Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk

OCTOBER TERM, 2012

Syllabus GENESIS HEALTHCARE CORP. et al. v. SYMCZYK

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit

No. 11–1059. Argued December 3, 2012—Decided April 16, 2013

Respondent brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) on behalf of herself and “other employees similarly situated.” 29 U. S. C. § 216(b). After she ignored petitioners’ offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, the District Court, ﬁnding that no other individuals had joined her suit and that the Rule 68 offer fully satisﬁed her claim, concluded that respondent’s suit was moot and dismissed it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Third Circuit reversed. It held that respondent’s individual claim was moot but that her collective action was not, explaining that allowing defend ants to “pick off ” named plaintiffs before certiﬁcation with calculated Rule 68 offers would frustrate the goals of collective actions. The case was remanded to the District Court to allow respondent to seek “condi tional certiﬁcation,” which, if successful, would relate back to the date of her complaint.

Held: Because respondent had no personal interest in representing puta tive, unnamed claimants, nor any other continuing interest that would preserve her suit from mootness, her suit was appropriately dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Pp. 71–79.

(a) While the Courts of Appeals disagree whether an unaccepted Rule 68 offer that fully satisﬁes a plaintiff ’s individual claim is sufﬁcient to render that claim moot, respondent conceded the issue below and did not properly raise it here. Thus, this Court assumes, without deciding, that petitioners’ offer mooted her individual claim. Pp. 71–73.

(b) Well-settled mootness principles control the outcome of this case.

After respondent’s individual claim became moot, the suit became moot because she had no personal interest in representing others in the ac tion. To avoid that outcome, respondent relies on cases that arose in the context of Rule 23 class actions, but they are inapposite, both be cause Rule 23 actions are fundamentally different from FLSA collec tive actions and because the cases are inapplicable to the facts here.

Pp. 73–78.

(1) Neither Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, nor United States Parole

Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U. S. 388, support respondent’s position.

Geraghty extended the principles of Sosna—which held that a class ac tion is not rendered moot when the named plaintiff ’s individual claim

Cite as: 569 U. S. 66 (2013)

Syllabus

becomes moot after the class has been duly certiﬁed—to denials of class certiﬁcation motions; and it provided that, where an action would have acquired independent legal status but for the district court’s erroneous denial of class certiﬁcation, a corrected ruling on appeal “relates back” to the time of the erroneous denial. 445 U. S., at 404, and n. 11. How ever, Geraghty’s holding was explicitly limited to cases in which the named plaintiff ’s claim remains live at the time the district court denies class certiﬁcation. See id., at 407, n. 11. Here, respondent had not yet moved for “conditional certiﬁcation” when her claim became moot, nor had the District Court anticipatorily ruled on any such request. She thus has no certiﬁcation decision to which her claim could have related back. More fundamentally, essential to Sosna and Geraghty was the fact that a putative class acquires an independent legal status once it is certiﬁed under Rule 23. By contrast, under the FLSA, “conditional certiﬁcation” does not produce a class with an independent legal status, or join additional parties to the action. Pp. 74–75.

(2) A line of cases holding that an “inherently transitory” class-

action claim is not necessarily moot upon the termination of the named plaintiff ’s claim, see, e. g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S.

44, 52, is similarly inapplicable. Respondent argues that a defendant’s use of Rule 68 offers to “pick off ” a named plaintiff before the collective- action process is complete renders the action “inherently transitory.” But this rationale was developed to address circumstances in which the challenged conduct was effectively unreviewable because no plaintiff possessed a personal stake in the suit long enough for litigation to run its course, and it has invariably focused on the ﬂeeting nature of the challenged conduct giving rise to the claim, not on the defendant’s litiga tion strategy. Unlike a claim for injunctive relief, a damages claim can not evade review, nor can an offer of full settlement insulate such a claim from review. Putative plaintiffs may be foreclosed from vindicat ing their rights in respondent’s suit, but they remain free to do so in their own suits. Pp. 75–77.

(3) Finally, Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326,

does not support respondent’s claim that the purposes served by the FLSA’s collective-action provisions would be frustrated by defendants’ use of Rule 68 to “pick off ” named plaintiffs before the collective-action process has run its course. In Roper, where the named plaintiffs’ indi vidual claims became moot after the District Court denied their Rule 23 class certiﬁcation motion and entered judgment in their favor based on defendant’s offer of judgment, this Court found that the named plain tiffs could appeal the denial of certiﬁcation because they possessed an ongoing, personal economic stake in the substantive controversy, namely, to shift a portion of attorney’s fees and expenses to successful

Syllabus

class litigants. Here, respondent conceded that petitioners’ offer pro vided complete relief, and she asserted no continuing economic interest in shifting attorney’s fees and costs. Moreover, Roper was tethered to the unique signiﬁcance of Rule 23 class certiﬁcation decisions. Pp. 77–78.

656 F. 3d 189, reversed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito, JJ., joined. Kagan, J., ﬁled a dissent ing opinion, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined, post, p. 79.

Ronald J. Mann argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were James N. Boudreau, Michele H. Mal loy, and Stephen A. Miller.

Neal Kumar Katyal argued the cause for respondent.

With him on the brief were Gary F. Lynch, Gerald D. Wells III, Adina H. Rosenbaum, and Stephen I. Vladeck.

Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging afﬁrmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Verrilli, Acting Assistant Attorney General Delery, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Thomas

M. Bondy, Michael E. Robinson, and M. Patricia Smith.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for ACA Interna tional by Michael D. Slodov, David Israel, and Bryan C. Shartle; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Mark D.

Harris, James F. Segroves, Robin S. Conrad, Shane B. Kawka, Karen R.

Harned, and Elizabeth Milito; for DRI–The Voice of the Defense Bar by Henry M. Sneath, Jeffrey A. Lamken, and Martin V. Totaro; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Rae T. Vann and Danny E.

Petrella.

Briefs of amici curiae urging afﬁrmance were ﬁled for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Lynn K.

Rhinehart, Harold C. Becker, James B. Coppess, and Matthew J. Ginsburg; for the Impact Fund et al. by Jocelyn Larkin, Victoria W. Ni, and Arthur

H. Bryant; for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by

Rebecca M. Hamburg, Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Daniel B. Kohrman, Laurie A. McCann, Thomas Osborne, and Melvin Radowitz; for the Serv ice Employees International Union et al. by Judith A. Scott, Nicole G.

Berner, Marcia D. Greenberger, Fatima Gross Graves, Patrick J. Szy manski, Judith L. Licthman, Sarah C. Crawford, and Sally J. Greenberg; and for Stephen B. Burbank et al. by Jonathan S. Massey.

Cite as: 569 U. S. 66 (2013)

Opinion of the Court Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq., provides that an employee may bring an action to recover damages for speciﬁed violations of the FLSA on behalf of himself and other “similarly situated” employees.

We granted certiorari to resolve whether such a case is justiciable when the lone plaintiff ’s individual claim be comes moot. 567 U. S. 933 (2012). We hold that it is not justiciable.

I

The FLSA establishes federal minimum-wage, maximum- hour, and overtime guarantees that cannot be modiﬁed by contract. Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 216(b), gives employees the right to bring a private cause of action on their own behalf and on behalf of “other employees similarly situated” for speciﬁed violations of the FLSA. A suit brought on behalf of other employees is known as a “collective action.” See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U. S. 165, 169–170 (1989).

In 2009, respondent, who was formerly employed by peti tioners as a registered nurse at Pennypack Center in Phila delphia, Pennsylvania, ﬁled a complaint on behalf of herself and “all other persons similarly situated.” App. 115–116.

Respondent alleged that petitioners violated the FLSA by automatically deducting 30 minutes of time worked per shift for meal breaks for certain employees, even when the em ployees performed compensable work during those breaks.

Respondent, who remained the sole plaintiff throughout these proceedings, sought statutory damages for the al leged violations.

When petitioners answered the complaint, they simultane ously served upon respondent an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. The offer included $7,500 for alleged unpaid wages, in addition to “such reason able attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses . . . as the Court may determine.” App. 77. Petitioners stipulated that if

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respondent did not accept the offer within 10 days after serv ice, the offer would be deemed withdrawn.

After respondent failed to respond in the allotted time pe riod, petitioners ﬁled a motion to dismiss for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction. Petitioners argued that because they offered respondent complete relief on her individual dam ages claim, she no longer possessed a personal stake in the outcome of the suit, rendering the action moot. Respond ent objected, arguing that petitioners were inappropriately attempting to “pick off ” the named plaintiff before the collective-action process could unfold. Id., at 91.

The District Court found that it was undisputed that no other individuals had joined respondent’s suit and that the Rule 68 offer of judgment fully satisﬁed her individual claim.

It concluded that petitioners’ Rule 68 offer of judgment mooted respondent’s suit, which it dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals reversed. 656 F. 3d 189 (CA3 2011). The court agreed that no other potential plaintiff had opted into the suit, that petitioners’ offer fully satisﬁed re spondent’s individual claim, and that, under its precedents, whether or not such an offer is accepted, it generally moots a plaintiff ’s claim. Id., at 195. But the court nevertheless held that respondent’s collective action was not moot. It ex plained that calculated attempts by some defendants to “pick off ” named plaintiffs with strategic Rule 68 offers before cer tiﬁcation could short circuit the process, and, thereby, frus trate the goals of collective actions. Id., at 196–198. The court determined that the case must be remanded in order to allow respondent to seek “conditional certiﬁcation” 1 in the

1 Lower courts have borrowed class-action terminology to describe the process of joining coplaintiffs under 29 U. S. C. § 216(b). While we do not express an opinion on the propriety of this use of class-action nomencla ture, we do note that there are signiﬁcant differences between certiﬁcation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the joinder process under § 216(b).

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Opinion of the Court

District Court. If respondent were successful, the District Court was to relate the certiﬁcation motion back to the date on which respondent ﬁled her complaint. 2 Ibid.

II

Article III, § 2, of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies,” which re stricts the authority of federal courts to resolving “ ‘the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies,’ ” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 471 (1982) (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commis sioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885)). In order to invoke federal-court jurisdiction, a plaintiff must demon strate that he possesses a legally cognizable interest, or “ ‘personal stake,’ ” in the outcome of the action. See Cam reta v. Greene, 563 U. S. 692, 701 (2011) (quoting Summers

v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488, 493 (2009)). This

requirement ensures that the Federal Judiciary conﬁnes it self to its constitutionally limited role of adjudicating actual and concrete disputes, the resolutions of which have direct consequences on the parties involved.

A corollary to this case-or-controversy requirement is that “ ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of re view, not merely at the time the complaint is ﬁled.’ ” Arizo

2 The “relation back” doctrine was developed in the context of class actions under Rule 23 to address the circumstance in which a named plain tiff ’s claim becomes moot prior to certiﬁcation of the class. This case raises two circumstances in which the Court has applied this doctrine.

First, where a named plaintiff ’s claim is “inherently transitory,” and be comes moot prior to certiﬁcation, a motion for certiﬁcation may “relate back” to the ﬁling of the complaint. See, e. g., County of Riverside v.

McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 51–52 (1991). Second, we have held that where a certiﬁcation motion is denied and a named plaintiff ’s claim subsequently becomes moot, an appellate reversal of the certiﬁcation decision may relate back to the time of the denial. See United States Parole Comm’n v.

Geraghty, 445 U. S. 388, 404 (1980).

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nans for Ofﬁcial English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 67 (1997) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975)). If an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a “personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,” at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be dis missed as moot. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 477–478 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the proceedings below, both courts concluded that peti tioners’ Rule 68 offer afforded respondent complete relief on—and thus mooted—her FLSA claim. See 656 F. 3d, at 201; No. 09–5782, 2010 WL 2038676, *4 (ED Pa., May 19, 2010). Respondent now contends that these rulings were erroneous, because petitioners’ Rule 68 offer lapsed without entry of judgment. Brief for Respondent 12–16. The United States, as amicus curiae, similarly urges the Court to hold that petitioners’ unaccepted offer did not moot her FLSA claim and to afﬁrm the Court of Appeals on this basis.

Brief for United States 10–15.

While the Courts of Appeals disagree whether an unac cepted offer that fully satisﬁes a plaintiff ’s claim is sufﬁcient to render the claim moot,3 we do not reach this question, or resolve the split, because the issue is not properly before us.

The Third Circuit clearly held in this case that respondent’s individual claim was moot. 656 F. 3d, at 201. Acceptance of respondent’s argument to the contrary now would alter the Court of Appeals’ judgment, which is impermissible in the absence of a cross-petition from respondent. See North west Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U. S. 355, 364 (1994); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 119, n. 14 (1985). Moreover, even if the cross-petition rule did not apply, respondent’s waiver of the issue would still prevent us from reaching it. In the District Court, respond ent conceded that “[a]n offer of complete relief will generally moot the [plaintiff ’s] claim, as at that point the plaintiff re

3 Compare, e. g., Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F. 3d 337, 340 (CA3 2004), with McCauley v. Trans Union, LLC, 402 F. 3d 340, 342 (CA2 2005).

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tains no personal interest in the outcome of the litigation.” App. 93; 2010 WL 2038676, *4. Respondent made a simi lar concession in her brief to the Court of Appeals, see App.

193, and failed to raise the argument in her brief in opposi tion to the petition for certiorari. We, therefore, assume, without deciding, that petitioners’ Rule 68 offer mooted re spondent’s individual claim. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U. S. 27, 34 (2004).

III

We turn, then, to the question whether respondent’s ac tion remained justiciable based on the collective-action alle gations in her complaint. A straightforward application of well-settled mootness principles compels our answer. In the absence of any claimant’s opting in, respondent’s suit became moot when her individual claim became moot, because she lacked any personal interest in representing others in this action. While the FLSA authorizes an aggrieved employee to bring an action on behalf of himself and “other employees similarly situated,” 29 U. S. C. § 216(b), the mere presence of collective-action allegations in the complaint cannot save the suit from mootness once the individual claim is satisﬁed.4 In

4 While we do not resolve the question whether a Rule 68 offer that fully satisﬁes the plaintiff ’s claims is sufﬁcient by itself to moot the action, supra, at 72, we note that Courts of Appeals on both sides of that issue have recognized that a plaintiff ’s claim may be satisﬁed even without the plaintiff ’s consent. Some courts maintain that an unaccepted offer of complete relief alone is sufﬁcient to moot the individual’s claim. E. g., Weiss, supra, at 340; Greisz v. Household Bank (Ill.), N. A., 176 F. 3d 1012, 1015 (CA7 1999). Other courts have held that, in the face of an unaccepted offer of complete relief, district courts may “enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in accordance with the defendants’ Rule 68 offer of judgment.” O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc., 575 F. 3d 567, 575 (CA6 2009); see also McCauley v. Trans Union, LLC, 402 F. 3d 340, 342 (CA2 2005). Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, see post, at 86 (opinion of Kagan, J.), nothing in the nature of FLSA actions precludes satisfac tion—and thus the mooting—of the individual’s claim before the collective- action component of the suit has run its course.

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order to avoid this outcome, respondent relies almost en tirely upon cases that arose in the context of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class actions, particularly United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U. S. 388 (1980); Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326 (1980); and Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975). But these cases are inapposite, both because Rule 23 actions are fundamentally different from collective actions under the FLSA, see Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 493 U. S., at 177–178 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and because these cases are, by their own terms, inapplicable to these facts. It follows that this action was appropriately dismissed as moot.

A

Respondent contends that she has a sufﬁcient personal stake in this case based on a statutorily created collective- action interest in representing other similarly situated em ployees under § 216(b). Brief for Respondent 47–48. In support of her argument, respondent cites our decision in Geraghty, which in turn has its roots in Sosna. Neither case supports her position.

In Sosna, the Court held that a class action is not rendered moot when the named plaintiff ’s individual claim becomes moot after the class has been duly certiﬁed. 419 U. S., at

399. The Court reasoned that when a district court certiﬁes

a class, “the class of unnamed persons described in the certi ﬁcation acquire[s] a legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the named plaintiff],” with the result that a live controversy may continue to exist, even after the claim of the named plaintiff becomes moot. Id., at 399–402. Geraghty narrowly extended this principle to denials of class certiﬁ cation motions. The Court held that where an action would have acquired the independent legal status described in Sosna but for the district court’s erroneous denial of class certiﬁcation, a corrected ruling on appeal “relates back” to

Cite as: 569 U. S. 66 (2013)

Opinion of the Court the time of the erroneous denial of the certiﬁcation motion.

445 U. S., at 404, and n. 11.

Geraghty is inapposite, because the Court explicitly lim ited its holding to cases in which the named plaintiff ’s claim remains live at the time the district court denies class cer tiﬁcation. See id., at 407, n. 11. Here, respondent had not yet moved for “conditional certiﬁcation” when her claim be came moot, nor had the District Court anticipatorily ruled on any such request. Her claim instead became moot prior to these events, foreclosing any recourse to Geraghty.

There is simply no certiﬁcation decision to which respond ent’s claim could have related back.

More fundamentally, essential to our decisions in Sosna and Geraghty was the fact that a putative class acquires an independent legal status once it is certiﬁed under Rule 23.

Under the FLSA, by contrast, “conditional certiﬁcation” does not produce a class with an independent legal status, or join additional parties to the action. The sole consequence of conditional certiﬁcation is the sending of court-approved written notice to employees, see Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., supra, at 171–172, who in turn become parties to a collective action only by ﬁling written consent with the court, § 216(b).

So even if respondent were to secure a conditional certiﬁca tion ruling on remand, nothing in that ruling would preserve her suit from mootness.

B

Respondent also advances an argument based on a sepa rate, but related, line of cases in which the Court held that an “inherently transitory” class-action claim is not necessar ily moot upon the termination of the named plaintiff ’s claim.

Like our decision in Geraghty, this line of cases began with Sosna and is similarly inapplicable here.

After concluding that the expiration of a named plaintiff ’s claim following certiﬁcation does not moot the class action, Sosna suggested that, where a named plaintiff ’s individual

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claim becomes moot before the district court has an opportu nity to rule on the certiﬁcation motion, and the issue would otherwise evade review, the certiﬁcation might “relate back” to the ﬁling of the complaint. 419 U. S., at 402, n. 11. The Court has since held that the relation-back doctrine may apply in Rule 23 cases where it is “certain that other persons similarly situated” will continue to be subject to the chal lenged conduct and the claims raised are “ ‘so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certiﬁcation before the proposed representative’s individual interest expires.’ ” County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 52 (1991) (quoting Geraghty, supra, at 399, in turn citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420

U. S. 103, 110, n. 11 (1975)). Invoking this doctrine, re

spondent argues that defendants can strategically use Rule 68 offers to “pick off ” named plaintiffs before the collective- action process is complete, rendering collective actions “inherently transitory” in effect. Brief for Respondent 37.

Our cases invoking the “inherently transitory” relation- back rationale do not apply. The “inherently transitory” ra tionale was developed to address circumstances in which the challenged conduct was effectively unreviewable, because no plaintiff possessed a personal stake in the suit long enough for litigation to run its course. A plaintiff might seek, for instance, to bring a class action challenging the constitution ality of temporary pretrial detentions. In doing so, the named plaintiff would face the considerable challenge of pre serving his individual claim from mootness, since pretrial custody likely would end prior to the resolution of his claim.

See Gerstein, supra. To address this problem, the Court explained that in cases where the transitory nature of the conduct giving rise to the suit would effectively insulate de fendants’ conduct from review, certiﬁcation could potentially “relate back” to the ﬁling of the complaint. Id., at 110, n. 11; McLaughlin, supra, at 52. But this doctrine has invariably focused on the ﬂeeting nature of the challenged conduct giv

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Opinion of the Court

ing rise to the claim, not on the defendant’s litigation strat egy. See, e. g., Swisher v. Brady, 438 U. S. 204, 214, n. 11 (1978); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 17–18 (1998).

In this case, respondent’s complaint requested statutory damages. Unlike claims for injunctive relief challenging on going conduct, a claim for damages cannot evade review; it remains live until it is settled, judicially resolved, or barred by a statute of limitations. Nor can a defendant’s attempt to obtain settlement insulate such a claim from review, for a full settlement offer addresses plaintiff ’s alleged harm by making the plaintiff whole. While settlement may have the collateral effect of foreclosing unjoined claimants from hav ing their rights vindicated in respondent’s suit, such putative plaintiffs remain free to vindicate their rights in their own suits. They are no less able to have their claims settled or adjudicated following respondent’s suit than if her suit had never been ﬁled at all.

C

Finally, respondent argues that the purposes served by the FLSA’s collective-action provisions—for example, efﬁ cient resolution of common claims and lower individual costs associated with litigation—would be frustrated by defend ants’ use of Rule 68 to “pick off ” named plaintiffs before the collective-action process has run its course. Both respond ent and the Court of Appeals purported to ﬁnd support for this position in our decision in Roper, 445 U. S., at 339.

In Roper, the named plaintiffs’ individual claims became moot after the District Court denied their motion for class certiﬁcation under Rule 23 and subsequently entered judg ment in their favor, based on the defendant bank’s offer of judgment for the maximum recoverable amount of damages, in addition to interest and court costs. Id., at 329–330.

The Court held that even though the District Court had en tered judgment in the named plaintiffs’ favor, they could nevertheless appeal the denial of their motion to certify the class. The Court found that, under the particular cir

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cumstances of that case, the named plaintiffs possessed an ongoing, personal economic stake in the substantive controversy—namely, to shift a portion of attorney’s fees and expenses to successful class litigants.5 Id., at 332–334, and

n. 6. Only then, in dicta, did the Court underscore the im

portance of a district court’s class certiﬁcation decision and observe that allowing defendants to “ ‘pic[k] off ’ ” party plaintiffs before an afﬁrmative ruling was achieved “would frustrate the objectives of class actions.” Id., at 339.

Roper’s holding turned on a speciﬁc factual ﬁnding that the plaintiffs possessed a continuing personal economic stake in the litigation, even after the defendants’ offer of judgment.

Id., at 336. As already explained, here, respondent con ceded that petitioners’ offer “provided complete relief on her individual claims,” Brief in Opposition i, and she failed to assert any continuing economic interest in shifting attor ney’s fees and costs to others. Moreover, Roper’s dictum was tethered to the unique signiﬁcance of certiﬁcation deci sions in class-action proceedings. 445 U. S., at 339. What ever signiﬁcance “conditional certiﬁcation” may have in § 216(b) proceedings, it is not tantamount to class certiﬁca tion under Rule 23.

* * *

The Court of Appeals concluded that respondent’s individ ual claim became moot following petitioners’ Rule 68 offer of judgment. We have assumed, without deciding, that this is correct.

Reaching the question on which we granted certiorari, we conclude that respondent has no personal interest in repre senting putative, unnamed claimants, nor any other continu ing interest that would preserve her suit from mootness.

5 Because Roper is distinguishable on the facts, we need not consider its continuing validity in light of our subsequent decision in Lewis v. Conti nental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472 (1990). See id., at 480 (“[An] interest in attorney’s fees is, of course, insufﬁcient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim”).

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Kagan, J., dissenting

Respondent’s suit was, therefore, appropriately dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir cuit is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor join, dissenting.

The Court today resolves an imaginary question, based on a mistake the courts below made about this case and others like it. The issue here, the majority tells us, is whether a “ ‘collective action’ ” brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq., “is justiciable when the lone plaintiff ’s individual claim becomes moot.” Ante, at 69. Embedded within that question is a crucial premise: that the individual claim has become moot, as the lower courts held and the majority assumes without decid ing. But what if that premise is bogus? What if the plain tiff ’s individual claim here never became moot? And what if, in addition, no similar claim for damages will ever become moot? In that event, the majority’s decision—founded as it is on an unfounded assumption—would have no real-world meaning or application. The decision would turn out to be the most one-off of one-offs, explaining only what (the major ity thinks) should happen to a proposed collective FLSA ac tion when something that in fact never happens to an indi vidual FLSA claim is errantly thought to have done so.

That is the case here, for reasons I’ll describe. Feel free to relegate the majority’s decision to the furthest reaches of your mind: The situation it addresses should never again arise.

Consider the facts of this case, keeping an eye out for any thing that would render any part of it moot. Respondent Laura Symczyk brought suit under a provision of the FLSA,

29 U. S. C. § 216(b), “on behalf of herself and others similarly

situated.” App. 21. Her complaint alleged that her former

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employer, petitioner Genesis HealthCare Corporation (Gene sis), violated the FLSA by treating 30 minutes of every shift as an unpaid meal break, even when an employee worked during that time. Genesis answered the complaint and simultaneously made an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. That settlement proposal cov ered only Symczyk’s individual claim, to the tune of $7,500 in lost wages. The offer, according to its terms, would “be deemed withdrawn” if Symczyk did not accept it within 10 days. App. 79. That deadline came and went without any reply. The case then proceeded in the normal fashion, with the District Court setting a schedule for discovery. Pause here for a moment to ask whether you’ve seen anything yet that would moot Symczyk’s individual claim. No? Neither have I.

Nevertheless, Genesis moved to dismiss Symczyk’s suit on the ground that it was moot. The supposed logic went like this: We (i. e., Genesis) offered Symczyk complete relief on her individual damages claim; she “effectively reject[ed] the [o]ffer” by failing to respond; because she did so, she “no longer has a personal stake or legally cognizable interest in the outcome of this action”; accordingly, the court “should dismiss her claims.” Id., at 67. Relying on Circuit prece dent, the District Court agreed; it dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction—without awarding Symczyk any damages or other relief—based solely on the unaccepted offer Genesis had made. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 35 (citing Weiss v.

Regal Collections, 385 F. 3d 337, 340 (CA3 2004)). And ﬁ nally, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concurred that Genesis’s offer mooted Symczyk’s individual claim (though also holding that she could still proceed with a collec tive action). See 656 F. 3d 189 (2011).

That thrice-asserted view is wrong, wrong, and wrong again. We made clear earlier this Term that “[a]s long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” Chaﬁn v.

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Chaﬁn, 568 U. S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the pre vailing party.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

By those measures, an unaccepted offer of judgment cannot moot a case. When a plaintiff rejects such an offer—how ever good the terms—her interest in the lawsuit remains just what it was before. And so too does the court’s ability to grant her relief. An unaccepted settlement offer—like any unaccepted contract offer—is a legal nullity, with no operative effect. As every ﬁrst-year law student learns, the recipient’s rejection of an offer “leaves the matter as if no offer had ever been made.” Minneapolis & St.

Louis R. Co. v. Columbus Rolling Mill, 119 U. S. 149, 151 (1886). Nothing in Rule 68 alters that basic principle; to the contrary, that rule speciﬁes that “[a]n unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 68(b). So assuming the case was live before—because the plaintiff had a stake and the court could grant relief—the litigation car ries on, unmooted.

For this reason, Symczyk’s individual claim was alive and

well when the District Court dismissed her suit. Recall:

Genesis made a settlement offer under Rule 68; Symczyk de cided not to accept it; after 10 days, it expired and the suit went forward. Symczyk’s individual stake in the lawsuit thus remained what it had always been, and ditto the court’s capacity to grant her relief. After the offer lapsed, just as before, Symczyk possessed an unsatisﬁed claim, which the court could redress by awarding her damages. As long as that remained true, Symczyk’s claim was not moot, and the District Court could not send her away empty-handed.

So a friendly suggestion to the Third Circuit: Rethink your mootness-by-unaccepted-offer theory. And a note to all other courts of appeals: Don’t try this at home.

To this point, what I have said conﬂicts with nothing in the Court’s opinion. The majority does not attempt to argue, à

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la the Third Circuit, that the unaccepted settlement offer mooted Symczyk’s individual damages claim. Instead, the majority hangs its hat on a ﬁnding of waiver. See ante, at 72, 78. The majority notes—correctly—that Symczyk ac cepted the Third Circuit’s rule in her briefs below, and also failed to challenge it in her brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari; she contested it ﬁrst in her merits brief before this Court. That enables the majority to “assume, without deciding,” the mootness of Symczyk’s individual claim and reach the oh-so-much-more-interesting question relating to her proposed collective action. Ante, at 73.1

But as this Court noted in a similar case, “assum[ing] what the facts will show to be ridiculous” about a predicate question—just because a party did not think to challenge settled Circuit precedent—runs “a risk that ought to be avoided.” Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corpo ration, 513 U. S. 374, 382 (1995). The question Symczyk now raises (“Did an unaccepted settlement offer moot my individual FLSA claim?”) is logically prior to—and thus inextricably intertwined with—the question the majority

1 The majority also justiﬁes this approach on the ground that Symczyk did not ﬁle a cross-petition for certiorari objecting to the Third Circuit’s decision. But that is because Symczyk got the judgment she wanted in the Third Circuit. As the majority agrees, a cross-petition is necessary only when a respondent seeks to “alter” the judgment below. Ante, at 72; see E. Gressman, K. Geller, S. Shapiro, T. Bishop, & E. Hartnett, Supreme Court Practice 490 (9th ed. 2007) (“[A] party satisﬁed with the action of a lower court should not have to appeal from it in order to defend a judg ment in his or her favor on any ground”). Here, the Third Circuit re versed the District Court’s dismissal of Symczyk’s FLSA suit, ruling that her collective action could go forward even though her individual claim was moot; accordingly, accepting Symczyk’s new argument would lead not to modifying the appellate judgment, but to afﬁrming it on a different ground. In any event, we have never held that the cross-petition require ment is jurisdictional. See id., at 493–494. We can choose to excuse the absence of a cross-petition for the same reasons, discussed next, that we can consider an issue not raised below. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 258–259, n. 5 (1980).

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rushes to resolve (“If an unaccepted settlement offer mooted Symczyk’s individual FLSA claim, could a court proceed to consider her proposed collective action?”). Indeed, the for mer is so much part and parcel of the latter that the question Genesis presented for our review—and on which we granted certiorari—actually looks more like Symczyk’s than like the majority’s. Genesis asked: “Whether a case becomes moot . . . when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defend ants to satisfy all of the plaintiff ’s claims.” Pet. for Cert. i.

Symczyk, of course, would respond “no,” because merely re ceiving an offer does not moot any claim. The majority’s refusal to consider that obviously correct answer impedes “intelligent resolution of the question presented.” Ohio v.

Robinette, 519 U. S. 33, 38 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). By taking a fallacy as its premise, the majority ensures it will reach the wrong decision.

Still, you might think, the majority’s approach has at least this beneﬁt: In a future FLSA case, when an individual claim for damages in fact becomes moot, a court will know what to do with the collective allegations. But no, even that much cannot be said for the majority’s opinion. That is because the individual claims in such cases will never become moot, and a court will therefore never need to reach the issue the majority resolves. The majority’s decision is ﬁt for nothing: Aside from getting this case wrong, it serves only to address a make-believe problem.

To see why, consider how a collective FLSA action seeking damages unfolds. A plaintiff ( just like Symczyk, but let us now call her Smith, to highlight her typicality) sues under § 216(b) on behalf of both herself and others. To determine whether Smith can serve as a representative party, the court considers whether the workplace policy her suit challenges has similarly affected other employees. If it has, the court supervises their discovery and notiﬁcation, and then “over see[s] the joinder” of any who want Smith to represent them.

Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U. S. 165, 171

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(1989). During that period, as the majority observes, the class has no “independent legal status.” Ante, at 74. At the same time, Smith’s own claim is in perfect health. Be cause it is a damages claim for past conduct, the employer cannot extinguish it by adopting new employment practices.

Indeed, the claim would survive even Smith’s own demise, belonging then to her estate. Smith’s individual claim, in short, is not going away on its own; it can easily wait out the time involved in assembling a collective action. Accord, ante, at 77 (“[A] claim for damages cannot evade review; it remains live until it is settled [or] judicially resolved”).

Now introduce a settlement offer into the picture: Assume that before the court ﬁnally decides whether to permit a col lective action, the defendant proposes to pay Smith the value of her individual claim in exchange for her abandonment of the entire litigation. If Smith agrees, of course, all is over; like any plaintiff, she can assent to a settlement ending her suit. But assuming Smith does not agree, because she wishes to proceed on behalf of other employees, could the offer ever succeed in mooting her case? I have already shown that it cannot do so in the circumstances here, where the defendant makes an offer, the plaintiff declines it, and nothing else occurs: On those facts, Smith’s claim is as it ever was, and the lawsuit continues onward. But suppose the de fendant additionally requests that the court enter judgment in Smith’s favor—though over her objection—for the amount offered to satisfy her individual claim. Could a court ap prove that motion and then declare the case over on the ground that Smith has no further stake in it? That course would be less preposterous than what the court did here; at least Smith, unlike Symczyk, would get some money. But it would be impermissible as well.

For starters, Rule 68 precludes a court from imposing judgment for a plaintiff like Smith based on an unaccepted settlement offer made pursuant to its terms. The text of the Rule contemplates that a court will enter judgment only

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when a plaintiff accepts an offer. See Rule 68(a) (“If . . . the [plaintiff] serves written notice accepting the offer, either party may then ﬁle the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter judgment”).

And the Rule prohibits a court from considering an unac cepted offer for any purpose other than allocating litigation costs—including for the purpose of entering judgment for either party. See Rule 68(b) (“Evidence of an unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs”). That injunction accords with Rule 68’s exclusive purpose: to promote voluntary cessation of litigation by im posing costs on plaintiffs who spurn certain settlement of fers. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U. S. 1, 5 (1985). The Rule provides no appropriate mechanism for a court to terminate a lawsuit without the plaintiff ’s consent.

Nor does a court have inherent authority to enter an un wanted judgment for Smith on her individual claim, in serv ice of wiping out her proposed collective action. To be sure, a court has discretion to halt a lawsuit by entering judgment for the plaintiff when the defendant unconditionally surren ders and only the plaintiff ’s obstinacy or madness prevents her from accepting total victory. But the court may not take that tack when the supposed capitulation in fact fails to give the plaintiff all the law authorizes and she has sought.

And a judgment satisfying an individual claim does not give a plaintiff like Smith, exercising her right to sue on behalf of other employees, “all that [she] has . . . requested in the com plaint (i. e., relief for the class).” Deposit Guaranty Nat.

Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326, 341 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., con curring). No more in a collective action brought under the FLSA than in any other class action may a court, prior to certiﬁcation, eliminate the entire suit by acceding to a de fendant’s proposal to make only the named plaintiff whole.

That course would short-circuit a collective action before it could begin, and thereby frustrate Congress’s decision to give FLSA plaintiffs “the opportunity to proceed collec

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tively.” Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U. S., at 170; see Roper, 445 U. S., at 339. It is our plaintiff Smith’s choice, and not the defendant’s or the court’s, whether satisfaction of her individual claim, without redress of her viable classwide alle gations, is sufﬁcient to bring the lawsuit to an end.

And so, the question the majority answers should never arise—which means the analysis the majority propounds should never apply.2 The majority assumes that an individ ual claim has become moot, and then asks whether collective allegations can still proceed by virtue of the relation-back doctrine. But that doctrine comes into play only when a court confronts a jurisdictional gap—an individual claim be coming moot before the court can certify a representative action. And in an FLSA case for damages, that gap cannot occur (unless a court, as here, mistakenly creates it): As I have explained, the plaintiff ’s individual claim remains live all the way through the court’s decision whether to join new plaintiffs to the litigation. Without any gap to span, the relation-back doctrine has no relevance. Neither, then, does the majority’s decision.3

2 For similarly questionable deployment of this Court’s adjudicatory au thority, see Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U. S. 27, 42 (2013) ( joint opinion of Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.) (observing in dissent that “[t]he Court’s ruling is good for this day and case only”).

3 And that is a good thing, because ( just as a by-the-by) the majority’s opinion also misconceives our decisions applying the relation-back doc trine. The majority painstakingly distinguishes those decisions on their individual facts, but misses their common take-away. In each, we con fronted a situation where a would-be class representative’s individual claim became moot before a court could make a ﬁnal decision about the propriety of class litigation; and in each, we used relation-back principles to preserve the court’s ability to adjudicate on the merits the classwide questions the representative raised. See, e. g., County of Riverside v.

McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 51–52 (1991); Swisher v. Brady, 438 U. S. 204, 213–214, n. 11 (1978); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110–111, n. 11 (1975); see also United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U. S. 388, 399, 404,

n. 11 (1980); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975). If, counter-

factually, Symczyk’s individual claim became moot when she failed to ac

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The Court could have resolved this case (along with a Cir cuit split, see ante, at 72, and n. 3) by correcting the Third Circuit’s view that an unaccepted settlement offer mooted Symczyk’s individual claim. Instead, the Court chose to ad dress an issue predicated on that misconception, in a way that aids no one, now or ever. I respectfully dissent.

cept Genesis’s offer of judgment, her case would ﬁt comfortably alongside those precedents. Because the District Court would not then have had “enough time to rule on a motion” for certiﬁcation under § 216(b), “the ‘relation back’ doctrine [would be] properly invoked to preserve the merits of the case for judicial resolution.” McLaughlin, 500 U. S., at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted).