District of Columbia v. Wesby

48 OCTOBER TERM, 2017 Syllabus DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al. v. WESBY et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit No. 15–1485. Argued October 4, 2017—Decided January 22, 2018 District of Columbia police offcers responded to a complaint about loud music and illegal activities in a vacant house. Inside, they found the house nearly barren and in disarray. The offcers smelled marijuana and observed beer bottles and cups of liquor on the foor, which was dirty. They found a makeshift strip club in the living room, and a naked woman and several men in an upstairs bedroom. Many party- goers scattered when they saw the uniformed offcers, and some hid. The offcers questioned everyone and got inconsistent stories. Two women identifed “Peaches” as the house's tenant and said that she had given the partygoers permission to have the party. But Peaches was not there. When the offcers spoke by phone to Peaches, she was ner- vous, agitated, and evasive. At frst, she claimed that she was renting the house and had given the partygoers permission to have the party, but she eventually admitted that she did not have permission to use the house. The owner confrmed that he had not given anyone permission to be there. The offcers then arrested the partygoers for unlawful entry. Several partygoers sued for false arrest under the Fourth Amend- ment and District law. The District Court concluded that the offcers lacked probable cause to arrest the partygoers for unlawful entry and that two of the offcers, petitioners here, were not entitled to qualifed immunity. A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit affrmed. Held: 1. The officers had probable cause to arrest the partygoers. Pp. 56–62. (a) Considering the “totality of the circumstances,” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U. S. 366, 371, the offcers made an “entirely reasonable inference” that the partygoers knew they did not have permission to be in the house, id., at 372. Taken together, the condition of the house and the conduct of the partygoers allowed the offcers to make several “ `common-sense conclusions about human behavior.' ” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 231. Because most homeowners do not live in such condi- tions or permit such activities in their homes, the offcers could infer that the partygoers knew the party was not authorized. The offcers also could infer that the partygoers knew that they were not supposed

Cite as: 583 U. S. 48 (2018) 49 Syllabus to be in the house because they scattered and hid when the offcers arrived. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119, 124–125. The party- goers' vague and implausible answers to questioning also gave the off- cers reason to infer that the partygoers were lying and that their lies suggested a guilty mind. Cf. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U. S. 146, 149, 155–156. Peaches' lying and evasive behavior gave the offcers reason to discredit everything she said. The offcers also could have inferred that she lied when she said she had invited the partygoers to the house, or that she told the partygoers that she was not actually renting the house. Pp. 57–60. (b) The panel majority failed to follow two basic and well-established principles of law. First, it viewed each fact “in isolation, rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances.” Pringle, supra, at 372, n. 2. Second, it believed that it could dismiss outright any circum- stances that were “susceptible of innocent explanation,” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 277. Instead, it should have asked whether a reasonable offcer could conclude—considering all of the surrounding circumstances, including the plausibility of the explanation itself—that there was a “substantial chance of criminal activity,” Gates, supra, at 244, n. 13. Pp. 60–62. 2. The offcers are entitled to qualifed immunity. Pp. 62–68. (a) As relevant here, offcers are entitled to qualifed immunity under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 unless the unlawfulness of their conduct was “clearly established at the time,” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U. S. 658, 664. To be clearly established, a legal principle must be “settled law,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U. S. 224, 228, and it must clearly prohibit the offcer's conduct in the particular circumstances before him, see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202. In the warrantless arrest context, “a body of rel- evant case law” is usually necessary to “ `clearly establish' the an- swer” with respect to probable cause. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 199. Even assuming that the offcers lacked actual probable cause to arrest the partygoers, they are entitled to qualifed immunity because, given “the circumstances with which [they] w[ere] confronted,” they “reason- ably but mistakenly conclude[d] that probable cause [wa]s present.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 640, 641. The panel majority and the partygoers have failed to identify a single precedent fnding a Fourth Amendment violation “under similar circumstances.” White v. Pauly, 580 U. S. 73, 79. And this is not an “obvious case” where “a body of relevant case law” is unnecessary. Brosseau, supra, at 199. Pp. 62–65. (b) Instead of following this straightforward analysis, the panel ma- jority reasoned that, under clearly established District law, a suspect's

50 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. WESBY Syllabus bona fde belief of a right to enter vitiates probable cause to arrest for unlawful entry. Thus, it concluded that the “uncontroverted evidence” of an invitation in this case meant that the offcers could not infer the partygoers' intent from other circumstances or disbelieve their story. But looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, a reasonable offcer could have interpreted the law as permitting the ar- rests here. There was no controlling case holding that a bona fde belief of a right to enter defeats probable cause, that offcers cannot infer a suspect's guilty state of mind based on his conduct alone, or that offcers must accept a suspect's innocent explanation at face value. And several precedents suggested the opposite. Pp. 65–68. 765 F. 3d 13, reversed and remanded. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, and Gorsuch, JJ., joined. Soto- mayor, J., fled an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judg- ment, post, p. 68. Ginsburg, J., fled an opinion concurring in the judg- ment in part, post, p. 69. Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General of the District of Columbia, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Loren L. Alikhan, Deputy Solicitor General, and Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Attorney General. Robert A. Parker argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Wall, Acting Assistant Attor- ney General Readler , Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Rachel P . Kovner, Douglas N. Letter, Barbara L. Herwig , H. Thomas Byron III, and Dana Kaersvang. Nathaniel P . Garrett argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Charlotte H. Taylor and Julia Fong Sheketoff.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Utah et al. by Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General of Utah, Tyler R. Green, Solici- tor General, and Kyle J. Kaiser and Meb W. Anderson, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Steven T. Marshall of Alabama, Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Douglas S. Chin of Hawaii, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Curtis T. Hill, Jr., of Indiana, Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Andy Beshear of Kentucky, Jeff

Cite as: 583 U. S. 48 (2018) 51 Opinion of the Court Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves a civil suit against the District of Co- lumbia and fve of its police offcers, brought by 16 individu- als who were arrested for holding a raucous, late-night party in a house they did not have permission to enter. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that there was no probable cause to arrest the partygoers, and that the offcers were not entitled to quali- fed immunity. We reverse on both grounds. I Around 1 a.m. on March 16, 2008, the District's Metropoli- tan Police Department received a complaint about loud music and illegal activities at a house in Northeast D. C. The caller, a former neighborhood commissioner, told police that the house had been vacant for several months. When off- cers arrived at the scene, several neighbors confrmed that the house should have been empty. The offcers approached the house and, consistent with the complaint, heard loud music playing inside. After the offcers knocked on the front door, they saw a man look out the window and then run upstairs. One of the partygoers opened the door, and the offcers entered. They immediately observed that the inside of the house “ `was in disarray' ” and looked like “ `a vacant property.' ” 841 Landry of Louisiana, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Bill Schuette of Michi- gan, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Doug Peterson of Nebraska, Adam Paul Laxalt of Nevada, Gordon J. MacDonald of New Hampshire, Christopher S. Porrino of New Jersey, Michael DeWine of Ohio, Mike Hunter of Okla- homa, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Kilmartin of Rhode Island, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Herbert H. Slatery III of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia, and Brad D. Schimel of Wisconsin; and for the National Associa- tion of Counties et al. by John J. Korzen and Lisa Soronen. Andrew J. Pincus, Eugene R. Fidell, Cecillia D. Wang, Ezekiel R. Ed- wards, Arthur B. Spitzer, and Scott Michelman fled a brief for the Ameri- can Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affrmance.

52 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. WESBY Opinion of the Court F. Supp. 2d 20, 31 (DC 2012) (quoting Defs. Exh. A). The offcers smelled marijuana and saw beer bottles and cups of liquor on the foor. In fact, the foor was so dirty that one of the partygoers refused to sit on it while being questioned. Although the house had working electricity and plumbing, it had no furniture downstairs other than a few padded metal chairs. The only other signs of habitation were blinds on the windows, food in the refrigerator, and toiletries in the bathroom. In the living room, the offcers found a makeshift strip club. Several women were wearing only bras and thongs, with cash tucked into their garter belts. The women were giving lap dances while other partygoers watched. Most of the onlookers were holding cash and cups of alcohol. After seeing the uniformed offcers, many partygoers scattered into other parts of the house. The offcers found more debauchery upstairs. A naked woman and several men were in the bedroom. A bare mat- tress—the only one in the house—was on the foor, along with some lit candles and multiple open condom wrappers. A used condom was on the windowsill. The offcers found one partygoer hiding in an upstairs closet, and another who had shut himself in the bathroom and refused to come out. The offcers found a total of 21 people in the house. After interviewing all 21, the offcers did not get a clear or consist- ent story. Many partygoers said they were there for a bach- elor party, but no one could identify the bachelor. Each of the partygoers claimed that someone had invited them to the house, but no one could say who. Two of the women work- ing the party said that a woman named “Peaches” or “Tasty” was renting the house and had given them permission to be there. One of the women explained that the previous owner had recently passed away, and Peaches had just started rent- ing the house from the grandson who inherited it. But the house had no boxes or moving supplies. She did not know Peaches' real name. And Peaches was not there.

Cite as: 583 U. S. 48 (2018) 53 Opinion of the Court An offcer asked the woman to call Peaches on her phone so he could talk to her. Peaches answered and explained that she had just left the party to go to the store. When the offcer asked her to return, Peaches refused because she was afraid of being arrested. The sergeant supervising the investigation also spoke with Peaches. At frst, Peaches claimed to be renting the house from the owner, who was fxing it up for her. She also said that she had given the attendees permission to have the party. When the sergeant again asked her who had given her permission to use the house, Peaches became evasive and hung up. The sergeant called her back, and she began yelling and insisting that she had permission before hanging up a second time. The off- cers eventually got Peaches on the phone again, and she ad- mitted that she did not have permission to use the house. The offcers then contacted the owner. He told them that he had been trying to negotiate a lease with Peaches, but they had not reached an agreement. He confrmed that he had not given Peaches (or anyone else) permission to be in the house—let alone permission to use it for a bachelor party. At that point, the offcers arrested the 21 partygoers for un- lawful entry. See D. C. Code § 22–3302 (2008). The police transported the partygoers to the police station, where the lieutenant decided to charge them with disorderly conduct. See § 22–1321. The partygoers were released, and the charges were eventually dropped. 1 1 In their merits brief, the partygoers attempt to dispute several of these facts. See Brief for Respondents 26–30. But the facts they now contest were presented in the petition for a writ of certiorari, and the partygoers did not contest them in their brief in opposition. Under this Court's Rule 15.2, the partygoers' failure to contest these factual assertions at the cer- tiorari stage waived their right to do so at the merits stage. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U. S. 379, 395–396 (2009). Furthermore, although both parties moved for summary judgment, the undisputed facts here are suffcient to resolve both probable cause and qualifed immunity. Our analysis thus would not change no matter which party is considered the moving party. Cf. Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372,

54 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. WESBY Opinion of the Court II Respondents, 16 of the 21 partygoers, sued the District and fve of the arresting offcers. They sued the offcers for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and under District law. They sued the District for false arrest and negligent supervision under Dis- trict law. The partygoers' claims were all “predicated upon the allegation that [they] were arrested without probable cause.” 841 F. Supp. 2d, at 32. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court awarded partial summary judgment to the partygoers. Id., at 48–49. It concluded that the offcers lacked probable cause to arrest the partygoers for unlawful entry. 2 Id., at 32–33. The offcers were told that Peaches had invited the partygoers to the house, the District Court reasoned, and nothing the offcers learned in their investigation suggested the partygoers “ `knew or should have known that [they were] entering against the [owner's] will.' ” Id., at 32. The District Court also concluded that the offcers were not enti- tled to qualifed immunity under § 1983. 3 It noted that, under District case law, “probable cause to arrest for unlaw- ful entry requires evidence that the alleged intruder knew or should have known, upon entry, that such entry was 378–379 (2007) (explaining that, at summary judgment, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party). 2 Because probable cause is an objective standard, an arrest is lawful if the offcer had probable cause to arrest for any offense, not just the offense cited at the time of arrest or booking. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U. S. 146, 153–155, and n. 2 (2004). Because unlawful entry is the only offense that the District and its offcers discuss in their briefs to this Court, we likewise limit our analysis to that offense. 3 The District Court granted summary judgment against two of the off- cers, but denied summary judgment against the other three because there were triable issues regarding qualifed immunity. See 841 F. Supp. 2d 20, 32–46 (DC 2012). The partygoers voluntarily dismissed their claims against those three offcers. See 765 F. 3d 13, 17 (CADC 2014).

Cite as: 583 U. S. 48 (2018) 55 Opinion of the Court against the will of the owner.” Id., at 37. And in its view, the offcers had no such evidence. Id., at 32–33, 37–38. With liability resolved, the case proceeded to trial on damages. The jury awarded the partygoers a total of $680,000 in compensatory damages. After the District Court awarded attorney's fees, the total award was nearly $1 million. On appeal, a divided panel of the D. C. Circuit affrmed. On the question of probable cause, the panel majority made Peaches' invitation “central” to its determination that the offcers lacked probable cause to arrest the partygoers for unlawful entry. 765 F. 3d 13, 21 (2014). The panel majority asserted that, “in the absence of any conficting information, Peaches' invitation vitiates the necessary element of [the partygoers'] intent to enter against the will of the lawful owner.” Ibid. And the panel majority determined that “there is simply no evidence in the record that [the party- goers] had any reason to think the invitation was invalid.” Ibid. On the question of qualifed immunity, the panel majority determined that it was “perfectly clear” that a person with “a good purpose and bona fde belief of her right to enter” lacks the necessary intent for unlawful entry. Id., at 27. In other words, the offcers needed “some evidence” that the partygoers “knew or should have known that they were en- tering against the will of the lawful owner.” Ibid. And here, the panel majority asserted, the offcers must “have known that uncontroverted evidence of an invitation to enter the premises would vitiate probable cause for unlawful entry.” Ibid. Judge Brown dissented. She concluded that summary judgment on the false-arrest claims was improper because, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable offcer “could disbelieve [the partygoers'] claim of innocent entry” and infer that they knew or should have known that they did not have permission to be in the house. Id., at 34. She also

56 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. WESBY Opinion of the Court disagreed with the denial of qualifed immunity, contending that a reasonable offcer could have found probable cause to arrest in this “unusual factual scenario, not well represented in the controlling case law.” Id., at 36. The D. C. Circuit denied rehearing en banc over the dis- sent of four judges. The dissenters focused on qualifed immunity, contending that the panel opinion “contra - vene[d] . . . emphatic Supreme Court directives” that “police offcers may not be held liable for damages unless the offcers were `plainly incompetent' or `knowingly violate[d]' clearly established law.” 816 F. 3d 96, 102 (2016) (quoting Carroll v. Carman, 574 U. S. 13, 17 (2014) (per curiam )). The panel majority—Judges Pillard and Edwards—responded in a joint concurrence. 816 F. 3d, at 96–101. They insisted that the panel opinion did not misapply the law of qualifed immunity, and that their disagreement with the dissenters was a mere “case-specifc assessment of the circumstantial evidence in the record.” Id., at 100. We granted certiorari to resolve two questions: whether the offcers had probable cause to arrest the partygoers, and whether the offcers were entitled to qualifed immunity. See 580 U. S. 1097 (2017). We address each question in turn. III The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Because ar- rests are “seizures” of “persons,” they must be reasonable under the circumstances. See Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 585 (1980). A warrantless arrest is reasonable if the offcer has probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a crime in the offcer's presence. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 354 (2001). To determine whether an offcer had probable cause for an arrest, “we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide `whether these historical facts, viewed from the

Cite as: 583 U. S. 48 (2018) 57 Opinion of the Court standpoint of an objectively reasonable police offcer, amount to' probable cause.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U. S. 366, 371 (2003) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 696 (1996)). Because probable cause “deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances,” 540 U. S., at 371, it is “a fuid concept” that is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 232 (1983). It “requires only a probabil- ity or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Id., at 243–244, n. 13. Probable cause “is not a high bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U. S. 320, 338 (2014). A There is no dispute that the partygoers entered the house against the will of the owner. Nonetheless, the partygoers contend that the offcers lacked probable cause to arrest them because the offcers had no reason to believe that they “knew or should have known” their “entry was unwanted.” Ortberg v. United States, 81 A. 3d 303, 308 (D. C. 2013). We disagree. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the offcers made an “entirely reasonable inference” that the par- tygoers were knowingly taking advantage of a vacant house as a venue for their late-night party. Pringle, supra, at 372. Consider frst the condition of the house. Multiple neigh- bors, including a former neighborhood offcial, informed the offcers that the house had been vacant for several months. 4 The house had no furniture, except for a few padded metal chairs and a bare mattress. The rest of the house was empty, save for some fxtures and large appliances. The house had a few signs of inhabitance—working electricity and plumbing, blinds on the windows, toiletries in the bath- room, and food in the refrigerator. But those facts are not 4 At oral argument, the partygoers argued that the house was not for- mally “vacant” under District law. Tr. of Oral Arg. 34. But a reasonable offcer could infer that the complaining neighbors used the term “vacant” in the colloquial, not the legal, sense.

58 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. WESBY Opinion of the Court necessarily inconsistent with the house being unoccupied. The owner could have paid the utilities and kept the blinds while he looked for a new tenant, and the partygoers could have brought the food and toiletries. Although one woman told the offcers that Peaches had recently moved in, the of- fcers had reason to doubt that was true. There were no boxes or other moving supplies in the house; nor were there other possessions, such as clothes in the closet, suggesting someone lived there. In addition to the condition of the house, consider the par- tygoers' conduct. The party was still going strong when the offcers arrived after 1 a.m., with music so loud that it could be heard from outside. Upon entering the house, multiple offcers smelled marijuana. 5 The partygoers left beer bot- tles and cups of liquor on the foor, and they left the foor so dirty that one of them refused to sit on it. The living room had been converted into a makeshift strip club. Strippers in bras and thongs, with cash stuffed in their garter belts, were giving lap dances. Upstairs, the offcers found a group of men with a single, naked woman on a bare mattress— the only bed in the house—along with multiple open condom wrappers and a used condom. Taken together, the condition of the house and the conduct of the partygoers allowed the offcers to make several “ `common-sense conclusions about human behavior. ' ” Gates, supra, at 231 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981)). Most homeowners do not live in near- 5 The panel majority dismissed this fact because the offcers “did not see any evidence of drugs” and did “not attempt to justify [the] arrests” based on drug use. 765 F. 3d, at 23, n. 5. But a reasonable offcer could infer, based on the smell, that marijuana had been used in the house. See John- son v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13 (1948) (noting that “the odor” of narcotics can “be evidence of most persuasive character”). And the off- cers could consider the drug use inside the house as evidence that the partygoers knew their presence was unwelcome.

Cite as: 583 U. S. 48 (2018) 59 Opinion of the Court barren houses. And most homeowners do not invite people over to use their living room as a strip club, to have sex in their bedroom, to smoke marijuana inside, and to leave their foors flthy. The offcers could thus infer that the party- goers knew their party was not authorized. The partygoers' reaction to the offcers gave them further reason to believe that the partygoers knew they lacked per- mission to be in the house. Many scattered at the sight of the uniformed offcers. Two hid themselves, one in a closet and the other in a bathroom. “[U]nprovoked fight upon no- ticing the police,” we have explained, “is certainly sugges- tive” of wrongdoing and can be treated as “suspicious behav- ior” that factors into the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119, 124–125 (2000). In fact, “deliberately furtive actions and fight at the approach of . . . law offcers are strong indicia of mens rea. ” Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 66 (1968) (emphasis added). A reasonable offcer could infer that the partygoers' scattering and hiding was an indication that they knew they were not supposed to be there. The partygoers' answers to the offcers' questions also sug- gested their guilty state of mind. When the offcers asked who had given them permission to be there, the partygoers gave vague and implausible responses. They could not say who had invited them. Only two people claimed that Peaches had invited them, and they were working the party instead of attending it. If Peaches was the hostess, it was odd that none of the partygoers mentioned her name. Addi- tionally, some of the partygoers claimed the event was a bachelor party, but no one could identify the bachelor. The offcers could have disbelieved them, since people normally do not throw a bachelor party without a bachelor. Based on the vagueness and implausibility of the partygoers' stories, the offcers could have reasonably inferred that they were lying and that their lies suggested a guilty mind. Cf. De-

60 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. WESBY Opinion of the Court venpeck v. Alford, 543 U. S. 146, 149, 155–156 (2004) (noting that the suspect's “untruthful and evasive” answers to police questioning could support probable cause). The panel majority relied heavily on the fact that Peaches said she had invited the partygoers to the house. But when the offcers spoke with Peaches, she was nervous, agitated, and evasive. Cf. Wardlow, supra, at 124 (explaining that the police can take a suspect's “nervous, evasive behavior” into account). After initially insisting that she had permission to use the house, she ultimately confessed that this was a lie—a fact that the owner confrmed. Peaches' lying and evasive behavior gave the offcers reason to discredit every- thing she had told them. For example, the offcers could have inferred that Peaches lied to them when she said she had invited the others to the house, which was consistent with the fact that hardly anyone at the party knew her name. Or the offcers could have inferred that Peaches told the par- tygoers (like she eventually told the police) that she was not actually renting the house, which was consistent with how the partygoers were treating it. Viewing these circumstances as a whole, a reasonable off- cer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe the partygoers knew they did not have permission to be in the house. B In concluding otherwise, the panel majority engaged in an “excessively technical dissection” of the factors supporting probable cause. Gates, 462 U. S., at 234. Indeed, the panel majority failed to follow two basic and well-established prin- ciples of law. First, the panel majority viewed each fact “in isolation, rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances.” Pringle, 540 U. S., at 372, n. 2. This was “mistaken in light of our precedents.” Ibid. The “totality of the circum- stances” requires courts to consider “the whole picture.” Cortez, 449 U. S., at 417. Our precedents recognize that the

Cite as: 583 U. S. 48 (2018) 61 Opinion of the Court whole is often greater than the sum of its parts—especially when the parts are viewed in isolation. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 277–278 (2002). Instead of consider- ing the facts as a whole, the panel majority took them one by one. For example, it dismissed the fact that the partygoers “scattered or hid when the police entered the house” because that fact was “not suffcient standing alone to create proba- ble cause.” 765 F. 3d, at 23 (emphasis added). Similarly, it found “nothing in the record suggesting that the condition of the house, on its own, should have alerted the [partygoers] that they were unwelcome.” Ibid. (emphasis added). The totality-of-the-circumstances test “precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.” Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 274. Second, the panel majority mistakenly believed that it could dismiss outright any circumstances that were “suscep- tible of innocent explanation.” Id., at 277. For example, the panel majority brushed aside the drinking and the lap dances as “consistent with” the partygoers' explanation that they were having a bachelor party. 765 F. 3d, at 23. And it similarly dismissed the condition of the house as “entirely consistent with” Peaches being a “new tenant.” Ibid. But probable cause does not require offcers to rule out a sus- pect's innocent explanation for suspicious facts. As we have explained, “the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is `innocent' or `guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.” Gates, 462 U. S., at 244, n. 13. Thus, the panel majority should have asked whether a reasonable offcer could con- clude—considering all of the surrounding circumstances, in- cluding the plausibility of the explanation itself—that there was a “substantial chance of criminal activity.” Ibid. The circumstances here certainly suggested criminal ac- tivity. As explained, the offcers found a group of people who claimed to be having a bachelor party with no bachelor, in a near-empty house, with strippers in the living room and sexual activity in the bedroom, and who fed at the frst sign

62 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. WESBY Opinion of the Court of police. The panel majority identifed innocent explana- tions for most of these circumstances in isolation, but again, this kind of divide-and-conquer approach is improper. A factor viewed in isolation is often more “readily susceptible to an innocent explanation” than one viewed as part of a totality. Arvizu, supra, at 274. And here, the totality of the circumstances gave the offcers plenty of reasons to doubt the partygoers' protestations of innocence. For all of these reasons, we reverse the D. C. Circuit's holding that the offcers lacked probable cause to arrest. Accordingly, the District and its offcers are entitled to sum- mary judgment on all of the partygoers' claims. 6 IV Our conclusion that the offcers had probable cause to ar- rest the partygoers is suffcient to resolve this case. But where, as here, the Court of Appeals erred on both the mer- its of the constitutional claim and the question of qualifed immunity, “we have discretion to correct its errors at each step.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 735 (2011); see, e. g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U. S. 765 (2014). We exercise that discretion here because the D. C. Circuit's analysis, if followed elsewhere, would “undermine the values qualifed immunity seeks to promote.” al-Kidd, supra, at 735. 7 A Under our precedents, offcers are entitled to qualifed im- munity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statu- 6 The partygoers do not contest that the presence of probable cause de- feats all of their claims. 7 We continue to stress that lower courts “should think hard, and then think hard again,” before addressing both qualifed immunity and the mer- its of an underlying constitutional claim. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U. S. 692, 707 (2011). We addressed the merits of probable cause here, how- ever, because a decision on qualifed immunity alone would not have re- solved all of the claims in this case.

Cite as: 583 U. S. 48 (2018) 63 Opinion of the Court tory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was “clearly established at the time.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U. S. 658, 664 (2012). “Clearly established” means that, at the time of the offcer's conduct, the law was “ `suffciently clear' that every `reasonable offcial would un- derstand that what he is doing' ” is unlawful. al-Kidd, supra, at 741 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 640 (1987)). In other words, existing law must have placed the constitutionality of the offcer's conduct “beyond debate.” al-Kidd, supra, at 741. This demanding standard protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly vio- late the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341 (1986). To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a suffciently clear foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must be “settled law,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U. S. 224, 228 (1991) (per curiam ), which means it is dictated by “con- trolling authority” or “a robust `consensus of cases of persua- sive authority,' ” al-Kidd, supra, at 741–742 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 617 (1999)). It is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The prec- edent must be clear enough that every reasonable offcial would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plain- tiff seeks to apply. See Reichle, 566 U. S., at 666. Other- wise, the rule is not one that “every reasonable offcial” would know. Id., at 664 (internal quotation marks omitted). The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle clearly prohibit the offcer's conduct in the particular circumstances before him. The rule's contours must be so well defned that it is “clear to a reasonable offcer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specifcity.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U. S. 7, 13 (2015) (per curiam ). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “defne clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the offcial acted reasonably in the particular cir-

64 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. WESBY Opinion of the Court cumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 779 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if the unlawfulness of the offcer's conduct “does not follow immediately from the conclusion that [the rule] was frmly established.” Anderson, supra, at 641. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the rule must obviously re- solve “whether `the circumstances with which [the particular offcer] was confronted . . . constitute[d] probable cause.' ” Mullenix, supra, at 13 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640– 641; some alterations in original). We have stressed that the “specifcity” of the rule is “es- pecially important in the Fourth Amendment context.” Mullenix, supra, at 12. Probable cause “turn[s] on the as- sessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts” and cannot be “reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Gates, 462 U. S., at 232. It is “incapable of precise defnition or quan- tifcation into percentages.” Pringle, 540 U. S., at 371. Given its imprecise nature, offcers will often fnd it diffcult to know how the general standard of probable cause applies in “the precise situation encountered.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 151 (2017). Thus, we have stressed the need to “identify a case where an offcer acting under similar cir- cumstances . . . was held to have violated the Fourth Amend- ment.” White v. Pauly, 580 U. S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam ); e. g., Plumhoff, supra, at 778–779. While there does not have to be “a case directly on point,” existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the particular arrest “beyond de- bate.” al-Kidd, supra, at 741. Of course, there can be the rare “obvious case,” where the unlawfulness of the offcer's conduct is suffciently clear even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam ). But “a body of relevant case law” is usually necessary to “ `clearly estab- lish' the answer” with respect to probable cause. Ibid. Under these principles, we readily conclude that the off- cers here were entitled to qualifed immunity. We start by

Cite as: 583 U. S. 48 (2018) 65 Opinion of the Court defning “the circumstances with which [the offcers] w[ere] confronted.” Anderson, 483 U. S., at 640. The offcers found a group of people in a house that the neighbors had identifed as vacant, that appeared to be vacant, and that the partygoers were treating as vacant. The group scattered, and some hid, at the sight of law enforcement. Their expla- nations for being at the house were full of holes. The source of their claimed invitation admitted that she had no right to be in the house, and the owner confrmed that fact. Even assuming the offcers lacked actual probable cause to arrest the partygoers, the offcers are entitled to qualifed immunity because they “reasonably but mistakenly con- clude[d] that probable cause [wa]s present.” Id., at 641. Tellingly, neither the panel majority nor the partygoers have identifed a single precedent—much less a controlling case or robust consensus of cases—fnding a Fourth Amendment violation “under similar circumstances.” Pauly, supra, at 79. And it should go without saying that this is not an “ob- vious case” where “a body of relevant case law” is not needed. Brosseau, supra, at 199. The offcers were thus entitled to qualifed immunity. B The panel majority did not follow this straightforward analysis. It instead reasoned that, under clearly established District law, a suspect's “good purpose and bona fde belief of her right to enter” vitiates probable cause to arrest her for unlawful entry. 765 F. 3d, at 26–27. The panel majority then concluded—in a two-sentence paragraph without any explanation—that the offcers must have known that “uncon- troverted evidence of an invitation to enter the premises would vitiate probable cause for unlawful entry.” Id., at 27. By treating the invitation as “uncontroverted evidence,” the panel majority assumed that the offcers could not infer the partygoers' intent from other circumstances. And by treat- ing the invitation as if it automatically vitiated probable

66 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. WESBY Opinion of the Court cause, the panel majority assumed that the offcers could not disbelieve the partygoers' story. The rule applied by the panel majority was not clearly established because it was not “settled law.” Hunter, 502 U. S., at 228. The panel majority relied on a single decision, Smith v. United States, 281 A. 2d 438 (D. C. 1971). 8 The defendant in Smith, who was found trespassing in a locked construction site near midnight, asserted that he was enti- tled to a jury instruction explaining that a bona fde belief of a right to enter is a complete defense to unlawful entry. Id., at 439–440. The D. C. Court of Appeals affrmed the trial court's refusal to give the instruction because the defendant had not established a “reasonable basis” for his alleged bona fide belief. Ibid. Smith does not say anything about whether the offcers here could infer from all the evidence that the partygoers knew that they were trespassing. Nor would it have been clear to every reasonable offcer that, in these circumstances, the partygoers' bona fde belief that they were invited to the house was “uncontroverted.” The offcers knew that the partygoers had entered the home against the will of the owner. And District case law sug- gested that offcers can infer a suspect's guilty state of mind based solely on his conduct. 9 In Tillman v. Washington 8 We have not yet decided what precedents—other than our own—qual- ify as controlling authority for purposes of qualifed immunity. See, e. g., Reichle v. Howards, 566 U. S. 658, 665–666 (2012) (reserving the question whether court of appeals decisions can be “a dispositive source of clearly established law”). We express no view on that question here. Relatedly, our citation to and discussion of various lower court precedents should not be construed as agreeing or disagreeing with them, or endorsing a particu- lar reading of them. See City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. 600, 615, n. 4 (2015). Instead, we address only how a reasonable offcial “could have interpreted” them. Reichle, supra, at 667. 9 The offcers cited many of these authorities in their opening brief to the Court of Appeals. See Brief for Appellants in No. 12–7127 (CADC), pp. 28–29. Yet the panel majority failed to mention any of them in its analysis of qualifed immunity.

Cite as: 583 U. S. 48 (2018) 67 Opinion of the Court Metropolitan Area Transit Authority , 695 A. 2d 94 (D. C. 1997), for example, the D. C. Court of Appeals held that off- cers had probable cause to believe the plaintiff knowingly entered the paid area of a subway station without paying. Id., at 96. The court rejected the argument that “the off- cers had no reason to believe that [the suspect] was `know- ingly' in the paid area” because the offcers “reasonably could have inferred from [the suspect's] undisputed conduct that he had the intent required.” Ibid. The court emphasized that offcers can rely on “the ordinary and reasonable infer- ence that people know what they are doing when they act.” Ibid. The court also noted that “it would be an unusual case where the circumstances, while undoubtedly proving an un- lawful act, nonetheless demonstrated so clearly that the sus- pect lacked the required intent that the police would not even have probable cause for an arrest.” Ibid. And the fact that a case is unusual, we have held, is “an important indication . . . that [the offcer's] conduct did not violate a `clearly established' right.” Pauly, 580 U. S., at 80. Moreover, existing precedent would have given the off- cers reason to doubt that they had to accept the partygoers' assertion of a bona fde belief. The D. C. Court of Appeals has held that offcers are not required to take a suspect's innocent explanation at face value. See, e. g., Nichols v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 322 A. 2d 283, 286 (1974) (holding that an offcer was not “obliged to believe the explanation of a suspected shoplifter”). Similar precedent exists in the Federal Courts of Appeals, which have recognized that off- cers are free to disregard either all innocent explanations, 10 10 See, e. g., Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F. 3d 518, 524 (CA8 2011) (“[An offcer] need not rely on an explanation given by the suspect”); Cox v. Hainey, 391 F. 3d 25, 32, n. 2 (CA1 2004) (“A reasonable police offcer is not required to credit a suspect's story”); Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F. 2d 1503, 1507, n. 6 (CA11 1990) (“[Offcers a]re not required to forgo arresting [a suspect] based on initially discovered facts showing probable cause simply because [the suspect] offered a different explanation”); Criss

68 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. WESBY Opinion of Sotomayor, J. or at least innocent explanations that are inherently or cir- cumstantially implausible. 11 These cases suggest that inno- cent explanations—even uncontradicted ones—do not have any automatic, probable-cause-vitiating effect. For these reasons, a reasonable offcer, looking at the en- tire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests here. There was no controlling case holding that a bona fde belief of a right to enter defeats probable cause, that offcers cannot infer a suspect's guilty state of mind based on his conduct alone, or that offcers must accept a suspect's innocent expla- nation at face value. Indeed, several precedents suggested the opposite. The offcers were thus entitled to summary judgment based on qualifed immunity. * * * The judgment of the D. C. Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Sotomayor, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I agree with the majority that the offcers here are entitled to qualifed immunity and, for that reason alone, I concur in v. Kent, 867 F. 2d 259, 263 (CA6 1988) (“A policeman . . . is under no obligation to give any credence to a suspect's story . . . ”). 11 See, e. g., Ramirez v. Buena Park, 560 F. 3d 1012, 1024 (CA9 2009) (holding that “innocent explanations for [a suspect's] odd behavior cannot eliminate the suspicious facts” and that “law enforcement offcers do not have to rule out the possibility of innocent behavior” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Edwards, 632 F. 3d 633, 640 (CA10 2001) (holding that probable cause existed where the suspect “offered only im- plausible, inconsistent explanations of how he came into possession of the money”); Bradway v. Gonzales, 26 F. 3d 313, 321 (CA2 1994) (holding that “[a] reasonable offcer who found the [stolen items], and who heard [the suspect's] implausible explanation for possessing them, would have be- lieved that probable cause existed”).

Cite as: 583 U. S. 48 (2018) 69 Opinion of Ginsburg, J. the Court's judgment reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. But I disagree with the majority's decision to reach the merits of the probable-cause question, which it does apparently only to en- sure that, in addition to respondents' 42 U. S. C. § 1983 claims, the Court's decision will resolve respondents' state- law claims of false arrest and negligent supervision. See ante, at 62, n. 7. It is possible that our qualifed-immunity decision alone will resolve those claims. See Reply Brief 20, n. 7. In light of the lack of a dispute on an important legal question and the heavily factbound nature of the probable- cause determination here, I do not think that the Court should have reached that issue. The lower courts are well equipped to handle the remaining state-law claims in the frst instance. Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment in part. This case, well described in the opinion of the Court of Appeals,* leads me to question whether this Court, in assess- ing probable cause, should continue to ignore why police in fact acted. See ante, at 54, n. 2. No arrests of plaintiffs- respondents were made until Sergeant Suber so instructed. His instruction, when conveyed to the offcers he superin- tended, was based on an error of law. Sergeant Suber be- lieved that the absence of the premises owner's consent, an uncontested fact in this case, suffced to justify arrest of the partygoers for unlawful entry. See App. 60 (Suber deposi- tion) (offcers had probable cause to arrest because “Peaches did not have the right, nor did the [partygoers] have the right[,] to be inside that location”). An essential element of unlawful entry in the District of Columbia is that the defend- ant “knew or should have known that his entry was un- wanted.” Ortberg v. United States, 81 A. 3d 303, 308 (D. C. *The Court's account of the undisputed facts goes beyond those recited by the Court of Appeals. Compare ante, at 51–53, with 765 F. 3d 13, 17– 18 (CADC 2014).

70 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. WESBY Opinion of Ginsburg, J. 2013). But under Sergeant Suber's view of the law, what the arrestees knew or should have known was irrelevant. They could be arrested, as he comprehended the law, even if they believed their entry was invited by a lawful occupant. Ultimately, plaintiffs-respondents were not booked for un- lawful entry. Instead, they were charged at the police sta- tion with disorderly conduct. Yet no police offcers at the site testifed to having observed any activities warranting a disorderly conduct charge. Quite the opposite. The off- cers at the scene of the arrest uniformly testifed that they had neither seen nor heard anything that would justify such a charge, and Sergeant Suber specifcally advised his superi- ors that the charge was unwarranted. See 765 F. 3d 13, 18 (CADC 2014); App. 56, 62–63, 79, 84, 90, 103. The Court's jurisprudence, I am concerned, sets the bal- ance too heavily in favor of police unaccountability to the detriment of Fourth Amendment protection. A number of commentators have criticized the path we charted in Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996), and follow-on opinions, holding that “an arresting offcer's state of mind . . . is irrele- vant to the existence of probable cause,” Devenpeck v. Al- ford, 543 U. S. 146, 153 (2004). See, e. g., 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.4(f), p. 186 (5th ed. 2012) (“The appar- ent assumption of the Court in Whren, that no signifcant problem of police arbitrariness can exist as to actions taken with probable cause, blinks at reality.”). I would leave open, for reexamination in a future case, whether a police offcer's reason for acting, in at least some circumstances, should factor into the Fourth Amendment inquiry. Given the current state of the Court's precedent, however, I agree that the disposition gained by plaintiffs-respondents was not warranted by “settled law.” The defendants-petitioners are therefore sheltered by qualifed immunity.