), or subsection (i) or (j) of section 527”); § 7210 (criminalizing neglecting to appear or produce documents “required under section 6420(e)(2), 6421(g)(2), 6427(j)(2), 7602, 7603, and 7604(b)”). Thus, “this title” must refer to the Tax Code as a whole.

The phrase “due administration of this title” likewise re- fers to the due administration of the entire Tax Code. As this Court has recognized, “administration” of the Tax Code includes four basic steps: information gathering, assessment, levy, and collection. See Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl, 575 U. S. 1, 8–10 (2015). The frst “phase of tax administra- tion procedure” is “information gathering.” Id., at 8; see,

e. g., §§ 6001–6096. “This step includes private reporting of

information used to determine tax liability, including reports by third parties who do not owe the tax.” Id., at 8 (citation omitted). The “next step in the process” is “ `assessment,' ” which includes “the process by which [a taxpayer's liability] is calculated” and the “offcial recording of a taxpayer's liabil-

Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 584 U. S. 1 (2018) 19 Thomas, J., dissenting ity.” Id., at 9; see, e. g., §§ 6201–6241. After information gathering and assessment come “ `levy' ” and “ `collection.' ” See id., at 9–10; see, e. g., §§ 6301–6344. Levy refers to “a specifc mode of collection under which the Secretary of the Treasury distrains and seizes a recalcitrant taxpayer's prop- erty.” Id., at 9. Collection refers to “the act of obtaining payment of taxes due.” Id., at 10.

Subtitle F of the Tax Code—titled “Procedure and Admin- istration”—contains directives related to each of these steps.

It requires taxpayers to keep certain records and fle certain returns, § 6001; specifes that taxpayers with qualifying incomes must fle returns, § 6012; and authorizes the Secre- tary of the Treasury to create returns for taxpayers who fail to fle returns or who fle fraudulent ones, § 6020. It requires the Secretary to make inquiries, determinations, and assessments of tax liabilities. § 6201. And it author- izes the Secretary to collect and levy taxes. §§ 6301, 6331.

Subtitle F also gives the Secretary the power to commence proceedings to recover unpaid taxes or fees, §§ 7401–7410, and to conduct investigations into the accuracy of particular returns, §§ 7601–7613.

Accordingly, the phrase “due administration of this title” refers to the entire process of taxation, from gathering infor- mation to assessing tax liabilities to collecting and levying taxes. It is not limited to only a few specifc provisions within the Tax Code.

The Court rejects this straightforward reading, describing the “literal language” of the Omnibus Clause as “neutral.” Ante, at 7. It concludes that the statute prohibits only acts related to a pending or imminent proceeding. Ante, at 13–14. There is no textual or contextual support for this limitation.

The text of the Omnibus Clause is not “neutral”; it omits the limitation that the Court reads into it. The Omnibus Clause nowhere suggests that “only some of” the processes

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Thomas, J., dissenting in the Tax Code are covered, ante, at 7, or that the line be- tween covered and uncovered processes is drawn at some vague notion of “proceeding.” The Omnibus Clause does not use the word “proceeding” at all, but instead refers to the entire Tax Code, which covers much more than that.

This Court cannot “lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless in- tends to apply.” Jama v. Immigration and Customs En- forcement, 543 U. S. 335, 341 (2005).

Having failed to fnd its proposed limit in the text, the Court turns to context. However, its two contextual argu- ments fare no better.

First, the Court contends that the Omnibus Clause must be limited to pending or imminent proceedings because the other clauses of § 7212 are limited to actions “taken against individual identifable persons or property.” Ante, at 8.

But specifc clauses in a statute typically do not limit the scope of a general omnibus clause. See Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 225 (2008) (explaining that the ejusdem generis canon does not apply to a “disjunc- tive” phrase in a statute “with one specifc and one general category”). Nor do the other clauses in § 7212 contain the pending-or-imminent-proceeding requirement that the Court reads into the Omnibus Clause. See § 7212(a) (prohibiting efforts to “intimidate or impede any offcer or employee of the United States acting in an offcial capacity”); § 7212(b) (prohibiting “forcibly rescu[ing] or caus[ing] to be rescued any property after it shall have been seized under this title”).

They thus provide no support for the Court's atextual limitation.

Second, the Court asserts that its reading prevents the Omnibus Clause from overlapping with certain misdemean- ors in the Tax Code. Ante, at 9 (discussing §§ 7203, 7204, 7205). But there is no redundancy problem because these provisions have different mens rea requirements. The Om- nibus Clause requires that an act be done “corruptly,” but

Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 584 U. S. 1 (2018) 21 Thomas, J., dissenting the misdemeanor provisions require that an act be done “willfully.” The difference between these mens rea require- ments is signifcant. While “willfully” requires proof only “that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the de- fendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and inten- tionally violated that duty,” Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S.

192, 201 (1991), “corruptly” requires proof that the defendant “act[ed] with an intent to procure an unlawful beneft either for [himself] or for some other person,” United States v.

Floyd, 740 F. 3d 22, 31 (CA1 2014) (collecting cases); see also Black's Law Dictionary 414 (rev. 4th ed. 1951) (“corruptly” “generally imports a wrongful design to acquire some pecu- niary or other advantage”). In other words, “corruptly” re- quires proof that the defendant not only knew he was obtaining an “unlawful beneft” but that his “objective” or “purpose” was to obtain that unlawful beneft. See 21 Am.

Jur. 2d, Criminal Law § 114 (2016) (explaining that specifc intent requires both knowledge and purpose).

The Court dismisses the signifcance of the different mens rea requirements, see ante, at 10, but this difference is impor- tant under basic principles of criminal law. The law recog- nizes that the same conduct, when committed with a higher mens rea, is more culpable and thus more deserving of pun- ishment. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U. S. 624, 643 (1991) (plurality opinion). For that reason, different mens rea re- quirements often differentiate culpability for the same con- duct. See, e. g., 40 C. J. S., Homicide § 80 (2014) (explaining that the distinction between frst- and second-degree murder is based on the defendant's state of mind); § 103 (same for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter). Unless the Court means to cast doubt on this well-established principle, it should not casually dismiss the different mens rea require- ments in the Omnibus Clause and the various misdemeanors in the Tax Code.

Even if the Omnibus Clause did overlap with these other misdemeanors, that would prove little. For better or worse,

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Thomas, J., dissenting redundancy abounds in both the criminal law and the Tax Code. This Court has repeatedly declined to depart from the plain meaning of the text simply because the same con- duct would be criminalized under two or more provisions.

See, e. g., Loughrin v. United States, 573 U. S. 351, 358, n. 4 (2014) (“No doubt, the overlap between the two clauses is substantial on our reading, but that is not uncommon in crim- inal statutes”); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U. S. 695, 714,

n. 14 (1995) (“Congress may, and often does, enact separate

criminal statutes that may, in practice, cover some of the same conduct”); Sansone v. United States, 380 U. S. 343, 352 (1965) (allowing the Government to proceed on a felony tax evasion charge even though that charge “ `covered precisely the same ground' ” as two misdemeanors in the Tax Code).

In fact, the Court's interpretation of the Omnibus Clause does not eliminate the redundancy. Certain misdemeanor offenses in the Tax Code—such as failing to obey a summons, § 7210—apply to conduct that takes place during a proceed- ing and, thus, would still violate the Omnibus Clause under the Court's interpretation. The Court's interpretation also makes the Omnibus Clause largely redundant with 18

U. S. C. § 1505, which already prohibits “corruptly . . . en-

deavor[ing] to infuence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States.” Avoiding redundancy is thus not a rea- son to favor the Court's interpretation. Cf. Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 385 (2013) (“[T]he canon against surplusage `assists only where a competing interpre- tation gives effect to every clause and word of a statute' ”).* *The Court also relies on legislative history to support its interpreta- tion. See ante, at 8–9. Even assuming legislative history could impose a requirement that does not appear in the text, the Court cites nothing in the legislative history that limits the Omnibus Clause to proceedings—or even uses the word “proceeding.” In fact, the legislative history does not say anything at all about the Omnibus Clause. As Marinello concedes,

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The Court contends that its narrow reading of “due admin- istration of this title” is supported by three decisions inter- preting other obstruction statutes, though it admits that the “language and history” of the Omnibus Clause “differ some- what” from those other obstruction provisions. Ante, at 12 (citing United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593 (1995); Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696 (2005); Yates

v. United States, 574 U. S. 528 (2015) (plurality opinion)).

“[D]iffer somewhat” is putting it lightly. The differences be- tween the Omnibus Clause and those other obstruction stat- utes demonstrate why the former does not contain the Court's proceeding requirement.

Aguilar interpreted 18 U. S. C. § 1503. The omnibus clause of § 1503 forbids corruptly endeavoring to obstruct “the due administration of justice.” The Court concluded that this language requires the prosecution to prove a “nexus” between the defendant's obstructive act and “judi- cial proceedings.” 515 U. S., at 599–600. But this nexus re- quirement was based on the specifc history of § 1503. The predecessor to that statute prohibited obstructing “the due administration of justice” “in any court of the United States.” Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197, 202 (1893) (citing Rev. Stat. § 5399). Based on this statutory his- tory, the Court assumed that § 1503 continued to refer to the administration of justice in a court. Aguilar, supra, at 599.

None of that history is present here.

Arthur Andersen is even further afeld. There the Court interpreted 18 U. S. C. § 1512(b)(2)(A), which prohibits “knowingly . . . corruptly persuad[ing] another person . . . with intent to . . . cause or induce [that] person to . . . with- the vague snippets of legislative history that the Court cites are discussing a different portion of 26 U. S. C. § 7212(a), involving threats against IRS offcers and their family members. See Reply Brief 11 (“The conceded focus of § 7212(a)'s legislative history was the offcers clause” and it was “relative[ly] silen[t] regarding [the Omnibus Clause]”).

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Thomas, J., dissenting hold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other ob- ject, from an offcial proceeding.” Relying on Aguilar, the Court concluded that § 1512(b)(2)(A) required the Govern- ment to show a “nexus” with “[a] particular proceeding.” 544 U. S., at 707–708. But this nexus requirement came from the statutory text, which expressly included “an offcial proceeding.” If anything, then, § 1512(b)(2)(A) cuts against the Court's interpretation of the Omnibus Clause because it shows that Congress knows how to impose a “proceeding” requirement when it wants to do so. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 248 (2010); Jama, 543 U. S., at 341.

Yates underscores this point. There the Court interpreted

18 U. S. C. § 1519, which prohibits obstructing “the investiga-

tion or proper administration of any matter within the juris- diction of any department or agency of the United States.” The four Justices in the plurality recognized that this lan-

Section 1519 “covers conduct intended to impede any federal investigation or proceeding, including one not even on the verge of commencement.” 574 U. S., at 547. The plurality contrasted the term “ `offcial proceeding' ” with the phrase “ `investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency,' ” noting that the latter is broader. Id., at 542. The same is true for the broad language of the Omnibus Clause.

In sum, these cases demonstrate that, when text and his- tory justify it, this Court interprets obstruction statutes to include a proceeding requirement. But we have never in- serted such a requirement into an obstruction statute with- out textual or historical support. Today the Court does pre- cisely that.

All else having failed, the Court invokes lenity-sounding concerns to justify reading its proceeding requirement into the Omnibus Clause. See ante, at 7, 9–10. But the rule of lenity applies only if after applying ordinary tools of statu-

Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 584 U. S. 1 (2018) 25 Thomas, J., dissenting tory interpretation, “there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what Congress intended.” Barber v. Thomas, 560 U. S. 474, 488 (2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court identifes no such grievous am- biguity in the Omnibus Clause, and breadth is not the same thing as ambiguity. The Omnibus Clause is both “very broad” and “very clear.” Yates, supra, at 566 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Lenity does not apply.

If the Court is concerned that the Omnibus Clause does not give defendants “fair warning” of what it prohibits, ante, at 6–7, I am hard pressed to see how today's decision makes things better. The Court outlines its atextual proceeding requirement in only the vaguest of terms. Under its inter- pretation, the prosecution must prove a “nexus” between the defendant's conduct and some “particular administrative pro- ceeding.” Ante, at 13. “[P]articular administrative pro- ceeding” is defned negatively as “not . . . every act carried out by IRS employees in the course of their `continuous, ubiquitous, and universally known' administration of the Tax Code.” Ibid. Further, the Government must prove that the proceeding was “reasonably foreseeable” to the defend- ant. Ibid. “Reasonably foreseeable” is again defned nega- tively as “not . . . that the defendant knew the IRS may catch onto his unlawful scheme eventually.” Ante, at 14. It is hard to see how the Court's statute is less vague than the one Congress drafted, which simply instructed individuals not to corruptly obstruct or impede the IRS' administration of the Tax Code.

To be sure, § 7212(a) is a sweeping obstruction statute.

Congress may well have concluded that a broad statute was warranted because “our tax structure is based on a system of self-reporting” and “the Government depends upon the good faith and integrity of each potential taxpayer to disclose honestly all information relevant to tax liability.” United

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Thomas, J., dissenting States v. Bisceglia, 420 U. S. 141, 145 (1975). Whether or not we agree with Congress' judgment, we must leave the ultimate “[r]esolution of the pros and cons of whether a stat- ute should sweep broadly or narrowly . . . for Congress.” United States v. Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475, 484 (1984). “[I]t is not our task to assess the consequences of each approach and adopt the one that produces the least mischief. Our charge is to give effect to the law Congress enacted.” Lewis v. Chi- cago, 560 U. S. 205, 217 (2010).

The Court frets that the Omnibus Clause might apply to “a person who pays a babysitter $41 per week in cash without withholding taxes,” “leaves a large cash tip in a res- taurant,” “fails to keep donation receipts from every char- ity,” or “fails to provide every record to an accountant.” Ante, at 10. Whether the Omnibus Clause would cover these hypotheticals—and whether the Government would waste its resources identifying and prosecuting them—is debatable.

But what should not be debatable is that the statute covers Marinello, who systematically shredded documents and hid evidence about his company's earnings to avoid paying taxes even after warnings from his lawyer and accountant. It is not hard to fnd similar cases prosecuted under the Omnibus Clause. See, e. g., United States v. Sorenson, 801 F. 3d 1217, 1221–1222 (CA10 2015) (defendant hid taxable income in elab- orate system of trusts); Floyd, 740 F. 3d, at 26–27, 31–32 (defendant created elaborate scheme to avoid paying pay- roll taxes).

The Court, in its effort to exclude hypotheticals, has con- structed an opening in the Omnibus Clause large enough that even the worst offenders can escape liability. In doing so, it

“[T]he authority vested in tax collectors may be abused, as all power is subject to abuse. However, the solution is not to restrict that authority so as to undermine the effcacy of the federal tax system.” Bisceglia, supra, at 146.

Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 584 U. S. 1 (2018) 27 Thomas, J., dissenting * * * Regardless of whether this Court thinks the Omnibus Clause should contain a proceeding requirement, it does not have one. Because the text prohibits all efforts to obstruct the due administration of the Tax Code, I respectfully dissent.

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Syllabus AYESTAS, aka ZELAYA COREA v. DAVIS, DIRECTOR,

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fth circuit No. 16–6795. Argued October 30, 2017—Decided March 21, 2018 Petitioner Ayestas was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a Texas state court. He secured new counsel, but his conviction and sen- tence were affrmed on appeal. A third legal team sought, unsuccess- fully, state habeas relief, claiming trial-level ineffective assistance of counsel but not counsel's failure to investigate petitioner's mental health and alcohol and drug abuse during the trial's penalty phase. His fourth set of attorneys did raise that failure in a federal habeas petition, but because the claim had never been raised in state court, the District Court held, it was barred by procedural default. That decision was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1—where this Court held that an Arizona prisoner seeking federal habeas relief could overcome the procedural default of a trial- level ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim by showing that the claim is substantial and that state habeas counsel was also ineffective in failing to raise the claim in a state habeas proceeding—and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U. S. 413—which extended that holding to Texas prisoners. Peti- tioner fled an ex parte motion asking the District Court for funding to develop his claim that both his trial and state habeas counsel were ineffective, relying on 18 U. S. C. § 3599(f), which provides, in relevant part, that a district court “may authorize” funding for “investigative, expert, or other services . . . reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant.” The court found his claim precluded by procedural default and thus denied his funding request. The Fifth Circuit also rejected the funding claim under its precedent: that a § 3599(f) funding applicant must show that he has a “substantial need” for investigative or other services, and that funding may be denied when an applicant fails to present “a viable constitutional claim that is not procedurally barred.” 817 F. 3d 888, 895–896.

1. The District Court's denial of petitioner's funding request was a

judicial decision subject to appellate review under the standard jurisdic- tional provisions. Pp. 37–43.

Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 584 U. S. 28 (2018) 29 Syllabus (a) Title 28 U. S. C. §§ 1291, 2253, and 1254 confer jurisdiction to review decisions made by a district court in a judicial capacity. “Ad- ministrative” decisions—about, e. g., facilities, personnel, equipment, supplies, and rules of procedure—are “not subject to [this Court's] re- view,” Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236, 245, but the District Court's ruling here does not remotely resemble such decisions. Petitioner's re- quest was made by motion in his federal habeas proceeding, which is indisputably a judicial proceeding. And resolution of the funding ques- tion requires the application of a legal standard—whether the funding is “reasonably necessary” for effective representation—that demands an evaluation of petitioner's prospects of obtaining habeas relief.

Pp. 38–40. (b) Respondent's arguments in support of her claim that § 3599's funding requests are nonadversarial and administrative are unpersua- sive. First, that the requests can be decided ex parte does not make the proceeding nonadversarial. The habeas proceeding here was clearly adversarial. And petitioner and respondent plainly have ad- verse interests on the funding question and have therefore squared off as adversaries. The mere fact that a § 3599 funding request may some- times be made ex parte is thus hardly dispositive. Second, nothing in § 3599 even hints that the funding decisions may be revised by the Di- rector of the Administrative Offce of the Courts. Lower court cases that appear to have accepted Administrative Offce review of certain Criminal Justice Act (CJA) payments, even if a proper interpretation of the CJA, are inapposite. Finally, the fact that § 3599(g)(2) requires funding in excess of the generally applicable statutory cap to be ap- proved by the circuit's chief judge or another designated circuit judge, instead of by a panel of three, does not make the proceeding administra- tive. If Congress wishes to make certain rulings reviewable by a single circuit judge, the Constitution does not stand in the way. Pp. 40–43.

2. The Fifth Circuit did not apply the correct legal standard in af-

frming the denial of petitioner's funding request. Section 3599 author- izes funding for the “reasonably necessary” services of experts, inves- tigators, and the like. But the Fifth Circuit's requirement that applicants show a “substantial need” for the services is arguably a more demanding standard. Section 3599 appears to use the term “necessary” to mean something less than essential. Because it makes little sense to refer to something as being “reasonably essential,” the Court concludes that the statutory phrase calls for the district court to determine, in its discretion, whether a reasonable attorney would regard the services as suffciently important, guided by considerations detailed in the opinion.

The term “substantial” in the Fifth Circuit's test, however, suggests a heavier burden. And that court exacerbated the difference by also

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